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Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism and Hate Speech in 2017-18 in Ukraine

(Report on the program "Xenophobia, radicalism and hate crimes in Europe, 2017-18")

In 2017, a number of changes in legislation were adopted that affected the interests of minorities in Ukraine during the year. The impact is very significant and concerns such sensitive aspects of human rights as the language of education and language quotas in the media. On September 28, 2017 a new law **“On Education”** came into force in this country.¹ The most acute problem with this law is the question of the language of education in Ukraine. The law introduces an actual ban on education in any language other than Ukrainian. From 2018, the teaching of subjects in the languages of national minorities will only be available in elementary schools. Four hundred thousand children will not be able to receive education in their native language.

From grade 5, the teaching of subjects in the languages of national minorities is almost completely eliminated. As of 2020, education in Ukraine will exclusively in Ukrainian. Only subjects such as foreign languages, literature, and folklore will be taught in the languages of national minorities.

17 per cent of Ukrainian citizens are Russians, 0.5 per cent are Belarusians, Moldovans and Crimean Tatars.

Under these conditions, the denial of the right to study in their native language in schools means depriving millions of Ukrainian citizens of basic human rights. More than 20 per cent of Ukrainian citizens are not ethnic Ukrainians, and for more than a third of Ukrainian citizens Ukrainian is not their native language.

This worsens the quality of education and of the preparation of children in general. According to the findings of international organizations and researchers, teaching a child in a non-native language impairs the realization of his potential by 20-30 per cent.

Another example of discrimination against national minorities is the introduction of language quotas in broadcasting and mass media. In 2016, language quotas were introduced on the radio. In 2017, it was the turn of television.

In October 2017, the Law “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Language of Audiovisual (Electronic) Mass Media on Language Quotas on Television” came into force.² According to the new law, at least 75 per cent of the content on the national channels should be in

¹ <https://strana.ua/news/95502-osnovnye-novovvedeniya-zakona-ob-obrazovanii.html>.

² <https://rian.com.ua/analytics/20171013/1028501197.html>.

Ukrainian. In October 2017, the law “On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Language of Audiovisual (Electronic) Mass Media and on Language Quotas on Television” came into force. According to the new law, at least 75 per cent of content on national channels should be in Ukrainian. This rule does not apply to all air time, but to the interval from 7 to 10 pm (or prime time). That is, only 25 per cent of broadcasting during this time can be conducted in any language other than Ukrainian.

For local TV channels, the quota is lower - only 60 per cent of broadcasting should be conducted in the state language during the same time interval of 7 to 10 pm. For TV channels broadcasting in indigenous languages, the mandatory share is reduced even more - up to 30 per cent. Films and TV series now need to be released in Ukrainian, and films made in the USSR must be released with Ukrainian subtitles. For each violation the channel will now be fined 5 per cent of the amount of the license fee.

Language quotas are, in many ways, a unique phenomenon for European legislation. Legal restrictions on consumed content will deprive millions of Ukrainian citizens, who are ethnic minorities, of access to information in their native language. This law was another step toward limiting the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens.

The presence of any positive, non-discriminatory changes in the Ukrainian legislation in 2017 cannot be established. On the contrary, all steps of Ukrainian parliamentarians are aimed at restricting and narrowing the rights of national minorities in this country. The reason lies in the constant radicalization of Ukrainian social and political life after 2014 and the upcoming 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.

2. Law enforcement practices.

Since 2014, practices of Ukrainian law enforcement toward minorities have changed for the worse. Representatives of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other minorities are under pressure from the state and from radicals.

On March 3, 2017, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting closed *Radio Vesti*.³ The National Council members unanimously refused to issue a broadcast license to this station. On February 23, the National Council refused to issue a broadcast license for Kharkiv to the station.

The reason for the closure of the radio station was 4 warnings of the National Council, issued earlier. *Radio Vesti* produced materials mainly in Russian, and the editorial team was rather critical of the current government. With the revocation of the broadcast license in Kharkiv, the National Council ignored the court decision made the day earlier. According to this decision, the National Council was forbidden to make any decisions regarding the application of the company for the extension of the license for broadcast in Kharkiv. However, the National Council ignored the court decision, thus violating Art. 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Failure to Comply with

³ <https://vesti-ukr.com/strana/228105-natssovet-zakryl-radio-vesti>.

a Court Decision.” The regulator appealed to the “two warnings” that were issued by Radio News. However, the radio station at that time had only one warning and one penalty.⁴

In connection with the blocking of the office of the TV Channel *NewsOne* by representatives of radical nationalist organizations in December 2017, the National Council formally spoke in support of the freedom of expression; however, the Council has supported imposing certain limits on this freedom: “[i]n connection with the situation caused by statements in live broadcast of the owner of the *NewsOne* Channel, the National Council fully supports the words of the President of Ukraine about the inadmissibility of ‘playing along with the Russian propaganda, including in such matters as the evaluation of the Revolution of Virtue,’” the regulator said in a statement.

The National Council also requested an extension of powers for a more effective fight against sedition in the media. “This will allow us to quickly regulate the information space and will prevent any unpunished statements or any information policy that denies the territorial integrity of Ukraine or questioning such outstanding events as the Revolution of Dignity,” the National Council said in a statement.⁵

The National Broadcasting Council also penalizes the media outlets that are found to be in non-compliance with language quotas. For example, on November 10, 2017, the regulator fined *Radio Lux FM* 50,5 thousand hryvnias.

The radio station was convicted of non-compliance with quotas for broadcasting Ukrainian songs in the state (Ukrainian) language. During the monitoring of the broadcaster, the National Council established that the share of songs in the state language on the *Lux FM* air from 7 am to 2 pm was 23.5 per cent, while the law on television and radio broadcasting required at least 25 per cent.⁶

In the field of education, there has also been discriminatory law enforcement practices toward minorities. Thus, the adoption of the law on education, which actually cancels the right to education by citizens of Ukraine in the languages of national minorities, has stirred discontent of the Hungarian community of Transcarpathia.

The rector of the Hungarian university in the region, Ildiko Oros, said: “We believe that the dark Stalinist times have returned to Ukraine, a country that calls itself a democracy. This caused outrage when the Ukrainian parliament passed a law violating the constitutional rights of minorities, such as the Hungarians of Transcarpathia, for example.” The Hungarian Foreign Minister labelled the reform a “backstabbing of the Hungarian diaspora in Ukraine.”⁷ According to the new law, education in middle and high schools will now be in Ukrainian.

⁴ <https://vesti-ukr.com/politika/226879-natssovet-sovershil-uholovnoe-prestuplenie-lishiv-radio-vesti-litsenzii-na-veshchanie-v-kharkove>.

⁵ <https://newsone.ua/news/politics/situaciya-vokrug-newsone-nacrada-vystupila-za-usilenie-svoix-polnomochij.html>.

⁶ <https://www.unian.net/society/2237066-radio-lyuks-fm-oshtrafovali-na-505-tyisyach-griven-za-nesoblyudenie-yazykovyih-kvot.html>.

⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-russian-41265262>.

Therefore, after studying in their own native language in elementary school (grades 1-4), children will be forced to switch to Ukrainian in middle school. This is a big problem for the Hungarians, who constitute at least 10 per cent of the population of Transcarpathia (at least one hundred fifty thousand people). In some areas, for example, in Beregovsk, 76 per cent of the population are ethnic Hungarians.

According to the Ministry of Education, 16,000 Hungarian children study at 71 Hungarian schools. The country has seen a decrease in the number of schools that educate children in the languages of national minorities.

In 2004, there were 74 Hungarian schools in Ukraine, with 19,000 students enrolled in them. The number of schools where education took place in Ukrainian and Hungarian decreased from 30 schools in 2004 to 26 in 2017. The number of students studying the Hungarian language has decreased from 1,454 in 2004 to 1,110 in 2017.

The new law on education has worsened the situation not only for Hungarians. All national minorities suffered from it. There has been a decrease in the number of schools with training or learning in languages of national minorities. The number of students whose native language is not Ukrainian or who learn a minority language is decreasing.

Over 355,000 students in 581 Russian schools study in **Russian**. It is important to note that it is the Russian-speaking schools that most often get closed in Ukraine. So, if in 2004 there **were 1,555 Russian schools** in Ukraine, then by 2017 their number **decreased threefold**, to **581**. The number of schools where children study both in Russian and Ukrainian has **decreased from 2,121 in 2004 to 542 in 2017**. The number of students studying in Russian decreased from 1.2 million in 2004 to 355,000 in 2017. The number of students studying the Russian language has decreased from 1.5 million in 2004 to 919,000 in 2017.

There are 16,000 children in **75 Romanian schools**. In 2004, **there were 95 Romanian schools** in Ukraine, with **26,000 students** enrolled in them. The number of schools where education took place in Ukrainian and Romanian increased from **eight schools in 2004 to 20 in 2017**. The number of students studying the Romanian language has decreased from **174,000 in 2004 to 4,000 in 2017**.

One thousand seven hundred eighty five **children** are enrolled in **five Polish schools**. In 2004 in Ukraine there were **five Polish schools, 1,418 pupils** enrolled in them. The number of schools in which education took place in the Ukrainian and Polish languages decreased from two schools in 2004 to one in 2017. The number of pupils studying Polish has increased from **5,533 in 2004 to 45,900 in 2017**.

There are **2,693 pupils in three Moldovan schools**. In 2004, there were eight Moldovan schools in Ukraine, with 6,128 students enrolled in these schools. The number of schools in which education took place in Ukrainian and Moldovan increased from four schools in 2004 to 10 in 2017. The number of pupils studying the Moldovan language increased from **1,335 in 2004 to 2,474 in 2017**.

At the moment, **there is not a single Crimean Tatar school in Ukraine**. In 2004, **there were 14 of them**, with **4,797 students** attending these schools. By 2014, there were 15 Crimean Tatar schools, in which there were 5,551 students. All these schools remain in Crimea after the Russian annexation. **26,500 students** studied in these schools **in 2004**. By **2014, there were 12,700 students**, and in 2017 **only 340 students**.

After the adoption of the new law on secondary education, the situation of national minorities in Ukraine will only become worse, since, in its essence, this law is discriminating against national minorities.

3. Xenophobia and Hatred Among Government Representatives

Since 2014, representatives of the executive and legislative power of Ukraine have been actively expressing xenophobia and hatred against representatives of national, linguistic, religious, and other minorities. The reason is the sharp radicalization of Ukrainian social and political life in the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution and the fighting in the eastern regions of the country.

In 2017, a number of manifestations of xenophobia and hatred among representatives of the executive and legislative power of Ukraine were recorded, namely:

On March 27, 2017, the People's Deputy and the national hero of Ukraine Nadezhda Savchenko, using an ethnic slur for Jews, made the following anti-Semitic comments: "I have nothing against the Jews. I am against the 'Zhidy,'" Then she continued, "I have repeatedly said that there are no bad peoples. There are bad individuals in every nation." She then argued that "Ukraine cannot be considered an anti-Semitic country since "Jews, who constitute two percent of the Ukrainian population, occupy 80 per cent of power in the country." The attempt to separate the "Jews" from the "Zhidy" looks frankly absurd, since the aim is to promote hatred towards the Jewish people. Equally absurd is the statement that Jews hold 80 percent of power in Ukraine.⁸ It can be assumed that MP Savchenko is trying to blame Jews for the troubles of Ukrainians.

On June 23, 2017, the chief editor of the popular news website strana.ua, Igor Guzhva, was detained by law enforcement officers. The Prosecutor General's Office accused him of extortion of a bribe in the amount of \$10,000 in return for agreeing to not publish certain compromising information. However, based on the statements of some officials, Guzhva's detention was politically motivated. Reporting on Guzhva's detention, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Yuriy Lutsenko, posted the following statement on his Facebook page: "Finally, I found out the truth. According to the GFS and the prosecutor's office, police detained Guzhva, who demanded and received \$10,000 for not publishing compromising information."⁹ As follows from the above, Guzhva is in fact detained for the criminal case, but the Prosecutor General writes that the chief editor of strana.ua simply lied and, therefore, deserves to be punished. This position is obviously far from legal accuracy and impartiality. Needless to say, there were no negative repercussions from the authorities for the prosecutor general for his biased and hateful position on this matter.

⁸ <https://vesti-ukr.com/politika/231689-ja-ne-ljublju-zhidov-ikh-vo-vlasti-80-savchenko-otmetilas-ocherednym-antisemitskim-zajavleniem>.

⁹ <https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3864404-rasprava-vly-zakonnoe-delo-reaktsiya-na-arest-huzhvy>.

Commenting on Guzhva's case, Ukrainian People's Deputy and Head of the 'People's Front' faction in the Verkhovna Rada Maxim Burbak stated: "Last night, another can of the Kremlin's canned food was opened, the one which took bribes for publishing numerous fakes in the media."

Thus, with one "witty" phrase, Burbak was inciting hatred for a journalist who is critical of the government. The People's Deputy was undoubtedly pleased with the prosecution of Guzhva. There were no negative legal consequences for the MP for his words.

Another People's Deputy and the adviser to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Anton Gerashchenko, was also inciting hatred while commenting on the case of Guzhva. Geraschenko stated on his Facebook page that "yes, this is a struggle! This is a fight against freedom to lie with impunity, spreading lies and destroying one's own country for money recompense. This one was the first one to go. And the others, those who trade with slander and falsehood, will go after him."¹⁰

In his statement, Gerashchenko called journalists liars and accused them of destroying their own country. The MP also threatened journalists with new persecutions. Geraschenko never faced any negative consequences for his hate speech.

On October 10, 2017, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, said that only intelligence officers and spies could travel to Russia: "When a country is recognized as an aggressor, only spooks and spies can go there. If one is a spook, we will find a way to transport him there. If one is a spy, then I think there is nothing for us to do when he performs some direct functions there. Unfortunately, the 'fifth column,' funded by the Russian special services, is actively working towards destabilizing the situation in our country."¹¹

From these comments it transpires that Turchynov considers millions of Ukrainian citizens who go to Russia to study, work, on personal business, and so on, to be Russian spies. Such an attitude towards ordinary people, citizens of their country, is a manifestation of hatred and discrimination. After all, there is no official prohibition for Ukrainians to travel to Russia.

On the same day, Turchynov also made another pronouncement related to 'Russian spies': "Everyone who cooperates with Russia will be shot down. There are no other options. When to shoot? We will discuss this separately."¹²

However, in the absence of a declared war and lawlessness, such statements by the Secretary of the National Security Council essentially open the way to reprisals against dissidents and the opposition, but also those Ukrainian citizens who study and work in Russia. After all, their activities in Russia may well be interpreted as support of Russia. There were no administrative or legal consequences to Turchynov in the aftermath of these radical statements.

¹⁰ <https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3864380-delo-huzhvy-heraschenko-poobeschal-novye-zaderzhaniya>.

¹¹ <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/10/2017/59dcd28b9a7947d5280aa7e8>.

¹² <https://strana.ua/news/104337-turchinov-zajavil-o-hotovnosti-k-rasstreلام-ukraintsev-kotorye-sotrudnichajut-s-rossiej.html>.

On September 23, 2017, an MP from the Popular Front, Viktor Yelensky, gave an interview,¹³ in which he discussed the situation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). In the interview, he repeatedly accused the Russian Diocese of supporting the war in the Donbas and of cooperation with the Russian special services. The people's deputy incited hatred in relations with the largest confessional group of Ukraine. According to opinion polls, about 12 million Ukrainian citizens are parishioners of the UOC-MP.

On November 13, 2017, the People's Deputy Irina Gerashchenko spoke out against the suppression of the facts pertaining to the instances of the violation of women's rights. As an example, she used the case of an alleged attempt by a drunken DPR militiaman to rape a female OSCE SMM observer: "[t]his ugly episode represents the whole mentality of the Orthodox 'Russian world,' which, unfortunately, is present in the minds of many Ukrainian politicians when it comes to women."¹⁴ The people's deputy collectively accused the Orthodox people and the Russians, implying that they drink and rape women. While rape and other crimes occur during all wars, Gerashchenko attributed them exclusively to the Russians and the Orthodox people. As in other cases, there were no punitive consequences for the MP because of this hateful position.

On December 2, 2017, the People's Deputy from the Popular Front, Dmitry Tymchuk, while commenting on the situation with churches and confessions in Ukraine, stated: "This is a vivid example of how a guilty mind betrays itself. The Russian Orthodox Church and the FSB have made it plain that they are not concerned about the interests of believers. They are concerned with having total control over an extensive network of agents of influence in Ukraine."¹⁵

With these extremely incendiary accusations, which are not supported by facts, the MP is trying to incite hatred towards Orthodox believers. He equated the Russian Orthodox Church, as well the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, to the FSB.

As we can see, representatives of the legislative and executive authorities of Ukraine have repeatedly shown xenophobia and hatred in 2017. Their hate speech is directed at the political opponents, the Orthodox believers, representatives of national minorities, and so on.

4. Anti-xenophobic rhetoric of politicians.

In 2014, there was a surge in xenophobia and radical nationalism in Ukraine. Over the past four years, the situation has not improved, but, on the contrary, has only got worse. Human rights organizations, including international, as well as foreign states, have repeatedly drawn the attention of Ukrainian authorities to the rampant acts by radical nationalists operating in the country.

In order to improve the image on the international arena, primarily their own personal image, Ukrainian politicians periodically speak out against xenophobia and radical nationalism in their

¹³ <https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-society/2310888-viktor-elenskij-narodnyj-deputat-ukrainy.html>.

¹⁴ <http://gordonua.com/news/society/irina-gerashchenko-vsya-mentalnost-russkogo-mira-prisutstvuet-v-mozgah-mnogih-ukrainskih-politikov-kogda-rech-idet-o-zhenshchinah-217031.html>.

¹⁵ <http://gordonua.com/news/society/tymchuk-rpc-fsb-dali-ponyat-chto-ih-zabotyat-ne-interesy-veruyushchih-a-totalnyy-kontrol-nad-razvetlennoy-setyu-agentov-vliyaniya-v-ukraine-220092.html>.

country. However, such statements, more often than not, are but a smoke screen and do not reflect on the actual situation in the country.

On December 4, 2017, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko commented on the blockade by radical nationalists of the TV channel *NewsOne*. His comments appeared on Facebook: “Any pressure on the media and, even more so, the blockade and the disrupting of the work of broadcast and media outlets, is unacceptable. It is also unacceptable to try to justify the actions of the aggressor country (Russia), playing along with Russian propaganda, including in such matters as the assessment of the Revolution of Dignity. Sometimes, such actions are a response to the inaction of those apparatuses of power that need to respond quickly. The National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting should regulate the media space more effectively.”¹⁶

As we see, the presidential comment consists of four sentences, but just one sentence is devoted to the condemnation of the radicals. The remaining three sentences are an attempt to embellish and to justify the acts of the radicals. It would be a stretch to qualify this statement as one condemning radical nationalism.

Commenting on the blockade of the TV channel, the owner of *NewsOne*, MP Yevgeny Murayev, said: “[t]hey [the radicals] are uncomfortable when absolutely everyone can be invited to speak on the channel, although the constitution guarantees it to us. They block [*NewsOne*] and keep 200 people without food and medicine, under siege. A huge number of people in camouflage and masks, and law enforcement agencies do nothing.”¹⁷

On the night of June 13, the offices of the Opposition Bloc party in Dnipropetrovsk region were set on fire. Yuriy Boyko, one of the leaders of this party, spoke out sharply against such actions and linked the arsons with the actions of nationalists: “25,000 people took part in the celebrations at that place. And in the whole country, over a million people celebrated on May 9 by laying flowers to monuments. This was the reason for retaliation by radicals, with the full support of authorities, which do not bring them to justice,” the politician said.¹⁸

We can conclude that the statements of the Ukrainian authorities against radical nationalists and xenophobia are practically absent or not directed against the culprits as such. These statements are primarily about either the preservation of power by specific politicians, or criticism of the radicals is so mild and mixed with other statements that it has no consequences.

At the same time, opposition politicians regularly condemn radicals and nationalists and regard them as a threat to freedom and democracy in Ukraine. However, their statements remain just words. At the moment, the opposition in Ukraine is extremely weak and divided for it to have any impact on the authorities or to be able to eradicate radicalism in society.

Political analyst Kost Bondarenko spoke against the activities of the Institute of National Remembrance: “I would compare the activities of Vladimir Vyatrovich with the period of the

¹⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/petroporoshenko/posts/1156032147864509>.

¹⁷ <https://newsone.ua/news/accidents/telekanal-newsone-zablokirovali-evgenij-muraev-prokomentiroval-situaciyu-na-kanale.html>.

¹⁸ <http://podrobnosti.ua/2177217-jurij-bojko-podzhog-ofisov-oppbloka-eto-mest-za-den-pobedy.html>.

Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang. Having come to power, he ordered to burn all the books and rewrite the history of China as if it starts with his reign.”¹⁹

According to Bondarenko, the Institute under the leadership of Vyatrovich is becoming the same propaganda tool as it was previously, during Soviet times. Vyatrovich’s policy of creating new myths regarding the struggle of Nazi collaborators from Western Ukraine may not be accepted by Ukrainian society, which can generate and intensify conflicts and contradictions within the country.

The head of the Ukrainian Jewish Congress, Eduard Dolinsky, reacted sharply to the words of Oleg Skripka about those who could not learn the Ukrainian language. The famous Ukrainian musician said that “people who cannot learn the Ukrainian language have a low IQ, they are diagnosed with moronism. It is necessary to separate them, because they are dangerous to society, it is necessary to create a ghetto for them. And we will help them, as one would help people with disabilities, on a volunteer basis, we will sing the ‘Vladimirsky Central’ for them.”

In a Facebook post, Dolinsky compared the current situation with the situation of Jews in Nazi Germany: “[t]his is ordinary fascism! Skripka calls for the introduction of Nazi laws. In Nazi Germany, Jews were denied the right to a profession, to education, then were forced to emigrate, and were sent to the ghettos and concentration camps.”²⁰

In general, statements against xenophobia and radical nationalism are heard primarily from opposition politicians and experts who are critical of the authorities. Politicians working for the current government, as well as pro-government experts, rarely speak out publicly against xenophobia.

5. The State of Immigrants.

At the moment, Ukraine does not have a problem with immigrants. The severe socio-economic crisis and the ongoing war makes the country unattractive for immigration. However, this issue also needs to be considered.

The attitude of Ukrainians towards immigrants is rather reserved. According to sociological surveys, only 12.9 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept a person speaking another language as a member of their family and 23 per cent are willing to accept such a person as a close friend; 14 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept a person of another nationality as a member of their family and 23.6 per cent as a close friend; 9.1 per cent are ready to accept a person of another faith as a family member and 18.7 per cent as a close friend. At the same time, 25.6 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept a person of another faith as a citizen of their country, and 5.3 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept a person of another race as a citizen of their country; 12.4 per cent would accept such a person as a close friend, and 28.1 per cent would only accept a representative of another race as a tourist.

¹⁹ <https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20171215/1019667515.html>.

²⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/eduard.dolinsky/posts/1492568024108594>.

These numbers are taken from the report “Ukrainian Society and European Values,” prepared by the Gorshenin Institute.²¹ They provide an exhaustive picture of how the citizens of Ukraine treat people of a different nationality, race or faith.

The situation with internally displaced persons (IDPs), which appeared in Ukraine in connection with the military conflict in the Donbas, stands a bit apart. According to the official data, there are 1.494 million such persons registered in the country. In a sense, they are also migrants, even while they remain in their own country.

The largest number of IDPs was recorded in the territories controlled by Ukraine in Donetsk and Lugansk regions – 543,000 and 290,000, respectively. Despite the proximity of the frontline, people prefer to stay in their native region, where they have more friends and relatives with whom they can stay. The remaining 700,000 IDPs are dispersed across other regions of Ukraine.

The situation of IDPs is complicated by the social structure of this group of individuals. 52 per cent of them are pensioners, 15 per cent are children, 3.5 per cent are disabled, and only 27.5 per cent are of working age.²² Only a small part of IDPs have government support. In 2017, the Social Insurance Fund of Ukraine paid them 1.6 billion hryvnia, and 44 thousand people received the money.²³ That is, only 2.95 per cent of IDPs received payments. It is obvious that such a meager amount of social benefits for IDPs in the fifth year of the war is completely unacceptable.

According to the International Organization for Migration, living conditions represent the main problem for the IDPs. This question concerns 27 per cent of the interviewed migrants. Paying for rented housing is next on the list of the problems (23 per cent), followed by the problem of paying for the utility bills (20 per cent); unemployment (13 per cent); access to medical services (5 per cent); suspension of social benefits (2 per cent); security (2 per cent); and financing their own business (1 per cent).²⁴

As can be seen, the situation of IDPs in Ukraine remains difficult. Considering the fact that, at the moment, the state has not resolved their problems, a similar trend will, most likely, continue in the future.

6. Societal Attitudes toward Immigrants, Foreigners, and Various Ethnic Minorities.

With the escalation of the domestic political and socio-economic crisis, the attitude of Ukrainians toward foreign citizens and ethnic minorities is gradually, yet steadily, becoming worse. Multiple ethnic groups live in Ukraine: from millions of Russians to hundreds of thousands of Poles. However, in 2017, Ukrainian sociologists did not measure the attitude of Ukrainians towards other ethnic groups, only measuring the Ukrainians’ attitude towards different states. With all the reservations, we are forced to extrapolate the Ukrainians’ attitude towards Russians (including

²¹ <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/13570.pdf>.

²² <https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/v-ukraine-zaregistrirovano-pochti-1-5-vynuzhdennyh-pereselencev-281015.html>.

²³ <https://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/fond-socstrahovaniya-v-2017-godu-vyplatil-pereselencam-1-6-mlrd-grn-274871.html>.

²⁴ <https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/issledovanie-opredelilo-sem-glavnyh-problem-pereselentsev-v-ukraine-1133359.html>.

those Russians who live in Ukraine) from the data on Ukrainians' attitudes about Russia as a country in general.

According to the opinion poll conducted in September 2016 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,²⁵ 40 per cent of Ukrainian citizens had a generally positive attitude toward Russia, 46 per cent had a negative attitude, and 14 per cent could not decide on the answer. A year later, these attitudes remained essentially the same: 37 per cent of Ukrainians had a positive attitude toward Russia, 46 per cent had a negative attitude, and 17 per cent could not decide on the answer.

The Razumkov Center provides information regarding attitudes toward Russian citizens.²⁶ The number of Ukrainians who positively related to the Russians in March 2017 was 29 per cent. The number of those who had a negative attitude was 21 per cent. At the same time, the number of those Ukrainians who had a neutral attitude toward Russia increased to 39 per cent.

The events of 2014 significantly influenced the attitude of Ukrainians toward Russia. Back in 2013, the number of Ukrainians who positively related to Russia was 81 per cent, and 10 per cent of Ukrainians had a negative attitude towards Russia.²⁷

Already in September 2014, after the bloody Battle of Ilovaik, only 48 per cent of Ukrainians had a positive attitude toward Russia, while 41 per cent had a negative attitude.²⁸ In the following years, the attitude toward Russians changed for the worse.

The survey conducted by the Pew Research Center and published in March 2018 is useful for determining the attitude of Ukrainians toward Jews.²⁹ The study dealt with the attitude of the inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe toward Jews.

Among the citizens of Ukraine, 29 per cent of Orthodox believers do not want to see Jews as members of their families; another 13 per cent are against Jews being their neighbors; and 5 per cent do not want to see Jews as citizens of their country. Ukrainian Catholics are more anti-Semitic. As many as 48 per cent of them do not want to see Jews as members of their families; 21 per cent as their neighbors; and 4 per cent as citizens of their country.

In addition, 37 per cent of Ukrainians believe that their culture is superior to the Jewish culture. Only 50 per cent do not agree that the Ukrainian culture is superior to the Jewish culture.

The report of the Gorshenin Institute, "Ukrainian society and European values," is very useful for assessing the attitude of Ukrainians towards migrants, foreigners, and national minorities.³⁰ In particular, the experts were interested to see in what capacity Ukrainians are ready to accept foreigners.

²⁵ <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=722&page=1&t=10>.

²⁶ <https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/ukraincy-nenavidyat-putina-i-distanciruyutsya-ot-zhiteley-rossii-241314.html>.

²⁷ <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=177&page=3&t=10>.

²⁸ <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=404&page=2&t=10>.

²⁹ <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/05/15120244/CEUP-FULL-REPORT.pdf>

³⁰ <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/13570.pdf>.

Only 12.9 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept a person who speaks a different language as a member of their family; 23 per cent would accept a person who speaks another language as a close friend; 14.3 per cent are ready to accept a person of another nationality as a member of their family; and 23.6 per cent are ready to accept a foreigner as a close friend.

Furthermore, 9.1 per cent are ready to accept a person of another faith as a family member, and 18.7 per cent - as a close friend. At the same time, 25.6 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept a person of another faith only as a citizen of their country; and 5.3 per cent of Ukrainians are ready to accept people of another race as citizens of their country, 12.4 per cent as a close friend, and 28.1 per cent are ready to accept such a person as a tourist.

As for the most important values for Ukrainians, solidarity is important for 16.1 per cent of Ukrainians in their personal capacity and for 16.4 per cent if speaking on behalf of the Ukrainian people. Equality is professed by 13.1 per cent of Ukrainians on a personal level and 12.4 per cent considered equality as an important value for all Ukrainians. Tolerance is important only for 9 per cent if they speak/act in a personal capacity and for 10.2 per cent - if speaking/acting on behalf of all of the Ukrainians.

These figures allow us to conclude that Ukrainians are quite restrained towards representatives of other nations, national and racial minorities. It can be assumed that the incitement of hatred against national minorities after 2014 is the cause of these negative attitudes.

7. Incitement of Ethnic and Religious Hatred.

One of the manifestations of growing radicalism and intolerance since 2014 is ethnic and religious intolerance. The media plays an important role in inciting religious and ethnic hatred in Ukrainian society. Let's consider specific examples:

On March 5, 2017, during the Day of the Orthodox Church Celebration, an Internet publication *Obozrevatel'* published an article entitled "Zombie Apocalypse: the Online Community is Outraged by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate's Procession in the Center of Kyiv."³¹ The article contains the following passage by a political technologist whose personal opinion is presented as a general sentiment among the Ukrainians: "The Moscow Pug was taken around the streets of Kyiv. While all the Orthodox believers of Kyiv were at churches, praying and celebrating the Orthodox holiday, Moscow devilry does not calm down. I saw this marginal weathered Moscow circus tent at the Golden Ring. And look at that moral conscience of the Russian Orthodox Church, Holy Man [Patriarch] Kirill Gundyayev. And where was the SBU (Ukrainian Security Service)?"

No alternative points of view were presented by the *Obozrevatel'*. This Internet publication clearly shares hatred toward the Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate.

On March 12, 2017, a national Ukrainian-language TV channel 1 + 1 released a story about the lawsuit of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) against

³¹ <https://www.obozrevatel.com/society/64817-zombi-apokalipsis-v-seti-vozmutilis-krestnyim-hodom-upts-mp-v-tsentre-Kieva.htm>.

Ukraine. The author of the article claimed that the lawsuit is Moscow's special operation aimed at undermining the national security of Ukraine.³²

On June 13, 2017, the Internet edition of the Radio Liberty project, *Krym.Realii*, contained, in its Opinions section, an article with a telling title: "Professional Spies of the Kremlin: How Russian Agents are a Threat to Ukraine."³³ In it, the clergymen of the UOC-MP are accused of being agents of the Russian special services who undermine the national security of Ukraine, act in Russian interests, etc. The author of the article is dismissive of the adherents of the UOC-MP. The publication of such an article, albeit in the Opinions section, is aimed solely at inciting hatred against Ukrainian Orthodox believers.

On July 27, which is the day of the celebration of the Day of the Baptism of Russia, the Ukrainian media, for the second year in a row, was inciting hatred toward the Moscow Patriarchate, which was being depicted in an ironic, dismissive manner. An example of this negative portrayal can be found in the TV show aired by TSN channel 1 + 1.³⁴

Due to the religious procession during the celebration, the roads were partially blocked in the center of Kyiv. This is a normal practice at any major public event. However, the Ukrainian media decided to stir things up: "It is already Thursday, so I can speak frankly about what is happening in the center. What is it, people? Again buses with grandmothers, Moscow priests again. What is the procession? Where? Why? Why during the weekday when everyone works? Everywhere hell and crying, the suffering and despair of drivers," commented one blogger.³⁵ No alternative points of view were provided by the *Observer*. Under the guise of "the opinion of an ordinary person," hatred is being formed and incited towards the Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate.

On April 28, 2017, a march in commemoration of the anniversary of the SS Galicia Division took place in Ivano-Frankovsk.³⁶ According to the media reports, the participants of the march chanted Nazi and xenophobic slogans, such as "My honor is loyalty" (an SS motto), "Remember, stranger, Ukrainian is the owner here," "One race, one nation, one birthplace, "Death to the enemies of Ukraine."³⁷

In Odessa, members of the Sokol movement (the youth wing of the *Svoboda* party) held a rally against local Roma, calling the Roma people "parasites," and declaring that "[r]ecently, [the Roma] participate in clashes with the locals and with guests of the city. Gypsies are carriers of various diseases, and their dwellings are a hotbed of unsanitary conditions. During the nationalist rally, the nationalists advised all passersby to avoid contact with the 'parasites of society.' Those people who were not indifferent and who stopped to talk to us were in solidarity with us, which is undoubtedly a positive sign."³⁸

³² <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/moskovskiy-patriarhat-provodit-specoperaciyu-yaka-mozhe-zashkoditi-nazbezpeci-ukrayini-894989.html>.

³³ <https://ru.krymr.com/a/28542917.html>.

³⁴ <https://ru.tsn.ua/Kiev/s-dobkinym-ikonami-i-selfi-po-Kievu-proshel-15-tysyachnyy-krestnyy-hod-upc-mp-903493.html>.

³⁵ <https://www.obozrevatel.com/kiyany/life/63872-krestnyij-hod-paralizoval-dvizhenie-v-tsentre-Kieva.htm>.

³⁶ <http://versii.if.ua/novunu/v-ivano-frankivsku-vidbuvsya-marsh-pamyati-diviziyi-galichina-foto-video/>

³⁷ <http://report.if.ua/polityka/u-frankivsku-vidbuvsya-marsh-pamyati-dyviziyi-galychyna/>.

³⁸ <http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/1091355-V-Odesse-nacionalisty-proveli-akciju-protiv-cygan->

The incitement of hatred against the parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which began after Euromaidan, continued in 2017. The media plays an important role in this process. Under the guise of the opinion of the common people, various media outlets create a hateful image of Orthodox people. Representatives of the government also incite religious hatred. We expect these trends to continue in 2018.

8. Radical Nationalist Groups and Parties.

Since 2014, the number of neo-Nazi and ultra-right groups in Ukraine, as well as their influence, have increased significantly. The neo-Nazi and ultra-right groups played a big role in overthrowing President Viktor Yanukovich and in the hostilities in eastern Ukraine. Weak state and a difficult socio-economic situation in the country all contribute to the quantitative and qualitative growth of ultra-right groups in the country.

Such groups, parties, and associations as *Liberty*, the *Right Sector*, *Azov*, the *National Corps* and its affiliated structures, and *C14* are still present in the public and political spheres of Ukraine. As of 2016, there have not emerged any new organizations.

However, on March 16, 2017, *Freedom*, the *National Corps* and the *Right Sector*, the *Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists*, the *Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists*, and *C14* signed a **Manifesto on Joining Forces**.³⁹ The manifesto includes a list of provisions on domestic and foreign policy that nationalists are planning to implement when they come to power.

Point 8 of this Manifesto presents a particular concern: “To clear the Ukrainian information space from hostile propaganda. To cultivate traditional values, strengthen national consciousness and dignity. To provide the Ukrainian language with the status of the only state language.” Thus, nationalists declare their intention to clear the Ukrainian information space from “enemy propaganda.” Apparently, they themselves will decide what constitutes such propaganda. If implemented, these plans would create obvious conditions for limiting freedom of speech, since any opinion that is contrary to the opinion of the nationalists can be declared to be enemy propaganda.

Another requirement, “[t]o ensure that Ukrainian has a status of the only state language” is, on the one hand, absurd, because the Constitution of Ukraine already provides the Ukrainian language with such a status; on the other hand, the interpretation of what constitutes “the only state language” could be rather broad and could be used to restrict the languages of national minorities, first of all, the Russian language.

Clause 20 of the signed Manifesto promises “[t]o promote the creation of a unified local church with a center in Kyiv. The creation of a single official state church will obviously limit the rights of believers of other faiths, first of all, those of the Moscow Patriarchate churches in Ukraine.

The Manifesto, signed on March 16, 2017, is essentially a declaration of intent. So far, the nationalists have not come to power and, accordingly, cannot implement its provisions.

³⁹ <http://svoboda.org.ua/news/events/00114270/>.

Actions aimed at consolidating efforts have had virtually no effect on the nationalists' popularity in the society. In 2016, the *Svoboda* party's popularity ranged from 5.0 to 6.2 per cent. According to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,⁴⁰ in December 2017, 5.4 per cent of Ukrainians were ready to vote for *Svoboda*.

The leader of *Svoboda* is Oleg Tyagnibok. Born in 1968 in Lviv, he is a physician by training. Tyagnibok is known for becoming, in 1991, one of the founders of the Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine (the name has an explicit reference to the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP)), which later became *Svoboda*. In 2004, at an event dedicated to the memory of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army fighters, Tyagnibok remarked: “[t]hey were not afraid, just like we should not be afraid now. They took up arms and went to fight into the forests of Ukraine; they fought against the *Moskali*, they fought against the Germans, they fought against the *Zhidy* (a derogatory term for Jews), and with other evil forces which wanted to take our Ukrainian state away from us...Ukraine should be finally given back to the Ukrainians. These young people, and you, the gray-haired ones, you are the right mixture that the Muscovite-Jewish mafia, which is currently ruling Ukraine, is most afraid of.”⁴¹

In 2016, the National Movement “State Initiative of Yarosh,” led by the former leader of the Right Sector Dmytro Yarosh, appeared on the electoral field of Ukraine. In 2016, the popularity of this movement ranged from 0.9 to 2.5 per cent. In 2017, the party rating was 1.7 per cent.⁴²

Dmytro Yarosh was born in 1971 in the Dnipropetrovsk region. In 2001, he graduated from Drohobych State Pedagogical University. Since 1994, he was the leader of the paramilitary *Stepan Bandera All-Ukrainian Organization “Tryzub.”* Originally formed as a paramilitary organization, it became, in 2013, the basis for the formation of the Right Sector. In October 2014, Yarosh was elected as a Member of Ukrainian Parliament.

The Right Sector continues to lose popularity. In 2016, its rating ranged from 0.7 to 2.2 per cent. In 2017, the party rating was 0.6 per cent. It can be assumed that such a drop in the rating is connected with the departure of Yarosh, its charismatic leader, who created his own movement. The current leader of the Right Sector, Andrei Tarasenko, was born in 1982 in the Dnipropetrovsk region. He is closely associated with Yarosh.

In 2016, another right-wing radical movement appeared on the Ukrainian political landscape, the National Corps Party (*Natsional'nyi Korpus*). It was created on the basis of the Azov regiment of Ukraine's National Guard and members of the Azov Civil Corps. The Azov regiment is known for using neo-Nazi symbolism and slogans. The popularity of this movement, created in October 2016, has not changed over time and amounts to 0.2 - 0.3 per cent.

Andrey Biletsky, head of the Azov, was born in 1979 in Kharkiv. He graduated with a degree in History from Kharkiv National University. He is known to his comrades-in-arms as the “White Leader.” In the 2000s, he headed the Kharkiv branches of *Tryzub*, collaborated with the Social-Nationalist Party and the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defense

⁴⁰ <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=730&page=1&t=1>.

⁴¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-i4gvF15BRI>.

⁴² https://zn.ua/POLITICS/na-dosrochnyh-vibrah-v-radu-mogut-proyti-sem-vosem-partiy-255633_.html.

(UNA-UNSO). From 2011 to 2014, he was held in custody for robbery. In March 2014, he was released and led the Right Sector (East), and later led the Azov Regiment. In October 2014, he became a Member of Ukrainian Parliament.

Another organization worth mentioning is C14. According to different versions, the name C14 (as spelled in the Ukrainian alphabet) resembles the word *Sich* (*ciy* in Ukrainian), or a reference to the famous Nazi symbol “14/88.” Members of this organization were mentioned in the media in connection with attacks on the Russian Center for Culture and Science, extremist slogans, attacks on political opponents, attempts at raiding, etc. Members of this organization are also suspected of murdering, in 2015, a pro-Russian journalist and writer, Oles Buzina. The organization posted an announcement on the Telegram platform, that for a certain sum of money they are ready to harass and put pressure on any person.⁴³

Sociologists did not measure the C14 ratings, so we can only assume that it ranges from 0.1 to 0.2 per cent.

Thus, the cumulative rating of right-wing radical and neo-Nazi parties and groups decreased from 11.4 per cent in 2016 to 8.2 per cent in 2017. This happened due to the fall in popularity of the Right Sector and the weakening of the *Governmental Initiative of Yarosh* (DIYA). At the same time, the rating of *Svoboda* remains the same.

In these circumstances, it would be in the interest of the radicals to consolidate their efforts. The union of the extreme right would be beneficial to them because, as individual parties, they have very limited prospects of gaining power. Only *Svoboda* has the potential to enter the parliament, but its rating is at the level of the passing threshold. In the case of the Governmental Initiative of Yarosh, the “Right Sector,” and the “National Corps” – separately, they have little chance to legitimize their influence by entering the Verkhovna Rada. It is the consolidation of their efforts and the creation of a single ultra-right party that would enter the Parliament that would guarantee them success during the elections. Therefore, this scenario is likely to take place in the future.

At the same time, such an association of radical right forces, if it occurs, will only have the character of a tactical alliance. Their common ideology does not guarantee close cooperation of various radical groups. The leaders of these groups are all believers in leaderism, which means that any potential unification will result in the struggle for the role of a single Fuhrer. Also, there is only a general unity of ideology among these different groups. Thus, *Svoboda* professes radical nationalism of the Western Ukrainian type based on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)-Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); Azov has a distinct neo-Nazi and paganist ideology; and C14 members are extremists. Furthermore, all these groups fight over spheres of influence and financial support.

Given all of the difficulties and circumstances presented above, the unification of Ukrainian radicals is possible but mainly as a tactical alliance aimed at participating in parliamentary elections, rather than as a long-term unification and the creation of a single radical structure.

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<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10216000390551024&set=a.2005593667921.2124105.1486042157&type=3&theater>.

9. Socially Dangerous Manifestations.

Ukrainian nationalists and extremists have traditionally been participating in sports hooliganism.

Among the traditional examples of extremist acts during sports events are racist insults, Nazi greetings and slogans, attacks on black fans, etc. There has also been pressure from radical nationalists on soccer players. The reader will find below but a few examples of sports hooliganism by extremists and radical nationalists:

Selected Instances of Xenophobia During Sports Events in 2017 in Ukraine:

<p>April 21, 2017</p>	<p>During the game between Dynamo (Kyiv) and Shakhtar (Donetsk), Dynamo Kyiv fans staged a White Life flash mob by wearing white outfits with the words “100 per cent White” inscribed on them. The United Nations Human Rights Commissioner Zeid bin Ra’ad al-Hussein called this attire “the clothing of the Ku Klux Klan.” Ultra-nationalist fans also used Nazi symbols.</p>
<p>October 2, 2017</p>	<p>FIFA fined the Ukrainian Football Federation 48,000 SFR. The reason was racist slogans of Ukrainian fans during the Ukraine vs. Turkey Football Match.</p>
<p>October 22, 2017</p>	<p>Brazilian footballer Paulinho, who played for <i>Zorya</i> team (Lugansk), complained in an interview with the Brazilian publication <i>R7</i>, about racism in Ukraine. He stated that he encountered racism in everyday life, on the streets, in shops, in cafes. He gave an example of a woman once calling him a monkey.</p>

November 28, 2017	Radical nationalists from the groups “Kharkiv City Patriots” and “The Club” stopped the bus of the football club Shakhtar (Donetsk). Radicals made claims to football players for “indistinct position regarding the ATO.”Also, the radicals demanded that football players wear T-shirts in support of the Ukrainian military.
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Summing up, it is worth noting that there remains a problem of racism, extremism and radical nationalism in the sports world in Ukraine. There are still manifestations of racism, the use of racist and Nazi slogans, characteristic symbols, etc.

At the same time, the number of documented facts of public acts by radical nationalists and extremists during sports events has declined since 2016. Also, in 2017, there were no recorded cases of physical violence inflicted by ultra-nationalists upon black fans or football players.

Aside from racist and Nazi-inspired acts, there is a new phenomenon of radical nationalists applying pressure on athletes. As mentioned, the radicals stopped the bus and demanded that the football players of football club Shakhtar (Donetsk) publically support the Anti-Terrorist Operation against Russia (ATO), threatening that there would be negative ramifications if their demands were not met.

It can be assumed that the restrictions imposed by FIFA and by the Ukrainian Football Federation (FFU) regarding racist and Nazi slogans during football matches will force the radicals and extremists to turn to exercising direct pressure upon the dissenters, a trend that was illustrated with the case of Donetsk footballers.

10. Hate Crimes

When considering hate crimes, the main source of information is the statistics of the General Prosecutor's Office. In particular, under article 161 of the Criminal Code

(“Violation of equal rights of citizens on the grounds of their race, nationality or religious beliefs.”).

In 2017, the Prosecutor General’s Office registered 52 crimes under Article 161. The law defines these crimes as “Intentional actions inciting national, racial or religious hostility and hatred, humiliation of national honor and dignity, or the insult of citizens’ feelings in respect to their religious convictions.”

Only three out of these 52 suspects under Article 161 received the details of the nature and cause of the charges brought against them. For the other 49 cases, the decision was not made. Unfortunately, the statistics do not specify the details of these crimes.⁴⁴

However, even according to official data, the number of crimes under Art. 161 for 2017 increased significantly. In 2016, 41 cases were registered under this article and 37 out of them were left without any decision made.

But such a number of hate crimes seems to be understated and may indicate falsification of official statistics. Thus, according to the LGBT human rights center *Nash Mir*, just 226 homophobic cases in relation to sexual minorities alone were committed and registered.⁴⁵

LGBT human rights activists identify the following cases of homophobia: 134 insults and threats; 92 cases of physical violence; 27 cases of homophobia in the family; 22 cases of threats and blackmail; 15 cases of robbery; six cases of creating obstacles to peaceful actions; two attacks during LGBT actions; and one case of torture. In 2016, only 67 cases of attacks on members of the LGBT community were registered.

Selected Instances of anti-Semitic Crimes

Date	Location	Incident
January 20, 2017	Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Odessa Region)	Unknown persons vandalized a memorial for murdered Jews

⁴⁴ https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/stst2011.html?dir_id=113281&libid=100820.

⁴⁵ http://gay.org.ua/publications/lgbt_ukraine_2017-u.pdf.

February 7, 2017	Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Odessa Region)	Unknown persons vandalized a memorial for murdered Jews, second time in one month.
February 26, 2017	Kolomyia	A cross commemorating Ukrainian Insurgent Army members was erected in a Jewish cemetery. Ukrainian nationalists installed the cross without receiving permission from authorities.
March 21, 2017	Berezovka	Unknown persons almost completely destroyed the Jewish cemetery
March 24, 2017	Ternopol'	Ternopol attackers painted Nazi symbols with red paint on the monument to the victims of the Holocaust
April 27, 2017	Ternopol'	Ternopol attackers re-painted Nazi symbols with red paint on the monument to the victims of the Holocaust
May 11, 2017	Cherkassy	At a Jewish cemetery in Cherkassy, a swastika was painted on one of the monuments and an inscription was made that read "Tolerance is a weakness."

Unfortunately, the Eurasian Jewish Congress did not keep records for 2017, which would provide us with the complete statistics on crimes motivated by anti-Semitism. For this reason, we cannot unequivocally assess the dynamics of anti-Semitic crimes in Ukraine during that year. We can only assume that, taking into account the activity of right-wing radicals, the dynamics were stable or negative. An increase in the number of anti-Semitic crimes is also mentioned in the report of

the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs.⁴⁶ The ministry notes that the number of anti-Semitic acts has doubled.

According to the report, Ukraine is the leader among the countries of the former Soviet Union in anti-Semitic incidents, including verbal attacks, violent acts and vandalism against Jewish objects.

In addition, the authors of the report accuse the Institute of National Remembrance of trying to rehabilitate and glorify the nationalist movements of the past and their leaders responsible for the murder and exile of Jews.

11. The Glorification of German National Socialism and of Nazi Collaborators.

- Glorification of Nazi collaborators

A key element of the glorification of Nazi collaborators in Ukraine is the annual march in commemoration of the SS Galicia Division, which was formed on April 28, 1943 in Western Ukraine and was made up predominantly of Ukrainian volunteers. Nationalists also glorify the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which, during the Second World War, collaborated with Nazi Germany.

On January 1, in Kyiv and in several other cities, there was a march in honor of the birthday of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the UPA. Participants of the march burned torches and chanted the slogans of the UPA, etc. Tens of thousands of people all over Ukraine took part in the march.⁴⁷

The leader (Führer) of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Bogdan Chervak, who is also a government official and first deputy head of the State TV and Radio of Ukraine, said that members of the SS Galicia Division were Ukrainian heroes and should be officially recognized and immortalized. Chervak noted on Facebook that “I always believed and still believe that the Ukrainians who fought in the ranks of the SS Galicia Division are heroes. The young men took up arms with one goal: to defeat Russia. And then take this opportunity to gain the independence of Ukraine. In the ranks of the division there were a lot of members of the OUN for whom Galicia became another chance to fight and to die for Ukraine. It is necessary to restore historical justice and to recognize, at the state level, the Ukrainian division as freedom fighters for the independence of Ukraine. I am sure that sooner or later this will happen.”⁴⁸

On April 28, 2017 there was also a march in commemoration of SS Galicia Division in Ivano-Frankivsk.⁴⁹ According to the media reports, marchers chanted such SS Nazi and xenophobic slogans, as “My honor is loyalty,” “Remember stranger, Ukrainian is the owner here,” “One race, one nation, one birthplace,” and “Death to the enemies of Ukraine.”⁵⁰

⁴⁶ <http://antisemitism.mda.gov.il>.

⁴⁷ <https://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/v-ukraine-fakelnymi-marshami-otmetili-den-rozhdeniya-stepana-bandery-778473.html>.

⁴⁸ <http://antifashist.com/item/ukrainskij-chinovnik-prizval-ne-stesnyatsya-a-gorditsya-diviziej-ss-galichina.html>.

⁴⁹ <http://versii.if.ua/novunu/v-ivano-frankivsku-vidbuvsya-marsh-pamyati-diviziyi-galichina-foto-video/>.

⁵⁰ <http://report.if.ua/polityka/u-frankivsku-vidbuvsya-marsh-pamyati-dyviziyi-galychyna/>.

In May 2017, a scandal broke out in connection with the symbols of the SS division. As explained by the head of the Institute of National Remembrance, Vladimir Vyatrovich,⁵¹ according to the law on the prohibition of communist and Nazi symbols, the symbols of the SS Galicia Division are allowed. The reason for this is that, according to Ukrainian legislation, members of the Division were fighters for the independence of Ukraine.

Thus, in banning Soviet symbolism—the symbolism of the victors over Nazism in World War II—today’s Ukrainian authorities emphasize and extol Nazi symbols of the SS Galicia Division.

On July 23, 2017, the remains of 23 soldiers of the SS Galicia Division were solemnly buried near the village Chervone of the Zolochovsky district, in the Lviv region. Present at the event, the governor of the Lviv region, Oleg Sinyutka, called the SS division fighters an example to emulate by the modern Ukrainian military.⁵²

On October 14, 2017 another march took place in Kyiv, in memory of the UPA. About 20,000 people took part in this march. Those who were present actively used symbols and slogans of the UPA. The march was followed by the torchlight procession. The march received extremely complimentary media coverage.⁵³

On October 14, 2017, on the anniversary of the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which collaborated with Germany during the Second World War, the Radio Liberty website published a congratulatory article about the UPA.⁵⁴

In it, the UPA is called the phenomenon of the twentieth century. The article emphasizes the positive role of the UPA in creating an independent Ukrainian state (which appeared 40 years after the defeat of the UPA). The article ignores the facts of the cooperation of the UPA with Germany. However, it emphasizes and glorifies the struggle of the UPA against the USSR, which was a member of the anti-Hitler coalition.

- **Desecration of Monuments and Memorials to Soldiers of the anti-Hitler Coalition.**

Since 2014, the number of instances of the desecration of the monuments and memorials of soldiers of the anti-Hitler coalition, first of all, of the Red Army memorials, has sharply increased in Ukraine.

On April 19, 2017 in the Mariinsky Park in Kyiv, a two-minute walk from the Verkhovna Rada, a monument to General Nikolai Vatutin was desecrated. General Vatutin was the one who liberated Kyiv from the German army in 1943. Members of the National Corps made inscriptions on the

⁵¹ <https://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/vyatrovich-zayavil-chto-v-ukraine-ne-zapreschena-simvolika-divizii-ss-galiciya-862362.html>.

⁵²

https://zik.ua/news/2017/07/24/na_lvivshchyni_perepohovaly_zagyblyh_u_brodivskomu_kotli_voiniv_dyvizii_113_7555.

⁵³

https://ua.censor.net.ua/video_news/459297/natsionalisty_provely_v_kyyevi_marsh_slavy_geroyiv_videofotoreportaj.

⁵⁴ <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28793692.html>.

monument.⁵⁵ The police did not take any action in response to this act of vandalism, despite the fact that the process of desecrating the monument was carefully recorded on video by the vandals themselves.

On May 18, 2017, the monument to General Nikolai Vatutin in Kyiv was desecrated again. This time, it was sprayed with paint.⁵⁶ Perpetrators were not found.

On July 3, 2017, in Lviv, unknown attackers kidnapped a bronze wreath from the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, located on the territory of the memorial complex Hill of Glory. In addition, large elements were cut from the bronze sculpture to the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War on Lychakovskaya street.⁵⁷

On July 22, at the Square of Glory in Kropyvnytsk (former Kirovograd), unknown persons desecrated a monument to the Red Army soldiers. The monument was sprayed with paint, and covered with offensive inscriptions.⁵⁸

On September 27, 2017, a monument to General Vatutin was desecrated in Poltava. Vandals sprayed the monument with red paint.⁵⁹ Perpetrators were not found.

On November 7, in Kyiv, in the Glory Park, unknown persons put out the Eternal Flame, filling it with concrete.⁶⁰

On November 20, 2017 in Kyiv in the Park of Glory, unknown persons repeated the outrage and extinguished the Eternal Flame again, filling it with concrete.⁶¹ Tellingly, the Glory Park is in close proximity to the government quarter, a 20-minute walk from the Ministry of the Interior. However, in both cases, the police could not find the perpetrators. Moreover, in each one of these cases, the police doubted the motives of the criminals, although it would seem that these motives were obvious.

Summing up, it is worth saying that the glorification of Nazi collaborators and the desecration of monuments to the fighters of the anti-Hitler coalition continues in Ukraine. Law enforcement agencies do not investigate acts of vandalism even when they occur in the center of Kyiv and when they are recorded by the vandals themselves. We expect that the tendency to desecrate the monuments and glorify the Nazi collaborators will only increase.

12. Harassment of Human Rights Activists.

Since 2014, the situation with veterans of the Second World War and the celebration of Victory Day has worsened in Ukraine. Prominent politicians are calling for the abolition of Victory Day.

⁵⁵ <http://nationalcorps.org/blog/naconalnij-korpus-proti-radjanskih-dolv-v-stolic-ukrani>

⁵⁶ <https://ukraina.ru/news/20170518/1018676247.html>.

⁵⁷ <http://old.npu.gov.ua/mvs/control/iviv/uk/publish/article/251625>.

⁵⁸ <https://rian.com.ua/story/20170722/1026061879.html>.

⁵⁹ <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4597187>.

⁶⁰ <https://kp.ua/citynews/591431-v-kyeve-vandaly-zalyly-vechnyi-ohon-tsementom>.

⁶¹ <https://Kiev.segodnya.ua/kaccidents/v-Kieve-vandaly-snova-zalili-betonom-vechnyy-ogon-i-votknuli-v-nego-krest-1091586.html>.

Radicals threaten participants of these celebrations with reprisals. State media outlets portray veterans and those Ukrainian residents who celebrate Victory Day in derogatory terms.

For example, on Victory Day, *Obozrevatel*' published a blog post by sociologist Igor Aidman, entitled "Victory, or the Day of Sorrow." In addition to the obviously derogatory title, the author urges to abandon the celebration of Victory Day and calls those who participate in the celebration 'complete moral idiots'.⁶²

The blog post is published as a private opinion, but its publication on Victory Day is markedly provocative and offensive. Alternative points of view are not presented in the same publication.

In his Facebook post on May 9, the editor-in-chief of the publication "Tsenzor.NET" asked his readers to "not be fooled by the Kremlin propaganda and to not celebrate the May 9 Putin holiday."⁶³ Thus, the author questioned the very idea of celebrating Victory Day.

On May 9, 2017 there were clashes in Kyiv, Dnieper, and Odessa. In Odessa, the head of the regional cell of the Right Sector, Sergei Sternenko, tried to break through to the Soviet monument with a portrait of the leader of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych. This clearly planned provocation, aimed at discrediting the Immortal regiment, provoked clashes at the Monument.

Radicals put pressure on celebrating Odessites by ripping away posters of heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Skirmishes occurred quite regularly. Police detained 15 people. In addition, two detainees had firearms and explosives with them.⁶⁴

There were other provocations and clashes that were staged by radicals in other Ukrainian cities. The radicals acted in a coordinated manner. So, at first, the nationalists in small groups attempted to aggressively wedge themselves into the first rows of celebrants, initiating verbal squabbles and demanding that opponents roll up the flags of political parties or remove the St. George ribbons. And sometimes they even directly attacked them, blocking movement, pulling portraits of war hero relatives out of the hands of the celebrants.

Following this, for 2-4 minutes, the warring parties were given freedom of action, and during this time, journalists managed to capture the necessary materials for further publication. After that, law enforcement officers (who had, until then, peacefully observed attempts at provocations) interfered and split up the fights.

In most regions, the activists of the Azov regiment and of its political wing, the National Corps Party (whose leader, Andrei Biletsky, is considered to be close to the Minister of the Interior Arsen Avakov), invariably participated in the aforementioned events and clashes.

A very rough confrontation happened in the Dnieper. The radicals attempted, in a rather aggressive way, to block the festive procession (under the pretext of not allowing the use of party symbols). In response, they faced resistance from strong young people who, apparently, were invited by the

⁶² <https://www.obozrevatel.com/abroad/19428-pobedobesie-ili-den-skorbi.htm>.

⁶³ <https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/1673629056010717>.

⁶⁴ <https://strana.ua/news/69802-draki-na-9-maya-v-odesse-kak-eto-bylo.html>.

organizers of the march to serve as physical shields. A fight ensued, which the police began to separate.

The police seized four knives, 30 non-lethal and one gas guns, six spray cans and chemical canisters. The confrontation in Dnieper became a manifestation of the struggle between the pro-government mayor Borys Filatov and an opposition, figure Aleksandr Vilkul, a city native and the former deputy prime minister.

A similar situation occurred in Kyiv, except that there, in addition to the clashes, the radicals threw smoke bombs and bags with paint at the celebrating residents of Kyiv, and an unknown person aimed at the festive crowd from a grenade launcher from the OUN office located along the pathway of the Immortal Regiment.⁶⁵

In 2017, radicals and nationalists continued to put coercive and moral pressure on celebrants of Victory Day. Participants were beaten and insulted during solemn demonstrations, and posters were seized. Ukrainian pro-government media outlets actively supported such actions by radicals.

Conclusion

1. As compared to 2016, Ukraine exhibited a high and persistent degree of xenophobia and radical nationalism in 2017.
2. The adopted laws significantly limit the rights of national minorities to receive an education and have access to information in their native language.
3. The state continued to pressure national minorities in questions of law enforcement.
4. The authorities continue to be a source of xenophobia and to use “hate speech.”
5. Statements against xenophobia on the part of the authorities are declarative in nature. The opposition is too weak to have any influence on government statements and policies.
6. The attitude of Ukrainian society toward foreigners remains rather restrained and is gradually deteriorating.
7. In Ukraine, ethnic and religious strife continues, primarily, in relation to Orthodox believers.
8. The level of support for right-wing radicals remains fairly stable. This is observed in terms of ratings and the number of participants in mass events. In the event of a sharp deterioration in the quality of life or of human losses at the frontline, the level of support will rise sharply.
9. The level of xenophobia-inspired sports hooliganism has somewhat decreased. The reason lies in the restrictive measures of FIFA and UFA.
10. Official statistics do not seem to take into account all crimes, but even these numbers show an increase in hate crimes by a quarter in comparison with 2016. These crimes are mostly not investigated.
11. Ukraine continues the glorification of Nazi collaborators.
12. Pressure is applied to those who celebrate Victory Day.
13. In 2018, we expect a further increase of negative trends in Ukrainian society due to the rise of xenophobia and radical nationalism.

Recommendations.

⁶⁵ <https://strana.ua/articles/rassledovania/70201-cto-na-samom-dele-proizoshlo-na-9-maya-v-kieve-i-v-dnepre-rekonstrukciya-strany.html>.

1. Implementation of the state policies aimed at establishing interethnic and interfaith dialogues in Ukraine;
2. Development of the draft Law “On the Concept of the state ethno-national policy of Ukraine” and submitting it for public discussion;
3. Resolving the issue of granting the right to national and cultural autonomy to national minorities of Ukraine by adopting the Law “On National-Cultural Autonomy”;
4. Adoption of the new version of the Law “On National Minorities”;
5. Modernization and restoration of the provisions of the Law “Foundations of the State Language Policy.” Refusal to accept the draft law “On the Languages of Ukraine”;
6. Establishment of proper legal and social protection of internally displaced persons in terms of improvement and simplification of registration of persons transferred from the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea and areas of the ATO, confirmation of their actual place of residence, the possibility of receiving social benefits in a number of banking institutions, etc;
7. Creation of a special central state institution on the ethno-national policy of Ukraine;
8. The dismissal of V. Vyatrovich and the reform of the Institute of National Remembrance of Ukraine;
9. Assistance on the part of state and local authorities to national minorities in conducting cultural and humanitarian activities;
10. Compliance by politicians and officials with anti-discrimination and tolerance-oriented policies towards national minorities and religious confessions of Ukraine; abstaining from propaganda and hate speech;
11. Increased liability for hate crimes and discrimination;
12. The introduction of criminal liability for the use of "hate speech" in the media;
13. Creating a system of state-public monitoring of crimes motivated by hatred, discrimination, radicalism and neo-Nazism;
14. Verification by international organizations – the UN, OSCE, CoE, and the EU – of Ukraine’s fulfillment of international obligations in the field of human rights;
15. Strengthening the role of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the field of protection of the rights of minorities through legislative expansion of powers;
16. Intensification of the role of international organizations in countering radicalism in Ukraine.