

Xenophobia, radicalism, hate crimes and migration changes in the Federal Republic of Germany in 2020-2022

Author: Dmitri Stratievski, PhD (Dr Dmitri Stratievski), political scientist, historian, Vice-Chairman of the Board of the Strategies Against the Right Commission (since 2022, 2014-2022 Board member), author of numerous publications on radicalism in German society, Head of the Berlin Register for Documentation of Right-Wing Extremism and Discrimination for the district of Steglitz-Zehlendorf, Berlin (2016-2022), Vice-Chairman of the Land Working Group "Migration and Pluralism" (2018-2022). Berlin (2016-2017), Member of the District Parliament of Steglitz-Zehlendorf Berlin (2018-2022), Vice-Chair of the Land Working Group "Migration and Pluralism" Berlin (2014-2018), Vice-Chair of the Working Group "Migration and Pluralism" in Steglitz-Zehlendorf, Berlin (2014-2018 and from 2022)

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Note

This report considers the three-year time period 2020-2022. During this period, **two key events occurred** in Germany, Europe and the **world**, effectively alternating in time: the **COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war against Ukraine**, which triggered significant processes across Europe, including Germany. Both events have left a significant imprint on the subject of this study. The right-wing populist and right-wing extremist community in Germany was divided in its attitude towards Russia, and in 2020 a new phenomenon, the Coronasceptic movement, emerged in German public life.

Changes in legislation and executive actions during the period under review

In terms of changes in legislation during this period, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic and the sanitary and epidemiological restrictions introduced in connection with it in the FRG could not but affect the lawmaking process in this area. A number of public authorities worked at reduced hours, with some employees staying at home and working in the Home Office. A significant percentage of working meetings were held online. Due to the restrictions on meetings of citizens in one closed room, public discussion and putting forward legislative initiatives from civil society were hampered. These objective circumstances somewhat slowed down some processes compared to previous time periods.

Combating discrimination and protecting the rights of minorities

In the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as in most other countries of the world, **the main legislative act is the Basic Law of the country, Grundgesetz, which was adopted in 1949** and has received a number of amendments over time. (Germany does not use the word "Constitution" in relation to the Basic Law). In Article 3, the word "race" is used when listing the criteria according to which discrimination cannot be tolerated. **A public proposal was made to remove the word "race" from the text of the document** . Argumentation of the supporters of the changes: the definition of "race" is outdated in itself and even racist. Modern science denies the existence of "races" as understood in the 18th and 20th centuries. The mention of the word, albeit with a positive context, a ban on discrimination, is unacceptable. In June 2020, the then Minister of Justice, Christine Lambrecht, declared her support in principle for such changes. The signal

from the Green Party was also positive.¹ The Left Party was not only in favour, but even submitted its own version of the bill in July 2020.² In November 2020, the Greens also made their own version public, proposing not only to strike out the word "race", but also to introduce a new concept, "group harm to human dignity".³ At the same time, the first preliminary hearings were held in the Bundestag, which **indicated a steady majority in favour of the changes**. In June 2021, the issue was considered in the Bundestag's Legal Committee, with the participation of prominent lawyers and legal scholars.⁴ According to the minutes, there was a lively discussion in the room. "Professors from the Hamburg Graduate School of Law, the Berlin Graduate School of Economics and Law, the University of Saarland and a number of other academics spoke in **favour of the** future change. The proposal was also supported by the Federal Anti-Discrimination Office and the German Institute for Human Rights. However, there were also voices **against it**. A representative of the University of Greifswald noted that without the noun "race", the adjective "racist" loses its meaning, which would make it more difficult to define racism and prosecute related violations and discriminatory practices. This also makes it difficult to change, as all the proposed bills from the Bundestag factions mentioned "prohibition of racist discrimination" instead of "race" as one of the characteristics in one way or another. Criticism was also voiced by , the chairman of the Constitutional Legal Committee of the Federal Bar Association, who argued that the word "race" in the Basic Law should not be taken with a racist or even Nazi connotation, because the authors of the Basic Law had intended the word to have a completely different meaning, in the spirit of democracy and equality. Thus, despite a majority in the coalition and a number of opposition factions, the constitutional change was put on hold for further consultations, postponed in working groups until October 2021.⁵ During the 2021 Bundestag election campaign, the Greens made this change one of their election slogans and organised a collection of signatures.⁶

¹ Constanze von Bullion, Grüne wollen das Wort "Rasse" aus dem Grundgesetz streichen, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.06.2020, URL: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rassismus-rasse-verfassung-gruene-1.4933809>

² Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Änderung des Artikels 3 Absatz 3 - Streichung des Begriffs Rasse)// Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 19/20628. URL: <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/206/1920628.pdf>

³ Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 3 Absatz 3 - Ersetzung des Wortes Rasse und Ergänzung zum Schutz gegen gegen gruppenbezogene Menschenwürdeverletzungen) // Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 19/24434. URL: <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/244/1924434.pdf>

⁴ Öffentliche Anhörung im Ausschuss für Recht und Verbraucherschutz am 21. Juni 2021. URL: <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2021/kw25-pa-recht-rasse-847538>

⁵ Paul Starzmann, Andrea Dernbach, Doch keine Verfassungsänderung, Tagesspiegel, 09.06.2021, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/warum-es-vorerst-bei-rasse-im-grundgesetz-bleibt-5607913.html>

⁶ Die Grünen, der Begriff "Rasse" im Grundgesetz ersetzen, URL: <https://www.gruene.de/aktionen/den-begriff-rasse-aus-dem-grundgesetz-streichen>

The issue is still under consideration. Federal Anti-Discrimination Commissioner Ferda Ataman expressed regret that the change to the Basic Law has not yet been implemented.⁷ **The fact that no amendments have been made does not indicate that MPs are reluctant to adopt them or that there are party-political obstacles.** Both in the past coalition, CDU, CSU and SPD (2017-2021), and in the current one, consisting of the SPD, Greens and FDP, there is a solid majority in favour of changes. To this majority can be added the opposition votes of the CDU/CSU and the Left Party. Of the parliamentary parties, only the AdG is opposed. The problem lies in the **very high barriers to changing the country's main law and the difficulty of finding the right wording** that will not be discriminatory, but at the same time will also indicate the inadmissibility of discrimination. Similar processes at the land level are proceeding at a markedly faster pace. In August 2022, the ruling coalition **in the state of Hamburg decided to remove the word "race" from the text of the land laws.**⁸

The central framework law of the Federal Republic of Germany protecting minority rights and prohibiting discrimination is the General Equality Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG)⁹. It was adopted in 2006 and replaced the Employee Protection Act (Beschäftigungsschutzgesetz, BeschSchG), which had been in force since 1994. While the previous law interpreted the concept of discrimination very narrowly and reduced it exclusively to verbal or physical sexual violence in the workplace, the current regulation is much broader in explaining what discrimination is and prohibits it: **"Any infringement of interests on grounds of race, ethnic origin, gender, religion, world view, disability, age or sexual identity is not permitted and must be suppressed"** (§1). The Law is in many of its tenets **an implementation at the level of national practice of the four main European Parliament Regulations** (2000/43/EG, 2002/73/EG, 2004/113/EG and 2007/78/EG) governing the fight against racism, equality in the workplace and at home, and gender equality. The main lobbyists for the law were and still are the political parties SPD, Left and Greens, the German feminist women's associations, the German Gay and Lesbian Union (LSVD), migrant NGOs, trade unions and organisations defending the rights of people with disabilities. The law is thus supported by representatives of

⁷ Dritter Jahrestag von Hanau. Ataman bescheinigt Deutschland Rassismus-Problem, Tagesspiegel, 18.02.2023, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/dritter-jahrestag-von-hanau-ataman-bescheinigt-deutschland-rassismus-problem-9373250.html>

⁸ Auswechselung des Begriffs "Rasse" in Hamburger Landesgesetzen, Legal Tribüne Online, 23.08.2022, URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/hamburg-justiz-gesetzesentwurf-begiff-rasse-rassismus-rassistisch-diskriminierung/>

⁹ Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz vom 14.08.2006, zuletzt geändert am 19.12.2022, URL: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/agg/>

interest groups that are often discriminated against. Other political forces either oppose or tolerate this legislation, but do not consider it particularly necessary. In August 2021, for the 15th anniversary of the AGG, the online magazine of the LGBTI community queer.de, entitled its article about this law "The unwanted child". The author recalls that CDU/CSU and FDP politicians were once opponents of the law, seeing no need for "special" protection against discrimination for LGBTI people. Over time, the attitudes of conservatives and liberals have changed. In the opinion of the publication, the law generally **fulfils its function, but needs to be improved and updated**.¹⁰ This was the opinion of many organisations over the years. The need to supplement the law was mentioned by human rights activists in Hesse¹¹ and North Rhine-Westphalia¹², two large regions of the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed, the law has not actually been amended since 2006. The 2013 amendments were more of a drafting nature (changes to §8, clarification of the wording regarding discrimination in the labour process in the form of unequal demands on employees). The **AGG changes took place in 2022**. They were initiated by the ruling coalition of the SPD, the Greens and the FDP (the latter party became a supporter of the law over time) in April 2022.¹³ In the same month they were adopted by the Bundestag in the third reading.¹⁴ Subsequent amendments were approved by the parliament in May¹⁵ and December 2022.¹⁶ All of the adopted amendments (§§4, 25-30) **relate in one way** or another to the **activities of the German Anti-Discrimination Agency**. The functions of the Office have been expanded. **Employees who feel aggrieved by maternity leave, the combination of work with caring for a child and/or a seriously ill family member, or problems with the performance of their work duties**

¹⁰ Dennis Klein, AGG: Das "unerwünschte Kind" wird 15 Jahre alt, Queer.de, 18.08.2021, URL: https://www.queer.de/detail.php?article_id=39759

¹¹ Forderung zur Reformierung des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes, Netzwerk gegen Diskriminierung Hessen, 14.06.2018, URL: https://www.netzwerk-gegen-diskriminierung-hessen.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Ja_zur_Vielfalt_2018/Forderungen_des_Netzwerks_gegen_Diskriminierung_Hessen_14.06.2018.pdf

¹² Infoveranstaltung zur Antidiskriminierungsberatung und zum Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, Servicestelle für Antidiskriminierungsarbeit NRW, URL: <http://www.nrwgegendiskriminierung.de/de/servicestellen-fuerantidiskriminierungsarbeit/archiv/news/news-lesen/infoveranstaltung-zur-ad-beratung-und-zum-agg.html>

¹³ Änderung des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes, URL: <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw14-de-gleichbehandlungsgesetz-887866>

¹⁴ https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/aktuelles/DE/2022/20220407_BT_Debatte_Aenderung_AGG.html#:~:text=Der%20Deutsche%20Deutsche%20Bundestag%20hat%20eine,des%20Bundes%20gest%C3%A4rkt%20werden%20soll.

¹⁵ Synopse zu §25 AGG für Änderung vom 28.05.2022, Rechtsportal Rewis, URL: <https://rewis.io/aktuell/synopsen/agg/9630/>

¹⁶ Synopse zu §27 AGG für Änderung vom 25.12.2022, Rechtsportal Rewis, URL: <https://rewis.io/aktuell/synopsen/agg/10840/>

due to illness, disability, accident or difficult family circumstances can now apply to it. The agency's responsibility to **provide specific legal support** to persons who have been discriminated against has been strengthened. The head of the Office is now **elected in the Bundestag**, and the Act emphasises its **independence**. The Federal Commissioner for Discrimination has not only been given **more competences** but also a **stronger political position**. In the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, an **expert council** of up to 16 specialists has been **established**, but the office as such has been taken out of the ministry. All of these steps indicate that the **actors of anti-discrimination policy are becoming stronger players in the political field of the Federal Republic of Germany**.

In June 2020, the Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz (Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz, LADG) was adopted in Berlin by the votes of the land-based governing coalition of the SPD, the Greens and the Left Party.¹⁷ According to the author of the report, it is the most comprehensive (of the laws currently adopted in Germany) and provides the most effective legal framework to protect against discriminatory practices. It provides a much broader interpretation of different types of discrimination than the current federal AGG, even with the 2022 amendments. It is also important that the LADG aims to protect specifically against discrimination by legal persons, mainly government agencies. For protection against discrimination at the domestic level, the AGG remains the framework. The law outlines **10 categories**: gender, ethnic origin, racist or anti-Semitic prejudice, religion and worldview, disability, chronic illness, age, language, sexual and gender identity, and social status. Even at the stage of the bill's consideration in the Berlin parliament, it sparked fierce public debate. The main lobbyist for the law, then Senator for Justice Dirk Behrend (Greens), regarded the LADG as a major achievement and recognised that **even today there are still people who suffer domestic discrimination and need to be protected**. The then chairman of the CDU faction in the local parliament, Burkard Dregger, thought the law was meaningless and had a different view from the ruling coalition: "If someone feels discriminated against, they can take it to court". Criticism was also voiced at the highest level, from the then German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer.¹⁸ The main stumbling block in the LADG was two provisions: the delegation of the power to sue to a

¹⁷Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz vom 04.06.2020, URL: <https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/recht/ladg/materialien/>

¹⁸ Keine Bundespolizisten mehr für Berlin: "Kann meine Beamten nicht dieser Diskriminierung aussetzen", sagt Seehofer, Tagesspiegel, 17.06.2020, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/kann-meine-beamten-nicht-dieser-diskriminierung-aussetzen-sagt-seehofer-7580302.html>

public organisation and the need for police officers to prove non-discrimination in their actions in case of complaints. Opponents of the law (MPs and ministers from the CDU/CSU and FDP at various levels and police unions at the time) **believed** that such a **rule violated the presumption of innocence of a police officer**, forcing him or her to find excuses, including when acting within the law. In 2020, some state interior ministers and local police chiefs emotionally declared their refusal to send police units to the German capital to assist Berlin's law enforcement forces at public events because they did not want to create difficult legal situations for their subordinates. Certain media outlets openly asked the question "**Law against the police?**"¹⁹ The supporters of the law (representatives of the then ruling Berlin coalition, relevant expert commissions and migrant organisations) rejected the criticism and saw no reason for concern. Police operations are filmed. The video serves as evidence of the law enforcement officer's actions, whether authorised or unauthorised. Most police officers work within the law, including in stressful situations. In June 2021, summing up a year of the law, the Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel, which cannot be blamed for its sympathy for the centre-left, noted that "**fears of Berlin's anti-discrimination law have proved unfounded**". According to the article, this was also recognised by the Metropolitan Police.

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In the process of implementing the law, an **office of the Ombudsman** for Protection against Discrimination and Equality was **established in Berlin**.²¹ As the start of the office coincided with the pandemic, complaints were filed mainly by telephone and e-mail. Importantly, the office accepts complaints in accordance with both state (LADG) and federal (AGG) law. From 1.7.2021 to 31.12.2021, the office received 295 state and 159 federal complaints. In the LADG part, the most common claims were for discrimination based on "ethnicity," "racist prejudice," and "disability and chronic illness," and in the AGG part, "gender."²² The website of the Land Senate

¹⁹ Annelie Kaufmann, Antidiskriminierungsgesetz Berlin. Ein Anti-Polizei-Gesetz? Legal Tribüne Online, 04.06.2020, URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/antidiskriminierungsgesetz-berlin-polizei-kritik-vermutungsregelung-gerichte/>

²⁰ Andrea Dernbach, Ein Jahr Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz. Menschenwürde, die konkret wird, Tagesspiegel, 20.06.2021, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/menschenwurde-die-konkret-wird-4257529.html>

²¹ Landesstelle für Gleichbehandlung - gegen Diskriminierung, Ombudsstelle, Berlin, URL: <https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/recht/ladg/ombudsstelle/>

²² Senatsverwaltung für Justiz, Vielfalt und Antidiskriminierung, Folgebericht zur Umsetzung des Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetzes (LADG) und des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes (AGG) in der Berliner Verwaltung, 0189, vom 18.03.2022, URL: <https://www.parlament-berlin.de/adosservice/19/Haupt/vorgang/h19-0189-v.pdf>

Office (Ministry of Justice) also contains detailed information on the law, explaining in simple language the principles of its operation and the content of the concept of "discrimination".²³

The law elicits a positive reaction from anti-discrimination specialists from other federal states. For example, the **head of Saxony's Anti-Discrimination Bureau noted that the state needs a "land anti-discrimination law modelled on Berlin"**.²⁴

In the period 2020-2022, existing laws were amended in the various federal states that do not explicitly include the word "discrimination" in their title and do not deal directly with this issue, but **contain paragraphs prohibiting discriminatory practices**. It would be beyond the scope of this report to list all laws in all regions of the Federal Republic of Germany, so one of the laws of the State of Berlin is cited as an example. In September 2021, the **Higher Education Act (BerlHG) 2011 was supplemented**. Clauses on gender equality in admission and in the process of study were added, the position of commissioner for diversity and anti-discrimination was introduced, and it was established that Berlin's higher education institutions are committed to diversity in the student population.²⁵

In 2021, the **Child Sexual Abuse Act**²⁶ was passed (approved in the Bundestag in March, approved by the Bundesrat in May and signed by the Federal President in June). The bill was initiated by the CDU/CSU faction and supported by the then coalition partner, the SPD, as well as the then opposition. Within the meaning of this report, the law is important because it contains, among other things, a list of measures to protect persons who were sexually abused as minors and to prevent discrimination and stigmatisation of victims in society. At the same time, the German Criminal Code (StGB) and the Family Measures Act (FamFG) were amended and supplemented.

²³ Senatsverwaltung Abteilung Antidiskriminierung, Fragen und Antworten zum LADG, Berlin, URL: <https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/recht/ladg/fragen-und-antworten/>

²⁴ Antidiskriminierungsbüro Sachsen, Mehr gemeldete Fälle, Merkur, URL: <https://www.merkur.de/deutschland/sachsen/antidiskriminierungsbuero-sachen-mehr-gemeldete-faelle-zr-92116739.html>

²⁵ Gesetz über die Hochschulen im Land Berlin (Berliner Hochschulgesetz - BerlHG) vom 26.7.2011, Fassung vom 14.09.2021, URL: <https://gesetze.berlin.de/bsbe/document/jlr-HSchulGBE2011V27IVZ>

²⁶ Gesetz zur Bekämpfung sexualisierter Gewalt gegen Kinder vom 16.06.2021, URL: https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%540attr_id%3D%27bgbl121s1810.pdf%27%5D__1677769568777

At the end of 2021, the future members of the ruling coalition **agreed** during negotiations **to expand the list of Federal Commissioners** (Bundesbeauftragte). This is a significant position in the German system of power, the holder of which is responsible for the coordination of a certain direction, distributed among various ministries. At the same time, the official is formally integrated into one of the existing institutions. Changes have also taken place in the area of interest to us. **To the previously existing Federal Commissioner for Combating Anti-Semitism were added for the first time, in February and March 2022 respectively, the Commissioner for Combating Racism** (integrated into the Chancellor's Office), the Commissioner for **Combating Anti-Gypsyism and Supporting Sinti and Roma Life in Germany** (integrated into the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth) and the **Commissioner for the Recognition of Sexual and Gender Diversity (Queer)** (ibid.). **The posts of the Independent Anti-Discrimination Commissioner, the Commissioner for Religions and Worldviews, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Commissioner for People with Disabilities and the Commissioner for Victims of Terrorist and Extremist Attacks have been retained** in the current government. Thus, more than 20 per cent of all Federal Commissioners (nine out of 42 in total) work in the field of anti-discrimination, human rights and equality. If we take into account that some of the Plenipotentiaries are in charge of foreign policy issues, such as interaction with certain important states and regions of the world, and cannot deal with these issues, it can be noted that **more than half of the Plenipotentiaries working in the field of domestic policy are directly involved in the above-mentioned topics.**²⁷ This is an indication of the government's attention to these issues.

During this period, a **number of programmes aimed at achieving equality in society were adopted. In 2020. The Federal Government adopted the Gender Equality Strategy.**²⁸ Nine goals were set: equal pay, equal treatment in the social professions, equality standards in the digital area (work and life), reconciliation of work and family, equality for women in parliaments at all levels, equality in culture and science, equality in the civil service, holistic and structural support for equality. The instruments proposed include women's quotas in politics and the economy, the expansion of the number of equality commissioners in all levels of government, state enterprises

²⁷ DVI2.12011/9#4, Liste der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung, der Bundesbeauftragten sowie der Koordinatoren / Koordinatorinnen der Bundesregierung nach § 21 Abs. 3 Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien (GGO) Stand 13. 03.2023, URL:

https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/ministerium/liste-beauftragte-bundesregierung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5

²⁸ Die Gleichstellungsstrategie der Bundesregierung, URL:

<https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/gleichstellung/gleichstellung-und-teilhabe/die-gleichstellungsstrategie-der-bundesregierung-154174>

and universities. A number of private companies have introduced such a position on their own initiative. Targeted support for NGOs is envisaged, and it is also proposed to apply Gender Mainstreaming, a commitment to gender mainstreaming in all decisions, to consider the differential impact of decisions on women and men. **In 2022, Berlin approved the equality strategy plan for people with different sexual identities "Living Queer".**²⁹ Its main areas of focus are: legal equality, participation in public processes, safety, health, strengthening counselling and communication structures, and international support. The preparation of the plan had an important feature. Even at the initial level, a competition was organised among NGOs (human rights defenders, representatives of LGBT interests, legal associations). Out of 140 applicants, 78 organisations were selected and given the right to initially participate in the development of the plan and later to take part in the working groups.

Combating the ideology and practice of hatred

In 2021, the new **Law on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crimes (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität)** will come into effect.³⁰ The drafting of the law began in 2019. Since then, three versions of the bill have been considered. In mid-2020, several factions of the Bundestag proposed different versions of the bill, but no compromise was found. In the end, the then ruling coalition's version, which was best evaluated by experts, was adopted by a majority vote in March 2021. During this period, the Ministry of Justice collected about 40 expert assessments from public organisations, professional associations and private commercial companies of all kinds, as the future law was to affect many public spheres, from migrants' rights to the media and digital space. Here are some of them: The German Trade Union Association (DGB), the humanitarian organisation of the Protestant Church Diakonie, the professional associations of lawyers, judges and doctors, the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the Central Union of Sinti and Roma in Germany, Google, the Association of Victims of Violence, the media holding RTL and a number of others. All written expert notes were transparently published on the website of the Ministry of Justice.³¹ The main novelty of the law is that, for the

²⁹ Aktionsplan "Queer leben", URL: <https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/aktuelles/alle-meldungen/bundeskabinett-beschliesst-aktionsplan-queer-leben--204942>

³⁰ Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität vom 30.03.2021, URL: https://dejure.org/BGBI/2021/BGBI_I_S_441

³¹ Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität, Stellungnahmen, Referenzenentwurf, Regierungsentwurf, Verkündung im Bundesgesetzblatt, https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/DE/Bekaempfung_Rechtsextremismus_Hasskriminalitaet.html

first time, **threats and hate speech used on the Internet are emphasised**. The **level of protection has been increased for municipal politicians**, who are most often the target of threats, slander and insults, but, unlike major federal politicians, have not previously been in the focus of public attention. Dissemination of **deliberately false information** to discredit a politician is now the same at all levels, and responsibility for such actions has been toughened. Insult, including written insults, disturbing public peace by threatening to use violence, violent acts and threats of such acts against family members and property of public figures (murder, kidnapping, injury, etc.), approval of violent actions in public space and a number of other offences are now **more strictly punished**. For threatening on social networks with murder or rape, imprisonment for up to three years is now allowed, for insult - up to two. **Anti-Semitic motivation has been recognised as an aggravating factor** in jurisprudence. The **protection of representatives of emergency services has been strengthened**: ambulance personnel, rescuers and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The **liability of social network** administration companies has been sharply **increased** for insufficient fight against extremist appeals and the use of hate speech, publication of banned symbols, incitement of ethnic hatred, distribution of child pornography and a number of other offences.³² Facebook, Whatsapp, Gmail, Tinder and other social networks of various orientations were given the right to a transitional period until 1 February 2022, after which they became obliged to register and transfer to law enforcement agencies criminally punishable content and information about its authors, including IP-address.³³ The law received support from various sectors of society. Lawyers and journalists felt it was right to provide a better level of protection to potential victims of verbal abuse, simplify the mechanisms of investigative procedures and the possibility of punishing the perpetrators, although at the same time a balance should be struck and not to confuse offences with freedom of speech.³⁴ In December 2022, the Civil Servants' Association called it "a step in the right direction" and emphasised that civil servants are a segment of the population that often has to face insults and threats.³⁵ In February 2022, the adaptation of other legislation to the new law

³² Manfred Pühl, Neue Gesetze gegen Rechtsextremismus und Hasskriminalität. Was steht drin. DEMO, 14.07.2021, URL: <https://www.demo-online.de/blog/neue-gesetze-gegen-rechtsextremismus-hasskriminalitaet-steht-drin>

³³ Rechtsextremismus und Hass im Netz. BKA rechnet mit 150.000 Strafverfahren, Heise online, 11.01.2022, URL: <https://www.heise.de/news/Rechtsextremismus-und-Hass-im-Netz-BKA-rechnet-mit-150-000-Strafverfahren-6323020.html>

³⁴ Schacrzad Osterer, Was bringt das neue Gesetz gegen Hasskriminalität im Netz? BR, 08.04.2021, URL: <https://www.br.de/nachrichten/netzwelt/was-bedeutet-das-neue-gesetz-gegen-hasskriminalitaet-im-netz,SU0FH2J>

³⁵ Gespräch im Bundesjustizministerium. Pakt für den Rechtsstaat: dbb drängt weiter auf Verstetigung , DBB, 13.12.2022, URL: <https://www.dbb.de/artikel/pakt-fuer-den-rechtsstaat-dbb-draengt-weiter-auf-verstetigung.html>

was finalised, including the amendment of seven paragraphs of the German Criminal Code (increased liability).

Migration law

It is in this area that the two key events of the past three years, the pandemic and the war, may have had the greatest impact. The partial closure of borders, restrictions on the movement of citizens by land, air and sea, and the application of quarantine measures at the national level had a particularly acute impact on people of foreign origin who did not hold German citizenship or residence permits. One group was **unmarried couples** living in different countries who had lost the possibility of personal contact, as **well as migrants who had already been granted permission to enter Germany under major programmes**. These were ethnic German immigrants and Jewish emigrants from the former Soviet Union. The problems were overcome by a special decision of the German Interior Ministry.³⁶ A change was also made in the Interior Ministry's regulations regarding the legal position of bi-national couples who are not officially married and wish to visit their partner.

With the outbreak of war in 2022, the **German** government adopted a new **simplification of the legislation for German resettlers with Ukrainian citizenship**. After entering the country as a Ukrainian refugee, they were granted the right to apply for recognition of their Late Settler status not in the country of origin, as is the usual procedure, but directly at the Land Offices for the Reception of Foreigners.³⁷ **Jewish migrants** with Ukrainian passports were **also entitled to apply in Germany**.³⁸

In general, during this period about 40 amendments to the current legislation on entry and stay of persons with foreign citizenship were adopted. Some of them also passed "under the sign of an epidemic". Here are some of them. In August 2021, the **acquisition and restoration of German**

³⁶ Jüdische Zuwanderer können nun trotz COVID-19-Einreisebeschränkungen wieder nach Deutschland einreisen, Schengenvisa News, 08.09.2020. URL: <https://www.schengenvisa.info/news/de/judische-zuwanderer-können-nun-trotz-covid-19-einreisebeschränkungen-wieder-nach-deutschland-einreisen/>

³⁷ Land Niedersachsen. Informationen und Unterstützung für Geflüchtete und Helfende, URL: <https://www.niedersachsen.de/ukraine/krieg-in-der-ukraine-fragen-und-antworten-209095.html>

³⁸ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Meldung vom 24.30.2022. Anordnung für vereinfachte Zuwanderungsregeln für ukrainische Juden, URL: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2022/03/besuch-felix-klein.html>

citizenship by Nazi victims and their descendants was **simplified**.³⁹ In July 2021, a dubious **regulation** was adopted, according to some lawyers and human rights activists, to **expand the information in the federal register of foreigners**. It cannot be ruled out that the protection of personal data is not adequately ensured. **Refugees with different statuses have been extended the additional support measures that other German residents also receive**. Here are some of them: additional bonus payments to regular child allowances, a free contingent of protective masks against COVID-19, an increase in the level of tax-free compensation for social activities, extraordinary cash payments to mitigate the effects of pandemic and lockdown inflation, etc. A **package of sanitation and hygiene measures for hostels for migrants and asylum seekers** was adopted.

At the beginning of March 2022, the **EU adopted Regulation 2022/382** on granting temporary asylum to Ukrainian citizens fleeing hostilities. The instructions adopted at the end of March also defined the **rights of third-country nationals permanently residing in Ukraine as of 24.2.2022**.⁴⁰ To ensure the legal status of refugees from Ukraine, the **Federal Republic of Germany invoked §24 of the Act on the Residence of Foreigners (AufenthG)**, which regulates temporary protection on the basis of the EU Directive of 2001.⁴¹ Then two governmental regulations (March and August 2022) were adopted, which established the legal status of Ukrainians on the territory of Germany. The regulation in practice is implemented in accordance with seven instructions of the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴²

Law enforcement practice

As noted above, the pandemic and related sanitary and epidemiological regulations (lockdowns, restrictions on meetings, especially in closed rooms, and in some periods restrictions on movement) did not pass without a trace in this area. The restrictions also affected the work of the

³⁹ Flüchtlingsrat Berlin. Gesetzgebung Asyl- und Migrationsrecht 2020/21, URL: https://fluechtlingsrat-berlin.de/recht_und_rat/asylg-2020/#ueberblick

⁴⁰ Flüchtlingsrat Berlin. Gesetzgebung Asyl- und Migrationsrecht 2022/23, URL: https://fluechtlingsrat-berlin.de/recht_und_rat/asylg2022/#1-aufnahmeregelung-fuer-kriegsfluechtlinge-aus-der-ukraine-8211-eu-beschluss-2022382

⁴¹ Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (Aufenthaltsgesetz, AufenthG), vom 25.02.2008, §24, Aufenthaltsgewährung zum vorübergehenden Schutz, URL: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_2004/_24.html

⁴² Flüchtlingsrat Berlin. Gesetzgebung Asyl- und Migrationsrecht 2022/23, URL: https://fluechtlingsrat-berlin.de/recht_und_rat/asylg2022/#1-aufnahmeregelung-fuer-kriegsfluechtlinge-aus-der-ukraine-8211-eu-beschluss-2022382

courts, which caused some difficulties (inviting witnesses, hearing schedules) and temporary delays in proceedings, but in general the judiciary functioned smoothly.

In November 2020. The **Federal Government published a new plan to combat right-wing extremism and racism**. More than one billion euros have been allocated for the period 2021-2024 to combat these manifestations. The corresponding budget line for 2021 has been supplemented by a separate amount of 150 million euros. Four main areas of work have been recognised as appropriate: **1. Raising awareness of the population, strengthening co-operation between state structures and NGOs. 2. Preventive measures. 3. Expansion of assistance to the victims. 4. Recognising and publicising the successes of members of society with a migration background, showcasing positive examples.**⁴³ The Plan consists of 89 different activities, both those aimed at combating specific phenomena, e.g. anti-Gypsyism, racism, anti-Semitism and others, and those in the form of specific programmes (educational, aimed at integrating and increasing the representation in public service of people with a migration background, youth, increasing media competence, etc.). The Plan defines the ministries and agencies responsible for the implementation of individual activities.⁴⁴ In May 2021, a resolution of the Government Commission on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Racism was promulgated, which contains a higher degree of specificity in the individual measures.⁴⁵ At an early stage, civil society organisations were given the opportunity to submit their recommendations and expert assessments to the commission. In August 2020, for example, the Anti-Discrimination Union (ADVD), an umbrella organisation of a number of NGOs across the country, took advantage of this.⁴⁶

The largest practical action in the field of migrant reception during this period was (and still is) the reception of Ukrainian refugees after the outbreak of a large-scale war in their country.

⁴³ Bundesregierung, Kabinettsausschuss, Klares Signal gegen Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, 25.11.2020, URL: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kabinett-rechtsextremismus-1819828>

⁴⁴ Maßnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur Bekämpfung von Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, vom 25.11.2020, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/997532/1819984/4f1f9683cf3faddf90e27f09c692abed/20-11-25-massnahmen-rechtsextremi-data.pdf?download=1>

⁴⁵ Abschlussbericht des Kabinettsausschusses zur Bekämpfung von Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, vom 12.05.2021, URL: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/sicherheit/abschlussbericht-kabinettsausschuss-rechtsextremismus.html>

⁴⁶ ADVD-Empfehlungen an den Kabinettsausausschuss gegen Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, ADVD, 05.08.2020, URL: <https://www.antidiskriminierung.org/neuigkeiten-1/2020/8/5/advd-empfehlungen-an-den-kabinettsausschuss-gegen-rassismus-und-rechtsextremismus?rq=kabinett>

At the end of 2022, 1,101,000 refugees from Ukraine were registered in Germany. This number does not mean that all of these persons remained residing in the country. As of **30.11.2022**, according to the Federal Statistical Office, there were **1,035,000** people with Ukrainian citizenship living in the Federal Republic of Germany. For comparison: at the end of 2021, there were 138,000 holders of Ukrainian citizenship in Germany (an increase of almost seven times). We can therefore speak of around **900,000 newcomers**. The majority of refugees are women of various ages and minors.⁴⁷ It should be noted that not all those who received the status of temporary protection (refugee) remained on the territory of the country. Some Ukrainians returned back or moved to other countries without leaving the register in the FRG. From the first days of the refugees' arrival, an **unprecedented programme of assistance was** launched, involving both government agencies and NGOs, church humanitarian organisations and individual German activists. Displaced persons were provided with food, hygiene items, financial and medical assistance, psychological support in their native language, and accommodation (dormitories and temporary accommodation and distribution centres were set aside, including large infrastructure facilities, such as Berlin's Tegel Airport, which will be decommissioned in 2021). Information on the rules of admission, registration, stay in Germany, medical care, education and other issues is published in analogue (leaflets, booklets and announcements) and in electronic form (websites of municipalities and foreigners' offices) in four languages: Ukrainian, Russian, German and English.⁴⁸ Immediately upon arrival in the FRG, Ukrainian refugees were registered and received a two-year residence permit in accordance with the above-mentioned §24 of the Residence Act. This type of residence permit can be extended unless circumstances in the country of origin change for the better and the threat to the health and life of the foreign national disappears. Ukrainian refugees were immediately integrated into the social system of the Federal Republic of Germany, provided with benefits, free medical insurance, housing and heating costs, as well as additional allowances, e.g. for the purchase of furniture, clothing and household appliances. They were provided with free German language courses and a work permit. School-age children were integrated into the FRG secondary education system (school attendance is compulsory in Germany). Ukrainian schoolchildren with insufficient knowledge of German attend so-called "welcome classes" formed in a number of schools in the country. Since 1.06.2022 **Ukrainian refugees have been entitled**

⁴⁷ Statistisches Bundesamt. Starker Zuwachs an ukrainischen Staatsbürgern seit Ende Februar 2022, URL: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Im-Fokus/Ukraine/Gesellschaft/_inhalt.html

⁴⁸ Land Berlin. Poschyrenni sapytannja, URL: <https://www.berlin.de/ukraine/uk/tschasto-sadawani-pitannja/>

to unemployment benefit ALG 2 (since 01.01.2023 renamed Bürgergeld)⁴⁹ and thus have been fully equalised in social security issues with FRG citizens and foreign citizens permanently residing in Germany. The German railways and regional transport companies have for a long time provided Ukrainian refugees with free travel. A Ukrainian passport was sufficient for travelling on public transport and regional trains throughout Germany. To travel on long-distance high-speed trains, a free ticket had to be issued at the station ticket office.

The implementation of the EU directives as well as the previously existing and national legal regulations regarding Ukrainian refugees adopted after 23.02.2022 can be considered successful in Germany, especially in relation to the circumstances, timing and number of arrivals. However, a **number of difficulties and shortcomings**, which the author of this report and other experts have observed in practice and from the refugees themselves, should be noted: 1. Bureaucratic obstacles in the process of registration and issuance of residence permits, long waiting times for interview dates, ambiguities in the distribution of competences between different agencies. 2. Lack of affordable housing, especially in large cities, as a result of which refugees were forced to live in hostels or reception centres for long periods of time or to move to smaller settlements with poorer infrastructure and low chances of employment. 3. Difficulties in the field of school education. Ukrainian pupils and their parents complained about the "too simple" programme in "welcome classes",⁵⁰ low intensity of German language learning, inconsistency of full-time education in Germany with continuing distance learning in the Ukrainian programme. 4. Long waiting times for German language courses, which makes (even) the initial integration of newcomers difficult. 5. Difficulties with the recognition of certificates and diplomas of all levels and with starting their own business.

There has also been **criticism** in German society (media, migrant organisations, human rights activists) that Ukrainian refugees are granted more rights in the EU, including the FRG, than asylum seekers from other crisis regions. In June 2022, 57 organisations in the FRG wrote to the Ministry of Social Protection demanding that the unequal treatment of Ukrainian and non-

⁴⁹ Lisa Kaspari, Harz IV für Ukrainer. 449 Euro und viele Fragen, Die Zeit, 01.06.2022, URL: https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2022-05/harz-iv-gefluechtete-grundsicherung-ukraine?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

⁵⁰ "Welcome" (in some Federal Länder "transition") classes are designed to teach German and explain the German education system to migrant pupils who have recently arrived in Germany. These classes also teach the subjects of the school programme, but in an extremely lightened version.

Ukrainian refugees be stopped. The Open Letter paid special attention to medical care.⁵¹ It also criticised the treatment of persons without Ukrainian citizenship who resided in Ukraine as of 23.02.2022. This particularly affected foreign students who had a limited Ukrainian residence permit. Human rights defenders recorded cases of discrimination against students from African countries who arrived in Germany from the territory of Ukraine.⁵²

Enforcement of the provisions of anti-discrimination legislation, primarily the **AGG, is almost always associated with certain difficulties**. Most experts agree on this point. Victims rarely file a lawsuit, considering litigation to be "pointless" and time-consuming and costly, with no significant chance of success and tangible results, such as compensation. Because a large percentage of persons who have been discriminated against are of foreign origin in Germany, language barriers, lack of knowledge of their rights, prejudices and preconceptions about the legal system and law enforcement, often due to negative experiences in the country of origin, also play a negative role. **German courts are more effective in the area of explicit discrimination, which is clearly covered by anti-discrimination law**. In November 2020, the verdict of the German Constitutional Court received a great deal of media attention. An employee of a private company was dismissed for making a racist remark about his black colleague. The dismissed employee lost his lawsuits in various courts in Cologne and in the High Labour Court. The Constitutional Court upheld the validity of the dismissal, stating that the invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of opinion in this case was groundless: the plaintiff had violated fundamental individual rights. (AZ 1 BvR 2727/19B).⁵³

During this period, several important decisions of the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) in the field of migration law and the stay of foreigners in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany were published. In November 2020, the court ruled that the **granting of protection status in another EU state cannot be an obstacle to the recognition of international protection status in Germany under family law**. The priority of preserving the

⁵¹ Offener Brief. Diskriminierung von nicht-ukrainischen Flüchtlingen beenden! Migazin, 01.06.2022, URL: <https://www.migazin.de/2022/06/01/offener-brief-diskriminierung-von-nicht-ukrainischen-fluechtlungen-beenden/>

⁵² Faktencheck. Bevorzugen EU-Länder ukrainische Flüchtlinge? DW, 09.11.2022, URL: <https://www.dw.com/de/faktencheck-bevorzugen-eu-1-C3%A4nder-ukrainische-fl-C3%BChtlinge/a-63548244>

⁵³ "Menschenverachtende Diskriminierung": Verfassungsgericht bestätigt Kündigung wegen rassistischer Affenlaute, Tagesspiegel, 24.11.2020, URL: <https://m.tagesspiegel.de/politik/menschenverachtende-diskriminierung-verfassungsgericht-bestaetigt-kuendigung-wegen-rassistischer-affenlaute/26653848.html>

integrity of the family has been recognised as more significant than the Dublin Agreements. (BVerwG 1 C 8.19).⁵⁴ In October 2022, the court recognised that a **person with subsidiary protection cannot be denied a foreign passport with reference to the fact that he or she can apply to the embassy of his or her home country for a national passport**. An important condition must be noted: the court did not give carte blanche to any alien with subsidiary status. The judgement concerned the plaintiff, an Eritrean national, who was required by the authorities of his country of origin to fulfil a number of obligations in order to obtain a new passport. He was required to sign a document expressing regret for "failure to fulfil a national duty", as well as a willingness to "bear the penalty" and to remit to his State 2 per cent of his income as a "diaspora tax". The key point in such matters is the legal assessment of whether such conditions are permissible in terms of international law, human dignity, threat to one's material well-being, etc. The Court found the condition to be impermissible (BVerwG 1 C 9.21).⁵⁵

Also in October 2022, the German Constitutional Court found that the rule in force since 2019, according to which **asylum seekers living in hostels receive 10 per cent less benefits** than those with the same status outside the hostels, **contradicts the** tenets of equal rights and equal provision of all persons with the minimum means consistent with human dignity. The **rule must be cancelled** (Az. 1 BvL 3/21). It should be noted that the plaintiff himself, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, will not be able to benefit from the judgement. In the years since the suit was filed, he has become employed and accordingly obtained a residence permit. But the plaintiff expressed his joy that the verdict of the highest court of the land will help other people who are now in the same situation.⁵⁶

Significant decisions have also been made by lower courts. In November 2022, the Saarland Higher Administrative Court found **that deportation of refugees from Germany to Greece is not possible at this time, as it is** suspected that the deportees may not be provided with "basic

⁵⁴ Klaus Dienelt, Internationaler Familienschutz in Deutschland auch bei Flüchtlingsstatus in einem anderen EU-Mitgliedstaat, Migrationsrecht.net, 18.11.2022, URL: <https://www.migrationsrecht.net/nachrichten-rechtsprechung/internationaler-familienschutz-in-deutschland-auch-bei-fluechtlingsstatus-in-einem-anderen-eu-mitgliedstaat.html>

⁵⁵ Klaus Dienelt, Zumutbarkeit der Passbeschaffung bei Erfordernis einer "Reueerklärung" , Migrationsrecht.net, 12.10.2022, URL: <https://www.migrationsrecht.net/nachrichten-rechtsprechung/unzumutbarkeit-der-passbeschaffung-bei-erfordernis-einer-reueerklaerung.html>

⁵⁶ Tanja Podolski, Alleinstehenden Asylbewerber steht mehr Geld zu, Legal Tribüne Online, 24.11.2022, URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/bverfg-1-bvl-3-21-berechnung-leistungen-asylbewerber-existenzminimum-verstoss-menschenwuerde/>

needs" in that country. The decision also applies to persons with Greek refugee status (Az 2/A81/22),⁵⁷ i.e. also in this case an exception to the Dublin Agreements has been accepted.

During the period in question, **measures continued to be taken to suppress the spread of hateful ideologies and to hold their proponents accountable.** In Germany there are legal **prohibitions on the use of symbols and salutations denoting adherence to the ideology of the "Third Reich"**. These articles are also present in the German Criminal Code (StGB): "Dissemination of propaganda materials and use of symbols or signs of anti-constitutional organisations" (Art. 86 and 86a) and "Incitement of ethnic discord" (Art. 130). In addition, the executive branch is responsible for issuing a list of prohibited "anti-constitutional symbols", usually associated with the period of National Socialism, but also including symbols of contemporary far-right extremist organisations. Lists exist at both federal and state level and are constantly being updated. Up-to-date lists are available on various internet platforms.⁵⁸ While the flags of Nazi Germany and its institutions criminalised at Nuremberg, the swastika or the SS runes and their modified forms used by modern neo-Nazi groups are easily identifiable and their use is therefore suppressed with legal instruments, some symbols have been the subject of debate in German society. This is most evident in connection with the "Imperial Military Flag" (the flag of the Armed Forces of the German Empire until 1921). It was not officially banned in any federal state until recently. The extreme right-wing uses it at demonstrations as a symbol of adherence to their ideology for fear of displaying "obvious" neo-Nazi symbols, which is immediately prosecuted. In autumn 2020, the process of banning this symbol began as well, also as a reaction to its massive appearance in 2019-2020 at far-right demonstrations and the symbolic "storming of the Reichstag" carried out in August 2020 on the steps of the Reichstag building by supporters of extreme right-wing movements as part of a protest against restrictions due to the COVID-19 epidemic.⁵⁹ In Bremen, the "Imperial Flag" and "Imperial Military Flag" were declared unconstitutional in September

⁵⁷ VG stellt systemische Mängel fest. Keine Abschiebungen nach Griechenland, Legal Tribüne Online, 24.11.2022, URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/ovg-saarland-2-a-81-22-abschiebungsverbot-griechenland-systemische-maengel/>

⁵⁸ In Deutschland verbotene Zeichen und Symbole, IDA-NRW, URL: https://www.ida-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Texte_zum_Download/Rechtsextremismus/Rheims_Symbole_Rechte_Szene.pdf

⁵⁹ Read more in the relevant section of the report.

2020.⁶⁰ This was followed by Bavaria,⁶¹ the North Rhine-Westphalia Landtags voted in favour of such a decision⁶² etc. The locks were supported by a number of German historians.⁶³ There are difficulties in the plane of practical application of the legislative norm. Firstly, both the "Imperial Military Flag" and the "Imperial Flag", which are similar to each other, are used in right-wing extremist circles. Secondly, these flags exist in different variations as the flag of the Armed Forces of the German Empire and the North German Union, with slight variations in the colour scheme and the Iron Cross.

Several right-wing extremist organisations in Germany were banned during this period. Here is a list of them. In 2020: Combat 18 (the German branch of a neo-Nazi network based in the UK), "Association of German Peoples", "Northern Eagle", "Assault Group 44", in 2021: "National Socialists of Rostock and Baltic Corps".⁶⁴ Analysing the activities of these groups allows us to note three unifying factors. Firstly, they are small groups of several dozen people, formally registered as a public organisation. Secondly, almost all right-wing radical groups are either connected with criminals or carry out criminal activities themselves, as can be seen in the example of "Northern Eagle". Thirdly, the process of finally banning a group takes a considerable period of time, not least because of its NPO status.

The Berlin court decision allowing the Office for the Defence of the Constitution to call the Identity Movement a right-wing extremist organisation is significant. It is an international right-wing radical right-wing network, originally originating in the UK. The particular danger of the "Identitarians" lies in their "pseudo-intellectual" image. "The movement" positions itself as a supposedly legitimate defender of the ethnic majority in European states on the basis of the theory

⁶⁰ Bremen, Pressestelle des Senats. Der Senator für Inneres Zeigen von Reichskriegsfahnen und Reichsfahnen wird verboten. 18.09.2020, URL: <https://www.senatspressestelle.bremen.de/pressemitteilungen/zeigen-von-reichskriegsfahnen-und-reichsfahnen-wird-verboden-344097?asl=bremen02.c.732.de>

⁶¹ Söder kündigt Verbot der Reichskriegsflagge in Bayern an, Augsburgener Allgemeine, 26.09.2020, URL: <https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/bayern/Rechtsextremismus-Soeder-kuendigt-Verbot-der-Reichskriegsflagge-in-Bayern-an-id58210536.html>

⁶² Nordrhein-Westfalen verbietet Reichskriegsflagge, Spiegel, 08.10.2020, URL: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/nordrhein-westfalen-landtag-stimmt-fuer-verbot-von-reichskriegsflagge-a-1a3a3261-5a68-456c-9486-902633aba078>

⁶³ Reichskriegsflagge. Historiker sind nachdrücklich für ein Verbot, NDR, 24.10.2020, URL: <https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/Reichskriegsflagge-Historiker-nachdruecklich-fuer-ein-Verbot,reichskriegsflagge106.html>

⁶⁴ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Rechtsextremismus: Symbole, Zeichen und verbotene Organisationen, vom September 2022, URL: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/rechtsextremismus/2022-02-rechtsextremismus-symbole-zeichen-organisationen.html>

of "identitarianism", against the "threat" posed by Islam. In June 2020, despite the allegedly non-violent forms of protest practised by this movement, the court recognised it as right-wing extremist. The main reasoning is that not only is the ideology of the Identitarists racist, but also their calls for "purity of race" and the recognition of members of certain ethnic groups as "second-class citizens" may well motivate the movement's supporters to violence. (AZ 1 L 188/20).⁶⁵ Also in the intervening period, higher courts have upheld a number of sentences handed down by primary courts. For example, in May 2021, the High Court of Justice **confirmed the validity of the conviction of** eight far-right activists from the terrorist group Chemnitz Revolution who had set up a neo-Nazi network and discussed online plans to organise riots and violence.⁶⁶

In addition to radical right-wing symbols and organisations, **Islamist associations and symbols are also banned**. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz, BfV) informs about this on its website. In 2020, a ban on Hizbollah was issued.⁶⁷ In 2021, several pseudo-social organisations with quite peaceful names were banned: "Give Peace", "People for People" and "German-Lebanese Family". In the same year, the German branch of Ansaar, a large network declaring aid to the needy in Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, was liquidated, along with 10 subsidiary organisations in Germany. In practice, following surveillance, German security services concluded that the organisation was involved in financing Hamas and Middle Eastern terrorist groups.⁶⁸

Preventive measures and state support for migrants, statistics of discriminatory manifestations

⁶⁵ Verfassungsschutz darf "Identitäre Bewegung" als "gesichert rechtsextremistisch" bezeichnen, Beschluss vom 19.06.2020, Kostenlose-Urteile, URL:

https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/VG-Berlin_1-L-18820_Verfassungsschutz-darf-Identitaere-Bewegung-als-gesichert-rechtsextremistisch-bezeichnen.news28905.htm

⁶⁶ BGH bestätigt Urteil gegen Mitglieder der rechtsextremistischen terroristischen Vereinigung "Revolution Chemnitz", Beschluss vom 20.05.2021, Kostenlose-Urteile, URL:

https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/BGH_3-StR-41820_BGH-bestaetigt-Urteil-gegen-Mitglieder-der-rechtsextremistischen-terroristischen-Vereinigung-Revolution-Chemnitz.news30368.htm

⁶⁷ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus, URL:

<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/verbotene-organisationen-islamismus>

⁶⁸ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Bundesinnenminister verbietet islamistisches Netzwerk Ansaar International e.V., Pressemitteilung vom 05.05.2021, URL:

<https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2021/05/verbotsverfahren-ansaar.html>

Federal target programmes are a traditional tool for preventive work of German state institutions. Funds from the state budget are allocated to a certain ministry or agency, which holds a competition among NGOs for project implementation. The main principles are to work at the "lowest" level, to be as close to the target groups as possible, and to work both with those who have already come under the influence of extremist groups and with those who may be susceptible to radical ideologies. Examples of such a programme include "Participate in Democracy" (Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, more than 600 projects throughout the Federal Republic of Germany),⁶⁹ "Unity through Participation" (Ministry of the Interior, 53 projects between 2020 and 2024),⁷⁰ "Uniting for Democracy and Tolerance, Against Extremism and Violence" (Federal Agency for Political Education)⁷¹ and others. As a rule, the projects welcome a comprehensive approach: they not only combat radicalism and extremism in a preventive manner, but also demonstrate the advantages of democracy and peaceful resolution of conflict situations, and show the possibility for everyone to participate in democratic processes.

Between 2016 and 2021, Germany operated a **National Preventive Programme against Islamist Extremism** under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. The website of the German Ministry of the Interior articulated the six main working areas of the programme as follows: The main points of the programme are: 1. Work at the municipal level, ending with small settlements, 2. Work with families and the social environment, including NGOs and self-help associations for migrants, 3. Work in mosques, houses of worship and religious communities, 4. Work in the educational sphere, including schools. 5. Work on the Internet, including social networks. 5. Risk assessment. 6. Co-operation within and outside the EU.⁷² In parallel, the state authorities publish brochures explaining what Islamism is, its methods, the difference between the world religion Islam and

⁶⁹ Programme Demokratie Leben. Extremismusprävention, URL: <https://www.demokratie-leben.de/magazin/magazin-details/extremismuspraevention-64>

⁷⁰ Programmem Zusammenhalt durch Teilhabe, URL: <https://www.zusammenhalt-durch-teilhabe.de/>

⁷¹ Bisherige BfDT-Formate Aktiv-Wettbewerb, Jugendkongress und Festakt zur Auszeichnung der "Botschafter*innen für Demokratie und Toleranz" werden in die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/bpb überführt, BFDt, 22.12.2022, URL: <https://www.buendnis-toleranz.de/service/177321/bisherige-bfdt-formate-aktiv-wettbewerb-jugendkongress-und-auszeichnung-der-botschafterinnen-fuer-demokratie-und-toleranz-werden-in-die-bundeszentrale-fuer-politische-bildung-bpb-ueberfuehrt>

⁷² Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamistischen Extremismus, URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/sicherheit/praevention-sprogramm-islamismus.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
<https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/radikalisierungspraevention/271943/nationales-praeventionsprogramm-gegen-islamistischen-extremismus-npp>

extremism and "political Islam".⁷³ Separate information is intended for Muslim youth in order to prevent them from being drawn into Islamist structures, such as Salafists, who are often the target group of extremists.

One of the preventive tools used in Germany to combat Islamist terrorism is the **forcible deportation of persons identified as potentially dangerous**, against whom there is strong evidence or strong, substantiated suspicion of links to terrorist organisations. In 2020. The European Court of Justice upheld Germany's right to preventively detain suspects in prison because their actions pose a tangible threat to national security, although the judges noted the need to keep them separate from other prisoners.⁷⁴ The example of deportations to Iran is illustrative. After the start of mass protests in this country in autumn 2022, a number of German states imposed a temporary moratorium on the expulsion of Iranian citizens from Germany to their home country. At the same time, the moratorium does not apply to potentially dangerous persons linked to terrorism.⁷⁵ The deportation process has not always gone smoothly. In August 2022, the media reported that 25 potentially dangerous foreign nationals could not be deported, although they were obliged to leave Germany. The deportation was hindered by circumstances of a "technical and legal nature".⁷⁶

As a summary, German state institutions focus on four types of support and prevention efforts: **1. Educational outreach at all levels. 2. Support for grassroots community organisations, including migrant organisations, which have direct contact with the target groups. 3. Prohibition of radical and extremist organisations of various ideological orientations, as well as individuals. 4. Decisions of judicial instances.**

⁷³ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Islamistische Aktivitäten erkennen, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz-mv.de/static/VERF/Dateien/Broschueren/Broschre_Islamistische_Aktivitten_erkennen.pdf

⁷⁴ Marcel Leubecher, Deutschland darf Islamisten vor Abschiebung im Gefängnis festhalten, Die Welt, 02.07.2020- URL: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article210877511/EuGH-Urteil-Deutschland-darf-Islamisten-vor-Abschiebung-im-Gefaengnis-festhalten.html>

⁷⁵ Sachsen und Thüringen verzichten auf Abschiebungen in den Iran, Sachsen-Anhalt skeptisch , MDR, 07.10.2022, URL: <https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/abschiebestopp-iran-sachsen-sachsen-sachsen-anhalt-thueringen-100.html>

⁷⁶ NRW kann 25 Gefährdeter nicht abschieben, NW Nachrichten, 15.08.2022, URL: https://www.nw.de/nachrichten/zwischen_weser_und_rhein/23330554_NRW-kann-25-Gefahrder-nicht-abschieben.html

Sociology, public sentiment, statistics

Public attitudes towards immigrants, foreigners, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities

In 2022, a large-scale study by the University of Leipzig on the broad spectrum of radical and extremist attitudes in society was released. The study draws parallels with similar work from 2020. A few key findings: 1. The number of individuals with deep, holistic right-wing views is declining, but extremist circles have effectively "canned". 2. Levels of intolerance towards foreigners are not increasing, but remain at high levels. 3. The same individuals possess a whole set of discriminatory perceptions, e.g. professing homophobia and sexism.⁷⁷ The Friedrich Ebert Foundation has published an equally extensive **study on right-wing extremist and anti-democratic trends in Germany in the period 2020-2021**. Here are the data regarding the issues outlined in this report. 70.3 per cent of respondents considered right-wing extremism a threat to the country (1st place in the list of threats), 35.3 per cent named Islamism (6th place) and 34.8 per cent left-wing extremism (7th place). The potential for right-wing populism decreased from 38.2% of respondents in 2018-2019 to 28.2% in 2020-2021. At the same time, the study shows such tendencies not only among supporters of extreme right-wing parties, but also among voters of the CDU/CSU, SPD and the Left. Such theses as "it is in the national interest to establish a dictatorship" and "we need a leader who will rule Germany with a strong hand" were condemned by an overwhelming number of respondents (respectively, summing up the answers "completely disagree" and "mostly disagree", 85.1 per cent and 84.4 per cent). Also the absolute majority did not support the statements "foreigners come to Germany to take advantage of its social system" (against 57.3%), "if there is a shortage of jobs, foreigners should be deported to their home country" (80.4%) and "there are already so many foreigners in the country that it already constitutes a danger for us" (67.4%), although these results already show a somewhat different trend than the condemnation of the dictatorship. **Verbal "disapproval" of foreigners, stereotypes not connected with potential use of violence, is much more widespread than other forms of xenophobia. The negative attitude to anti-Semitic clichés is quite unambiguous.** 80.7 per cent disagreed with the statement "even today the influence of Jews is too great". 86,2% with "Jews more often than representatives of other nationalities use cunning techniques to achieve their goals", 84,9% with "Jews have special characteristics and properties, they are not suitable for our

⁷⁷ Oliver Deckel u.a., Autoritäre Dynamiken in unsicheren Zeiten. Neue Herausforderungen - alte Reaktionen? Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie 2022,, URL: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2022-11/decker-kiess-heller-braehler-2022-leipziger-autoritarismus-studie-autoritaere-dynamiken-in-unsicheren-zeiten_0.pdf

society". In general, unequivocal support for hatred of foreigners was expressed by 4.5 per cent of respondents, anti-Semitism by 1.7 per cent, right-wing extremism by 1.7 per cent, and dictatorial form of government by 2.2 per cent. All of these manifestations are more widespread in East Germany than in West Germany. The authors summarise: **only a small proportion of the population has unambiguously right-wing extremist views. But the percentage is higher in the latent plane, because a larger proportion of respondents are susceptible to right-wing populist propaganda, which can lead to right-wing radical views.**⁷⁸

In 2022, **data from the National Monitoring on Discrimination and Racism** were published. 22 per cent of all German residents and 58 per cent of those who might be discriminated against on the basis of "external characteristics" have experienced racism. 45 per cent of those surveyed had observed a racist manifestation at least once. 90% recognised the existence of racism in Germany, of which 61% agreed that it is quite widespread. 70% expressed a personal willingness to oppose racism as much as possible. More than 83 per cent agreed that racism still occurs today against blacks and Jews.⁷⁹

Statistics on hate crimes and other incidents of hate speech

The following **hate-motivated terrorist attacks** occurred in Germany in 2020. In February 2020, a right-wing radical and racist murdered nine foreign-born residents of the city as well as his mother in Hanau. The crime was committed in two bars and a kiosk frequented predominantly by people with a migration background.⁸⁰ In April and May 2020, an Islamist supporter of the "Islamic State" carried out arson attacks on a number of Turkish shops and restaurants in the Bavarian town of Waldkraiburg. Six people were injured as a result. His actions were motivated by hatred of people of Turkish origin. The arrest prevented the perpetrator from committing other acts. Explosives and homemade bombs were found in his flat.⁸¹ In August 2020, a radical Islamist,

⁷⁸ Andreas Zick, Beate Kuppel, Die geforderte Mitte. Rechtsextreme und demokratiegefährdende Einstellungen in Deutschland 2020/21, FES, URL: <https://www.fes.de/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=78925&token=eb588a6bb6d9b528b8f13b53c5f3642cf896db55>

⁷⁹ Rassismusmonitor. Studie rassistische Realitäten. URL: https://www.rassismusmonitor.de/fileadmin/user_upload/NaDiRa/CATI_Studie_Rassistische_Realit%C3%A4ten/DeZIM-Rassismusmonitor-Studie_Rassistische-Realit%C3%A4ten_Wie-setzt-sich-Deutschland-mit-Rassismus-auseinander.pdf

⁸⁰ Wikipedia, Anschlag in Hanau 2020, URL: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anschlag_in_Hanau_2020

⁸¹ Angeklagter legt Geständnis im Prozess ab, Spiegel, 02.03.2021, URL: <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/waldkraiburg-angeklagter-legt-gestaendnis-in-terrorprozess-am-olg-muenchen-ab-a-468d20c9-3610-4085-acce-4dfb1a125695>

originally from Iraq, deliberately organised an accident on one of the autobahns of the Federal Republic of Germany. Six people were injured.⁸² In October 2020, an Islamist, Salafist and homophobic man carried out a knife attack on two tourists in Dresden. One person was killed.⁸³ In November 2021, a jihadist attacked passengers on a train travelling to Nuremberg. According to the version of the investigation, the perpetrator "tried to chaotically kill non-Muslims". Four people were injured.⁸⁴ In 2022, there were no hate crimes recognised as terrorist attacks per se.

The Federal Statistical Office provides information on "politically motivated offences and acts of violence on a "right-wing extremist basis" for the specified period: 2020: total number of offences 22.357, of which 1.023 acts of violence, 2021: 20.201 и 945.⁸⁵ The following can be noted: In the period 2020-21, compared to 2018-2019, there is a slight increase in the total number of this type of crime, but at the same time a decrease in acts of violence is recorded.

A separate table shows a **comparison of right- and left-wing extremist offences for 2021.**⁸⁶

Type of offence	Right-wing extremists	Left-wing extremists
Murder	1	0
Attempted murder	2	1
Bodily injuries	783	362
Arson	11	159

⁸² Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus, Zahlen und Fakten, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten/zahlen-und-fakten_node.html;jsessionid=5CCF56EDD4AE2F0F95861673A8CADD46.intranet231#doc678982bodyText4

⁸³ Messerangriff in Dresden - Verdächtiger ist islamistischer Gefährder, Spiegel, 21.10.2020, URL: <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/dresden-messerangriff-auf-zwei-maenner-verdaechtiger-ist-islamistischer-gefaehrder-a-45742cc0-53dd-4061-ab8f-037d937150cb>

⁸⁴ Benedikt Warmbrunn, Angreifer wollte "wahllos nicht-muslimische Menschen" töten, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23.12.2022, URL: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ice-messerangriff-islamist-1.5721319>

⁸⁵ Anzahl der politisch motivierten Straftaten und Gewalttaten mit rechtsextremistischem Hintergrund in Deutschland von 2010 bis 2021, Statista, URL: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/4032/umfrage/rechtsextremismus-und-fremdenfeindlichkeit-in-deutschland/>

⁸⁶ Anzahl der politisch motivierten Straftaten mit rechts- und linksextremistischem Hintergrund in Deutschland nach Art des Delikts im Jahr 2021, Statista, URL: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/4721/umfrage/vergleich-der-anzahl-von-rechten-und-linken-gewalttaten/>

Use of explosives	1	7
Participation in violent riots	7	147
Dangerous interference with transport	10	47
Kidnapping	1	0
Robbery	3	17
Blackmail	7	4
Resistance to law enforcement officers	119	243
Property damage	923	3.419
Threats, pressure	425	145
Other offences	6.034	1.498
Total	20.201	6.142

In absolute terms, the data on individual types of crime are roughly in line with the 2018-2019 statistics. The fluctuations are insignificant. Statistics show that the number of crimes with a right-wing extremist background has for a long period of time noticeably exceeded the number of crimes based on a left-wing extremist worldview. Crimes committed mostly by far-right extremists are more dangerous and cause direct harm to a person (murders, attempted murders, bodily harm, threats). Left-wing extremists are more prone to arson, property damage, organising riots and resisting the police.

Data on some types of such crimes: **right-wing radical 21,964 (-6.95% vs. 2020), left-wing radical 10,113 (-7.82%),⁸⁷ motivated by foreign ideologies 1,153 (+13.48%),⁸⁸ religious-ideological 479 (+0.42%), no category 21,339 (+147.44%),** the latter predominantly related to radical Covidian sceptics.⁸⁹

The peculiarities of the statistics of "politically motivated crimes" for 2021 is that **about 40% of the total number do not fit into the classic groups of "right-left-Islamists"**. Experts attribute this to the **COVID-19 pandemic and the radicalisation of a section of society** protesting against

⁸⁷ Discrepancies with the data of the statistical agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are related to different interpretations of this type of offence.

⁸⁸ The report further states that this section mainly includes hate crimes resulting from conflicts within FRG residents with Turkish roots, as well as between residents with Turkish and Kurdish roots.

⁸⁹ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2021, bundesweite Fallzahlen, URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/nachrichten/2022/pmk2021-factsheets.pdf;jsessionid=2BBAA9F9D1AC4013C0C1326338AB5A15.1_cid364?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

sanitary restrictions. The protests (discussed below) went far beyond the established ideological palette.

The data for 2022 cannot yet be summarised by individual offences at this time. In terms of the **total number of "politically motivated offences", 2022 was a record year with 58,916 cases (2021: 55,048). In the field of right-wing extremism, there was again an increase: 23,493 cases. Around 14,000 of these are regarded as "manifestations of propaganda". 1,170 acts of violence resulted in bodily injuries to 675 people. In the field of Islamism, 481 offences were recorded (almost unchanged compared to 2021). However, 74 cases were found to have "terrorist features", the highest number among all "politically motivated offences").**⁹⁰

The following **detection rate in 2021** was noted: in the area of "politically motivated crime" in general 40.97% (2020: 43.08%), specifically for violence against the person 67.16% (58.6%).⁹¹

In the area of **homophobia and transphobia, 458 offences** were registered in **2020, including 113 violent offences (total data from the sections "gender/sexual identity" and "sexual orientation")**, and **768 and 169 offences in 2021.**⁹² At the same time, there are voices in the media and among human rights defenders that the real number of cases is higher because victims often do not report to the police.⁹³

Public organisations in Germany, which **independently keep statistics on manifestations of hatred and discrimination** against minorities, traditionally provide different and higher data than the police and other law enforcement agencies. They record xenophobic leaflets, stickers, graffiti and stickers, verbal abuse in public transport and on the street, discrimination in public institutions, etc. NGOs are better placed to record such manifestations, as victims have more trust in non-

⁹⁰ 58.916 Delikte im Jahr. Kriminalität auf Höchststand, TAZ, URL: <https://taz.de/58916-Delikte-im-Jahr-2022/!5932762/>

⁹¹ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2021, bundesweite Fallzahlen, URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/nachrichten/2022/pmk2021-factsheets.pdf;jsessionid=2BBAA9F9D1AC4013C0C1326338AB5A15.1_cid364?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

⁹² Straf- und Gewalttaten im Bereich Hasskriminalität 2019 und 2020, LSVD, 04.05.2021, URL: <https://www.lsvd.de/media/doc/2445/pmk-2020-hasskriminalitaet.pdf>

⁹³ Gregor Graschnik, Hohe Dunkelziffer bei queerfeindlicher Gewalt, Frankfurter Rundschau, 28.03.2022, URL: <https://www.fr.de/rhein-main/wiesbaden/hohe-dunkelziffer-beiqueerfeindlicher-gewalt-91441635.html>

governmental organisations than in official law enforcement agencies. This is not least true for migrants from non-democratic countries, who often have experience of negative contact with the police and other state institutions or lack confidence that their complaints will be properly addressed. In addition, certain forms of discrimination, threats, neglect and other facts of violation of citizens' rights are difficult to prove legally.

The Amadeu Antonio Foundation has collected 201 **anti-Semitic incidents** in its databank for 2020, 309 in 2021 and 132 in 2022.⁹⁴ These are attacks, vandalism, insults and other acts. A few examples from the media. In August 2020, a bar in Berlin owned by a Jewish businessman was set on fire. The owner had received repeated threats from the far-right.⁹⁵ In October 2020, a student in Hamburg wearing a kippah was seriously injured. The attack took place near a synagogue.⁹⁶ In May 2021, 12 monuments at the Jewish cemetery of Heusenstam in Hesse were desecrated by unknown perpetrators.⁹⁷ In September 2021, a terrorist attack was foiled at a synagogue in Hagen. Four suspects from Islamist circles were arrested.⁹⁸ In September 2022, a rabbi was attacked in a Berlin underground station. He was pushed and anti-Semitic insults were hurled at him.⁹⁹

The brandeilig.org platform records **Islamophobic incidents against mosques in Germany**: offensive graffiti, vandalism, arson, attempts to disrupt services, written and verbal threats to imams, mullahs and worshippers, far-right gatherings directly outside mosques, etc. In 2020 there were 149 such incidents, in 2021. 63 and in 2022 10.¹⁰⁰ Presumably the sharp drop in reported cases does not mean a marked decline in Islamophobia, but is due to the difficulty of fixation, which is more or less favourable in different periods. As a rule, victims do not rush to contact the police or public organisations, not wanting unnecessary publicity.

⁹⁴ Amadeu-Antonio-Stiftung, Chronik, URL: <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/chronik/>

⁹⁵ Robert Klages, Jüdischer Besitzer im Visier von Neonazis? Tagesspiegel, 17.08.2020, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/brandanschlag-auf-berliner-kneipe-morgen-wird-besser-4189645.html>

⁹⁶ Wikipedia, Anschlag vor der Synagoge Hamburg 2020, URL:

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anschlag_vor_der_Synagoge_Hamburg_2020

⁹⁷ Claudia Bechthold, Jüdischer Friedhof. Unbekannte schänden Grabsteigene, OP-online, 20.05.2021, URL: <https://www.op-online.de/region/heusenstamm/juedischer-friedhof-geschaendet-90653061.html>

⁹⁸ Reul: Wir hatten konkreten Hinweis auf Ort, Zeit und Täter, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16.09.2021, URL: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/hagen-synagoge-anschlag-festnahme-1.5411884>

⁹⁹ Schrecklicher Angriff auf Balbir auf Berliner U-Bahn-Station, FOCUS, 14.09.2022, URL: https://www.focus.de/politik/schrecklicher-scheissjude-angriff-auf-rabbiner-der-juedischen-gemeinde-potsdam_id_146078257.html

¹⁰⁰ Brandeilig. Initiative gegen Moscheeangriffe, URL: <https://brandeilig.org/>

The Berlin Register for Documentation of Right-Wing Extremism and Discrimination, which has branches in all districts of the city, lists **3,822 cases of racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, far-right manifestations, hatred of Muslims, hatred of the LGBTI community, discrimination against people with disabilities, social chauvinism and Nazi aggrandisement** in its final report for **2020 for the capital alone**.¹⁰¹ **In 2021 there were 4,841 cases,**¹⁰² **in 2022 there will be 4,156.**¹⁰³

Activities of radical political forces

Far-right and right-wing populists

There were no particular changes on the far right flank of the German political spectrum during this period. **"Alternative for Germany" (AdG) has consolidated its position as the main extreme right-wing political force**, expressing the ideas of a relatively broad group of voters, ranging from the far right and neo-Nazis to right-wing populists and anti-migrant communities. No other political party has succeeded (and likely will not succeed in the near future) in competing with the AdG in this niche. Between 2020 and 2022. The AdG received the following electoral support. Land elections: Hamburg, 2020: 5.3 per cent, Rhineland-Palatinate, 2021: 8.3 per cent, Baden-Württemberg, 2021: 9.7 per cent, Saxony-Anhalt, 2021: 20.8 per cent, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 2021: 16.7 per cent, Saarland, 2021: 5.7 per cent, Schleswig-Holstein, 2022: 4.4 per cent, North Rhine-Westphalia, 2022: 5.4 per cent, Lower Saxony, 2022: 11 per cent.¹⁰⁴ Separately mentioned are elections in the state of Berlin, 2021: 8.4 per cent¹⁰⁵ (not shown in the overall statistics in the link above because there was a repeat election in 2023) and Bundestag elections, 2021: 10.3 per cent.¹⁰⁶ A trend that emerged shortly after the **AdG's** emergence on the German political scene continues: the party **has significantly higher support in the east of the**

¹⁰¹ Berliner Register, Jahresbericht 2020, URL: https://www.berliner-register.de/documents/25/20210903_2020-Jahresbrosch%C3%BCre-fertig-web.pdf

¹⁰² Berliner Register, Jahresbericht 2021, URL: <https://www.berliner-register.de/publikationen/jahresbericht-2021-der-berliner-register-426/>

¹⁰³ Berliner Register, Jahresauswertung 2022, URL: <https://www.berliner-register.de/artikel/auswertung-fuer-2022-467/>

¹⁰⁴ Ergebnisse der AfD bei den Landtagswahlen, Statista, URL: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/320946/umfrage/ergebnisse-der-afd-bei-den-landtagswahlen/>

¹⁰⁵ Bundewahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021, URL: <https://www.bundewahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99/land-11.html>

¹⁰⁶ Bundewahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021. Endgültiges Ergebnis, URL: https://www.bundewahlleiterin.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/52_21_endgueltiges-ergebnis.html

country than in the west. At the same time, the **AdG can achieve relatively high results in the West German regions** if it manages to **mobilise voters** who tend to ignore elections and temporarily attract right-wing CDU supporters. Other circumstances also play into the AdG's hands, such as the **poor performance of Democratic Party deputies in certain constituencies or political events** (the migration crisis, terrorist attacks) that encourage people to make an "emotional", situational choice. Overall, even in Saxony-Anhalt, where the AdG has strong primary structures and a significant number of regular supporters, the party managed only 0.8 per cent to cross the 20 per cent electoral threshold set by pollsters. In all other Länder, the AdG's results were far below this threshold. The fact that the AdG's rating is highly situational is confirmed by its significant drop in 2020. In March 2020, after the start of the pandemic, **AdG leaders either tacitly supported the government's actions or even demanded tougher measures**, such as an immediate ban on mass events or a lockdown modelled on Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic. (Such actions were not taken in Germany until later). This did not please the party's electorate, which was largely susceptible to conspiracy theories and denied the existence of the virus or markedly downplayed its dangers. As time passed, the AdG politicians changed their rhetoric, criticised the epidemiological measures and took part in coronasceptic demonstrations, but the trust of a part of the electorate was undermined. The consequences of this were evident until the Bundestag elections in September 2021, when the AdG won 2.3 per cent less votes than in 2017 and lost 11 seats in parliament.¹⁰⁷

Some politicians, regional branches and inner-party factions of the AdG, as well as the entire youth organisation of the party, were previously under surveillance by the German security services due to suspicions of right-wing extremism. This was the case, for example, with the far-right intra-party group Wing. Although this platform was dissolved by a decision of the AdG board in March 2020,¹⁰⁸ its leaders continued to retain influence in the party. In March 2022, a court in Cologne issued a judgement allowing the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to monitor the entire party as such.¹⁰⁹ This legal verdict could have far-reaching consequences. The party may be restricted in its political activities. This is a negative signal to its sponsors. It may also create a

¹⁰⁷ Bundewahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021, URL:

<https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99.html>

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-gegen-afd-der-fluegel-kaempft-ums-ueberleben-16687932.html>

¹⁰⁹ Reiner Burger, Markus Wehner, So kämpft der "Flügel" der AfD ums Überleben, FAZ, 20.03.2020, URL: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-beobachtung-verfassungsschutz-101.html>

situation in which civil servants and judges will have to choose between membership of the AdG and their professional activities.

The rest of Germany's far-right parties remain statist on this field. Germany's oldest existing neo-Nazi party, the **National Democratic Party (NPD)**, continues to lose members (2018: 4,000, 2021: 3,150) and struggles for political survival. The relatively new, **Third Way Party** (2022: 650 members), established in 2013, is also not showing significant electoral success. In 2020, the party attempted to be at the forefront of protests against pandemic restrictions, but was quickly pushed back by more significant players with such an agenda. Another small far-right party, the **Right** (2022: 500 members), chose a similar strategy when it organised a 'national solidarity action' in Dortmund against measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus. A number of planned marches were banned as neo-Nazi.¹¹⁰ The strategy was also unsuccessful in this case. Some small far-right parties still fulfil the precepts to contest elections and campaign. But their results are within the statistical margin of error. For example, in 2021, the NPD showed the worst result in its history in the Bundestag elections with 0.1 per cent of the vote.¹¹¹

The so-called "Citizens of the Reich" ("Reichsbürgers") should be presented separately. Representatives of a network of such groups, often unconnected, believe that with the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945, the "Third Reich" did not cease to exist. They do not recognise the FRG as a legitimate state. Some groups print their own "passports" and "banknotes" and hold "elections" for "deputies" to self-proclaimed "Reichstags". Manifestations, rallies and other actions are also organised. A certain percentage of "Reich citizens" live in isolated communes and, wishing to minimise contact with the state, are engaged in agriculture and their own handicrafts. For a long time, "Reichsbürgers" were not considered dangerous or violent. Rather, they were perceived as members of a strange subculture. This changed after the murder of a policeman by a member of the group in 2016. The killer was sentenced to life imprisonment.¹¹² Firearms were found in the possession of members of the group. Currently, the "citizens of the Reich" are under surveillance

¹¹⁰ Lucius Teiderlbaum, Rechte Reaktionen auf Corona, Hagalil Jüdisches Leben online, 24.03.2020, URL: <https://www.hagalil.com/2020/03/rechte-reaktionen-auf-corona/>

¹¹¹ Stimmanteile der NPD bei den Bundestagswahlen, Statista, URL: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/368838/umfrage/stimmenanteile-der-npd-bei-den-bundestagswahlen/>

¹¹² Lebenslange Haft für Reichsbürger für Mord an Polizisten, DIE ZEIT, 23.10.2017, URL: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-10/reichsbuergerbewegung-urteil-mord-polizisten-wolfgang-p>

by the German security services. In the 2020s, the flats of members of the group were regularly searched. Activists of the NGO "United German Peoples and Tribes" are considered particularly dangerous (search of 21 flats in March 2020 by 400 police officers).¹¹³ The NGO was recognised as extremist and banned. Also in the ranks of this movement sectarianism, denial not only of the FRG as a state, but also of democracy in general, anti-Semitism, and Holocaust denial increased. Of the total number of "Reichsbürger", estimated at 19,000 people, 950 are recognised as right-wing extremists.¹¹⁴ In 2020-2021. "Reichsbürgers" were active participants in protests against pandemic measures. In August 2020, during one demonstration, representatives of the movement, together with other right-wing radicals and a pro-Russian group, managed to break through a police cordon and symbolically "storm" the steps of the Reichstag building in Berlin, displaying their flags. The police quickly pushed the offenders back. Criminal proceedings were instituted.¹¹⁵ The most high-profile event was the **exposure of the attempted coup d'état** prepared by the Citizens of the Reich. In December, dozens of people were arrested, including the well-known conspiracy theorist Prince Heinrich XIII, a former Bundestag deputy from the AdG and at the time a judge, former members of the Bundeswehr and the GDR People's Army, and representatives of other security forces, including special forces.¹¹⁶ The police found 90 firearms. According to the German security services, the conspirators planned to overthrow the current government and establish a monarchist-authoritarian model in the country. Experts believe that the conspirators had insufficient capabilities to realise their plans or even to pose any significant threat to the German statehood, but the special services naturally acted proactively and stopped the dangerous activities.

One of the significant formats of public manifestations of the extreme right is the "Monday demonstrations". The extreme right tries to voice its vision of the main themes (2020-2021: pandemic, 2022: war) and thus to assert itself in the public space, especially in the cases mentioned above, when it fails to establish itself in other structures. These demonstrations rarely gather more than 100 people. The above-mentioned extreme right-wing parties are joined by right-wing

¹¹³ Reiner Burger, Peter Karstens, "Reichsbürger"-Gruppierung. Hochgefährliche Spinner, FAZ, 19.03.2020, URL: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/verbotene-reichsbuerger-gruppe-rechtsextrem-und-hochgefuehrlich-16686793.html>

¹¹⁴ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021/9, URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2019-kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

¹¹⁵ Markus Decker, Nach Sturm auf den Reichstag laufen 34 Ermittlungsverfahren gegen 40 Verdächtige, RND, 16.01.2021, URL: <https://www.rnd.de/politik/reichstag-sturm-2020-34-ermittlungsverfahren-gegen-40-verdaechtige-PL7S65SDPZEDJGWXVVV3BQIR3M.html>

¹¹⁶ Florian Flade u.a., Reichsbürger planten Staatsstreich. Fantasien vom Umsturz, Tagesschau, 07.12.2022, URL: <https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/razzia-reichsbuerger-staatsstreich-geplant-101.html>

extremist social movements such as Free Saxony, the Leipzig Civic Movement and others. One of the most numerous events and an example of a rare "successful" mobilisation was the march in September 2022 (slogans of support for Russia, priority of German interests, demanding the resumption of gas supplies from the Russian Federation), which according to the organisers was attended by up to 3,000 people, according to the police, 1,500-1,700.¹¹⁷ The relative success of this far-right event was due to its pro-Russian agenda: the march was joined by "GDR nostalgics" and other citizens sympathetic to Russia, who usually do not or have not previously participated in far-right rallies. Another typical example of interaction between pro-Russian activists and the extreme right was the numerous actions organised in 2022 by pro-Russian activist Elena Kolbasnikova and lawyer Markus Beisicht, well known in far-right circles in West Germany.¹¹⁸

Ultra-right-wing organisations and structures that were not formalised into a political party or social movement remained under the surveillance of the German security services during this period. Examples include the magazine "Compact", the community "One Percent", the "Institute for Public Policy", the publishing house "Antaios" and others,¹¹⁹ around which their own right-wing radical milieu was formed.

Left-wing radicals

Unlike the extreme right, united by a relatively homogeneous ideological platform, the **German radical left has no unified political position**. This was particularly evident in the period under review. On two key topical events (the pandemic and the war), the radical left had opposing views. Representatives of left-radical groups were present at demonstrations approving and criticising measures to combat the pandemic, at rallies in support of Ukraine and with pro-Russian rhetoric. There are only two unifying factors: **radical anti-fascism and radical rejection of capitalism**. **The** extreme left has no full representation in the government. The Left Party, although it has Marxist, Maoist and Trotskyist currents, such as Marx 21 (2020: 450 members), which are recognised by researchers as left-extremist, is generally not. The party is a member of the Bundestag, a number of Landtags and municipal parliaments, and is the ruling party in the state of

¹¹⁷Michael Freitag, Rechte Montagsdemonstrationen. Die Radikalisierung ist abgeschlossen, Leipziger Zeitung, 29.09.2022, URL: <https://www.l-iz.de/leben/gesellschaft/2022/09/rechte-montagsdemonstrationen-1-die-radikalisierung-ist-abgeschlossen-video-474207>

¹¹⁸Lars Wienand, Thomas Terhorst, Polizei durchsucht das Haus von Rusenkorso-Organisatorin, T-Online, 27.03.2023, URL: https://www.t-online.de/region/koeln/id_100151052/pro-russischer-autokorso-in-koeln-durchsuchung-bei-organisatorin.html

¹¹⁹Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2022-06-07-verfassungsschutzbericht-2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

Thuringia. It is integrated into the modern socio-political model of the FRG and does not pursue the goal of dismantling it. The ultra-left spectrum is represented by three small political parties: The **German Communist Party** (GKP, 2021: 2,850 members), the **Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany** (MLPG, 2020: 2,800 members) and the **Socialist Equality Party** (SPR, 2022: 280 members). All three parties are under surveillance by the intelligence services. While the Trotskyists of the SPR are completely invisible in the public space, the activists of the SCP and MLPG focus on events related to Russia, the CIS and Eastern Europe. For example, their stands are regularly present at the 9th May celebrations at the Soviet memorial in Berlin's Treptow Park, at various festivals dedicated to the culture of Eastern European states, etc. All three parties also take part in elections at various levels, both independently and as part of extreme left-wing regional blocs, but has no MPs. In the parliamentary elections of 2021, these parties scored 0.0%.¹²⁰ The Left Party does not support these forces and does not allow their participation in its events.

In the German media and conservative circles, **Antifa** is often referred to as a major global network of left-wing extremists active in Germany. In practice, **Antifa as a single centralised structure has not existed for a long time**. There are a number of informal and semi-formal groups of varying degrees of radicalism that identify themselves as Antifa and/or speak on its behalf.¹²¹ In practice, in fact, the only relatively mass and unified movement of the radical left is the "**Autonomists**" (2021: up to 8,000 members, branches in 37 cities). This group considers it legitimate to use violence to fight neo-Nazis, to resist police interventions, and to "conquer autonomous spaces" in the streets for a "free society," which manifests itself in the form of riots and property damage. It is the "autonomists" who are regularly involved in the May 1 riots in the centre of Berlin and Hamburg, as well as during the G-20 and G-7 meetings. German "autonomists" are linked to like-minded people in other European countries and in the United States, are mobile and participate in violent protests outside Germany.

The platform of the **Interventionist Left (IL)** is also active in the FRG. This is an umbrella structure uniting 13 organisations in Berlin, Hannover, Bremen and other cities. The German security services consider the IL to be left-wing extremists. A 2021 report refers to "1,000 people

¹²⁰ Bundeswahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021. Endgültiges Ergebnis, URL: https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/52_21_endgueltiges-ergebnis.html

¹²¹ Read more in an article by the report's author <https://www.initiative-quorum.org/ru/details/antifa-neschestvuet.html>

in various working groups".¹²² The platform has been particularly active during the 2020-2021 sanitary restrictions, advocating the nationalisation of all pharmacological concerns and making vaccines available to everyone in the world.¹²³ In general, the IL proclaims a significant number of left-populist slogans: the creation of a socialist state of universal equality, the nationalisation of all housing to ensure equality, and proposes extremely radical methods in the field of environmental protection and in the fight against the far-right.

Anarchists, in particular the largest anarcho-syndicalist association in Germany, the Free Union of Workers and Workers' Associations (2021: approx. 1,300 members), are also considered to be on the left-extremist spectrum.¹²⁴ Experts differ as to whether this assessment is correct. On the one hand, German anarchists do not rule out the use of violence in the course of a "social revolution" and can therefore be classed as left-wing extremists. On the other hand, violence, according to anarchists, is "possible" only if this "revolution" has already begun and the prerequisites for the creation of a "classless" society have appeared. As long as this situation does not exist, anarchists deny violence, not sharing the main slogan of left-wing extremists, "civil disobedience", i.e. the legitimacy of violence (resistance to the police, attacking the ultra-right, damaging the property of "exploiters") already now.

Islamists

In 2022, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimated the **potential for Islamists** in Germany at **28,290** (slight decrease compared to the **previous year: 28,715**).¹²⁵ Upon enquiry in the Bundestag, the Federal Government informed the public that as of 1 June 2022, the intelligence services had recorded **531 of the most dangerous Islamists** in the country who **pose a threat** (so-called Gefährder) and **516 Islamists also under surveillance but assessed as less dangerous** (so-called relevante Personen).¹²⁶

¹²² Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021, URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2021-gesamt.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

¹²³ Wikipedia, Interventionistische Linke, URL: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interventionistische_Linke#cite_note-19

¹²⁴ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2022-06-07-verfassungsschutzbericht-2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

¹²⁵ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus, Zahlen und Fakten, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten/zahlen-und-fakten_node.html

¹²⁶ Bundestag. Inneres und Heimat - Antwort - hib 336/2022, Zahl sogenannter Gefährder in Deutschland, vom 29.06.2022, URL: <https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-901570>

Salafists remain the largest Islamist group in the FRG. They claim to have the "only correct" interpretation of Islam, rooted in literal adherence to the Koran, and tolerate violence against "apostates" from their dogma. The Salafists have largely lost their influence and funding channels since the defeat of the paramilitary structures of the Islamic State (IS), but remain the most organised and structured Islamist group in the FRG. The Salafists are one of the few Islamist groups in the country that propagandises directly on the street, handing out copies of the Koran to passers-by, attending "secular" events, and trying to communicate with people from the Muslim world living in Germany, from the Middle East and Asia to the Central Asian countries of the CIS and Africa. Various small jihadist groups are associated with Salafists, who to a greater or lesser extent (either openly or by means of hints, "coded" language) call on German Muslims to take the path of struggle against Western society, which, in their opinion, is the antithesis of the Islamic world and the Muslim worldview.¹²⁷

The structures of the **Muslim Brotherhood** also remain in place. It is the oldest Sunni Islamist network in the Federal Republic of Germany and has existed since 1994. In 2018, it was renamed the "**German Muslim Community**". The network is largely legalised through registered NGOs. The group's goal is the widespread application of Sharia law as the only acceptable system of ethical, moral, legal and religious norms. Members of the group are particularly harsh on those violations of their value system that are not "criminal" from the point of view of German law: alcohol consumption, adultery, and renunciation of Islam. A number of mosques and Islamic centres in Germany, for example in Aachen and Munich, are either closely associated with or controlled by the Brotherhood. "The Brotherhood also influences the Central Council of Muslims of the Federal Republic of Germany, the largest representation of Muslim interests in contacts with government institutions, and is part of the international structures of the network.¹²⁸ As part of the network, there is an officially registered NGO, the Muslim Youth of Germany.

"**Hizbollah, which** does not recognise the right to exist of the State of Israel and calls for an armed struggle against it, was banned in Germany in March 2020, following a series of searches of activists' flats and offices in various cities in Germany. However, it retained the same number of activists in 2021.

¹²⁷ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus, Begriff und Erscheinungsformen, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/begriff-und-erscheinungsformen/begriff-und-erscheinungsformen_node.html#doc714104bodyText1

¹²⁸ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Islamismus. Muslimbruderschaft in Deutschland, IRL: <https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/islamismus/290422/die-muslimbruderschaft-in-deutschland>

"The **Milli-Gerus Islamic Community** (founded in 1995) tries to operate in a legal public space. The organisation has a German-language website, where Milli-Gerus tries to present itself as a promoter of traditional peaceful Islam and dissociates itself from radicals.¹²⁹ Within it there are working associations of women and young women, which is supposed to emphasise the tolerance of Islam. Experts believe that the organisation is not generally radical, but that it includes groups that are prone to Islamism and extremist actions. "Milli-Gerus" is supported by the Turkish government and has extensive connections in the Turkish political and religious elite. The new leadership of the organisation has been declaring a reformist course for years.¹³⁰ Some land offices for the defence of the Constitution have stopped including Milli-Gerus in their annual reports, i.e. they have formally ceased monitoring. (It is acceptable that surveillance continues to be conducted covertly.) But the Federal Office still lists the "Community" in its documents, referring to the presence of radical elements with influence on certain mosques and separating them from the total number of members of the organisation and adjoining groups.

"**The Furkan Community** was founded in Germany in 1994. The most active branches are located in Dortmund, Berlin, Munich and Hamburg. The community has its own print edition, online TV channel and websites. Furqan's ideology is similar to the tenets of other Islamist groups, but is articulated more specifically than "only" adherence to the Quran and Sharia, and is aimed at Muslims living in Western states. It focuses on the personality of radical preacher Alparslan Kuytul. Main theses: Western civilisation is inherently hostile to Muslim civilisation. The only way is a Muslim revival. A Muslim cannot follow Western laws, for this will inevitably lead to a violation of the canons of Islam. Compromises are impossible. Therefore, it is necessary to be in opposition to the Western system of values and social practices, for example, not to take part in elections and to deny democracy as such. With regard to the possibility of using violence, Kuytul took a certain point: violence can be renounced now, but the preacher does not rule out the "necessity" of using it in the future if, in his opinion, the foundations of Islam are threatened.¹³¹ It is this fact that is identified by the German security services as a potential danger and is the reason for the surveillance of Furkan.

Tablighi Jamaat is the largest Islamic network in the world (80 million people), founded in India and spreading in Asia, the Middle East and partly in Europe, mainly in the UK. In some countries

¹²⁹ Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüs, URL: <https://www.igmg.org/>

¹³⁰ Sehitlik-Moschee: Neuer Vorstand: "Ich möchte keine Politisierung". TAZ, 13.02.2017, URL: <https://taz.de/ehitlik-Moschee-Neuer-Vorstand/15380449/>

¹³¹ Ministerium des Innern NRW. URL: <https://www.im.nrw/furkan-gemeinschaft>

of the world this community is recognised as extremist and banned, for example in Russia. "Tablighi had individual representatives in West Germany as early as the 1960s, but the structures as such emerged in the 2000s. Cells of activists have been noted in Berlin, Hanover, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich and Bochum. Experts note that even today the group's networks in Germany are quite unstable and cannot be called a unified organism. "Tablighi" professes an extremely conservative form of Islam, according to which the only righteous way of life of a Muslim can only be the most accurate observance of the commandments of the Koran, which includes dress, food, behaviour, denial of democracy and everything "Western", minimal contact with non-Muslims and other strict restrictions. The goal is the "return of true Islam," the Ummah. Formally "Tablighi" declare their apolitical¹³² and are not noted in terrorist activities, but they continue to appear in the reports of special services, both because of their radical outlook and because of active recruitment of supporters, mostly young German Muslim residents from disadvantaged families and poor social strata of society. Specialists draw parallels with Furkan. Both groups in Germany do not rely on terror. However, their activists are sufficiently radicalised, deny a value system that does not conform to their ideas, and are strongly influenced by preachers who may change their strategy over time. This is recognised as dangerous.

German security services separately identify the so-called **legalist structures of Islamists**. These are, as a rule, officially registered NGOs, self-help groups, cultural associations and religious communities that exist in a legal public space and have the right to organise events, activities, conduct worship services, Quran recitation courses, etc. A classic example of such an organisation is the radical **Islamic Centre Hamburg**. It is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, its activists profess a similar ideology, but it is to a large extent an independent structure.

Information on the number of these and other organisations in 2020-2021 can be found in the summary table of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution report¹³³ :

Organisation	2020	2021

¹³² Hamburg. Behörde für Inneres und Sport. URL: <https://www.hamburg.de/innenbehoerde/islamismus/511912/tabligh-i-jama-at/>

¹³³ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2022-06-07-verfassungsschutzbericht-2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

Islamic State, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Shabab, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham	No precise data	No precise data
Salafists	12.150	11.900
Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan	160	160
Hezbollah	1.250	1.250
Muslim Brotherhood/Muslim Community in Germany	1.450	1.450
Hamas	450	450
Turkish Hezbollah	400	400
Tablighi Jamaat	650	550
Islamic Centre Hamburg	No precise data	No precise data
Milli-Gerus and adjoining organisations	10.000	10.000
Furkan Community	400	400
Caliphate State	--	700
Others	1.250	330

The war in Ukraine and its impact on xenophobia and minority situation

The start of large-scale military operations in Ukraine in February 2022 has led to an aggravation of the situation in the migrant communities of people from the USSR and post-Soviet states in Germany. Up to four million people with "post-Soviet migrant roots" live in the FRG. They hold

different political positions, which could not but cause conflicts. The number of potential participants in conflict situations has statistically increased since the arrival in the country during 2022 of citizens of various states directly involved in the war or perceived to be involved. The activity of various NGOs, informal associations, and social media communities conducting offline activities increased sharply. The German authorities generally allowed demonstrations of various political orientations, imposing only certain restrictions on symbols that were either prohibited by law or could serve as a source of provocation or insult. The public demonstration of the "Z" symbol used to mark Russian military equipment in the war against Ukraine was prohibited. After the ban, public display of the symbol became an offence under the previously existing § 140 StGB ("approval and justification of crimes") within the meaning of approval of aggressive war in public space", punishable by a monetary fine or imprisonment for up to three years. For example, an FRG citizen of Russian origin who appeared at work wearing clothes with the symbol was sentenced to a fine of 1,500 euros.¹³⁴ In another case (placing the symbol on a private car), the fine was EUR 4,000.¹³⁵

In 2022, for the first time, **data on offences related to the war in Ukraine** appeared in the state federal statistics. There were 5,510 such offences recorded. The report cites the categories of "approval of criminal acts" (1,169), property damage (613), and insults (194).¹³⁶ The real data may be much higher. For example, the Berlin police response to the parliamentary enquiry reports 3,250 offences in which at least one Ukrainian citizen was injured. However, the police could not clarify what percentage of these crimes were "politically motivated" and what percentage had a non-political background.¹³⁷ The media also published state-specific police data on crimes with a clear anti-Ukrainian political motivation for various periods. For example, from April to June 2022, 38 such crimes were committed in Brandenburg.¹³⁸ Police and human rights activists have noted facts

¹³⁴ Christoph Hasselbach, Vom Z-Symbol bis zum Hakenkreuz: verbotene Kennzeichen, Deutsche Welle, 22.03.2023, URL: <https://www.dw.com/de/vom-z-symbol-bis-zum-hakenkreuz-verbotene-kennzeichen/a-65075915>

¹³⁵ Rechtsprechung AG Hamburg, 25.10.2022, DE JURE, URL: <https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=240+Cs+121%2F22>

¹³⁶ 58.916 Delikte im Jahr. Kriminalität auf Höchststand, TAZ, URL: <https://taz.de/58916-Delikte-im-Jahr-2022/!5932762/>

¹³⁷ Seit Kriegsbeginn: 3250 Straftaten gegen Ukrainer in Berlin, Berliner Zeitung, 30.30.2023, URL: <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/3250-straftaten-gegen-ukrainer-in-berlin-viele-korperverletzungen-li.333110>

¹³⁸ Marion Kaufmann, Ermittlungen wegen Verwendung des Z-Symbols: Ukrainische Geflüchtete in Brandenburg beleidigt und bedroht, Tagesspiegel, 17.01.2023, URL:

of discrimination against both Russian-speakers, i.e. the entire community of German residents for whom Russian is their native language or one of the main communication tools, and citizens of Russia and Belarus.¹³⁹ Facts of discrimination that are not offences within the meaning of criminal and administrative law are much more difficult to record. For example, many complaints are received from citizens of Russia and Belarus about discrimination in the banking sector. NPO representatives have to distinguish between discriminatory actions and compliance with EU sanctions against these citizens.

The coronosceptic movement

Despite the fact that the German Federal Government and the heads of the Länder pursued, in comparison with a number of other states, a relatively mild strategy of sanitary and epidemiological restrictions in the fight against the spread of COVID-19 and abandoned a number of measures used in the EU, Russia and Asia (no electronic control of citizens' movement, virtually no restrictions on movement per se, masks in open spaces were mandatory only for a short period of time and on a small number of streets within major cities), it quickly gained a relative mass appeal and also quickly entered the political scene. It quickly gained relative mass popularity and just as quickly withdrew from the political scene. In Germany, systemic opponents of government restrictive measures to combat the spread of COVID-19 are commonly referred to as Querdenker ("those who think differently").

As the pandemic spread, restrictive measures were introduced in the first half of 2020 in the Federal Republic of Germany, such as the closure of schools, kindergartens, playgrounds and a number of shops, the restriction of personal contact in the home, and the requirement to wear a medical mask in closed rooms and on public transport. Already in mid-March 2020, various activist groups began demonstrating to criticise the first measures introduced. In Stuttgart, the first organised coronasceptic group "Querdenken 711" was formed. Critics put forward conspiracy theories about the state's desire to "establish a dictatorship" and "total population control", denied

<https://www.tagesspiegel.de/potsdam/brandenburg/ermittlungen-wegen-verwendung-des-z-symbols-ukrainische-gefluchtete-in-brandenburg-beleidigt-und-bedroht-9188061.html>

¹³⁹ Anne Jenton, Wegen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Anfeindungen gegen Deutsche aus Russland: So bekommen Betroffene Hilfe, SWR, 09.03.2022, URL:

<https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/baden-wuerttemberg/diskriminierung-deutsche-aus-russland-100.html>

the existence of the virus or significantly downplayed its danger, drew parallels between the sanitary restrictions and the persecution of Jews in the "Third Reich", and opposed vaccination. Between 2020 and 2021, coronasceptics managed to organise eight relatively large demonstrations in Berlin alone. Notable actions also took place in Munich, Hanover, Bremen, Stuttgart, Dresden and other cities across the country.

Experts noted a high degree of heterogeneity of the movement. Not all participants in the demonstrations supported all the above theses, regularly took part in protests, and shared radical positions. There were divergences in every point. For example, on the issue of vaccination, along with categorical opponents of vaccines as such ("anti-vaccinationists"), some activists were exclusively against vaccination of children, while allowing it for adults; others insisted on longer testing of vaccines; others denied compulsory vaccination and any social pressure, but accepted vaccination on a voluntary basis; others expected "familiar" vaccines, refusing new varieties. The attitude to conspiracy theories was also ambiguous among coronasceptics. A certain percentage of participants joined the actions on an ad hoc basis, guided by personal fears, fears of losing their jobs or losing their usual way of life. However, the unifying factors included **distrust of the authorities, the media and "classical" medicine, opposition to restrictive measures, regardless of the alleged "goals" of the government, as well as downplaying the danger of the virus.**

Some Coronasceptics resorted to violence. Two cases were the most high-profile. In September 2021, an employee of a petrol station in Idar-Oberstein in south-west Germany **was killed**. A visitor responded to the clerk's request to wear a legally mandated medical mask by firing a fatal shot into the victim's head.¹⁴⁰ In December 2021, a Coronasceptic activist **killed** his wife and three children at his home in Königs-Wusterhausen near Berlin before committing suicide.¹⁴¹ "The "cause" of the tragedy was the exposure of forged vaccination certificates in the family's possession. The killer was found to have believed in conspiracy theories, particularly a "worldwide Jewish conspiracy" and vaccination as "a step towards establishing Jewish domination". Verbal and physical violence was inflicted on doctors and nurses, employees of vaccination centres, and

¹⁴⁰ Christian Gehrke. Tankwart erschossen: Täter fühlt sich "stark belastet" von Corona-Situation, Berliner Zeitung, 20.09.2021, URL: <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/staatsanwalt-tankstellen-kassierer-wegen-corona-maske-erschossen-li.184058>

¹⁴¹ Mord in Königs Wusterhausen. Familienvater war in "Querdenker"-Kreisen unterwegs, N-TV, 08.12.2021, URL: <https://www.n-tv.de/panorama/Familienvater-war-in-Querdenker-Kreisen-unterwegs-article22986752.html>

municipal politicians who supported the vaccination campaign and restrictive measures.¹⁴² There have also been arson attacks on vaccination centres, for example in September 2021 in Saxony.¹⁴³ In April 2021, representatives of Reporters Without Borders stated that the majority of all attacks on journalists at that time occurred at Coronasceptic demonstrations.¹⁴⁴

As mentioned above, Coronasceptics did not have a single ideological platform, so it would be wrong to classify them all as supporters of a particular ideology. Nevertheless, right-wing extremists and populists became not only regular participants in coronasceptic actions (with the connivance of the organisers), displaying right-wing radical symbols such as the "Imperial Flag", but also allies of seemingly "moderate" coronasceptics in their struggle against the state and society, most of whom do not share their postulates. The most striking example was the aforementioned breaking of the police cordon and the symbolic "occupation" of the steps of the Reichstag building during the coronasceptic demonstration in August 2020.¹⁴⁵ Right-wing extremists from the "Citizens of the Reich" grouping under the "Imperial Flag" took an active part in it. Politicians from the AdG, the Third Way, the Right, the NPDG and activists from anti-migrant right-wing extremist movements such as Pegida took part in other actions. In particular, Lutz Bachmann, the founder of Pegida, was particularly active at the rallies.¹⁴⁶ The slogan put forward by one of the Third Way representatives, "The **system** is more dangerous than a coronavirus", became popular in coronasceptic circles. The media reported on the close ties of significant figures in the coronasceptic movement, such as the founder of Querdenker 711, entrepreneur Michael Ballweg, to the AdG, the far-right group Resistance 2020 and Pegida.¹⁴⁷ Ballweg, as well as another leader of the "Querdenkers", the doctor and blogger Udo Schiffmann,

¹⁴² Ärztekammer beklagt "neue Qualität von Hass" wegen Coronaimpfungen, Ärzteblatt, 22.10.2021, URL: <https://www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/128390/Aerztekammer-beklagt-neue-Qualitaet-von-Hass-wegen-Coronaimpfungen>

¹⁴³ Tobias Utz, Brandanschlag auf Corona-Impfzentrum - Flucht in roter Limousine, Merkur, 15.09.2021, URL: <https://www.merkur.de/welt/sachsen-brandanschlag-corona-impfzentrum-treuen-polizei-einsatz-zr-90981951.html>

¹⁴⁴ "Reporter ohne Grenzen"-Liste. Pressefreiheit nur noch "zufriedenstellend" , Tagesschau, 20.04.2021, URL: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rog-pressefreiheit-deutschland-corona-101.html>

¹⁴⁵ Proteste in Berlin Fast 40,000 Menschen bei Corona-Demos - Sperren am Reichstag durchbrochen, RBB, 20.08.2020, URL: https://www.rbb24.de/politik/thema/2020/coronavirus/beitraege_neu/2020/08/demonstrationen-samstag-corona-querdenken-gegendemos.html

¹⁴⁶ Main Baumgärtner u.a., Wut und Wahnsinn, Spiegel, Heft 20, 09.05.2020, URL: https://medienblog.hypothesen.org/files/2020/05/Wut-und-Wahnsinn_SPIEGEL-20.pdf

¹⁴⁷ Tilman Steffen, Corona-Proteste: Sie wollen sich anstecken dürfen , DIE ZEIT, 09.05.2020, URL: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2020-05/coronavirus-proteste-demonstrationen-infektionsschutz-einschraenkungen/komplettansicht>

repeated the theses of the extreme right: the "system" is to blame for everything and must be abolished, i.e. democracy replaced by authoritarianism, the media "manipulated" and "silenced", the "inability" of the democrats to carry out public administration in Germany, anti-Semitic statements about a "world conspiracy", etc. Ballweg met with representatives of the "Reichsbürger" in order to co-ordinate common action.¹⁴⁸ It is interesting to note that in February-March 2022, a number of the frontmen of the "Querdenkers", Stoffmann, former TV moderator Eva Hermann and entrepreneur Michael Wendler, expressed support or understanding of Russia's actions to varying degrees. Narratives close to the Kremlin have also become popular among the rank and file of the former Coronasceptic movement.

Conclusions

1. The two key events of this period, the **war and the pandemic, had the greatest impact** both on German society as a whole and on the radicalised part of it.
2. **On the extreme right wing, the AdG retains its leadership**, although this party has lost its popularity in certain periods. **Its rating is situational and unstable.** No other political party in Germany showed such a "spread" of results in different elections, from 4 to 20 per cent. The **AdG continues to radicalise in the far-right direction.** Party representatives openly violate taboos and informal social agreements of the FRG, such as the inadmissibility of revanchism and relativism. Whereas previously pro-Russian and anti-Russian, more nationalist groups competed within the party, now most AdG spokespersons are to varying degrees pro-Kremlin. In general, the far-right and right-wing populists express pro-Russian views to attract new supporters. "Traditional" far-right parties have finally become marginalised. The new right-wing extremist parties have failed to expand their influence in society and are unable to compete with the AdG, which allows this party to retain its core electorate.
3. **No special changes (qualitative or quantitative) were observed on the extreme left flank.** No new influential actors have emerged. Already established left-extremist movements are trying to respond to the changed agenda, but have no electoral success.

¹⁴⁸ Stefan Tomik, Rüdiger Soldt, Querdenker und Reichsbürger, Audienz bei König Peter I., FAZ, 26.11.2020, URL: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/querdenker-um-michael-ballweg-treffen-reichsbuerger-peter-fitzek-17070780.html>

4. **Islamist structures continue to be operational.** It is not always the case that the official liquidation of certain organisations (their branches in Germany) leads to the cessation of activities or at least to a marked decrease in membership.
5. **The number of German residents with strong far-right views continues to decline. Nevertheless, the number of people who latently support one or another type of xenophobia remains at a high level. The percentage of people who share intolerance towards minorities to a greater or lesser degree is relatively stable. The most negative attitude is towards asylum seekers.**
6. In Germany, a **significant number of programmes are in place** at the national, state and municipal levels **aimed at strengthening tolerance, mutual understanding between different population groups and their involvement in democratic processes.** Targeted programmes are also in place for migrant communities. The projects also aim to combat radical manifestations and to create "niches" in society where extremist cells could potentially form. **The programmes have shown some results, but there is no mechanism that could unambiguously assess the effectiveness of each programme individually and of all projects as a whole in** relation to specific social groups.
7. The migration of **refugees from Ukraine** to Germany in 2022 has resulted **in some difficulties in** accommodation and social security for these people. A number of issues continue to be acute, such as finding accommodation and the recognition of foreign diplomas. However, the state and society as a whole have managed to find an answer to the challenges. The experience in accommodation of refugees from Syria in 2015-2016 and the readiness of the population to help played a significant role.
8. **The Coronasceptic movement** gained relative popularity and mass appeal in a short period of time, but failed to formalise into a political party or a stable social movement. As the restrictive measures were lifted, it **lost its significance.** Some of the movement's activists, having come into contact with far-right circles in 2020-2021, remained close to them, while others became apolitical again.
9. Coronasceptic networks have shown that **there is considerable protest potential in German society,** especially in the area of conspiracy and "alternative" perceptions of political processes. **Government agencies have not always been able to conduct an effective information campaign,** convince as many citizens as possible of the need for restrictive measures, the dangers of the coronavirus and solidarity with the most vulnerable groups.

10. **There is a strong majority in German society that denies racism.** However, certain specific measures, such as renaming streets and schools, are often viewed with scepticism.

Recommendations

1. **The General Equality Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) should be further amended by expanding and clarifying the catalogue of discriminatory acts and the criteria for defining them.** The law can be amended by a simple majority in the Bundestag. The format of the current coalition (Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals) is well suited to do so. The changes should be broader than the already adopted 2022 amendments, which "only" (without belittling the issues) expanded the rights of the Anti-Discrimination Commissioners.
2. **The "Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz" (Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz, LADG) should be used as a basis for adopting similar legislation in other federal states.** This is the opinion of both the state and city anti-discrimination commissioners and representatives of NGOs. The practical application of the law in Berlin has shown its effectiveness. The fears of conservatives that police work would be paralysed have proved unfounded.
3. **It is advisable to expand the use of the integration planning tool at the grassroots level.** A number of municipalities, e.g. Hildesheim, Göppingen and Karlsruhe, the counties of Kelheim and Ober-Algäu in Bavaria and others, approve their own Integration Plan, taking into account the peculiarities of a particular locality or region. Combined with the integration programmes of the federation and the state, it allows for more effective coordination and implementation of individual projects. This practice could be extended to all German municipalities.
4. Federalism and the special powers of the Länder have traditionally played an important role in German politics. Nevertheless, it is possible to **synchronise legislation and harmonise anti-discrimination and minority rights regulations** in all 16 Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany.

5. It is crucial to more **actively involve civil society organisations, interest representations and outside experts in the development of legislation to combat discrimination and protect the rights of minorities.** Positive examples already exist. In drafting the Law on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crimes 2021, mentioned in the text, expert assessments helped legislators to break the deadlock and find the most acceptable and workable wording. The example of the 2022 government plan "Live Queer" mentioned in the text, in the process of drafting which not only experts but also NGOs more broadly became full-fledged creators of the endeavour, participated in its development and were given seats in working groups, shows that this format of interaction between the government and society is extremely effective. It makes it possible to avoid mistakes in laws, regulations and government programmes, to take into account the interests of all public groups that will be affected in specific cases.
6. In a broader sense, it is advisable to **organise public debates on draft laws, because the bills being** introduced are published in advance on the websites of the Bundestag and Landtags. In almost all regions of Germany, along with NGOs and the expert community, there are Foreigners' Councils (Ausländerbeirat), which include activists with migration backgrounds, often without German citizenship, and Migration and Integration Councils (Beirat für Migration und Integration, the name may vary slightly from region to region), advisory bodies to the local executive, consisting of specialists in the field of migration recognised in the locality. Often these people have deep knowledge and extensive practical experience. The potential of these structures is underutilised. They provide local counselling services in the field of migration and integration, but could be involved in the discussion of federal and state draft laws.
7. The target group of any political endeavour is the entire population of the state. Although studies and surveys confirm a strong anti-racist and anti-fascist majority in Germany, a generally minority-friendly climate, specific programmes and activities bear a certain patina of "elitism". A relatively small number of people directly involved in and/or interested in these issues are informed about them. The state **needs to better inform the general public about** new and long-standing laws and programmes in the field of anti-discrimination and minority rights.

8. Along with information, it is considered advisable to **increase the level of involvement of the population** in these programmes, to avoid situations where only activists and experts are involved in the programmes.
9. The experience of land expert and migrant organisations shows that people with a migration background who are discriminated against are often unaware of their rights, in particular the possibility of filing an administrative or judicial complaint, contacting the local anti-discrimination ombudsman and/or the integration ombudsman. In order to change the situation, it is **necessary to inform the population as much as possible about their rights. Internet sites, mailing lists, announcements and leaflets in town halls can be used for this purpose. In addition to German, it is recommended to use the languages of national minorities** (native and/or understandable to them): Turkish, Arabic, Ukrainian, Russian, English, French, Spanish, Polish, Greek, Serbian and Croatian, possibly other languages in areas with a high concentration of members of certain diasporas. Such information campaigns should be carried out on an ongoing basis at all levels, up to the municipal level.
10. Campaign planning **should take into account the changes in Germany's migration landscape** in 2022, the arrival of "new" migrant groups, Ukrainians and Afghans from among professionals who have worked with Western public and private companies, who were particularly endangered and forced to leave their homeland after the Taliban came to power.
11. The two "new" migrant groups, Ukrainians and Afghan specialists, have considerable potential. They include a high percentage of people with higher and secondary specialised education and work experience, including in professional fields, in which there is currently a shortage of personnel in Germany. It is therefore **important to simplify and de-bureaucratise the process of recognising foreign diplomas as a matter of urgency**. This issue has been on the agenda in the Federal Republic of Germany before, but now it has become even more urgent.
12. **It is necessary to expand and modernise the network of German language courses.** It may make sense to attract retired and unemployed teachers, to apply state incentive tools for private language schools.
13. The arrival of a significant number of "new" migrants in the country has further aggravated two issues related to their accommodation. Firstly, **hostels, temporary**

accommodation centres for refugees, where newcomers live after their registration and recognition (in the case of Ukrainian citizens this happens in a short period of time and automatically, according to a simplified procedure), **should be created** not on the outskirts of settlements, in isolated conditions, but **in places where there is infrastructure and the possibility of communication with the population**. It is not always "convenient" for local politicians in terms of public opinion, but it is difficult to integrate people if they live far away from public transport stops, shops, schools and kindergartens, sports grounds and halls, if there is no possibility for children, youth and adults to spend time outside the dormitory. Secondly, **integration** and, in general, a decent life in the "new" state is not **possible without living in separate housing**. There is a chronic shortage of affordable rental housing in Germany's major cities. For people with migration backgrounds, especially newcomers, finding a suitable flat becomes almost impossible.

14. The state **needs to fight more systematically against false statements and rumours denigrating migrants and other minorities**, creating an atmosphere of intolerance and hatred in certain public niches. New legislation provides a broader legal framework for such a fight and efforts need to be intensified. In social media in particular, a considerable number of anti-Semitic, racist, Islamophobic and other myths are circulating. Fictitious stories about alleged "crimes" "committed" by migrants and "concealed by the authorities and the media" are widespread. The administration of social networks is far from always quick and objective in examining incoming complaints, limiting themselves to automatic checks and formal replies about allegedly not found violations. In the German-speaking segment of the Internet, German government agencies need to be more active in combating dangerous fakes and exposing inaccurate information.
15. In the fight against Islamism, it is important to **support Muslim communities** and individual clerics who oppose radicals and preach Islam as a religion of peace. Often state support is limited to financial injections and formal visits by politicians. Federal and state resources in a broader sense could help counter extremism, the infiltration of radicals into the Muslim milieu, the recruitment of new migrants and socially disadvantaged youth, and increase the effectiveness of educational programmes.

16. A large number of integration and anti-discrimination projects are being implemented at the federal, state and municipal level. The conditions for applying for funding for such projects are quite transparent. However, bureaucratic barriers related to reporting and documentation prevent new and "under-professional" NPOs from competing successfully with established, long-established organisations with sufficient staff, including accountants with experience. **Debureaucratisation and projects with small funding** could increase the chances of "newcomers" with direct contact with target groups to obtain funds to implement projects that, due to a number of peculiarities, may be more difficult for large and long-established NPOs to implement.