CONTEMPORARY FAR-RIGHTS
Right radicalism in Europe: ideology, social basis, prospects

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Report ‘Contemporary far-rights. Right-wing radicalism in Europe: ideology, social base, prospects’ is the result of the work of an international team of experts from ten European countries. The report answers the questions of what the social basis of European right wing radicalism is, and what the objective prerequisites and possible directions for its development are. In addition, the authors answer the questions of what stays behind the ideology of modern radicalism, what the sources of funding for right-wing radical organizations are, and who their leaders are. Significant part of information is introduced for the first time.


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Introduction

Radicalism is a commitment to the extreme views and concepts of the social order associated with the possibility of its radical transformation. An important distinctive feature of radicalism is that the radicals are striving to implement radical socio-political changes that are not aimed at preserving and developing but at decaying existing systems. In the context of the policy on minorities, one can speak of right-wing radicals, including religious radical activists of Christian churches, left-wing radicals and religious radicals — Islamists.

Right-wing radicalism is a political movement that shares the views of supremacism, the belief that the superiority of some individuals and groups and the inferiority of others is an innate and objective reality. Right-wing radicals often support the principle of segregation: the division of people into national, religious and other groups considered ‘supreme’ and groups considered ‘inferior’. As a rule, the aim of the movement is to change the social order in the interests of a particular social group which they consider like ‘the highest’. In addition to supremacism right-wing radicalism is characterized by etatism, the cult of a strong state that controls all aspects of society’s life as the main tool of revolutionary change.

The task of modern right-wing radicals is mainly to incite hatred against minorities and use this resource to achieve success in elections.

Modern European right-wing radicals are united by a common ideological base — migrantophobia, Islamophobia, phobia towards certain ethnic minorities, and Euroscepticism.
1. The social base: who and why votes for them?

In recent years, there have been favourable conditions for the activities of right-wing radical organizations in Europe — the migration crisis, the sharp demographic growth in the number of ethnic and religious minorities, mainly immigrants from the Third World countries, European integration and related refusals of elements of national identity.

At the same time, a powerful social base of right-wing radicalism is being formed here. It is the result of many years of globalisation and features of liberal capitalism, which involves the free movement of capital and labour. Capitals prefer poor countries with low wages and taxes. Labour resources, on the contrary, prefer rich countries with higher living standards.

As a result, in advanced countries a new stratum is formed, i.e. people with professional education, mostly white, who either lost their jobs due to the transfer of production abroad, or began to receive lower wages due to the fact that many migrant workers have come to the country, and successfully dumped on the labour market.

These people form a protest electorate, similar to the protest electorate from the American ‘rust belt’ who voted for D. Trump. These masses oppose globalisation, they want to return production to their country, to reduce the number of labour migrants and to give priority to receiving social benefits to foreigners.

In fact, these people, called losers by the liberal elite, made Brexit possible. They are the natural environment for right-wing radical parties. That is why the largest ones are so successful.

At the same time, we can state that voters who vote for right-wing radicals are not yet ideological opponents of the parties in the democratic spectrum. Rather they are a protest electorate, frightened by a sharp change in the socio-cultural landscape, who are worried about their jobs, social guarantees, etc. Under certain conditions, they are ready to vote for ‘system’ politicians.

Accordingly, extreme right, neo-Nazi ideology has not been demarginalised. It still belongs to the insignificant political minority. According to polls, respondents who have prejudices against Muslims, migrants, Jews, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals and other minorities, respond negatively to questions related to open racism and praising
Nazism. Polarization takes place mainly along the line ‘for or against the reception of refugees’, and prejudices against Jews, Roma and sexual minorities are associated not with Nazi ideological views, but with ingrained prejudices of a non-racist nature.

Thus, the social base of right-wing radicals is not homogenous — a significant part has recently voted for the parties of the democratic spectrum, which at this stage are not ready to adopt a racist or neo-Nazi ideology. The smaller and as yet absolutely marginal part unites the supporters of racist and ultra-nationalist views.

2. Other prerequisites for right-wing radicalism

Other prerequisites of European radicalism are the peculiarities of the European constitutional tradition, as well as the contradiction between values and interests typical for the European society.

Thus, one of the main features of the European constitutional tradition is the lack of privileges for any social group, including ethnic groups. Simultaneously, the titular nation has natural privileges (in the education system, culture, the media, etc.). In order to avoid the contradiction between the position of the ethnic majority and the ethnic minority and preserve the unity of society, European countries historically deny the existence of ethnic minorities, for example, in France and Greece (except West Thrace), or limit their de jure or de facto number to a narrow range of insignificant in number traditional minorities.

As a consequence, France and Greece did not join the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe. The official position of these countries says that only representatives of the title ethnic group live there. French law does not allow even collecting statistical data on the ethnic origin of its citizens. Approximately the same is happening in Greece. Its constitutional tradition equates individual rights of minorities with religious and ethnic segregation, from which Orthodox Greeks suffered throughout ages of Ottoman Empire.

Many European countries have made reservations when joining the Framework Convention on the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities. The countries determined that they treat only
indigenous traditional ethnic minorities as national minorities. For example, in Germany these are small communities of the Danes, Serbs, Frisians, and German gypsies, in the Netherlands — only the Frisians, etc. Even those countries that have adopted the Convention without reservations de facto conduct exactly the same policy in relation to large ethnic communities, as well as those that have done so with reservations. So, in Great Britain, acceding to the Convention without reservations, there is one state language (English) and three regional ones — Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland, and Irish in Northern Ireland. The Arabic language and Hindi spoken by a significant part of immigrants are out of the question.

First of all, large non-indigenous communities, which do not identify themselves with any of the ‘traditional’ minorities, suffer from this practice. They are Turks, Arabs, natives of former Yugoslavia, Pakistanis, Indians, etc.

Such a policy has two consequences:

1. The state avoids supporting the culture and education of the largest minorities.

2. The integration policy towards minorities assumes only one form — voluntary cultural assimilation.

This is quite logical: if there are no ethnic minorities in the country, then no support is possible. In principle, for almost a century and a half, the representatives of the majority as well as the representatives of ethnic minorities felt comfortable with such an approach. Minorities tried to assimilate as quickly as possible and to join the advantages of the Western civilization.

The problem arose when a significant part of immigrants began to reject voluntary assimilation. This has been happening since the end of the 20th century when the process of globalisation combined with the process of national and religious revival of the Islamic world has led to the emergence of a broad stratum of migrants who are not ready to accept European standards. This process is especially aggravated during the period of regional conflicts, when Europe becomes a harbour for refugees from war-torn countries.

As a result, according to recent polls, in France about 75% of Muslims feel ‘more or less’ or ‘unconditionally’ French, and then representatives of their religion, their ethnicity or country of exodus. But 25% (and this is a very large number) do not agree to adopt this
model. For them, their ethnic, religious and geographical origin is a priority. They do not consider themselves French, although for many of them France is the motherland, and they have a French passport. This picture is typical for other countries.

Thus, the state has built a rigid integration framework, and all those who can provisionally be called victims of globalisation and international conflicts found themselves outside it in the beginning of 21st century. They do not want to change their identity and prefer to educate their children in the traditions of their ancestors, but for a variety of reasons they were forced to leave their country of birth. Within strict integration rules, this group chose to self-isolate and create a kind of ghetto. And it’s not just about immigrants of the first generation, but also about large compact immigrant groups of the second and even third generation, left by the state in an ideological and cultural vacuum.

Today it becomes obvious that this vacuum is successfully filled by Islamists and other radicals. As a result, a situation arises where people who find themselves outside the framework of the state integration system and automatically fall under the influence of Islamists often try to impose their way of life on others. Hence the ‘sharia patrols’ and the requirement to introduce sharia in a separate area of London or Paris appears. This creates a basis for the growth of xenophobia, mutual hostility, discrimination and the strengthening of the influence of radical groups, both Islamist and right-wing radical.

In general, the state, instead of developing a new national policy that ensures the interests of all population groups, categorically does not want to abandon the policy of assimilation. However, it periodically makes various kinds of symbolic concessions, such as the ban on the installation of Christmas trees, sales of alcohol and pork in areas predominantly populated by Muslims, etc. All this only creates additional conditions for the ‘ghettoization’ of communities and increases intercommunity disunity and enmity.

In fact, the European idea could solve this long-standing problem. However, the EU leadership is moving towards a federation and, in the long term, the creation of a single multinational state of Europeans with common European values. This attempt faces the opposition of many member states of the European Union, whose governments are not ready to sacrifice their national traditions and interests.
Situation is even worse in Ukraine. It is not about immigrants but irredenta. Irredenta is an accidental diaspora. People feel themselves as national minority outside their historical homeland as a result of changes in borders but not of immigration. They are absolutely not ready for the assimilation that is imposed on them by the ethnic majority.

Another precondition for radicalism is the growing contradiction between basic democratic values and political interests. And in some circumstances, the state prefers to sacrifice values in the name of interests, and in some — on the contrary. The rejection of values in the name of political interests in most cases leads to disillusionment of citizens in the existing state system as a ‘provider’ of the declared principles of democracy. People start looking for a fairer society, a more efficient ‘provider’.

For example, the ban on wearing women’s Islamic garments violated the principle of equality of religions and the principle of separation of church and state in France for many Muslims. The laws adopted in the Netherlands, France and in a number of other countries, which allow accelerated expatriation of Muslims suspected in visiting Daesh (ISIL), and other anti-Islamic emergency laws made many Muslims disappointed in such democratic values as the priority and independence of the judiciary, the presumption of innocence, etc. The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent anti-terrorist operations of Western countries in North Africa, Iraq and Syria were considered by many of them as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Islamic states, etc.

Part of the Muslim youth of Europe believes that the state declares one thing and does another, in particular violates their religious rights. So, instead of a justice society they live in a society of lies and discrimination. Thus they leave for areas controlled by ISIL or go into ‘internal immigration’ accepting radical forms of Islam. Part of the indigenous population of Europe, disenchanted with Western democracy or considering that society places them in an unequal position with immigrants or representatives of other minorities, chooses right-wing radicals.

It is interesting that the prevalence of interests over values has an impact not only on citizens of countries where this prevalence takes place but also on residents of foreign countries. For example,
analysis of the presidential elections in Russia in March 2018 showed that the devastating defeat of candidates from liberal parties (they scored in aggregate less than 5% of the vote) is, among other things, the result of the disappointment of the Russian voter in Western European balance between the declared values and interests. And since Russian liberals have a reputation for Westerners who want to ‘make Europe out of Russia’, they became the first victims of such a transformation.

In the late 1980s everything was different: the Russian voter strongly believed that the Western way of life would guarantee him the triumph of the principles of democracy, equality and justice declared but violated by the Soviet regime. Then liberal B. Yeltsin came to power. The present disappointment in the capitalism of the 1990s was supplemented by no less massive disappointment in the West.[1]

On the other hand, the rejection of interests in the name of democratic values often leads to the victory of the interests of radical forces over the interests of public security. For example, with regard to the fight against hate speech, most European countries prefer to give preference to values. It is a question of the priority of the widely understood principle of freedom of speech over the security interests of members of minorities, and, ultimately, of society. In this case, the requirements of Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are sacrificed: ‘all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form… shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognise participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law’.

When the Convention was signed in 1965, the United Kingdom, France and Italy made reservations to this article. In Italy, the criminal responsibility for the spread of hatred is connected with the proof of the influence of the accused on a wide audience with the ‘goal of changing her behaviour’, which is also very difficult to prove. Many other countries that formally acceded to the Convention without reservations in fact ignore the requirements of Article 4. For example, in Ukraine this is due to the need to prove ‘direct intent’.
At the same time, the general justification for refusing to criminalize the propaganda of hatred is adherence to the principle of freedom of speech and expression, which is the cornerstone in the basic law of most EU countries. As a result, this contradiction turned into one of the key problems of combating the spread of hatred.

3. Which parties are considered as right-wing radicals today?

In accordance with the structure of the social base, there is also a political differentiation of right-wing radical organizations. The most numerous and influential group consists of populist forces that oppose refugees and migrants but try to distance themselves from direct racist, sexist or other discriminatory appeals against minorities. These forces are now widely or relatively widely represented in the parliaments of Italy (League of the North — 37.0% and the Movement of Five Stars — M5S — 32.7% in the 2018 elections), Poland (Law and Justice Party — PiS — 37.58%), France (the National Front — 13.2% of the vote in the last parliamentary elections), the Netherlands (Freedom Party — 13.3%), Russia (Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Vladimir Zhirinovsky — 13.14% and the Rodina Party — 1.5%) and Germany (Alternative for Germany — AfG — 12.6%).

One should also mention the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which fulfilled its program, achieving victory in the referendum on Brexit. These parties advocate the withdrawal or restriction of participation in the EU (except for Russia, which is not part of the EU), the termination or restriction of immigration, the immediate deportation of illegal immigrants, strict state control over Muslim communities, etc.

As mentioned above, in recent years the popularity of these parties has increased under the influence of such factors as the migration crisis, the economic problems associated with the transfer of production to poor countries, etc. Realizing this, many of the leaders began to struggle for power. To do this, they need to expand their electoral base, including minorities. So Marine Le Pen was forced to radically change the ideology of her party making it completely tolerant, for example, to gays and Jews, for which she even excluded its founder, her father Jean-Marie Le Pen. The same can be said about the Free-
dom Party in Holland, whose leader copped out anti-Semitism and sexism in public speeches.

Russian moderate right-wing radical parties are developing approximately in the same vein. As a rule, they act under the slogans ‘Stop humiliating the Russians’ and ‘For the Russian people’. In the pre-election manifesto of the party in 2016, Zhirinovsky’s party (LDPR) proposed to exclude Article 282 (extremism) from the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The Rodina Party supports the recognition of Russophobia as a ‘state crime similar to treason’, requires recognition of Russians as a ‘divided nation with the right of reunification in its natural historical borders of the Russian world’, the introduction of a visa regime ‘with all states provoking mass migration to Russia’ and ‘ruthless struggle against any manifestations of ethnic crime’.

As a result, all these European moderate radical parties managed to rally those frightened voters who were united by a common sense of ‘global danger’, namely, migrants and their countries’ dependence on the EU. Conditionally they can be called right populist.

At the same time, they should not be hastily transferred from the category of ‘right-wing radical’ to the category of ‘centre-right’ ones. Their birthmarks are still there, although they are stubbornly trying to hide them. So the leader of the Alternative for Germany Alexander Gauland said during the campaign in the Bundestag that Germany ‘should be proud of its soldiers who participated in both world wars, and people must cease to reproach the Germans with the Second World War’. His colleague, the leader of the party branch in the federal state of Thuringia, Björn Höcke, called the monument to the victims of the Holocaust in Berlin ‘a disgrace to Germany’. ‘We Germans are the only people in the world who planted a monument to shame in the heart of their capital’, Höcke said at a meeting with supporters of the party in Dresden (the federal state of Saxony), referring to this memorial in Berlin. ‘Our morale now corresponds to the spirit of a completely defeated people’. The politician also accused the German Chancellor Angela Merkel of the wrong education of the younger generation, who, in his opinion, does not have proper patriotism.

This applies also to Marine Le Pen’s statement about the need to close all mosques in France, as well as to participation of activists of the ruling Law and Justice Party in anti-Semitic actions.
in Poland, which drew attention of the politically correct European Jewish Congress.\textsuperscript{[7]}

These parties are based on a fairly broad anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic movement. For example, in June 2009 the anti-Islam English Defence League (EDL) street movement emerged as a strident voice against what it saw as the ‘creeping effects’ of ‘Islamisation’ in UK public life.\textsuperscript{[8]}

In May 2011, another anti-Islam protest movement and political party, Britain First, emerged on the UK radical nationalist scene. Led by a former BNP Councillor, Paul Golding, Britain First has gained notoriety for its ‘mosque invasions’, ‘Christian Patrols’ and demonstrations held in areas with sizeable Muslim populations in the UK that are explicitly designed to provoke minority communities. Despite garnering a significant online following (nearly 2.3 million Facebook followers), it was in fact offline actions by the group caught up with the movement in 2017 — with both leaders facing time in prison for conducting a Cardiff ‘mosque invasion’ in November 2016\textsuperscript{[9]} and an aggressive leafletting campaign against an Asian-owned takeaway restaurants in May 2017.\textsuperscript{[10]} As of spring of 2018, the movement and its leaders have been banned from Facebook and Twitter.\textsuperscript{[11]}

The final and most recent group in this re-emergence on the British radical nationalist scene from the ballot box to the streets is the Football Lads Alliance (FLA). Formed in June 2017 by property manager and Tottenham Hotspur fan, John Meighan, the movement successfully hosted its first demonstration on June 24, 2017 in the immediate aftermath of several UK-based terror attacks — mobilizing nearly 10,000 supporters to its first London protest.\textsuperscript{[12]} At its subsequent protest on October 7, 2017, the group managed to mobilize again in central London — turning out nearly 30,000 activists marching under the banner of ‘uniting against extremism’ and lobbying for a harder line against Islamist terrorists.\textsuperscript{[13]}

This type of movement exists in other countries of monitoring. For example, the Italian Generatio Identitaria (Identitarian Generation), the Dutch Rechts in Verzet, which also specializes in anti-Islamic activities, including attacks on mosques, the PEGIDA movement, which was created in Germany but opened branches in Britain and France, banned in Russia Movement Against Illegal Immigration, the ‘Russians’ Movement, the unregistered Russian National Democratic Party, etc.
By the way, the influence of these groups is reduced, because since the end of 2017 — beginning of 2018 none of them could bring just 1,000 people to the streets. The most active FLA could bring to the recent protest on May 19, 2018 — one year to the day after the 2017 Manchester arena bombings — only several hundreds rather than the thousands seen previously.[14]

Also, there are other right-wing radical parties that can be called ultranationalists or neo-Nazi. They profess more racism and more frank ethnic nationalism.

These are the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP), the British National Party (however, this party has practically suffered a crash today and de facto almost ceased its activities), the neo-Nazi group National Action (NA) founded in 2013, which has quickly established itself as one of the most violent and concerning movements to ever emerge on the UK extreme right, CasaPound (CP) and its student association Blocco Studentesco, Forza Nuova (FN), Blocco Lavoratori Unitario e ambientalista; LFCA (La Foresta che Avanza), the National Revolutionary Group Militia, Lotta Europea and Movimento Sociale per l’Europa in Italy, the organization of the National Radical Camp in Poland (ONR), the organization Młodzież Wszechpolska, the National Revival of Poland (NOP), the Golden Dawn Party in Greece, and the Hungarian party Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary).

It is also necessary to mention radical nationalist parties in Ukraine — there are more than ten of them. The most famous are the Freedom Party, Right Sector, National Corps and C14. Their combined rating is more than 11%. But they do not have chances for unification because of the big ambitions of their leaders and different sources of financing (see below) that are not compatible with each other for various reasons. At the same time, unlike other parties, Ukrainian radical groups have military groups of more than 10,000 people, which are an integral part of the armed forces of Ukraine or the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The situation in Russia differs significantly from the Ukrainian one, since right-wing radical organizations and parties of the neo-Nazi type are barely left there today. By 2016, all of the prominent organizations of right-wing radicals and nationalists have been banned, and their leaders have been forced to emigration or arrested. So, in 2016, A. Belov (Potkin), leader of the largest nationalist project of
the 2000s — Movement Against Illegal Immigration, and the following ‘Russians’ Movement, was adjudged. In the end of the year the second co-chairman of the ‘Russians’ Dmitry Demushkin was arrested.

A number of Islamist groups were liquidated in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Samara. The activity of certain Wahhabi communities, ideologically and organizationally linked to the Islamic State and Hizb ut-Tahrir (both banned in Russia), was suspended. Many activists of banned Islamist organizations were forced to emigrate. For example, in Novy Urengoy the entire asset of the local Wahhabi mosque went abroad.

Information about recently arrested Islamic terrorists in the media show that they mostly come from Central Asian countries. So, the recruitment of local residents for terrorist organizations is becoming increasingly problematic.

As already indicated, many activists of radical organizations left Russia to participate in military operations in Syria and Iraq on the side of terrorists (more than 5,000 people), and also to participate in the civil war in Ukraine (and on both sides of the conflict).

Finally, we should also mention the split of Russian right-wing radical organizations after the conflict in Ukraine. A certain part of the so-called ‘true nationalists’ supported the Kiev authorities, and the other — the separatists. For the same reason, there was a split in the unnatural, but long-term alliance between Russian nationalists and liberals, which arose in 2011 during the formation of the anti-Putin opposition. As a result of this alliance, the process of demarginalization of right-wing radicals was initiated, and they mounted the rostrum of the so-called Coordinating Council of the Opposition.

All European ultra-radical neo-Nazi parties hate their ethnic and religious minorities. Some of them, like the Golden Dawn, publicly praise Hitler and the Third Reich. All of them, except for the Jobbik, Golden Dawn and Ukrainian Freedom, do not raise more than 3% of the votes. So, they are marginal in their countries, as a voter for the ultra-right is not yet ready to accept a neo-Nazi ideology.

Separately, the countries with state right-wing radical policy should be considered. This is, first of all, Ukraine. Right-wing radicalism of the ruling coalition was first expressed on April 2015, when they voted for the law ‘On the legal status and respect for the memory of fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century’. By
this law the right-wing and radical militarist organizations which collaborated collectively or individually with the Nazi regime and fought against the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition were heroised. Among these are the Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the People’s Liberation Revolutionary Organization (NWRO), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of Ataman Taras Borovets (Bulba) ‘Polesskaya Sich’, the Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army (UNRA), the Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army, Ukrainian Main Liberation Council (UGVR). Article 6 of this law says that persons, who publicly disregard the fighters for the independence of Ukraine, interfere with the enjoyment of the rights of fighters for independence, take responsibility in accordance with the current legislation of Ukraine. In addition, the public denial of the ‘legitimacy of the struggle for Ukraine’s independence in the 20th century’ is recognised as an outrage against the memory of the fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century, the humiliation of the dignity of the Ukrainian people, and is unlawful. Thus, since April 2015 the heroisation of the Nazi collaborators, which is a manifestation of indirect anti-Semitism, became a part of the state ideology of Ukraine due to the efforts of the ruling parties.

Secondly, the Rada adopted on September 5 and the President signed on September 26, 2017 the law ‘On Education’. By this law teaching in secondary schools is prohibited in any language, except Ukrainian from 2018. Since 2020, this rule will extend to primary school. This decision contradicts Ukraine’s international obligations, and also disagrees with the position of UNESCO, as well as with the Hague recommendations of the OSCE (1996) on the rights of national minorities to education. It leads to the assimilation of minorities, which corresponds to the typical requirements of radicals. Therefore, objectively, the political regime in Ukraine is moving towards rapprochement with right-wing radicals.

4. Ideology

The ideology of modern right-wing radicals is rather vague and inconcrete. It is a mixture of political isolationism, protectionism, racism, white nationalism, anti-Semitism and populism. As soon as the
far right’s range is wide enough, from right-wing populists such as Le Pen and Wilders to neo-Nazis such as Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the ideological platform of this movement is also wide. Recently, they have been trying to associate it with the ideology of alternative right (alt-right), which is interpreted by different ideologists in different ways, from the explicit white racism and anti-Semitism of R. Spencer to the moderate right-wing populism of S. Bannet. This is an American product that claims to be universal, in any case, for what they call the ‘Western world’.

In general, the alt-right rejects the Western democratic ideal and dominant conservatism, criticizes multiculturalism and the thesis of the need to protect the rights of minorities.

The founder of the theory of alt-right was the American Richard Spencer, president of the Institute of National Policy. He used to work for American Conservative and Taki’s Magazine. In 2010, he coined the term ‘alternative right’ and created the website AlternativeRight.com, which he edited until 2012. The website has roots in American online resources of a right-radical and racist kind, such as 4chan and 8chan. The resource actually became the spokesman of the ideology of white nationalism. No one can say whether this is a social movement or simply a website. The site includes a large section of blogs where users with racist views publish their materials anonymously. In this regard, the journal ‘Columbia Journalism Review’ wrote in 2016: ‘Because of the nebulosity of anonymous online communities, no one is sure who is alt-right and what motivates them. It is also unclear who are true believers in their ideals, and who are just clever trespassers trying to ruffle feathers’.[15]

Nevertheless, the site became the mirror for the ideological views of the ultra-right and neo-Nazis not only in the US but also in Western Europe. A little earlier, in 2005, American conservative commentator Andrew Breitbart created another site, Breitbart.som, better known as Breitbart News. In fact, it was the aggregator of American news. Also, the resource specialized in extreme right-wing comments, and its founder positioned it as ultra-conservative and pro-Israeli.

Later Stephen Bannon, a former military man, investment banker and public figure who became Executive Chairman of Breitbart.com, joined the site. It was he who positioned the site as the ‘Huff-
ington Post’ for the right, drawing parallels with the popular conservative publication. After the death of E. Breitbart in 2012, Bannon became the head of the online resource. In 2016, he announced the website as a platform for the alt-right[^16] with no objection from R. Spencer. Under his leadership, the site modified the nationalist agenda to meet the needs of the so-called ‘anti-establishment’, refusing explicit manifestations of racial hatred. Bannon always denied having racist views. A little later he said: ‘If you look at the identity movements over there in Europe, I think a lot of [them] are really “Polish identity” or “German identity”, not racial identity. It’s more identity toward a nation-state or their people as a nation’.[^17]

At the same time, the term alt-right received a new content and began to be viewed as an ideology that defends ‘traditional identity’, ‘Western values’ etc. Breitbart News focused on speeches against multiculturalism, free immigration and free trade, especially with Mexico and China.

Starting in 2011, the site began to attract significant investment funds, which allowed to finance the ultra-right movements in Europe. For example, in 2017 it became known that the new xenophobic organization in the Netherlands Erkenbrand is not just inspired, but also funded by Breitbart.com. Experts do not exclude that many other organizations of the right-populist type get the same help. Nevertheless, the total amount of investment in the resource remains unclear. One key private sponsor is known. This is a conservative activist, the CEO of one of the hedge funds — Renaissance Technologies LLC — Robert Mercer. In March 2017 Newsweek magazine reported that only in 2011 Mercer invested at least 11 million dollars in the resource.[^18] The site also actively attracted advertisers.

In fact, this web resource has become an ideological platform for right-wing populists around the world. According to the study conducted by the Pew Global Research Center in 2014, 3% of respondents regularly used the news from Breitbart, and 79% of the site’s audience reported that they were right-centrist according to their beliefs.

On August 17, 2016 Bannon was appointed executive director of the presidential campaign of Donald Trump. On November 13, 2016, after winning the presidential election, D. Trump appointed him chief strategist and his senior adviser. In this position he worked for 7 months. In fact, Bannon was called to the administration of the
American president to enforce his ideological guidelines, although publicly Trump distanced himself from alt-right.

However, in the first half of 2017 the site lost up to 90% of all advertisers. Since November 2016, the number of visitors has decreased by 53%, which is about double rate of falling attendance of other major news sites after the election. Reduced attendance also coincides with boycotts aimed at preventing advertisers from displaying ads on the site. The boycott was mainly organized by the anonymous online group Sleeping Giants. On June 5, 2017 they announced that 2,200 organizations had committed themselves to stop advertising on Breitbart and similar sites that support Trump.

Thus, two varieties of alternative right are ideological platforms for right-wing populism of moderate right-wing radicals such as Trump, Le Pen, Farage, etc., on the one hand, and ultra-right nationalists and neo-Nazis, on the other. Now we are talking about ‘network ideology’, not related to the ‘leader’ culture and centralized leadership, but the case of financing the Dutch Erkenbrand allows us to say that the management of at least one of the platforms, namely Breitbart.com, does not preclude such a development of events. However, a number of experts suggest that the Breitbart platform is only a screen that other forces use to fund right-wing radicals.

Speaking about the ideology of right-wing radicals, we cannot fail to mention the role of the Catholic Church. Despite the frankly tolerant position of Pope Francis, a rather powerful opposition has formed within the Catholic Church. It actively interacts with the far right, offering them ultra-Catholicism as a new and certainly more powerful ideological base.

This happens almost in all countries of the conditional West, from Italy, where a well-organized ultra-right Catholic opposition was formed inside the church, to Poland, where the representatives of the Catholic Church are one of the main consultants of the PiS law-populist government on migrants, Muslims and refugees. Even in the United States, there is a whole group of opposing Catholic priests and activists who consistently oppose the leadership of the Vatican and the Pope personally (for example, the Church Militant site: https://www.ncronline.org).

In fact, we can say today that in the Vatican there is an ultra-Catholic movement against Pope Francis I on the issue of minorities
and, above all, migrants. These circles reject the Pope's ecumenism, its openness to other religions, the criticism of anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism in Catholic circles. There are also contradictions on theological and doctrinal issues. There happen conflicts on the other issues related to foreign policy such as religious freedom in China, to which the Pope actively establishes relations and attitude to the Russian leader Vladimir Putin, whom Vatican ultra-conservatives see as an example of traditional Christian leader opposing to his Western colleagues.\[19\]

Confrontation escalated after the publication of a recent (April 8, 2016) encyclical ‘Amoris Laetitia’ (‘Joy of love’), where he calls to accept immigrants, and to welcome diversity. In opposition to this encyclical, there were 80 senior representatives of the Catholic clergy, 45 of them sent official letters with objections to the Pope. This seemed impossible some time ago.

Cardinal Raymond Leo Burke, patron of the Order of the Knights of the Order of Malta, can be mentioned among the most active critics of the Pope. He is a leader of the conservative wing of the Vatican. In addition to purely theological disputes, he takes an uncompromising stance towards immigration and openness to other religions, especially to Judaism and Islam. Cardinal Burke has repeatedly and publicly criticized the Pope Francis in respect of that encyclical.\[20\]

There are also more radical ultra-Catholic circles, the most active is the Lepanto Foundation (Fondazione Lepanto). The Foundation does not recognise the results of the election of Pope Francis I and therefore refuses to obey him. On the issue of immigration, religious minorities and other religions, it stays on ultra-radical position.\[21\]

Ultra-Catholic radicalism is also actively using the Internet. A number of websites and blogs that are Catholic in form but right-radical in content are actively using the language of hatred towards minorities and other religions. Some examples of these traditional Catholic associations are: www.sodalitium.it; www.magisterium.biz; www.osservatorio anti-pagano.it; www.inter multiplies unavox.it; https://www.traditio.it; https://www.holywar.org. The latter, HolyWar, is one of particular concern. This is a transnational resource associated with similar radical Catholic groups (and web resources) in countries such as Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, France and Sweden. The site positions itself as a mouthpiece of supporters of
a new crusade for the purity of the Christian faith, its materials are characterized by manifestations of anti-Semitism, including denial of the Holocaust, and also openly anti-Islamic and racist content.

In addition, there is a large section of comments on the website, as well as on the vast majority of the same resources. There you can read many Islamophobic and homophobic messages from readers. There is almost no difference with neo-Nazi sites. The only difference is perhaps in more pronounced anti-Semitism and in alarming appeals to the ‘holy war’ of Christians against immigrants, homosexuals, Jews and Muslims. All this indicates an active process of radicalisation of already existing ultra-Catholic movements.

Separately it is necessary to say about the ideological base of the Ukrainian radicals. It differs significantly from the general radical ideology of the West. In Ukraine, there is no migrant problem (with the exception of forced migrants from the South-East of the country, the negative attitude towards them grows every year), there is no Muslim problem, but there is a problem of creating a Ukrainian nation. This is a real problem in a country where more than 40% of the population associates themselves with other nations, and Russian is the language of everyday communication for more than 60% of residents.

The theory of Ukrainian integral nationalism became an ideological basis of modern Ukrainian nationalism around 100 years ago. The author of this theory was the Ukrainian nationalist Dmitry Dontsov (end of 19th — beginning of 20th century), although the universal theory of integral nationalism was formulated before him by the French philosophers Charles Maurras and Maurice Barrès. They opposed it to the principles of human liberalism and focused on illiberal, totalitarian nature of nationalism: all citizens must obey the same norms and rules and share a common enthusiasm, and all personal liberties must submit to the idea of nationalism. At the same time, integral nationalists refuse to cooperate with other nations.

Dontsov tried to apply these principles on Ukrainian soil. He opposed the Ukrainian nation — ‘svidomy’ (conscious) — to the Ukrainian people. He declared Ukraine’s independence not the only end in itself. According to Dontsov, the main goal is the creation of a European Ukrainian nation by cleansing the Ukrainian people. Ideas of friendship between nations, or, especially, of federalism or autonomy,
both within Poland and within Russia popular in the late 19th — early 20th centuries were discarded.

Dontsov called for the orientation to the European (West European) values of ‘racial hygiene’ popular in the 19th century, advocated the struggle and resistance to imperial Russian nationalism and the chauvinism of Poland against the domination of other people’s ideas and ideals. Justifying his views, Dontsov advanced theories about the existence of two worlds (‘Latin-Germanic’ and ‘Moscow-Asiatic’), which are constantly at odds with each other. The border of these ‘worlds’ runs along the Eastern part of the ethnic boundaries of Ukraine and Belarus. Thus Dontsov justified the need to orient Ukrainian foreign policy towards Europe. Also, Dontsov fully shared the general provisions of the nationalist theory of statism, advocating a strong independent Ukrainian state.

In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian political conflict associated with the events of 2014, the theory of Ukrainian integral nationalism acquires special significance. According to modern Ukrainian nationalists, including entire political elite of the country, it is possible ‘to create a Ukrainian’ within Russian-Ukrainian contradiction only in one way. Namely by development of ‘Ukrainian’ and Ukrainian culture, especially in education, media and public service at the expense of ‘Russianness’ and Russian culture widespread in the central and Eastern part of Ukraine.

The carriers of this policy were, first of all, immigrants from Western Ukraine, which had never been part of the Russian Empire or the USSR until 1939. From their midst the leaders of the Ukrainian national radicals emerged. They form the ideology of these organizations basing on Russophobia on the one hand, and the glorification of the Ukrainian collaborators of the Second World War on the other.

5. Leaders

Sociological portraits of leaders of large right-wing radical organizations are quite different. In the West, they are often former activists of parties in the political establishment, then broke with him and decided to link their fate with the ultra-right.
For example, one of the leaders of the German party AfG Alexander Gauland was a long-term member of the CDU. In the 70s he worked in the parliamentary faction of the CDU/CSU. In 1987, after the victory of the CDU in the land elections in Hesse, Gauland became the head of the apparatus of the Prime Minister of the Land Walter Walmann. He was known as the participant of several scandals, in particular, related to attempts to illegally remove ‘inconvenient’ high-ranking officials with the replacement of ‘their own people’. He was also one of the founders of the so-called ‘Berlin community’ inside the CDU, an extremely conservative group of Christian democrats. In 2013 he left the CDU.

Another well-known AfG politician, Hans-Joachim Berg, deputy chairman of the faction in the Berlin land parliament and one of the ‘grey cardinals’ of the party, was a part of the CDU for 30 years, an adviser to a number of ministers at the land and federal levels.

Some AfG deputies have changed their membership cards several times in the past. For example, Andreas Galau, deputy of the Parliament of Brandenburg, was a member of the CDU, ‘Republicans’ and the FDP. With the party membership of the Liberal Democrats, he worked in the City Hall of Berlin.

Geert Wilders, leader of the right-wing Freedom Party in the Netherlands, was elected to the municipal council of Utrecht, the fourth largest city in the Netherlands[22], in 1997, but then broke with the party.

Paul Nuttall, the current leader of the UKIP, took the place of retired N. Farage. He was previously a member of the Conservative Party and a school teacher. He joined UKIP in 2004 after a failed performance as a candidate from the Conservative Party in the local elections in Liverpool. Nuttall is known as a politician who advocated a ban on the public wearing of Islamic clothing covering the face[23], and also opposed Labourists’ plans to combat homophobic bullying in schools, describing this step as ‘politically correct nonsense’. [24]

At the same time, there is a definite percentage of people working in the professions among ultra-right deputies. For example, the deputy chairman of the Alternative for Germany fraction in the Berlin Land Parliament, Karsten Woldeit, worked as an auto mechanic and then served in the Bundeswehr under contract as an ordinary soldier. Another deputy chairman of the faction, from Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania, Holger Arppe, worked as a compositor in the printing house of the local newspaper before becoming the deputy.

There are exceptions: for example, the charismatic leader of the Movimento 5 Stelle (5-star Movement) in Italy Beppe Grillo. Grillo (68 y.o.) was a comedian who entered politics in 2009 with Giampiero Casaleggio, the founder of Movimento 5 Stelle. The British newspaper Spectator called him ‘the new Italian Mussolini’ in 2013.[25]

Another popular leader of the Italian right-wing populists is Matteo Salvini, who has every chance to become prime minister after parliamentary elections in 2018. Matteo Salvini is a young leader (44 y.o.) of the popular ultranationalist Italian party Lega Nord. In 2013, he replaced the founder of LN, Umberto Bossi, and since then he has been the leader of the party. His political credo is to limit migration and exit the European Union. He openly expresses his admiration for the Russian leader V. Putin and the US President D. Trump.

He also successfully launched the party project at the national level, given that LN has always been active in the North of the country. As a leader, he made the party close to other related right populist and nationalist parties, such as the French national front of Marine Le Pen, the British Independence Party, etc. His personality shapes the party’s politics and ideology, which is becoming more and more xenophobic with a strong anti-liberal demagogy, orientation to the so-called anti-establishment and Euroscepticism.

The most vivid representative of the moderate part of European right-wing radicals is Mrs. Marine Le Pen (born August 5, 1968), who is serving as President of the National Front (NF) in France since 2011. She is the daughter of NF founder Jean-Marie Le Pen and model Pierrette Lalanne. At the head of the party, Marine did much to change the image of the party demonstratively pushing representatives of the gay community to leadership posts and expelling her more radical father from the party.

During the campaign for the presidency of France in 2017, she lost to Emmanuel Macron gaining, nevertheless, 33.9% of the votes. It is a record for candidates from the NF. She is a member of the National Assembly of France (there are eight deputies of NF in the French Parliament). Before that, from 2014, she was a member of the European Parliament, where her party is represented by 23 members.
Le Pen is opposed to globalisation, which she blames for various negative economic trends, and opposes European Union supranationalism and federalism, instead favouring a loosely confederate ‘Europe of the Nations’. She has called for France to leave the Eurozone for a referendum on France leaving the EU. She has been a vocal opponent of the Treaty of Lisbon, and opposes EU membership for Turkey and Ukraine. Le Pen has pledged to take France out of NATO and the US sphere of influence. She proposes the replacement of the World Trade Organization and the abolition of the International Monetary Fund.

Le Pen and the NF believe that multiculturalism has failed, and argue for the ‘de-Islamisation’ of French society. She has called for a moratorium on legal immigration. She would repeal laws allowing illegal immigrants to become legal residents, and has argued that benefits provided to immigrants be reduced to remove incentives for new immigrants.

On foreign policy, Le Pen supports the establishment of a privileged partnership with Russia, and believes that Ukraine has been ‘subjugated’ by the United States. She is strongly critical of NATO policy in the region, Eastern European anti-Russian sentiment, and threats of economic sanctions. She supported the results of the Russian referendum and the annexing Crimea in 2014.

The NF had difficulties finding funding because of the opposition of French banks to her political platform. This led to the National Front borrowing €9 million from the First Czech-Russian bank in Moscow in 2014.

In Greece and in the East of Europe, right-wing radical leaders, as a rule, are either newcomers to politics, people from the bottom, who came there for opportunistic or ideological reasons, or active participants of the right-wing radical movement in the past.

For example, Nikos Michaloliakos (born in 1957) came to the party Golden Dawn in the early 1980s. He was already active on the extremely right-wing spectrum of Greek politics after the fall of the junta. His past is vague. A group of researchers who publish materials on the XYZ CONTAGION blog found evidence that his father had close ties with those who helped the Nazis in Greece during World War II. This explains the familiarity of Nikos Michaloliakos with nationalistic and neo-Nazi ideology from an early age.
He was accused of terrorist acts in the late 1970s, but he was found not guilty during the trial. Michaloliakos led the party when it was on the edge of the political scene, having extremely low popularity during the normalization of Greek democracy.

In the 1990s the party radicalized openly. Low results in the elections were compensated by attacks on students-democrats and left-wing activists. In foreign policy, the party officially supported Milosevic’s policy in the former Yugoslavia. In this very difficult situation, Michaloliakos was undoubtedly the leader. Gradually, he became the personification of the ultra-right political direction in Greece, and in 2010 he was elected for the first time as a member of the Athens City Council. Real success came to the party in 2012 when it formed the third largest faction in the country’s parliament.

Until 2013, the party received solid state support and successfully combined methods of parliamentary struggle with public populist actions such as the distribution of Easter gifts to ‘ethnically pure Greeks’ and violent actions. In September 2013, Michaloliakos was deprived of parliamentary immunity and arrested on charges of creating a criminal organization. He was released only in July 2015. The trial was started in 2017.

His wife, Eleni Zaroulia (born in 1961) is also a member of parliament from the Golden Dawn, although officially the party does not support the political activity of women in favour of a more traditional way of life. Despite this, she became the first woman represented by the party as a member of parliament in the last four elections. Her father owned real estate, including the hotel, which she inherited. This gave her the opportunity to quit employment, which also led to strong criticism from former members of the Golden Dawn. Their daughter, Urania Michaloliakos, also participates in the activities of the party.

Another leader and founder of the party Christos Pappas (born in 1962) remains one of the most zealous supporters of Nazi ideology. Before becoming elected deputy of parliament, he was a shopkeeper, and then a representative of the world-famous furniture company in the city of Ioannina. Before that, he tried to launch the Golden Dawn bookstore in the Kipseli area in Athens, where the organization had its first offices. His father was a military officer in the Greek army, faithful to leader of the junta of the ‘Black Colonels’ Georgios Papa-
dopoulous. That explains his connections with nationalist ideology and his common ‘routes’ with Nikos Michaloliakos.

**Ilias Kasidiaris** (born in 1980) is known as one of the most dynamic and promising members of the party. He was born into a wealthy family in the province of Mani in the South Peloponnese — a territory with a large nationalistic ‘background’. It is known that his two ancestors on the paternal and maternal line cooperated with the occupation administration during the Second World War. In 2004, he joined the Golden Dawn party. He has a stylized swastikas tattoo with a party logo on his arm. He participated in a series of illegal attacks on the left and migrants. Active participant in the protests against the construction of a mosque in Athens. Member of Parliament since 2012. Like other deputies from the party Golden Dawn, denies the Holocaust.

On September 28, 2013 he was deprived of immunity and arrested along with other party leaders on charges of belonging to a criminal organization. The indictment included murder, extortion and participation in the disappearance of up to 100 migrants. On October 2, 2013, Ilias Kasidiaris was released on bail of 50,000 euros.

However, on July 10, 2014, he was taken into custody on charges of possession of weapons again. On July 1, 2015, Kasidiaris was released from custody after the judges of the Court of Appeal found that the ‘legal weight’ of the crime was not sufficient for detention, but he was banned from visiting his party’s offices. At the same time, he still sits in parliament. Since 2017, he is accused in the trial of the Golden Dawn.

**Ioannis Lagos** is the oldest member of the Golden Dawn Party, a member of the Greek parliament since 2012. He became famous due to his involvement in the murder of anti-fascist Pavlos Fyssas in 2013, which was the last reason to start mass repressions against the party. He is also known as one of the founders of a group of football fans — neo-Nazis. He was declared ‘a martyr — innocent victim’ by the party and had become a kind of symbol of the struggle for a ‘just cause’. Popular among neo-Nazi youth in Greece.

Leader of the *Ukrainian* party Freedom **Oleg Tyahnibok** was born in 1968 in Lviv. He is a doctor. O. Tyahnibok is known for having become one of the founders of the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine (the name has a very unambiguous reference to the NS-DAP) in 1991, from which Freedom was formed.
Dmitry Yarosh was born in 1971 in the Dnepropetrovsk region. In 2001 he graduated from Drohobych Pedagogical University. Since 1994 he was the leader of the paramilitary organization Trizub named after S. Bandera. The organization was initially formed as a combat group. In 2013, it became the basis for the Right Sector. In October 2014 he became a deputy.

The current leader of the Right Sector Andrei Tarasenko was born in 1982 in the Dnepropetrovsk region. Closely and personally associated with D. Yarosh.

The leader of the National Corps Andrei Biletsky was born in 1979 in Kharkov. He graduated from Kharkov National University, History Department. Has the nickname ‘White Leader’. In 2000, he headed the Kharkov branch of the Trizub, cooperated with the Freedom Party, when it was called the Social-National Party, and with UNA-UNSO. In 2011—2014 he was detained for robbery. In March 2014 he was released and headed Right Sector (East), and later — the regiment Azov. In October 2014 he became a deputy of Ukraine.

A fairly wide range of young leaders are offered by the Hungarian ultra-right.

Gábor Barcsa-Turner is the key figure of the Hungarian extreme right scene. He has been the co-chairman of the Hatvannégy Vármegye Mozgalom (HVIM, Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement) since 2014, the founder of Szent Korona Rádió (Saint Crown Radio), the far-right news portal and radio channel, and Farkasok (Wolves), a paramilitary organization that is closely associated with HVIM and organizes military trainings. He was also a key figure of extreme right-wing demonstrations in 2006, took part in every event and participated in every demonstration until 2010. He considers that these times are the best period of his life.

László Toroczkai is one of the most famous, influential and active right-wing politicians, organizers and activists in Hungary. He has been Mayor of Ásotthalom, a municipality on the Serbian-Hungarian border in Southern Hungary since 2013. He has been the vice-president of the Jobbik Party since 2016. László Toroczkai was born in 1978 in Szeged, a county centre in the South of Hungary, 20 kilometres from Ásotthalom, where he now lives. He comes from a conservative middle-class family. He graduated from a good Catholic school, and then studied communications at a university in his home-
town. Married with a second marriage; his wife is from Moldavia, they have three children. The political career of Toroczkai began in the mid-1990s. In 1998, he was a local candidate for the right-wing Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIÉP). In the same year, his father became chairman of the local branch of this party in Szeged. He was also the editor of a number of extremely right-wing publications, including periodicals. Received a reputation as a specialist in the formation of various kinds of ultra-right organizations and social movements.

In 2001, he founded the Hatvannégy Vármegye Mozgalom (HVIM, Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement), which has since been one of the most important far-right radical organizations. Toroczkai was the chairman of HVIM until 2014. He also founded the Betyársereg (Army of Outlaws), which today is considered the most dangerous paramilitary organization. In 2006, Toroczkai was one of the organizers of extreme right-wing demonstrations and rallies, including anti-Romani activities, responsible for the attack on the public television building. He has been a close friend of György Budaházy, another landmark figure of the Hungarian extreme right wing, who was the leader of the terrorist organization Magyarok Nyilai (Arrows of Hungarians). He was repeatedly convicted of crimes against the right to freedom of assembly and the illegal use of force. For his extremist and revisionist activities, Toroczkai was banned from entering Canada, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia.

Zsolt Tyitityán is a well-known figure in the extreme right subculture. He is the leader of the extremist group Betyársereg (Army of Outlaws). He plays a key role in the reorganization of the extreme right wing in Hungary after Jobbik’s attempt to become a more moderate people’s party. Tyitityán was born in 1978. He was a member of the Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (Hungarian National Front), which was one of the first neo-Nazi groups in Hungary, formed in 1989. He was also a member of the organization Blood and Honour in Hungary.

In 2008, Toroczkai founded the Army of Outlaws. Later Tyitityán became its leader, who earlier served a prison sentence for causing serious bodily harm with a racist motive. The Army of Outlaws is an openly racist and anti-Semitic organization that does not accept Roma or Jews as members and whose members believe in white supremacy. According to Mr. Tyitityán’s characterization, this organization is
a sports organization of friends who take care of their physical well-being and are serious about physical activity. In fact, the Army of Outlaws is not only a right-wing radical organization, but functions as an arbitrary security force whose services might be purchased upon request in any settlement in which inhabitants are not satisfied with public security. The Outlaws organize marches through settlements, mainly to intimidate the local Roma community.

Tyitityán is also known for his extremist and cruel views, which he has never concealed. During several demonstrations, he even called for future violence against various minority groups, which he considers inevitable in the ‘racial war’. He constantly uses the neo-Nazi language of hatred, repeatedly stated that he is proud to be a Nazi. He describes himself as ‘a person with a racial consciousness who believes in autocracy and the hierarchy of races’.

Gábor Vona is one of the founders, and since 2006 he has been the Chairman of the extreme right-wing party Jobbik. Thanks to him, the party became one of the key players of the Hungarian political scene. Vona was born in 1978. His ancestors were smallholders on both sides. He originates his anti-communist views and his love for the land from his background. He often turns to his family history, telling that his grandfather died in Transylvania during the Second World War, fighting against the Red Army.

Vona studied history and psychology in the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. While studying, he participated in the activities of the Student Union of the University, which at that time was a political incubator for many extreme right-wingers. After graduation, he worked as a history teacher for a short time, but soon turned to politics. In 2001, he became an active member of the ruling party Fidesz, but in 2003 he left it, joining the young and unknown party Jobbik, becoming deputy chairman of the party.

In 2006, he became the Chairman of the Jobbik, and since then he has led the party. In 2007, he founded the radical nationalist Magyar Gárda Mozgalom (Hungarian Guard Movement) and became its first leader. The Hungarian Guard served as the paramilitary wing of the Jobbik until its dissolution in 2008. He was a candidate from his party for the post of Prime Minister both in 2010 and in 2014. In 2010, when the Jobbik first got into parliament, Vona also became the leader of his party faction.
He describes himself as a national radical, guided by law and order. At the same time, he initiated the transformation of the Jobbik from a radical, extremely right-wing party into a modern conservative people’s party. However, these attempts so far have a declarative nature and are sabotaged on the ground. Many are sceptical about the Jobbik’s change of its image. So the Jewish community rejected Vona’s congratulations on the Hanukkah holiday, which he sent in December 2016, which triggered a stream of anti-Semitic rhetoric from his side.

**György Gyula Zagyva**, former skinhead, is a leading figure in the Hungarian extreme right scene. He is co-chair of HVIM and the head of the public works program and an ‘integration expert’ (meaning the integration of Gypsies) in the local government of the city of Tiszavasvári in Eastern Hungary. Since 2010, the mayor of the town has been the representative of the Jobbik Party. Zagyva was born in 1976 into a family having nationalistic, far-right views. According to his acquaintances and friends, his commitment to nationalism, revisionism and extreme right ideas comes from his parents and grandparents. He was a member of various small right-wing organizations, and after that joined the Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIÉP) in 1999, but soon left and joined HVIM in 2002. He was the leader of HVIM from 2006 to 2010, until he became a MP of the Jobbik without being a member of the party. Leaving the National Assembly in 2014, he returned to the leadership of HVIM. In 2014, he was found guilty of threatening journalists at ultra-right event. He was repeatedly banned from entering Serbia and Romania for his neo-Nazi views.

**Vladimir Zhirinovsky** is chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Until the age of 18, he bore the second name of his father, Edelstein, but changed it to the surname of his mother, probably because of state anti-Semitism in the USSR.\[31\]

During the Soviet period he worked in the nomenclature organizations associated with the Communist Party’s and KGB bodies: the Soviet Committee for the Peace Protection (Western Europe section) — 1972–1975, and the Foreign Law Collegium (‘Iniurcollegia’) — 1977–1983, which was a subdivision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; from 1983 to 1990 he headed the Legal Department of the state publishing house ‘Mir’ (‘The World’).\[32\]

In the early 90s the former head of the Israeli special service NATIV, engaged in Soviet Jews, Mr. David Bartov, said in a pri-
private conversation with Jewish activists from the former USSR, that Zhirinovsky in the early 80s asked through Zionist underground in Moscow an invitation for repatriation to the State of Israel, received it, but did not apply for Aliya.\[33\]

In 1988–1989 V. Zhirinovsky tried to enter the new democratic movements in the USSR. So he took part in the constituent congress of the Democratic Union of V. Novodvorskaya and was elected there to the central body, participated in the establishment of the first independent Jewish society in the USSR, ‘Shalom’, where he was also elected as a member of the Board together with the former first secretary of the Birobidzhan CPSU regional committee Lev Shapiro and Zionist-Refusenic Yuli Kosharovsky.\[34\]

However, in 1990 he headed the first registered non-Communist party — the LDPR. Former high-ranking official of the KGB of the USSR Mr. Oleg Kalugin, now living in the US, said that Zhirinovsky was a KGB agent for a long time and did it on behalf of this secret service, and Zhirinovsky himself didn’t deny it.\[35\]

From the very beginning, the LDPR positioned itself as a populist ultra-right party, and it is no secret that there is no collective leadership there. In 2006, Zhirinovsky for the first time publicly admitted that his father was a Jew. Speaking in the same year before the Jewish community in the Moscow Jewish Community Center, he admitted that he is not a nationalist or anti-Semitic himself, but he had to act under these slogans because at that time it provided him to be inside of the Russian parliament.

Since the 2000s, he is gradually transferring the party’s management to his son, Igor Lebedev, who, however, does not have such a powerful charisma as his father.

6. Financing

The right-wing parties have a variety of sources of funding. The first source is state funding. All right-wing parliamentary parties, except for the Golden Dawn, enjoy state support today. However, although the Greek parliament does not finance this party, some members of the Golden Dawn still receive funding.

Sometimes the funding is quite sufficient. So, according to the one-page official financial report of the Hungarian party Jobbik, in
2016 82.7% of the revenues came from the state, 16.1% accounted for private contributions and donations, 0.6% accounted for membership fees, and only 0.6% accounted for other sources.\[36\]

According to the LDPR consolidated financial report for 2016, the main source of money for the party was state funding: of 1.354 billion roubles (about 20 million euros) received by the Liberal Democratic Party, 843 million roubles was allocated by the state. Of 368 million roubles of private donations, 348 million were donated by 12 legal entities, the rest — by individuals. 7.4 million were generated by the LDPR’s income from entrepreneurial activity, 3 million from civil law transactions, and 120 million from other revenues. Membership fees amounted to only 0.03% of the LDPR income\[37\]

In most countries, state aid to parliamentary parties exists and is seen as a necessary tool for maintaining a healthy democracy. For example, in the UK there is a special fund to support all opposition parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP, etc.). In 2016, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) received 89,869 pounds from this fund.

However, as for the Hungarian ultra-right, an expert point of view contradicts the official data of Jobbik. Thus, Transparency International Hungary (TI-H) argues that the ‘financial management of the party is not transparent enough’, since the party spends much more than the officially declared.\[38\]

It is also interesting that in 2014–2016 the European right-wing radical parties received 2.3 million euros from the EU budget\[39\], which completely contradicts the EU’s statements on the suspension of funding for anti-democratic parties. However, only in 2016, 600,000 euros were allocated to the ‘APF-Alliance for Peace and Freedom’, where the Golden Dawn is a prominent member\[40\]. In addition, the Alliance includes the Italian right-wing radical Forza Nuova, led by Roberto Fiore, and the British National Party of Nick Griffin. The European Parliament assures that funding was suspended in 2017, but experts believe that it continues on other budget lines and in relation to other organizations that are also associated with right-wing European parties.

Western media are actively promoting the idea of financing the European far-rights by Russian state structures, but Russian authorities categorically deny that. In 2016, the British daily newspa-
per *The Telegraph* published article based on data by US intelligence service. The article says that Vladimir Putin *may finance* several ultra-right and ultranationalist parties in Europe. According to the British newspaper, an American intelligence investigation of Russian funding of European ultranationalist parties proves that ultimately Russian money ‘will contribute to the success of these parties in the elections, what will weaken the structure of NATO and the EU and help lift the EU sanctions against Russia’. Nevertheless, no proof is given in the article. It is only known that the French party National Front did receive a loan of 2 million euros in one of the Russian banks.

Greek media are also trying to find a ‘Russian trace’ in financing the Golden Dawn. They try to justify this saying that financing neo-Nazi parties is a usual practice for Russian authorities.

According to Greece mass media, direct contacts between the Kremlin and the Golden Dawn began through the mediation of the leader of Russian nationalists, the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party V. Zhirinovsky and philosopher A. Dugin. Zhirinovsky knew Michaloliakos since 1996. The philosopher of the radical nationalist views Aleksandr Dugin met the emissaries of Michaloliakos — his wife Eleni Zarulia and Artemide Matheopoulos, who was also a family member of Michaloliakos, in 2012. According to the Greek media, Dugin, who supposedly has similar views to the Golden Dawn, is a secret adviser to V. Putin, which, however, is not proved by Russian experts.

Greek media are confident that the financing of the Golden Dawn by Russia is mediated by the Russian parliamentarian (United Russia) and billionaire Andrei Skoch. He is a member of the Committee on CIS Affairs and relations with compatriots. It is believed that he is personally acquainted with Russian President Vladimir Putin and is an intermediary between Gazprom, which is ‘charged’ to finance the Golden Dawn and the Greek shipowners, who are transferring money to right-wing radicals in reality.

According to journalists, Skoch also has friendly relations with Michaloliakos’ brother and lawyer, Takis Michalolias, who changed his surname in 1980. However, the only ‘proves’ are the photographs of A. Skoch with Takis and businessmen who sponsor the Golden Dawn.
However, Greek journalists consider this an almost indisputable fact since, from their point of view, the Kremlin is interested in the Golden Dawn because of its openly anti-American stance. Russian authorities also seek to use it for pressure to the EU states and support in European Parliament.

There are rumours that the Jobbik Party in Hungary was also created with the money of Russian special services. However, this is also based on assumptions with weak evidence base. In particular, the assumption that the Jobbik received money from Russian sources is based on the fact that one of the leaders of the party, a member of the European Parliament and the president of the right Alliance of European National Movements, Béla Kovács, along with his Russian wife Svetlana Istoshina, was accused of spying for Russia by the Hungarian government. It was alleged that it was Kovács who financed the party in 2005 when it was still a young non-parliamentary group of ultra-radicals.[44]

However, no direct evidence of this was presented. The party itself categorically denies the existence of any foreign funding.

One way or another, but since early 2016, the US has expressed its concerns about possible contacts between representatives of the Russian government and business with leaders of right-wing extremist organizations in Europe and announced an investigation.

In truth, the above episodes, as well as a number of others related to charges without evidence, are very painfully perceived by the Russian society. In the 90s, it has been persuaded that the West guards over democratic freedoms, in particular the rule of law and its constituent part, the presumption of innocence. Numerous unproven accusations of crimes based on the opinion of the media or Western politicians, in which the Russian leadership is credited with the motives taken for evidence, have led to total disappointment in the West of Russian voters in recent years, which, as already indicated, reflects the growing support of V. Putin.

Another source of funding for right-wing radicals is private donations from local or foreign businessmen. For example, the Golden Dawn is financed by businessmen associated with the shipyard and shipowners. The Ukrainian businessman I. Kolomoisky finances the Right Sector and Azov, while the Ukrainian Freedom is supported financially by a conglomerate of Western Ukrainian businessmen.
It is known that Arron Banks, a British financier who often assists right-wing radical organizations, provides the main financial support for the United Kingdom Independence Party. He annually donates more than 1 million pounds. In addition, UKIP’s major donors in 2016 were: Financial Service, a London-based managing and financial consulting company, donated £359,000; Techtest Ltd, a company that develops and manufactures transmitters, donated £100,000; Patrick Barbour, Chairman of the Barbour Index PLC and Microgen PLC, an activist of the Taxpayers Alliance, donated £100,000; Ko Barclay, the son of billionaire Daily Telegraph-owner Sir Frederick Barclay, donated £180,000.\[^{[45]}\]

Interestingly, the almost non-existent British National Party (BNP) received several large sums. So the party received more than £382,000 under the wills of Dennis Stanley Radmore, John Christopher Lintill and Barbara Swift.\[^{[46]}\]

According to the widely held statement, the Jobbik Party in Hungary is supported by Lajos Simicska, former close ally of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and chief businessman of the Fidesz Party. He is called ‘the key oligarch of the regime’. However, in 2014 there started a struggle between Prime Minister Orbán and Simicska caused probably by broken promises of the parties. Simicska turned away from Fidesz and publicly supported the Jobbik several times. Nevertheless, in 2016, there were no signs that he was continuing to fund right-wing radicals.

But experts believe that private donors of the ultra-right are mostly businessmen of medium and small businesses who are trying to provide themselves with cover in case of a conflict with the authorities or preparing to enter politics. Probably, there are other reasons. According to the data published by the American Institute of Geostrategic Analysis Stratfor, the Golden Dawn receives donations from ethnic Greeks living abroad — in the US, Canada, Australia and Germany. The amounts vary from small donations to large ones. In particular, Australian businessman of Greek origin Kostas Meikris, known for his right-wing beliefs makes generous donations.

At the same time, as reported by the Greek site tvxs.gr, the Golden Dawn is partially financed by Russian citizens of Greek origin who have moved to Greece or live ‘for two houses’, as well as Russians who have received a ‘residence permit in return for the
purchase of real estate’ in Greece. The website does not provide figures and names, but stresses that this phenomenon became widespread in 2013—2014.

It is known that certain right-wing radical groups in Europe, for example the Dutch Erkenbrand, are financed by the ultra-right from the US. There is an opinion that funding is actually carried out by US intelligence agencies which is creating some kind of alternative to Wilder’s Freedom Party organization.

Another source of funding for right-wing radicals is their own business. A number of right-wing radical parties are quite successful in selling their symbols, books, etc. In Greece, the Golden Dawn holds a whole network of bookstores and party attributes stores, and also provides security services, both to businesses and individuals.

In Russia, right-wing radicals are also sponsored by small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, for example, middle-class businessman Denis Nikitin, who opened a very successful clothes business for the ultra-right White Rex. White Rex supports right-wing radicals convicted of hate crimes, sponsors the organization of mixed martial arts tournaments and also promotes right-wing ideology.

Editor-in-chief of the popular Russian nationalistic Internet media Sputnik & Pogrom Egor Prosvirnin gave some ideas of how ultra-right sights are funded in his interview to The Village magazine in July 2017. He said that the main source of S&P funding was a paid subscription (‘Wanna be Russian — pay, no money — live Soviet’, he said), about 10% they got from advertising (since the magazine has about 750 visitors, it is interesting for advertisers). In addition, some entrepreneurs paid salaries to some employees of the media.

Strong-arm services to business are provided by right-wing radicals in Ukraine. In addition, they provide ‘services’ for conducting mass actions in the interests of certain political forces. So, a small action without fights and provocations, numbering up to 50 people, costs up to 100,000 UAH ($4,000). If we talk about large-scale actions with fights, the price increases several times. Video published on the Internet costs about $500, a speaker shouting appeals — $100, guarding the meeting — 500 UAH per person. Total price for the meeting is about $10,000.

According to records, Ukrainian right-wing radical groups receive money from the leaders of the political establishment. Thus,
according to the Donetsk journalist and activist of EuroMaidan Artem Furmanyuk, the National Corps work under the full control of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Arsen Avakov, and the Azov regiment is a ‘private army’ of the leaders of the People’s Front Party. By this the organizations live quite comfortably. In return, for example, the National Corps ensures the security of enterprises both in the Donbass and in other regions of the country, provides security of the financial and economic activities of the group of the Minister of Internal Affairs, etc.\[52\]

Smaller, especially unregistered groups use crowdfunding, or public funding, usually through ‘electronic wallets’. Money can be raised to help arrested activists, to hold various mass actions, etc.

For example, in Russia, right-wing radicals often raise funds to help the so-called ‘prisoners of war’ — arrested and convicted for hate crimes against nationalists, and the organization of mass actions. Over the past few years, nationalists have conducted public events in the framework of crowdfunding campaigns, such as the ‘Solidarity Day with Political Prisoners Nationalists’ celebrated since July 25, 2009. A number of projects and individuals were fundraising then. We are talking about moderate sums, quite feasible for nationalist-minded representatives of the middle class. For example, a group that raised funds to help ‘prisoners’ had sent 62 transfers of 1,000 to 5,000 roubles ($15—85) in 2016.\[53\]

Besides participation in public actions, radicals earn money by ‘protection racket’ of legal and illegal businesses, such as casinos, brothels, drug dealing, etc. In addition, right-wing radicals receive income from smuggling, kidnapping, enterprise protection, force support of business processes, etc.\[54\], \[55\]

Here again, the Greek Golden Dawn is the first in the list. It receives money from prostitution and other criminal businesses and is laundering them through a chain of bakery and confectionery stores in Greece.\[56\] The network of ‘folk bakeries’ gives the Golden Dawn additional political dividends: they create jobs for the Greeks. Individual journalists conducted a private investigation and found out that in this ‘business’ the Greek ultra-right closely cooperate with Russian mafia circles, which they do not name.

This business is also popular among Ukrainian radicals, first of all, the Right Sector. Among the particularly bright episodes of the
'earnings', one can name the blockade of the Crimea, when the radicals took money for passing the trucks to the peninsula. ‘Protection racket’ of business by representatives of other radical groups is also very widespread.

7. Relations with the authorities

All monitoring states rhetorically express a negative attitude towards right-wing radicals. At the same time, many of them use these parties in their political interests, which objectively leads to the growth of right-wing radicals in the society.

Practically in every country there are divisions of special services which control radicals. Let’s look at Italy, which has great experience in this area.

Formally, the Italian special services are subordinated to the Prime Minister, assisted by the inter-ministerial committee for the security of the Republic. The management is carried out through the so-called ‘Office of Delegation’, an institutional body that acts as an interim instance between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence Unit. A delegation may be headed by a secretary of state or a minister in no charge, who cannot fulfil other duties.

The Office of Delegation is directed by the Italian intelligence system, called the ‘Information Security System of the Republic’ and consists of a number of units, some of which are designed to combat extremism.

In turn, the Minister of the Interior has two main structures: the Crisis Group (Law 133/2002) and the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (Law 06/05/2006). The latter controls the national and internal terrorist threat, as well as coordinates national investigations against radical Muslims in order to prevent radicalization and causes contributing to terrorism. This structure also monitors activities regarding possible transfers of funds for international terrorism or organizations and constantly monitors activities on the Internet. This structure is based on the strategy of ‘repression for the purpose of prevention’, which means that police activities and monitoring of the country’s territory are carried out together with the policy of cooperation with Muslim communities.
In addition, since 2001, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has a Financial Security Committee to prevent terrorists from entering the main financial system of Italy.

Italian police forces have a special department (DIGOS), which deals with ‘political crimes’, as well as another department (DIA), which deals with organized crime. In recent years, when jihadism has become an ongoing problem and there are indisputable facts of cooperation between radical and mafia structures, these two departments actively cooperate with each other to better protect the country from possible attacks.

Nevertheless, this system works poorly, with all the systemic contradictions existing in European countries (see section 2). This is facilitated by the migration crisis and the deepening of economic problems. Italian secret services in 2016 officially testified to the growth in the number of right-wing radical neo-Nazi organizations, primarily at the expense of young people. Recruiting is carried out mainly through social networks and other Internet resources. At the same time, the number of hate crimes is growing. With rare exceptions, in 2016 it grew in all European countries. The average growth was 20%.

At the same time, the authorities often use radical organizations to achieve their internal and foreign policy goals. So, in Italy, despite the open system of interaction of mafia and Islamist structures for the transfer of weapons to Syria and Iraq, the authorities are actually limited to cosmetic measures and do not block the established channel of contraband. The connection between Islamists and Italian criminal clans has long been known to both Italian and American special services. In particular, according to WikiLeaks, as early as 2008, FBI officials in Naples reported that ‘the criminal interaction between Italian organized crime and Islamic extremist groups provides potential terrorists with access to financing and logistics from the side of criminal organizations with established routes of smuggling...’

For the transit of weapons and militants, the Islamists have conspired with the mafia clans of Italy, which bought, for example, arms for them in the former Yugoslavia or Africa, transferring it to the ports of Italy, and then to the Middle East. In 2016, Italian anti-mafia services carried out three major seizures, during which they confis-
cated weapons arsenals, including Kalashnikov assault rifles, bullet-proof vests and hundreds of ammunition that were ready for sale to Islamists. They even found a price-list for a variety of weapons with prices ranging from 250 to 3,000 euros printed in Arabic, French and Italian.[61]

Sharing weapons for drugs is also widespread. Italy’s former national prosecutor against the mafia, Pierluigi Vigna, warned in 2004 that Italian intelligence agencies ‘have evidence that Camorra groups are involved in the exchange of weapons for drugs with Islamist terrorist groups’. [62] However, this system of interaction continued to operate until recent time.

State structures and, in general, the ruling political elite use ultra-radicals not only for Italy. In Poland, the ultra-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, which was in power, actively used in 2016 small ultra-radical parties to inject anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic hysteria.

This conclusion was reached by the Polish left-wing Razem (Together) party, which conducted its investigation, to find sources of funding and political support for a number of high-profile events of Polish right-wing radicals. By announcing ‘zero tolerance’ to the cooperation of the ruling party with right-wing organizations, the Razem created a special website www.zero-tolerancji.pl, where they published 239 facts of cooperation between PiS and right-wing radicals.

Here are some examples reported by Razem:
- February 2016 — an event organized by the National Radical Camp, sponsored by the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda[63];
- March 2016 — an event dedicated to Antonio Salazar was organized by the National Radical Camp and the local PiS unit in Piaseczno[64];
- October/November 2016 — in order to combat the incitement of hate, Facebook banned the following accounts: Marsz Niepodległości (March of Independence), Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), National Radical Camp and Młodzież Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth)[65];
- November 2016 — the conference ‘Crisis in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities’ was held in the Polish Parliament. The event was organized by Młodzież Wszechpolska and was attended by delegations of nationalists from 11 countries (i.e. Forza Nuova from Italy, Nordisk Ungdom from Sweden, etc.). The conference was supported
by deputies from the ruling party: Adam Andruszkiewicz, Sylwester Chruszcz and Robert Winnicki[66].

Finally, the third form of interaction between the ruling parties and the right-wing radicals is the attempts of the establishment’s parties to ‘play’ on their field. This is caused by growing popularity of right-wing radical ideas among voters and the fears of the ruling circles to lose their popularity. This was most clearly manifested in the UK during the Brexit campaign period. The ruling Conservative party played on the field of right-wing radicals from the Independence Party and lost this game.

However, in other cases, these processes ended well for the ruling parties. They managed to attract radical voters to their side and push right-wing radical parties to their side. In 2016 we could see this in Hungary, Ukraine, Poland and the Netherlands.

So, it follows that the ruling European elites do not yet consider right-wing radicals as a serious threat to democratic values, which requires, at least, to distance from these growing political forces.

8. Conclusion

So, modern right-wing radicals can be conditionally divided into two categories: moderate radicals who operate within the law and limit their political ambitions to stop the influx of migrants and the Islamisation of their countries; and ultranationalist groups that combine legal and illegal actions, resort to force actions against their opponents, and put forward discriminatory demands not only for refugees, but also for members of other minorities, including ethnic and racial ones.

In modern Europe, there are objective prerequisites for the popularity and growth of the influence of right-wing radical parties. These include the formation of a social base of the educated part of society that has suffered from the effects of globalisation; presence of features of the European constitutional tradition leading to the refusal to recognise not only the rights, but also the very existence of ethnic minorities; the presence of growing contradictions between democratic values and the political interests of the ruling elites.

All this contributes to the growth of the influence and popularity of right-wing radicals. However, at this stage we can say that the
bulk of voters in these parties are not neo-Nazi or racist. They are people, frightened by the migratory crisis and the competition of migrants in the labour market and social services. Under certain circumstances, they can return to previous democratic preferences.

Until now, the ruling European elites have not seen the depth of the risks associated with radical organizations. This is indicated by attempts to use them to solve their internal and foreign policy problems, attempts to provide them with financial and political support, use the ideology of right-wing radicals to attract voters, etc. As a result, we observe a drift to the right in the policies of European countries, which leads to the formation of right-wing radical and even neo-Nazi parties in the ruling coalitions, in the adoption of an increasingly radical agenda leading to the restriction of human rights and the infringement of democracy.

The situation began to change partially after the sensational vote on Brexit. After that, European officials, as well as officials of international organizations, began to show obvious concern about the right-wing radical parties of the EU countries. The reason for this is trivial — the European structures are concerned that the growing influence of right-wing radicals in society, and especially their entry into power, will lead to the emergence not only of Britain but also of a number of other countries from the European Union.

At the same time, they are absolutely indifferent to those countries where right-wing radicals do not declare a withdrawal from the alliance in their programs (for example, the Baltic states). So far, there is a complete lack of interest in right-wing radicals in the countries of the former USSR since these countries are not included in the EU at all.

Meanwhile, the influence and popularity of nationalists in Europe continues to grow, and nothing indicates that this process will objectively come to nought.

In these circumstances, there is a risk of further radicalisation of the voter. When the proposals of moderate nationalists will seem insufficient to solve vital problems and people’s eyes will turn to today’s marginal parties of neo-Nazi and racist persuasion, radicalisation will become off-scale. Then the extreme right ideology will be demarginalised, since the number of its supporters will grow much faster than now, and national radicals will meet quite different perspectives related to real claims to power.
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