



## Report of Xenophobia, Radicalism and Hate Crime in Netherlands

The Netherlands is a country with a well known tradition of respect for human rights. Human rights in this country are protected by national legislation and international agreements. It is the country with the most modern system of the State and Public monitoring of Xenophobia and Hate crime, which allows to provide prompt response to any complaint of citizens. At the same time, the problems connected with existing radical groups or individuals spreading hatred still remain here.

### 1. Legislation.

*Anti-terrorist legislation primarily targets people with dual citizenship.* On May 17, 2016, the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) passed a draft temporary law put forward by the Ministry of Security and Justice (MSJ) that imposes administrative sanctions to help further combat terrorist-related activities.<sup>1</sup> The draft legislation, whose short title is the Temporary Law on Counterterrorism Administrative Measures, restrains the freedom of movement of persons who constitute a threat to national security or who intend to join a terrorist faction, in order to protect national security and contribute to the prevention of participation in or provision of financial support to Jihadism. (*Dutch House of Representatives Approves Administrative Counterterrorist Measures*, MSJ website (May 17, 2016); *Temporary Law on Administrative Measures Combating Terrorism*, Dutch Senate (Eerste Kamer).<sup>2</sup>

The proposed measures permit the government “to impose a notification requirement, an area ban or a restraining order in response to practices that can be placed in connection with terrorist activities or support for them. Examples include contact with other radicalized people combined with a conspicuous interest in certain properties or events.” (*Dutch House of Representatives Approves Administrative Counterterrorist Measures, supra.*) The draft law would cover individuals who return from jihadist battles and who are deemed to be a threat to Dutch national security but who “have not (yet) been subjected to criminal investigation,” as well as to persons who “are strongly radicalized and willing to employ violence” but who have not left the Netherlands to join a terrorist militia. When the ban is on a certain area or proximity to certain objects or to a part or parts of the Netherlands, the Minister of

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<sup>1</sup><http://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/netherlands-two-new-sets-of-administrative-sanctions-proposed-to-fight-terrorism/>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Security and Justice may apply technological means to monitor compliance with that the ban. (Temporary Law on Counterterrorism Administrative Measures, art. 2a.)<sup>3</sup>

In addition, the government could bar individuals from leaving the Netherlands when “well-founded suspicions” exist that they are planning to leave the Schengen area to join a terrorist organization.” The Counterterrorism Administrative Measures, stressed, nevertheless, that the provisions “may only be imposed if they are necessary for national security reasons.”

On May 24, 2016, the Dutch House of Representatives passed a second item of legislation put forward by the MSJ to combat terrorist activities. This seeks to amend the Dutch Citizenship Law and would permit the government to withdraw Dutch citizenship, without any prior criminal conviction, from jihadists who join terrorist organizations abroad. According to the Ministry, “[u]pon returning to the Netherlands these jihadists may constitute a direct threat to national security,” and a rapid response is needed in such cases to prevent such persons from being able to return to the Netherlands. The amending legislation states that the Minister of Justice and Security may require the revocation of the Dutch nationality of a person who has attained the age of 16 who voluntarily enters the armed services of a state engaged in combat operations against the Kingdom of the Netherlands or against an alliance in respect of which the Kingdom is a member. The Minister may also withdraw the citizenship of a person of at least 16 years of age and who is outside the Kingdom if it appears from the person’s conduct that he or she has joined an organization that has been placed on a list of organizations participating in national or international armed conflict and deemed to be a threat to national security. Dutch Senate website (in Dutch) Thus, the proposal would make it possible for a person’s Dutch citizenship to be revoked as soon as he or she joined a group that appears on a (public) list of terrorist organizations that includes, for example, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, the draft law provides for jihadists to be declared undesirable aliens once their citizenship has been revoked.<sup>5</sup> The two new measures of withdrawal of citizenship and of declaration of being an undesirable alien complement the existing means of combatting terrorism and would prevent the lawful return of such persons to the Netherlands and to the Schengen area. The withdrawal of Dutch nationality will not be possible, however, if the individual would thereby become stateless; international conventions would not permit it. Thus, the possibility of revocation of citizenship is in practical terms limited to persons with dual nationality.<sup>6</sup>

The main criticism can be summarized as follows: (1) the measures can have a stigmatising effect and can lead to further polarization and increasing distrust – something which, in turn, can lead to further radicalization; (2) the measures can lead to ‘risk exportation’ that is pushing dangerous individuals away from Dutch society, while allowing them to stay in an “international army of jihadists” and continue to commit crimes abroad.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

*Restrictions on Islamic veils.* In November 2016, MPs in the Netherlands have voted overwhelmingly in favor of a ban on wearing face-covering Islamic veils in some public places, including schools, hospitals, government buildings and on public transport. Under the law, the burqa could still be worn on the streets. Women caught flouting the ban can be fined up to 405 euros.<sup>7</sup>

## **2. Law enforcement practice.**

*Court roles against hate speech.* On December 9th 2016, a court in Amsterdam found Geert Wilders, the Eurosceptic, anti-Muslim populist leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), guilty of public insult and incitement to discrimination, over a speech in which he called for “fewer Moroccans” in the country.<sup>8</sup> The panel of three judges rejected these arguments, but did not impose the fine of €5,000 (\$5,300) requested by the government, saying the conviction itself was punishment enough.<sup>9</sup>

*Human rights are not considered in arms export.* The Dutch government has awarded an arms export license to a Dutch company for military material to be exported to the Egyptian navy. The organizations PAX, Stop Arms Trade and the NJCM (Dutch Section of the International Commission of Jurists) have initiated a legal procedure, arguing that the Netherlands has not, or insufficiently, taken into consideration human rights, and the Egyptian involvement in the Yemen war when licensing this arms export. The district court of Noord-Holland decided on this case on 25 August 2016. The Dutch Court ruled on 25 of August 2016 that peace- and human rights organisations are not allowed to challenge arms trade licenses in court.<sup>10</sup>

*Censorship.* A decision by the mayor of the city of Sittard-Geleen to ban demonstration against Black Pete has rekindled a heated political debate.<sup>11</sup> Demonstrators consider the tradition racist — one that is shaped by the country's not-so-distant colonial past and trades on garish racial stereotypes.<sup>12</sup> One of the conditions to be met to be allowed to demonstrate was that the protesters could voice ‘only positive messages, meaning no negative messages on racism in relationship to the festivities of Sinterklaas.’<sup>13</sup> By imposing conditions on the content of a protest, the mayor has applied censorship. This is detrimental to the right to freedom of expression and the right to protest. This constitutes a violation of the law, the

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-burqa-veil-ban-holland-votes-for-partial-restrictions-some-public-places-a7445656.html>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21711635-it-may-only-boost-muslim-bashers-popularity-netherlands-has-found-geert-wilders-guilty>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> <http://pilpnjcm.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Arms-Export-Court-ruling-and-summary-English.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/11/19/amnesty-betogers-tegen-zwarte-piet-in-geleen-gecensureerd-a1532660>

<sup>12</sup> [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/02/the-dutch-are-slowly-recognizing-that-their-blackface-tradition-of-zwarte-piet-is-racist-and-weird/?utm\\_term=.a34f24eb0c5f](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/02/the-dutch-are-slowly-recognizing-that-their-blackface-tradition-of-zwarte-piet-is-racist-and-weird/?utm_term=.a34f24eb0c5f)

<sup>13</sup> <http://pilpnjcm.nl/pilp-starts-litigation-against-censorship/>

Constitution and human rights. In November, police arrested more than 100 protesters in the town of Maassluis, near Rotterdam, during a confrontation between supporters and opponents of Black Pete.<sup>14</sup>

*Ethnic profiling.* A research carried out within the Amsterdam-Amstelland of the selection mechanisms used by police officers was the first study of proactive police actions to deal explicitly with the considerations that play a role in the minds of police officers when they are deciding who to stop and check<sup>15</sup>. It emerged from this study that police officers base these decisions on profiles of 'suspicious citizens'. These profiles are based to a large extent on characteristics such as age, colour, and ethnic origin. The study concluded that these stereotypes are dominant within the police force concerned. The result is that young men (more so than women) from ethnic minorities are subjected to more frequent checks than others. Celebrities are not an exception, as illustrated by the discrimination suffered by rapper Typhoon, who was pulled over because the officer reasoned that a person with his dark complexion should not be driving such an expensive car.<sup>16</sup>

*Police violence.* In June 2016, a young man of 21 years was gunned down in the city of Schiedam in the Netherlands. The fact that he was dark complexioned, and ethno-racial profiling among Dutch police officers in the Netherlands is condoned as an unfortunate security measure.

*Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants.* According to Amnesty International, the government resumed in 2016 transfers of asylum-seekers to Greece for determination of their asylum claims under the "Dublin II" Regulation, despite serious concerns about asylum-determination procedures and detention conditions in Greece.<sup>17</sup> In June, the government proposed amendments to the Aliens Act. If implemented, many asylum claims would be processed within eight days, including in complex cases. In July, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) expressed concern that existing "accelerated procedures", allowing determination of asylum applications within 48 working hours, and the proposed eight-day procedure, might not allow asylum-seekers to substantiate their claims adequately, putting them at risk of forcible return. According to government figures, thousands of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers were taken into immigration detention centres during the year and held on a remand regime. Those detained included vulnerable individuals, such as trafficking and torture survivors, with little consideration given to alternatives to detention. Even unaccompanied minors, whom the government asserted had no legitimate claim to remain or reside in the Netherlands, continued to be detained.<sup>18</sup> Dutch law provides no maximum time limit on immigration detention.

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.dw.com/en/dutch-police-detain-100-black-pete-protesters/a-36372588>

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/amnesty\\_stopandsearchpowersposearisktohumanrights.pdf](http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/amnesty_stopandsearchpowersposearisktohumanrights.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> <https://thedailyherald.sx/opinion/letter-to-the-editor/57904-racism-in-the-dutch-kingdom-is-unacceptable>

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/netherlands>

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

### 3. Rhetorics. What are the causes behind it?

*Black Pete debate is very illustrative of the official government rhetoric regarding minorities in general and racism in particular.*<sup>19</sup> Protests and demonstrations from minority groups have dominated Sinterklaas celebrations in recent years in Dutch cities. In August 2015, a United Nations-convened committee on racial discrimination in Geneva called on the Dutch government to "promote the elimination of those features of the character of Black Pete which reflect negative stereotypes and are experienced by many people of African descent as a vestige of slavery."<sup>20</sup> The growing backlash to Zwarte Piet seems to have had an effect. In 2016, Dutch primary schools abolished the sporting of physical markings during Sinterklaas that could be deemed offensive, including blackface, thick lips and gold earrings. The country's children's ombudsman issued official statement that the Black Pete tradition violates children's rights and should "be stripped of discriminatory or stereotypical characteristics."<sup>21</sup>

Leftist, pro-immigration parties have called for a wider Dutch reckoning with the nation's multicultural identity that would include a museum about the history of slavery as well as the abolition of the black minstrel figure. Far-right politician Geert Wilders has repeatedly spoken in defense of Zwarte Piet, even proposing a law that would ensure the character is preserved exactly as it is.

### 4. Public opinion.

According to the PEW Research Centre research on global attitudes and trends,<sup>22</sup> Dutch seem to be slightly less prejudiced in comparison to other Europeans<sup>23</sup>. As the figure below illustrates,<sup>24</sup> thirty-seven percent of Dutch view Roma negatively, while 35% share negative attitudes towards Muslims. Four percent of Dutch are anti-Semitic.

Cross-national research by the PEW also illustrates how views on the integration of Muslims have changed over time in some of the countries polled. Since 2005, when the question was first asked, the percentage saying Muslims want to adopt national customs has increased by 23 percentage points in Germany, 12 points in the UK, **11 points in the Netherlands** and 7 points in France.<sup>25</sup> PEW also found that people on ideological rights are more Islamophobic.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3877975/pvv-kondigt-zwarte-pieten-wet.html>

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.dekinderombudsman.nl/70/ouders-professionals/nieuws/kinderombudsman-zwarte-piet-vraagt-om-aanpassing/?id=667>

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/methodology-27/>

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/>

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/>

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/>

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga\\_2016-07-11\\_national\\_identity-02-01/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga_2016-07-11_national_identity-02-01/)

As illustrated by the following PEW figure,<sup>27</sup> fifty-three percent of Dutch believe that Muslim prefer to be distinct from host society, while 42% believe that Muslims are willing to adopt to Western customs.

Again, quite predictably, people on the right of the ideological spectrum are much more skeptical that Muslims want to integrate into the larger society than those on the left.<sup>28</sup>

When asked specifically about support among Muslims for extremist groups like ISIS, few among the European publics surveyed think such sympathies are widespread (see figure, presented bellow)<sup>29</sup>.

Overall, Europeans are sharply divided on whether refugees leaving countries such as Iraq and Syria are a major threat to their country. In the Netherlands, concern is much lower.<sup>30</sup> According to PEW, the attitudes toward Muslims and refugees are closely linked in public opinion. In all 10 countries surveyed (including Netherlands), people who have a more negative view of Muslims are also much more concerned about the threat of refugees.

There is also an evidence that people tend to view the influx of refugees as a factor that contributes to terrorist threat<sup>31</sup>. As the following figure shows, sixty-one percent of Dutch believe that refugees increase domestic terrorism.

Dutch are split over the economic threat posed by refugees. Nearly equal percentages say refugees are a burden as say their work and talents make the nation stronger<sup>32</sup>.

As illustrated by the figures above, the polarization of Dutch society is not limited to ethnic and religious lines. Ideological polarization between multicultural and xenophobic Holland is explicitly reflected in attitude research, especially with respect to perceived threat towards refugees and Muslims. Most notably, while traditional left insists cultural diversity, minority participation and tolerance; liberals enthusiastically gravitate towards the politics of fear and intolerance that is championed by extreme right. Public opinion reflects these extreme standpoints.

*Likewise, minority attitudes towards Netherlands often reflect insecurity and mistrust.* According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, non-Western minorities living in the Netherlands are losing faith in

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<sup>27</sup>[http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga\\_2016-07-11\\_national\\_identity-02-02/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga_2016-07-11_national_identity-02-02/)

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/muslim-integration-dot-plot-web-version/>

<sup>29</sup>[http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga\\_2016-07-11\\_national\\_identity-02-04/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga_2016-07-11_national_identity-02-04/)

<sup>30</sup>[http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga\\_2016-07-11\\_national\\_identity\\_02\\_05/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga_2016-07-11_national_identity_02_05/)

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/>

<sup>32</sup>[http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga\\_2016-07-11\\_national\\_identity-02-07/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ga_2016-07-11_national_identity-02-07/)

the country; and feel negative about the social climate, less at home and more discriminated against.<sup>33</sup> Among the four large groups of non-Western minorities in the Netherlands, there's been a decrease in the number of people answering yes to the question of whether they feel at home here. About 75 percent of Suriname people still feel at home in the Netherlands, among the other three groups its only about 60 percent. Turkish Dutch in particular feel the need to return to their country of origin. Among the older Turkish Dutch, half want to go back to Turkey. Among the second generation - the generation of Turkish-Dutch born in the Netherlands - a third would prefer to live in Turkey.<sup>34</sup>

About half of the second generation Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch feel strongly Dutch. At the same time, three quarters of them feel strongly Moroccan or Turkish. They have native Dutch in their social network, but in their spare time mostly associate with people with a similar background. In general, young second generation immigrants are better educated and speak better Dutch than their parents. But at the same time, it remains more difficult for non-Western minorities to find a good job than it is for native Dutch. Even if they have the same level of training and work experience. Furthermore, non-Western immigrants are more than three times as likely to be suspected of a crime than native Dutch, 2.7 percent compared to 0.7 percent. Here it is mainly young Antillean- and Moroccan-Dutch men.<sup>35</sup>

*Homophobia decreases, except among immigrants.* Although 93% of the Dutch population are 'not negative' about homosexuality, 32% still consider two men kissing in public to be offensive, according to new research by the government's socio-cultural think tank Cultural Planning Bureau. Almost one in four people finds the sight of two women kissing to be offensive, while 12% find a heterosexual couple kissing in public to be objectionable.<sup>36</sup> Homosexuality remains a problem for many migrant groups. While 83% of the native Dutch have no objections to gay marriage, just 27% of the Dutch Somali population and 30% of the Dutch Moroccan population think the same. Nevertheless, the percentage of people with an immigrant background who do not accept homosexuality and would be unhappy if their child was gay has gone down over the past eight years, the Cultural Planning Bureau shows.<sup>37</sup>

The Dutch College of Human Rights received a total of 3,143 reports of discrimination last year, according to the Discrimination Monitor the College published on Tuesday for International Human Rights Day. In 2015 there were 2,148 reports and in the year before that 1,786. The most significant increases compared to 2015 could be seen in reports of discrimination based on race, from 297 in 2015 to 595, based on religion from 86 to 181 and based on sexual orientation from 32 to 63. Percentage wise race discrimination is the biggest problem the College currently deals with 26 percent of the reports are related to race. Discrimination based on a disability or chronic illness comes in a close second place with 25 percent of the reports. The number of requests for a ruling also increased last year, with 41 to 463 requests. Here discrimination based on disability was the basis of most cases, followed by race and

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<sup>33</sup> <http://nltimes.nl/2016/12/15/non-western-minorities-losing-confidence-netherlands-report>

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/05/dutch-tolerance-of-homosexuality-increases-new-survey-shows/>

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/05/dutch-tolerance-of-homosexuality-increases-new-survey-shows/>

gender. About a third of the cases resulted in a judgment. In 73 percent the organizations took measures to prevent further discrimination following the judgment.<sup>38</sup>

## 5. Radical and new realities.

According to Guardian, Dutch sense for harmonious group relationships in 2016 was fundamentally disturbed by populist political narrative, radicalization and polarization.<sup>39</sup>

According to the official report of the House of Representatives of the Netherlands, the extreme right groups and individuals are particularly focused on Islam and Muslims, asylum seekers and ideological opponents.<sup>40</sup> Hatred against Muslims and asylum seekers on the Internet is viewed as a potential indication of a new wave of violence. In 2016, a far right group carried out an attack on a mosque in Enschede (February 2016). A new xenophobic-nationalistic group Erkenbrand is directly inspired by the alt-right movement the United States. This far right extremist group includes primarily people with higher education. In addition, Dutch version of Soldiers or Odin or DSDA are primarily active on Internet.<sup>41</sup>

In practice, it increased general feeling of threat and insecurity among visible minorities. Synagogues and Jewish schools received police protection from homegrown jihadists. Muslim places of worship also became target of far-right groups.<sup>42</sup>

Far right leader Geert Wilders kept monopoly on hate speech and indictment for (Muslim) hatred. In August 2016, Wilders presented, through Facebook and Twitter, a draft version of his manifesto for the coming national elections (March, 2017). Asked to put his manifesto pledges in context, Wilders retorted: “The context is 1400 years of jihad.<sup>43</sup>” In the words of Gordon Darroch (Dutch News), “the main themes of Wilders’s campaign are the well-worn hobby-horses of immigration, immigration and immigration, as well as a pledge to leave the EU. Wilders reaffirmed his core belief in the need to ‘de-islamise’ the Netherlands by refusing all new asylum seekers as well as anyone whose application is still in progress. More insidious is the plan to shut all mosques and Islamic schools, ban the Koran and outlaw ‘expressions of Islam that interfere with public order’ – in essence, putting the presumption of guilt on Muslims for any incidents they get caught up in. Wilders may protest that he does not endorse violence against Muslims, but such measures would do much to facilitate it.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> <http://nltimes.nl/2017/03/21/discrimination-reports-surge-nearly-50-percent-netherlands>

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> [https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven\\_regering/detail?id=2017Z04565&did=2017D09381](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2017Z04565&did=2017D09381)

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/features/2016/08/the-netherlands-under-wilders-is-a-dismal-prospect-and-not-just-for-muslims/>

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

At the same time, Dutch politics is challenged by realistic terrorist threat in the Netherlands. Around 220 Dutch Muslims are believed to have travelled to join armed groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS), raising fears that they might carry out attacks in the Netherlands when they return, according to a Dutch secret service AIVD report.<sup>45</sup>

A particular matter of concern is related to insufficient cooperation with foreign security agencies and preventive measures in the case of terrorist suspects. In late March 2016, Turkish officials revealed that they had previously arrested Brahim el-Bakraoui, one of two brothers suspected of carrying out the March 22, 2016, attacks in Brussels, Belgium. Turkey had arrested el-Bakraoui in June 2015 at the Turkish-Syrian border on charges of being a foreign fighter. Turkey deported him to the Netherlands that July. A Dutch court later released el-Bakraoui citing a lack of evidence connecting him to terrorism. El-Bakraoui returned to Belgium after his release.<sup>46</sup>

The Dutch National Terrorism List included 39 individuals and three organizations as of January 2016, more than double the list's size a year before. The individuals and groups on the list are subject to asset freezes in the Netherlands. A government statement said the freeze makes it harder for Dutch citizens to aid would-be foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, an ultra-conservative Salafist movement within Sunni Islam, is considered a breeding ground for radicalization of Dutch Muslims. Security concerns are merely related to a small proportion of its followers – known as jihadi Salafists – who are known for strong endorsement and preaching of violence.<sup>48</sup> The security service AIVD stated in a report that while Salafist preachers have mostly operated within the boundaries of Dutch law, they have frequently promoted intolerance and 'undemocratic activities'.<sup>49</sup> These 'undemocratic activities' range from attacking supporters of the 'Je Suis Charlie' campaign on social media, to encouraging young followers to use violence against the state and against people of different beliefs.<sup>50</sup> According to security report, these are not isolated incidents, but reflections of more widely held sentiments. It is against this background that the Dutch parliament unsuccessfully passed a motion calling on the cabinet to look into banning Salafist organizations in the Netherlands. The freedom to religion have won over the right to be protected against hate speech.

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<sup>45</sup> <https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/publicaties/2016/01/12/aivd-publicatie-leven-bij-isis-de-mythe-ontrafeld>

<sup>46</sup> <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/netherlands>

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/02/dutch-will-not-ban-salafist-organisations-despite-radicalisation-fears/>

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/features/2016/03/holocaust-denial-pickup-artists-and-salafism-the-dutch-government-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/>

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

Most notably, no arrests made or punishments handed out in the aftermath of radical Muslims' protests in the Hague, where people have been waving ISIS flags and chanting 'death to Jews'.<sup>51</sup> Despite the Dutch law stating 'He who in public, either verbally or in writing or image, incites hatred or discrimination against people or incites acts of violence towards people or property of people because of their race, their religion or beliefs...shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine of the third category,' there was no any criminal follow up upon discrimination-incitement cases against Salafist protestors before the Dutch court of law.<sup>52</sup>

## 6. The Government and new political trends.

As previously mentioned, apart from the threat posed by extremists, the refugee crisis is also polarizing Dutch society and boosting the popularity of right wing politicians, such as Geert Wilders, who leads the anti-Islamic Freedom Party. In the words of Labor Party representative, Marcouch, "This polarization is worrisome. It is a sentiment that has been building up for years, starting from the attacks of 9/11, the murder of Theo van Gogh, the hundreds of Dutch jihadists that have joined ISIL and now the refugee crisis. At first the influx of refugees was opposed, but even that has increasingly shifted to an opposition against other ethnic groups, particularly Muslims."<sup>53</sup>

Liberal reactions to extreme right are particularly inconsistent. For example, Prime Minister Mark Rutte (Dutch Liberal party VVD) has frequently branded Geert Wilders' plan to close every mosque in the Netherlands as 'a threat to the rule of law'.<sup>54</sup> However, in order to secure popular votes, he does not hesitate to tune national security concerns with Islamophobia.<sup>55</sup> For example, in his open letter to the country's citizens, Rutte invited anyone who cannot respect Dutch customs to leave.<sup>56</sup> In his words: "People who 'refuse to adapt, and criticize our values' should 'behave normally, or go away'". He said the Dutch were "increasingly uncomfortable" with those who abused the freedoms they enjoyed after coming to the Netherlands, who "harass gays, or whistle at women in short skirts, or brand ordinary Dutch people racists. 'If you so fundamentally reject this country, then I'd prefer it if you leave.'" He said the solution was "not to tar everyone with the same brush, or insult or expel whole groups" but to "make it crystal clear what is normal, and what is not normal, in our country. We must actively defend our values."

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<sup>51</sup><http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/02/dutch-will-not-ban-salafist-organisations-despite-radicalisation-fears/>

<sup>52</sup><http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/02/dutch-will-not-ban-salafist-organisations-despite-radicalisation-fears/>

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup><http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/09/rutte-on-zomergasten-wilders-multiculturalism-and-the-last-taboo/>

<sup>55</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/dutch-muslims-mark-rutte-geert-wilders-netherlands>

<sup>56</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/netherlands-pm-mark-rutte-dutch-citizens-open-letter-pvv>

## 7. Popularity of radicals

In 2015 and 2016 polls show stable political support for both the leading VVD and Wilders PVV. It indicates that at least half of Dutch voters oscillate between far right and centrum right.

In October 2016, a poll from Kantar TNS, formerly TNS Nipo, indicated that the ruling liberal VVD forms the biggest party in parliament.<sup>57</sup> The poll gives VVD 27 seats in the 150 seat parliament, or 18% of the vote. Geert Wilders' anti-Islam PVV, which was on target to win 29 seats in the September poll, has now slumped to 23. In June, Nipo put support for the PVV as high as 36 seats, or 24% support. The middle ground is still held by the Liberal Democrats (D66), Socialists and Christian Democrats on 18 and 16 seats respectively<sup>58</sup>.

In December 2016, however, the opinion polls shows Wilders running either neck and neck or just behind the Liberals (VVD) with about 18% of the vote.<sup>59</sup> The poll of polls that is an amalgam of five separate opinion polls and shows Geert Wilders' party would take 31-37 seats in the 150 seat parliament if there was a general election tomorrow. That means popular support for anti-Islam campaigner has raised to 20% and 25% of the electorate. Support for the ruling VVD has fallen to between 15% and 17.5%, the new poll of polls shows. Backing for the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats has also fallen slightly as the PVV gathers votes. The poll of polls say the PvdA, which is part of the current coalition with the VVD, is likely to win no more than 12 seats in the March 15 general election.

Despite the PVV's strong position in the polls, Wilders is unlikely to become prime minister because of the Dutch system of coalition politics. Although the leader of the biggest party after the election is invited to form a government, all the other major parties have said they will not work with the PVV.<sup>60</sup>

*Election March 2017* brought no major surprises. Rutte's centre-right, liberal VVD won 33 MPs, by far the largest party in the 150-seat Dutch parliament<sup>61</sup>. Wilders' Freedom party (PVV) finished second 20 seats, while the Christian Democrat CDA and liberal-progressive D66, both ended third with 19 seats.<sup>62</sup> In the first statement, after the elections, Rutte stated: "This was an evening when ... the Netherlands said 'Stop' to the wrong sort of populism."<sup>63</sup> However, it is important to note that the VVD had lost eight seats while the Party for Freedom gained five. Populism did not win the election but did de facto attract

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<sup>57</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/10/vvd-well-ahead-of-pvv-in-new-poll-other-parties-stable/>

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/geert-wilders-trial-on-inciting-hatred-charges-opens-without-him>

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/12/geert-wilders-pvv-stretches-lead-in-latest-poll-of-polls/>

<sup>61</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/15/pm-mark-rutte-set-to-beat-geert-wilders-in-dutch-election>

<sup>62</sup> Ibid

<sup>63</sup> Ibid

many new voters. Moreover, Rutte adopted parts of Wilders' rhetoric during the campaign, including telling immigrants to respect Dutch norms and values or leave.<sup>64</sup>

The big winners were the pro-European leftwing ecologists of GreenLeft, who leapt from four seats to 14. In contrast, the social democratic Labour party (PvdA), Rutte's coalition partner, slumped from 38 seats to a historic low of nine.<sup>65</sup>

VVD is currently building a new coalition, most likely based around the VVD, CDA and D66 – a combination that falls five MPs short of a 76-seat majority. To this day, the fourth coalition partner is still unknown.

*Islamic Radicalization* According to the Netherlands's General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Islamic extremism in the Netherlands has transformed from a "virtually invisible" phenomenon into an open and widespread one with several hundred supporters and thousands of sympathizers.<sup>66</sup> In March and December 2016, Dutch police separately arrested two terror suspects in the city of Rotterdam<sup>67</sup>. On December 7, Dutch police arrested a 30-year-old man in Rotterdam suspected planning a terrorist attack. Detectives found an AK-47 rifle, explosives, and a painting of an ISIS flag in his apartment.<sup>68</sup> In March 2016, Dutch police arrested a French citizen in Rotterdam in connection with a suspect French police had arrested three days earlier for plotting an attack in that country.<sup>69</sup>

As of November 2016, approximately 270 Dutch citizens have left the Netherlands to fight in conflicts in the Middle East since 2012.<sup>70</sup> The Dutch government has devoted new resources to combat extremism and stem the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. Dutch intelligence is concerned that as ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria and the Netherlands further restricts jihadists from leaving the country, would-be Dutch foreign fighters will focus on carrying out domestic terrorism.<sup>71</sup>

In April 2017, the Dutch government announced that there remains a "real chance" of a terrorist attack occurring in the Netherlands. Though it had "no concrete evidence" of an attack being planned, the government said the "most substantial threat" was from "the jihadist movement."<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/netherlands>

<sup>67</sup> <https://apnews.com/83cdc8f904b84d93acf2d722e11b49e8/dutch-detain-man-rifle-ammo-image-flag-home>

<sup>68</sup> <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/27/europe/france-foiled-attack/>

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/netherlands>

<sup>71</sup> [https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/DTN43%20openbare%20samenvatting%20ENG\\_tcm32-214369.pdf](https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/DTN43%20openbare%20samenvatting%20ENG_tcm32-214369.pdf)

<sup>72</sup> <https://www.government.nl/topics/counterterrorism-and-national-security/news/2017/04/06/threat-level-in-the-netherlands-real-chance-of-an-attack>

## 8. Hate Crime.

A third of the mosques in the Netherlands have experienced at least one incident of vandalism, threatening letters, attempted arson, the placement of a pig's head, or other aggressive actions in the past 10 years.<sup>73</sup> It is unclear, however, whether aggression towards Muslims is increasing as the police only started to record the specifically anti-Muslim nature of such attacks and discrimination in 2015.<sup>74</sup>

In 2016, several demonstrations opposing the arrival of refugees have turned violent, dead pigs have been placed near asylum centers and local politicians have been threatened.<sup>75</sup> Jeyantha Kathiravelu is a member of the local municipal council in Sliedrecht. The 20-year-old received threats after a council meeting about the possibility of opening an asylum seekers' center. The threats were sent mainly by email and via social media and ranged from statements such as, "dirty Muslim, go back to Morocco", to more obscene ones, such as, "I'm going to rape your rabbit and chop it into pieces", and "I hope you will be the refugees' first victim".<sup>76</sup>

The hotline for reporting Islamophobia recorded a total of 158 cases of violence against Muslims in the Netherlands in 2016. In 90 percent of these cases, women wearing headscarves were targeted. 29 percent of those incidents involved physical violence. In most cases the perpetrators were white men, according to the hotline's annual figures.<sup>77</sup> The hotline also noticed an increase in incidents surrounding protests against the arrival of asylum seekers or the construction of asylum centers. More than half, 58 percent, of the violent incidents were never reported to the police.<sup>78</sup>

In February 2016 two Islamophobic incidents took place in the city of Enschede, a 33-year-old man threw a petrol bomb at a mosque as adults and children worshipped inside. The perpetrator was caught by non-Muslims living near the mosque and has since been charged with arson with terrorist intent. Furthermore, Azzedine Karrat, the imam at the Essalaam mosque in Rotterdam, received a letter addressed to the mosque. "Pigs," said the text, followed by more insults. The letter warned the recipients to expect "important visitors" and included Nazi symbols (see below).<sup>79</sup> In December, fire was set up at the site where the Association of Islamic Communities planned to build a mosque in Culemborg.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/netherlands-mosque-attacks-rising-islamophobia-160308101155120.html>

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> <http://nltimes.nl/2016/04/15/muslim-women-frequently-targeted-netherlands-hate-crimes>

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/netherlands-mosque-attacks-rising-islamophobia-160308101155120.html>

<sup>80</sup> <http://nltimes.nl/2016/12/29/mosque-site-five-cars-set-alight-culemborg>



The letter sent to Imam AzzedineKarrat, Published by Aljazeera, 16 March, 2016<sup>81</sup>

*Anti-Semitism* According to Chief Rabbi of the Netherlands Binyomin Jacobs, most Dutch Jews have grown so accustomed to anti-Semitic insults on the street that they seldom bother reporting them.<sup>82</sup> However, a trend of anti-Semitic incidents in Dutch schools has become particularly worrisome. In June 2016, high school students at a graduation party in the town of Schijndel sang about burning Jews. As they entered the hall, some of the graduates broke out in song with the lyrics, “Together we’ll burn Jews, because Jews burn the best”- a chant sometimes heard at the country’s soccer stadiums.<sup>83</sup>

#### **9. The Interethnic or religious Clashes.**

*Erdogan-Gulen power struggle divides Dutch Turks.* Turkey’s failed coup has raised tensions in Dutch Turkish community that was polarized between supporters and opponents of Erdoğan. A cultural centrum in Rotterdam run by the Nida Foundation, which is affiliated to the Gülen movement, was pelted with stones for two nights in a row.<sup>84</sup> weekend. In Zaandam, the headquarters of Animo, another Gülen-oriented organisation, was targeted on Friday night by a group of about 20 young people who smashed the windows and chanted pro-Erdoğan slogans.<sup>85</sup> The Turkish consulate in Rotterdam sent out a circular ordering its nationals to pass on details of anyone who had insulted Erdoğan on social media, though it later retracted the letter, claiming it had been badly worded.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>81</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/netherlands-mosque-attacks-rising-islamophobia-160308101155120.html>

<sup>82</sup> <http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/analysis/the-top-10-global-anti-semitic-incidents-of-2016/2017/01/05/>

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/18/turkish-diaspora-eu-erdogan-failed-coup>

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

In March 2017, there has been growing tension between the Netherlands and Turkey over Dutch refusal to allow Turkey's family minister to campaign in their country.<sup>87</sup>

## 10. Xenophobia in Sport and around Sport.

*Anti-Semitism.* In April 2016, following Feyenoord's 2-1 victory over Utrecht in the Dutch Cup match, a group of fans started chanting "Jews to the gas!" and " Hamas, Hamas". Earlier in the year, PSV Eindhoven fans chanted, "If you don't jump, you're a Jew, and all Jews must die."<sup>88</sup>

Dutch Muslims shouted anti-Semitic slogans amid violent clashes with police in Rotterdam over authorities' refusal to allow a Turkish Cabinet minister to campaign in Holland for a Turkey referendum vote. Dozens of protesters gathered Saturday night in front of the Turkish consulate in the Dutch city to listen to Family Minister FatmaBetulSayan Kaya. Upon receiving a false rumor that she had been arrested, the crowd began roaring "cancer Jews" and "cancer Wilders" shortly before the outbreak of violence that led to the injury of five people, including one policeman<sup>89</sup>

*Racism.* January 2016, a black Ajax player RiechedlyBazoerwas was subjected to monkey chants by a section of ADO Den Haag supporters.<sup>90</sup> In February 2016, two incidents took place. The first one took place shortly after the end of the FC Groningen v Ajax encounter, a fan of the home side was arrested for performing a Nazi salute and shouting racist words against an Ajax fan. Second incident involves an Ajax fan who was caught on camera while lynching a black-skinned doll wearing a jersey with the name of Feyenoord goalkeeper Kenneth Vermeer.<sup>91</sup> According to the Dutch football association KNVB, the referee can stop the game if the chants reach such an extent that the person being insulted can no longer continue.<sup>92</sup> In a broader context, it seems that sport racism mirrors the burning socio-political problem. On several occasions, a football show hostJohan Derksen insulted a prominent public figure (a former TV presenter and politicians) Sylvana Simons who has been outspoken on racism, and has raised hackles by calling for the "decolonisation" of education and language use in the Netherlands. But it was her criticism of the traditional festive character known as Black Pete that unleashed a backlash of death-threats and misogynistic, racist abuse. <sup>93</sup>When a football show host Johan Derkensuggested that Sylvana was "running around proud as a monkey", a colleague suggested he had meant to use the phrase "proud as a

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<sup>87</sup> <http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Dutch-Muslims-shout-antisemitic-slogans-during-Turkish-consulate-protest-484071>

<sup>88</sup> <http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/analysis/the-top-10-global-anti-semitic-incidents-of-2016/2017/01/05/>

<sup>89</sup> <http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Dutch-Muslims-shout-antisemitic-slogans-during-Turkish-consulate-protest-484071>

<sup>90</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jan/18/riechedly-bazoer-ajax-racist-chanting>

<sup>91</sup> <http://www.faren.net/news/increased-concerns-racism-dutch-football/>


<sup>92</sup> <http://nltimes.nl/2016/01/18/dutch-football-addressing-racist-fans-ajax-match-den-haag>

<sup>93</sup> <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38089469>

peacock". But he was adamant: "No, she doesn't look like a peacock." Then a famous radio presenter played gorilla grunts on air and said "be quiet, Sylvana".<sup>94</sup>

*Islamophobia.* In April 2016, Johan Derksen caused another controversy with appeal to keep Moroccan football players out of Dutch football clubs.<sup>95</sup>

## 11. Glorification of Nazism or Nazi collaborators.



The pamphlet reads: "White is better, own people first!!! Allochthones need to leave here. This is only the beginning."<sup>96</sup>

Wilders' party serves as a broad political umbrella for different patriotic, pro-fascist and neo-nazi circles. Freedom Party leader has never employed anti-Semitic discourse himself, but he never distanced himself from notorious fascist among his supporters and collaborators. For example, members of NVU (National People Union) were actively involved in Wilders anti-refugee campaign #KomInVerzet! (#StartTheResistance).<sup>97</sup> Anti-fascist groups warn that Wilders give fascism exactly the face of legitimacy that openly Nazi groups and outfits like Pegida still lack.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> <http://themoroccantimes.com/2016/04/19576/racist-pundit-asks-to-keep-moroccan-football-players-out-of-dutch-football-clubs>

<sup>96</sup> <http://www.doorbraak.eu/racist-tide-in-the-netherlands-encounters-opposition/>

<sup>97</sup> <http://kafka.nl/personen/geert-wilders/?lang=en>

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

## 12. The persecutions of human rights activists and antifascists.

According to the Antifascist Action Netherlands, 15 anti-fascists were arrested on 11 September 2016, during the actions against Pegidain The Hague. Most of them have been charged with 'disturbing an approved gathering' (Article 144), and released the same evening.<sup>99</sup>

On 21 November, more than 166 persons were arrested at the anti-fascist protest under the slogan “Stop oppression against anti-fascists and anarchists” in the Hague.<sup>100</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In the Netherlands, human rights are protected by national legislation and international agreements. Nevertheless, human rights are sporadically jeopardized, for instance, when xenophobic or radicalized individuals and groups threaten dignity (hate speech against Jews, Muslims, immigrants, homosexuals; ethnic profiling; police racism), or physical integrity (xenophobic, or homophobic attacks, attacks on refugee shelters, etc.) In general, better protection against hate speech is recommendable, because it creates a socio-political climate in which violence becomes tolerated. In addition, official data on hate crime is needed to capture all complexity and seriousness of human rights violations in the Netherlands and to build adequate protective measures.

### Recommendations:

*Terrorism measures and respect for human rights.* On 30 April 2015, the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights or, in Dutch, College voor de Rechten van de Mens (CvdRM) issued a general press release with the telling heading ‘Aanpakterrorismevooral symptoombestrijding’ (Approach against terrorism mainly about fighting symptoms).<sup>101</sup>

In its recommendations on this draft legislative proposal, the CvdRM, while understanding the need to protect the Dutch democracy, rule of law and population from terrorist violence, noted first of all that the proposal will affect various human rights, including the right to respect for private and family life and the right to freedom of movement. In principle, infringements on the exercise of such rights are possible, but only when these infringements are founded on a sufficiently clear and precise basis, when there is a compelling societal need to implement the measures, when the measures are in proportion to the objective they are designed to achieve and when the measures are accompanied by an adequate form of legal protection.

The CvdRM noted, however, that the draft legislative proposal’s criterion – when that person can be connected to terrorist activities or the support of such activities, based on the behaviour of that person – “does not form a sufficiently clear and precise legal basis for the justification of the limitation of human

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<sup>99</sup> <http://www.laetzenietlopen.nl/>

<sup>100</sup> <http://www.thejournal.ie/dutch-protest-wilders-3092796-Nov2016/>

<sup>101</sup> <https://www.mensenrechten.nl/berichten/aanpak-terrorisme-vooral-symptoombestrijding>

rights”. Moreover, the CvdRM “ha[d] doubts about the decision to adopt administrative law measures rather than criminal law provisions”.<sup>102</sup>

In addition, the CvdRM warned against the potentially stigmatising effects of the proposal on groups of migrants with Islamic religious beliefs. Similar and even stronger concerns were voiced against the draft legislative proposal on the amendment of the Netherlands Nationality Act.<sup>103</sup> This proposal would allow the Government to withdraw Dutch citizenship, without a criminal conviction,<sup>104</sup> when the person in question has joined an organisation which is taking part in a national or international armed conflict and which has been placed by the Minister of Security and Justice on a list of organisations that constitute a threat to national security. However, the necessity of the proposal, which could infringe on rights such as the right to freedom of movement and the active and passive right to vote, had not been sufficiently demonstrated, among other things, because of the existing possibility to withdraw nationality after conviction for terrorist activities.

It also raised concerns about the practicability and suitability of the proposal vis-à-vis its objective, about the imprecise and broad criterion of ‘affiliation with a Jihad terrorist organisation’,<sup>104</sup> about its lack of adequate legal protection (no prior judicial review, even though the human rights implications can be very far-reaching, and no effective participation of the person in the administrative law procedure) and because of its discriminatory effect, as it will result “in a distinction between Dutch citizens who have or do not have dual nationality [this is because nationality can only be revoked in case of dual nationality, as revoking nationality of a person with one passport will lead to statelessness, which is to be avoided], with risks for the stigmatization of groups of the population with an immigrant background, without providing sufficiently weighty reasons for making that distinction”.<sup>105</sup>

**Ethnic profiling.** According to Amnesty International<sup>106</sup>, the following steps should be taken: The circumstances in which police officers are entitled to use discretionary powers should be described with the utmost clarity. The use of characteristics such as race, colour, and ethnic origin should be explicitly prohibited or defined with the greatest possible clarity. There should be better government monitoring of the way proactive stop and search powers are used. This should include a specific, targeted investigation to discover whether ethnic profiling takes place, and if so to what extent. It should be made obligatory for police officers to register their reasons for asking to see someone’s ID, including cases in which those concerned respond to the request and are able to show their ID.

Government monitoring should be improved on the basis of comprehensive analysis of previous incidence of ethnic profiling. A special attention should be paid to the immigration control practices. Amnesty International proposes that the government (1) provide systematic data on how many people who are lawfully resident in the Netherlands (e.g. visible minorities) are subjected to checks on the

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> [https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34356\\_intrekken\\_nederlanderschap](https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34356_intrekken_nederlanderschap)

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> <https://www.mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/detail/35932>

<sup>106</sup> [http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/amnesty\\_stopandsearchpowersposearisktohumanrights.pdf](http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/amnesty_stopandsearchpowersposearisktohumanrights.pdf)

suspicion of illegal stay; (2) clarify the guidelines for the application of an objectively justified reasonable suspicion of illegal stay (to prevent people being checked for illegal stay wholly or partly on the grounds of their colour or ethnicity); (3) clarify the policy priorities with respect to irregular migrants in terms of individual responsibility for criminal offences or causing a public nuisance.<sup>107</sup>

**Extremism.** Research shows that low socio-economic status is prevalent among both jihadi and right wing extremists.<sup>108</sup> Education and employment may decrease the potential for crime and terror among disadvantaged groups. Pro-social measures in form of (voluntary) jobs, and additional training should be included in prevention strategies in deprived districts. Furthermore, subtle criminal monitoring should go hand in hand social, cultural and educational investments in segregated areas. Multicultural associations and community networks should support mutual (interethnic and interreligious) understanding that form the basis for the peaceful democracy.

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<sup>107</sup>Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>DE BIE, Jasper L., et al. Changing organizational structures of jihadist networks in the Netherlands. *Social Networks*, 2017, 48: 270-283.