

XENOPHOBIA, RADICALISM, AND HATE CRIME IN THE OSCE AREA

2018-2020

Report

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The monograph "Xenophobia, Radicalism and, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Area, 2018-20", prepared by the Moscow Economic Institute with the assistance of the European Center for the Development of Democracy, is a study by leading experts from around the world, based on monitoring and comparative analysis of anti-extremist legislation, law enforcement practice, the level of public tolerance, statistics of hate crimes committed, and activities of radical and extremist organizations from 2018 to 2020 in a number of countries around the world. The geographic scope of the study is designated as the "OSCE area", although we are talking about 10 European countries and 2 North countries including America. Of course, such a set of monitoring countries does not cover all the states that are members of this international organization, however, it allows us to trace general trends in lawmaking, law enforcement practice and other spheres of government and public life that affect the situation with extremism. The work analyzes the factors influencing the formation of public demand for radicalism, manifestations of xenophobia and racism, and provides statistics on hate crimes. A separate subject of research is the description of the main active radical and extremist organizations in Europe and North America. The analysis is given on the example of Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and France, as well as the USA, Canada, Russia and Ukraine.

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ANNEX. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this Study is to identify common trends in combating radicalism and extremism in the OSCE area in the sphere of lawmaking and law enforcement practice, as well as to identify the most successful experiences in countering these phenomena. Another goal of the monograph was to determine the current level of xenophobia and hate crimes in the countries monitored, based on analysis of sociological surveys, official data, and materials of non-governmental organizations. The research also included an analysis of the activities of radical and extremist organizations, which are, in fact, the main beneficiaries and participants in social processes that lead to new risks to public security and the stability of existing political systems.

Since there are different views of extremism around the world, as well as different assessments of the threats to public security in connection with extremist and radical manifestations, and, consequently, different requirements for anti-extremist legislation and law enforcement practices, the only relevant research methodology in this case is the method of international comparative dynamic analysis. On the other hand, each country has its own criteria for hate crimes and extremism, which do not allow for a simple statistical comparative analysis of crime in the monitoring countries. However, a complex comparative analysis is possible when the percentage dynamics for each country are compared separately for a certain time period.

The method of international comparative analysis implies the study of the subject of research by comparing and contrasting similar political, social and other phenomena in different countries and political systems in order to identify common patterns and conditions of their emergence in the course of socio-political and socio-economic processes. The dynamic nature of comparative analysis is expressed in the fact that the study affects a certain historical period, in this case the empirical data was collected for 7 years - from 2013 to 2020.

As a rule, comparative analysis is used when comparing complex processes and phenomena, which are described by a set of widely varying characteristics. For this reason, this method is well suited for the study of various social and political factors, including the preconditions for the radicalization of society, threats to public security, etc.

The analysis was conducted on the following countries in Europe and America: the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Greece, Italy, Ukraine, Russia, the Netherlands, and Spain. The choice of monitoring countries was based on such factors as a commitment to the shared values declared by international organizations promoting cooperation in the field of legal standards, human rights, democratic development, rule of law and cultural interaction, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. An important factor was also the common challenges in the field of countering extremism and radicalization that each of these countries has faced in recent years. The list of monitoring countries allows for an analysis of the above factors in the OSCE area, although it does not include a number of European and FSUSoviet Union countries, which are members of the organization.

Nevertheless, it allows tracing *general trends* in lawmaking, law enforcement practices and other spheres of state administration and public life that affect the situation with extremism in all these countries.

Based on the objectives of the study, the object of the study was anti-extremist and anti-discrimination legislation, which can affect the situation of national and religious minorities, law enforcement practices regarding the protection of public safety, minority rights, and extremist actions. Xenophobic sentiments in the monitoring countries and their influence on the radicalization of society, activities of extremist groups, and their influence on the radicalization of certain population groups, as well as other factors influencing this process were also the object of analysis. In addition, hate crimes and the dependence of their number and severity on the level of radicalization of society and the activity of extremist organizations became a separate object of research. As mentioned above, extremist and radical organizations were a separate subject of study. In fact, the paper compiled a complete list of the most significant of them, including international network structures, and gave an overview of their methods of work, including the dissemination of their views and the recruitment of new members in the online information environment.

Researchers from many European universities and research centers contributed to this article: The Center for Analysis of the Radical Right, UK; the Observatoire des radicalités politiques in Paris (Observatoire des radicalités politiques); Pantheon University of Athens; Berlin Registry for the Documentation of Right-Wing Extremism and Discrimination for the Steglitz-Zehlendorf District (Germany); Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement; Jagiellonian University; Dept. The Institute for the Study of National Policy and Interethnic Relations, Moscow; the Ukrainian Institute for Policy Analysis and Management; York University (Toronto); and others.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISSUE.

Against the backdrop of a huge body of work on radicalism and extremism in individual countries, studies of general *regional* trends, particularly comparative studies of radicalism in Europe, North America, or the former Soviet Union, are not common.

In 1994, the journal *Contemporary European History* published an article by Diethelm Prowe, professor of history at Carleton College, entitled "'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts". The author, drawing on the political and economic realities of the time (multicultural society, decolonization, the end of the Cold War, a thriving consumer society, the widespread triumph of democracy, etc.), concludes that the threat of right-wing radicalism is virtually leveled and can do no harm to the society of the future. To repeat the phrase of Richard Stöss, then a popular political scientist and professor at the Free University of Berlin, he stated in his work, as if to draw a line under the past period: "Grandpa Fascism is dead."¹

¹ Diethelm Prowe, "'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts" // "Contemporary European History", vol. 3 #3, Nov. 1994, pp. 289-313, online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20081528?seq=1>

In the 80-90s of the last century, when the place of right-wing radical, populist, and nationalist parties in the political spectrum of European countries had changed and a trend to increase their electoral appeal was outlined, the attitude of fundamental science to them had also changed. During this period, works aiming to thoroughly study this new phenomenon in order to clarify the objective and subjective reasons for their unexpected resurrection from oblivion began to appear. As early as 1997, Professor Hebert Kitschelt of the University of Michigan, in collaboration with Anthony J. McGann, published a monograph entitled "The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis". Based on a comparative analysis of the socio-political and economic situation in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Great Britain, it is the first attempt to substantiate the electoral success of the radical right in some of them. The monograph argues that changes in the social structure and economy alone cannot adequately explain the success of extremist parties. Instead, we must look at the competitive struggle between parties, their internal organizational patterns, and their long-term ideological traditions in order to understand the principles that determine their success. The book concludes for the first time that right-wing parties have a better chance of success when moderate right-wing parties, once in parliament, tend to occupy a centrist niche, disassociating themselves from extreme right-wing voters.² It is worth emphasizing that already in 20 years, with the growth of xenophobic sentiments in Western society, the moderate right-wing parties will do everything possible not to lose the far-right voters, which will lead them to converge with the radical right parties and even to the creation of common inter-party coalitions.³

Dr. Cas Mudde, a well-known Dutch political scientist specializing in political extremism and populism in Europe and the United States, has played a major role in the comparative study of right-wing radicalism in Europe. In 2002, he published a monograph "The Ideology of the Extreme Right". Based on a comparative analysis of the situation in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany in the late 1990s, he tried to draw a general portrait of European Radical Rights. He notes that although individual parties may focus their voters on different issues, all far-right parties in Europe share the basic ideology of Nationalism, Xenophobia, Chauvinism, but also of law and order, which, however, is understood differently by Radical Rights and Right-wing Extremist groups.⁴

Cas Mudde was one of the first Western European researchers who began researching racism and extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. In his article "Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe," published in the "Slavic and East European Journal" in 2005, he presented the results of his study based on a comparative analysis of the activities of Radical right groups in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, and Slovenia. He also compared the results of this work with the situation in Western

² Herbert Kitschelt, Anthony J. McGann "The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis", Michigan, 1997

³ В. В. Энгель, «Современный европейский радикализм: компаративный анализ»//Московский институт психоанализа. ЦМКА// «Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии», сс. 138-161, онлайн: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sovremennyy-evropeyskiy-radikalizm-komparativnyy-analiz>

⁴ Cas Mudde, "The Ideology of the Extreme Right", Manchester University Press, 2002, online at: <https://library.oapen.org/viewer/web/viewer.html?file=/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/35009/341385.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Europe and drew a rather sensational conclusion for those times: there is no "special" East European Racism and Extremism. Despite its historical peculiarities, it has absolutely all the features of European Radicalism, including the ideology of Nationalism and Xenophobia. He also proved that Eastern Europe, contrary to popular belief at the time, is neither a breeding ground for Racist extremism nor a refuge for Racist extremists.⁵

The first comprehensive and truly pan-European study of Populism of Radical right parties in Europe, C. Mudde made in his monograph "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe", was published in 2007. This book, based on a large number of sources and academic literature, offers a critical and original perspective on three main aspects of European Right-wing populism: concepts and classifications; themes and problems; and explanations of electoral failures and successes. It concludes with a discussion of the impact of right-wing parties on European democracies and vice versa.⁶

Finally, the current state of right-wing radicalism has been explored by C. Mudde in his monograph "The Far Right Today," published in Cambridge in 2019. It is a comprehensive analysis of right-wing and extremist parties and groups in Europe (the author analyzes the differences between them), covering history, ideology, organization, people (leaders, members, and activists as well as voters), actions of these organizations, and possible consequences. The main question the author wants to answer is how serious are the electoral prospects of the far-right in Europe. The author concludes that Right-wing ideology and major Radical right parties are gradually becoming part of the political reality in Europe. It is interesting that in this monograph, along with the use of materials from Europe and America in his comparative analysis, C. Mudde often turns to the experience of Asian countries, in particular India and Japan.⁷

In 2013, a collection on the study of Radical Right in Europe and the United States was published in London, entitled "Right-Wing Radicalism Today. Perspectives from Europe and the US" and edited by Sabine von Mering and Timothy McCarthy.⁸ It contains a number of articles by various authors based on a comparative analysis of radical right parties in Europe and the United States. Importantly, the authors did not try, as is sometimes customary, to prove a fundamental difference between these parties in Western and Eastern Europe, which allowed them to draw some important conclusions concerning most states in the OSCE area. For example, Dr. Thomas Grumke shows in his article "Globalized anti-globalists: the ideological basis of internationalization of right-wing extremism" how globalization contributes to the development and spread of right-wing radicalism and extremism, using Hungary (Jobbik party), Germany (NDPG), and several other countries as examples. He also destroys the main myth concerning the claims that the hallmark of right-wing groups is to concentrate on the problems of their

⁵ Cas Mudde, "Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe"// "Slavic and East European Journal", May 2005, #19(2), pp. 161-184.

⁶ Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe", University of Georgia, 2007.

⁷ Cas Mudde, "The Far Right Today," Polity, Cambridge, 2019.

⁸ "Right-Wing Radicalism Today. Perspectives from Europe and the US", London, 2013, online: <https://www.routledge.com/Right-Wing-Radicalism-Today-Perspectives-from-Europe-and-the-US/Mering-McCarthy/p/book/9780415627283>

countries only and not to enter into real political alliances with colleagues from neighboring countries and regions of the world. The author shows that extensive international and transnational networks take place among the extreme right, which are increasingly interconnected organizationally and ideologically. Globalization provokes not only far-right groups to unite, but also contributes to the growth of their popularity among ordinary people. In particular, the author attributes the electoral success of the Hungarian neo-fascist Jobbik party to the growth of global processes.⁹

In 2011-14, the International human rights movement "World without Nazism" published three volumes of monitoring reviews under the title "The White Book of Nazism," with the general editorship of V. Engel.¹⁰ The reviews are based on a vast body of factual material obtained through analysis of both the legal framework and media materials of 21 European monitoring countries. The data collected and systematized according to a common methodology allowed the authors to compile a rating of radical-nationalist danger in Europe. The goal of the study was also to identify the main areas of social development in various European countries in terms of radical nationalist (neo-Nazi) threats, as well as to develop recommendations for their minimization.

It is important to mention the project of Latvian NGO "European Center for the Development of Democracy", which is based on comparative monitoring of Xenophobia and hate crime in European countries. Five pan-European reports and a number of analytical articles on radicalism have been prepared since 2014 as part of the project.¹¹

In another article in the collection entitled "A comparative look at right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobic hate crimes in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia" by Joachim Kersten and Natalia Hankel, a comparative analysis of right-wing radical groups in three countries attempted to identify the growing popularity of the extreme right in the post-socialist space. The authors rightly pointed to several major factors that predetermined this development. First of all, the role of religion, mainly Catholicism, in shaping the nationalist rejection of secular socialist ideology was stressed. In addition, the role of the democratic "explosion" of the k. 80s in recreating old historical models of nationalism, where a throwback to the past was seen as a tool to combat the communist legacy. The copying of old nationalist models led to the formation of a radical right ideology, which differed little from the fascist models of the early 20th century, including Ukrainian Integral nationalism or the Russian Black Hundreds movement. According to the authors, religious fervor combined with nationalist patriotism led to the re-creation of the old ideology of racial purity, for which "others," whether ethnic, religious minorities or gays, were the main danger and source of "racial pollution". Interestingly, similar trends were recorded in the territory of the former GDR (East Germany) during the first period after

⁹ Ibid, pp. 9-18.

¹⁰ See Civic Nation Internet Platform, Publications, online: https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/publikatsii/?PAGEN_1=3

¹¹ Ibid, online: <https://www.ru.civic-nation.org>

reunification with West Germany, when there was a growing interest in the ideology of the Third Reich.¹²

In 2017, the Russian journal "Comparative Politics" published an article by I.N. Tarasov, professor at Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad, entitled "Right-Wing Radicalism and Factors of Xenophobic Social Practices in Hungary and Slovakia: a Comparative Analysis".¹³ In this article, based on a comparative analysis of the practices of Radical Right organizations in the two countries, the author proves that the activities of these groups have a determining influence on the formation of xenophobic attitudes in society, thus refuting the well-known thesis that Radical Rights are a consequence of Xenophobia in the society. Prof. Tarasov proves that there is also an inverse relationship.

In general, in the 10s of the 21st century there were quite a few comparative studies devoted to the ideology of right-wing radicals in Eastern Europe. The authors sought to find the uniqueness of these parties, their difference from similar groups in Western Europe. In this regard, it is necessary to mention the work of Professor Andrea Pirro of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence. Independently and in co-authorship with other researchers, he has published several articles on this topic. In particular, in September 2013 he published "Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The Different Context and Issues of the Prophets of the Patria" in the journal "Government & Opposition". In this article the author analyzed the programs and electoral speeches of the leaders of the Bulgarian "Ataka", Hungarian "Jobbik", and Slovak "National Party", which were gaining popularity in these countries at the time. On the basis of this analysis, he concluded that despite certain national differences, the ideology of these parties is absolutely identical, based on clericalism, hatred of ethnic minorities, especially the Roma and irredentists of neighboring countries, and Euroskepticism.¹⁴ In later years, the author published several other works on the same topic.¹⁵

In 2018 the journal "Current Problems of Europe" published an article by a team of employees of the Russian academic Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences "Political parties facing new challenges: the experience of Western Europe and Russia", written on the basis of the materials of the methodological seminar organized by the Center for Scientific Information Studies of Global and Regional Problems of INION "Political parties facing new challenges". It was one of the few attempts in Russian historiography to analyze, on the basis of a comparative analysis of political life in Russia and Western Europe, the reasons for the popularity of right- and left-wing parties under the conditions of

¹²Joachim Kersten & Natalia Hankel, "A comparative look at right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobic hate crimes in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia" // "Right-Wing Radicalism Today. Perspectives from Europe and the US", London, 2013, online: <https://www.routledge.com/Right-Wing-Radicalism-Today-Perspectives-from-Europe-and-the-US/Mering-McCarty/p/book/9780415627283>, pp. 85-94.

¹³ I.N. Tarasov, "Right-wing radicalism and factors of xenophobic social practices in Hungary and Slovakia: a comparative analysis" // journal Comparative Politics, 2017, vol. 8, no. 1, online: <https://www.comparativepolitics.org/jour/article/view/574/478>

¹⁴ Andrea Pirro, "Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The Different Context and Issues of the Prophets of the Patria" // "Government & Opposition", vol. 49(4), pp.600-629.

¹⁵ Andrea L. P. Pirro, Homepage, online: <https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=9efVotAAAAAJ&hl=en>

globalization. Interestingly, the authors agree that Russia has not been affected by this process, but they conclude that this is due to the lack of a system of political parties in real competition in the political field.¹⁶

In 2018, the Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis, under the editorship of Valery Engel, PhD published a monograph by an international team of authors titled "The Modern Far Right. Right-Wing Radicalism in Europe: Ideology, Social Basis, and Prospects". The book analyzes the social base of the ultra-right, the preconditions of the emergence of this movement in modern European countries, ideology, relationships with the authorities and sources of funding. In addition, the book provides biographical portraits of the leaders of the main right-wing parties.¹⁷

In 2019, the Center for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Cross-Cultural Communication (CMCA) at the Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis published in the Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology an article by V. V. Engel, "Contemporary European Radicalism: A Comparative Analysis." Using methods of comparative analysis on the example of 15 European countries, the author traces the general trends in the formation of xenophobic sentiments and, most importantly, the role of the state and political players in this process. At the same time, he comes to the conclusion that the formation of xenophobic and Radical sentiments in Europe is a process which fully meets the interests not only of ultra-radical parties and groups, but also of the ruling elites, since it allows them to stay in power in the conditions of growing xenophobic sentiments among the voters. For the sake of this, the elite turns to explicit and implicit alliances within Radical Right parties present in the parliaments of Europe. However, this phenomenon has another side - the gradual slide of society and political elites to the right and the corrosion of democratic institutions.¹⁸

In connection with research on the far-right in the region of Eastern Europe, I would also like to highlight the work of Hungarian authors Anna Kende and Peter Kreko, whose subject matter is Radical Right parties and xenophobic sentiments in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2019, they published an article entitled "Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-Wing Populism in East-Central Europe". Using the examples of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, the authors explored various characteristics of nationalism in the said region, as well as factors of inter-group tensions especially in the context of anti-immigrant political discourse. According to them, the success of right-wing radicalism in the post-socialist space consisted in a high but unstable national identity based on the experience of fragile national sovereignty, deeply rooted and socially acceptable (i.e. normative) inter-group hostility with

¹⁶ "Political Parties Facing New Challenges: The Experience of Western Europe and Russia"// JI. "Actual Problems of Europe," 2018, pp.235-268., online: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politicheskie-partii-pered-novymi-vyzovami-opyt-zapadnoy-evropy-i-rossii-metodicheskij-seminar-tsentra-nauchno-informatsionnyh>

¹⁷ "The Modern Far Right. Right-Wing Radicalism in Europe: Ideology, Social Base, Perspectives," CMCA, Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis, 2018.

¹⁸ B. V. Engel, "Modern European Radicalism: A Comparative Analysis," Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis. CMCA// Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology, pp. 138-161, online: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sovremennyy-evropeyskiy-radikalizm-komparativnyy-analiz>

minorities (especially toward the Roma minority), and the effective use of the immigrant threat in this context.¹⁹

A whole stratum of scientific works has been published since the 1990s in Russia, where the problem of nationalism and radicalism was very topical at the time due to the collapse of the USSR. It is necessary to highlight the works of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (IEA) of the Russian Academy of Science (RAS), which since 1993 has published dozens of monitoring studies concerning the analysis of interethnic conflicts in post-Soviet countries.²⁰

At the same time, in 1993, with the assistance of the IEA and RAS, the NGO "Assistance in Ethnological Monitoring and Early Conflict Prevention" was established, which is better known as the Ethnological Monitoring and Early Conflict Prevention Network (EAWARN). In 2015, the organization was transformed into the Distributed Research Center for Interethnic and Interreligious Problems.²¹ It assessed the socio-cultural and political situation in multi-ethnic regions and communities, mostly in the former Soviet republics. Its monitoring activities have resulted in the regular publication of the Bulletin of the Ethnological Monitoring and Early Conflict Prevention Network, the Annual Reports on Interethnic Relations and Conflicts in Post-Soviet States, and the databank Ethnicity and Conflicts in Post-Soviet States.²²

In 1994-2014, it prepared reports titled "The Ethnopolitical Situation in Russia and Neighboring States," edited by Acad. V. A. Tishkov, which is a collection of articles on the topic of interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In some of them, for example in the article "On the Strategy to Counteract Interethnic Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Territory" by Dr. V. Stepanov, the experience of European countries was analyzed. In particular, the mentioned article talked about the experience of Great Britain on the creation of the program state document on extremism counteraction, as well as about different approaches in UK and Russian Federation to extremism definitions.²³

The work of the Russian "Sova" Center for Information and Analysis should also be noted, whose authors in a number of their monitoring reviews used the method of comparative analysis in assessing the risks of extremism in Russia. For example, in 2015, an analytical article by A. Verkhovsky, Director of the Center, "The Criminal Law of OSCE Countries against

¹⁹ Anna Kende, Peter Kreko "Xenophobia, prejudice, and right-wing populism in East-Central Europe"// "Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences", vol. 34, August 2020, pp. 29-33, online:

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352154619301299>

²⁰ Center for Ethnopolitical Studies. IEA RAS, online: <http://iea-ras.ru/index.php?go=Structure&id=12&in=view>

²¹ "EAWARN ETHNOLOGICAL MONITORING NETWORK FORCED TO CLOSE," National Accent, online:

<https://nazaccent.ru/content/11250-set-etnologicheskogo-monitoringa-eawarn-prosushetvuet-eshe.html>

²² Ethnological Monitoring and Conflict Early Warning Network, online:

<https://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/1428250>

²³ V.V. Stepanov "On the Strategy to Counter Extremism in the Russian Federation"// "Ethnopolitical Situation in Russia and Neighboring States. Annual Report of the Ethnological Monitoring Network, 2013," p. 165, online:

http://xn---8sbnatxcctbeddbtj9c2e.xn--p1ai/files/doc-files/2016/08/etnopoliticheskaya_situaciya_v_rossii_-_2013.pdf

Hate Crimes, Incitement to Hatred and Hate Speech," was published. It provides a detailed analysis of the legal norms against radical organizations, which is very useful for the analysis of law enforcement practices in European countries.²⁴

In 2019 the journal "Media, War & Conflict" published an article "Comparative Analysis of Survival Strategies of Right-Wing and Islamist Communities in Social Networks (Data from Russian Social Network VKontakte)" by 4 Russian authors, employees of the Big Data Laboratory of Tomsk State University M. Myagkov, E. Schekotin, S. Chudinov, and V. Goyko, in English.²⁵ The article presents a comparative analysis of Internet communities of Radical Rights and Islamists who are considered numerous and dangerous extremist groups in Russian society. Internet communities were selected based on content posted on Russia's largest social network *VKontakte*. The authors found that both right-wing and Islamist groups use similar behavioral techniques, with the most common being the imitation of ideologically neutral content. In addition, each extremist community employs its own unique methods.

The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right, edited by Jens Ridgren, was published in 2018, providing a broad overview of the ideology and activities of right-wing radicals and Islamists, their interaction with religious institutions, the influence of globalization, etc. The studies in this volume covered not only European countries, but also Russia, the United States, Australia, Israel, and Japan.²⁶ In his foreword, Dr. Ridgren also writes of the cultural influences of the United States. Ridgren also writes about cultural racism as an important component of the new right-wing radical ideology. The author links the impact of cultural racism directly to changes in the social environment due to the growth of migration flows.

The growth of immigration as a reason for the rise of radical rights sentiments was actively discussed by many authors during the active period of the 2015-18 migration crisis. Most of the researchers, such as Lewis Davis of Union College in the United States and Samit Deolle of Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg, Germany, who analyzed this phenomenon using the example of the Central and Northern European region of Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Austria, and Norway, agreed with this position.²⁷ Prof. Jason Kerberg of the Muskingum University (USA), analyzed the phenomenon on the example of voting in the parliaments of 16 European countries, and many others agree with him.²⁸ At the same time, they believe that the main problem of immigration is not only cultural differences between

²⁴ Alexander Verkhovsky, "Criminal Law of OSCE Countries against Hate Crimes, Incitement to Hatred and Hate Speech," M. 2015. online: <https://www.sova-center.ru/files/books/cl15-text.pdf>

²⁵ "A comparative analysis of right-wing radical and Islamist communities' strategies for survival in social networks (evidence from the Russian social network *VKontakte*)"// "Media, War & Conflict", vol.13, #4, pp.425-447.

²⁶ "The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right", Edited by Jens Rydgren, Oxford, 2018, online at: <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-the-radical-right-9780190274559?cc=lv&lang=en>

²⁷ Lewis Davis and Sumit S. Deole, 2017. Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe. - *Ifo DICE Report*, # 4/2017, December, vol.15. (<https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-davis-deole-december.pdf> (accessed: 02.12.2018)

²⁸ Kehrberg Jason, "The Demand Side of Support for Radical Right Parties"// "Comparative European Politics", #13(5), pp. 553-576, online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264474027_The_Demand_Side_of_Support_for_Radical_Right_Parties

immigrants and the native population of Europe, which can cause social frustration, but also the fear of the working class that their place can be taken by immigrants willing to get less money for the same work.

The socio-economic aspects of the migration crisis that led to the growth of Radical Right popularity are explored in the works of Professor Menno Fenger of Erasmus University in Rotterdam, where using the comparative analysis of migration processes and ultra-right activity in the USA, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France, he concludes that white representatives of working professions become new voters of the ultra-right, often this educated stratum, that are gradually forced out of the labor market by labor migrants from third-world countries.²⁹ Many other researchers hold the same view, including Vassiliki Georgiadou of Greece's Panteon University, Lamprini Rory of the British University of Exeter, and Costas Roumanias, associate professor at Athens University of Economics and Business. In their joint paper, "Mapping the European Far Right in the 21st century: A Meso-level Analysis," published in 2018 in the journal "Electoral Studies", they drew on a broad sample of sociological research in 28 European countries between 1999 and 2014 and concluded that the economic difficulties associated with the influx of immigrants strengthen the position not only of right-wing radicals, who are more likely to exploit the cultural negativity of everyday people, but of right-wing extremists seeking to break down existing political and economic systems.³⁰

Anti-Muslim sentiment as an ideological basis in the activities of many European Right-wing groups was explored in an article by David Bell and Zan Strabak, "Exclusion of Muslims in Eastern Europe and Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Muslim Attitudes in France, Norway, Poland, and the Czech Republic". It was published in the "International Journal of Minority and Group Right" in November 2020. The authors used data from the 2014-15 European Social Survey in 4 countries as their source. They found that anti-immigrant approaches in countries with a long history of Third World immigration, i.e., Western European countries, differ significantly from those in Eastern European countries with minimal migrant presence. The results of the analysis show that both the levels and determinants of anti-Muslim attitudes in these two European regions vary greatly, with the highest levels of anti-Islamic attitudes being recorded in the countries with the lowest Muslim populations, Poland and the Czech Republic, which can be explained by active anti-Islamic propaganda, encouraged by the government among others.³¹

²⁹ Menno Fenger, "The social policy agendas of populist radical right parties in comparative perspective"// Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy , Volume 34 , Issue 3: SI: Social Policy and Populism: welfare chauvinism and identity politics in a Europe on the brink of Brexit , October 2018 , pp. 188 - 209, online at: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-international-and-comparative-social-policy>

³⁰ Vasiliki Georgiadou, Lamprini Rori, and Costas Roumanias, "Mapping the European far right in the 21st century: A meso-level analysis" // "Electoral Studies", vol. 54, August 2018, pp. 103-115, online at: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137941830026X#!>

³¹ David Andreas Bell and Strabak, "Exclusion of Muslims in Eastern Europe and Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Muslim Attitudes in France, Norway, Poland and Czech Republic"// "International Journal of Minority and Group Right", vol. 28, #1, pp.117-142.

Speaking of the comparative analysis of Radical Right, we should mention the tremendous research work done by the Center for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) in London. Founded in 2017 by Prof. Matthew Feldman, this organization has brought together key researchers of the phenomenon from around the world. Over the past years, CARR has published various kinds of studies based on comparative analysis in different countries around the world or in specific regions, focusing on different aspects of right-wing radicalism: ideology, populism, international relations, etc.³² We can also highlight separate CARR reports on right-wing radical populism,³³ the ideology of the far right, and their organizational structure³⁴, published in December 2020.³⁵ In particular, a series of articles by a number of authors dedicated to the analysis of right-wing radical activities during the coronavirus pandemic draws attention. For example, the already mentioned V. Engel proves in one of his articles published on the organization's website, "Will Be the World More Tolerant After the COVID-19 Pandemic?,"³⁶ that right-wing parties lost some of their popularity during the pandemic as migration flows significantly decreased and public discourse shifted "to health care and governmental crisis management, a field where radicals feel less confident than they do about immigration, refugees, and EU membership".³⁷

In 2018, CARR published the results of a study (report) by the Jena Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ) in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) in London. The study is titled "Loving Hate. Anti-Muslim Extremism, Radical Islamism and the Spiral of Polarization" by British researcher Mike Fielitz and German researchers Julia Ebner, Jakob Gohl, and Matthias Kwent.³⁸ It deals with the interdependence of anti-Muslim and Islamist extremism and radicalism. Based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of social media, more than one million German-language anti-Muslim and Islamist Internet materials were analyzed between 2013 and 2017. The results of this study are quite predictable: "Hostility toward Muslims and Islamist fundamentalism are closely linked. Mobilization and recruitment strategies mirror each other, and there are also ideological overlaps. This becomes particularly evident in their online propaganda on social media."³⁹

The topic of Islamic extremism in Europe and the World is a separate layer of research. Since the transformation of Islamic extremism into a significant factor of threat to European and

³² Center for Analysis of the Radical Rights, online at: <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/>

³³ "Populism Research Unit. Year in Review Report", CARR, December 2020, online at: <https://usercontent.one/wp/www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/PRU-Year-in-Review-2020.pdf>

³⁴ "Ideology Research Unit. Year and Review Report", CARR, December 2020, online at: <https://usercontent.one/wp/www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/IRU-Year-in-Review-2020.pdf>

³⁵ "Organisation Research Unit. Year and Review Report", CARR, December 2020, online at: <https://usercontent.one/wp/www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ORU-Year-in-Review-2020.pdf>

³⁶ Valery Engel, "Will be the world more tolerant after the Covid-19 Pandemic? ", May 27, 2020, online at: <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/05/27/will-be-the-world-more-tolerant-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/>

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Maik Fielitz, Julia Ebner, Jakob Gohl, and Matthias Kwent "Loving Hate. Anti-Muslim Extremism, Radical Islamism and the Spiral of Polarization", Jena/London/Berlin 2018, online at: http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/IDZ_Sonderheft_01_eng_Web.pdf

³⁹ Ibid.

American security since September 11, 2001, there have been serious studies of Islamism and Islamic terrorism. Above all, researchers have been interested in what the model of religious Islamic extremism is that has spread through Western countries. In 2005, an article entitled "Mixed Logit Estimation of Radical Islamic Terrorism in Europe and North America: A Comparative Study" appeared in "The Journal of Conflict Resolution". Its authors, Carlos Pestana Barros and Isabelle Proença, tried, based on an analysis of numerous Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, the United States and Canada from September 1979 to December 2002, to identify the main characteristics of Islamist terrorism. The goal of the authors was to determine with a high degree of probability from external indicators that an attack was carried out by Islamists. The authors determined that the pattern of Islamist terrorism is characterized, in descending order, by "blind" bombings aimed at hitting as many completely unauthorized people as possible in order to intimidate society and the country's leadership, by showy executions of "infidels," and by hostage-taking.⁴⁰

A number of researchers try to divide Islamism into moderate and radical. For example, one of the recent monographs on this topic, by Russian authors L. Grinin and A. Korotayev, "Islamism and its Role in Modern Islamic Society" concludes that "Islamism for the most part is not a radical movement", that it is a political current that represents "a form of social and political activity based on the idea that public and political life should be guided by the system of Islamic principles".⁴¹ However, the authors ignore the fact that the very wording "political and public life in accordance with the system of principles of Islam" is already radical in itself. After all, we are talking about demanding the rejection of the secular form of government in favor of Islamic Shariah norms, which deny the idea of equality between men and women, freedom of religion, and other democratic values.

American forensic psychiatrist Mark Sageman, who personally examined arrested Islamist extremists, attempted to construct a model for radicalization of Muslim youth. As a government counterterrorism consultant, he wrote a monograph titled "Leaderless Jihad Terror Networks in the 21st Century", which was published in 2008. In it he debunked the myth then prevalent in historiography that jihad is impossible without a leader and without the support of the Muslim community. He proved that Islamist terror is possible even on an individual basis, subject to certain external factors and "group dynamics. For example, traumatic events experienced personally or of which it has become known can trigger an internal outcry in young people. They interpret this outrage through a particular ideology, being Muslims - an Islamic ideology that is more heartfelt and understood than any other based on alien doctrines. Usually in chat rooms or other Internet forums, adherents share this moral outrage, which resonates with the personal experience of others. This is how ordinary Muslims become Islamist radicals, lone-wolf terrorists, and this is how small terrorist groups often form,

⁴⁰ Carlos Pestana Barros and Isabel Proença, "Mixed Logit Estimation of Radical Islamic Terrorism in Europe and North America: A Comparative Study" // "The Journal of Conflict Resolution", Vol. 49, No. 2, The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism (Apr., 2005), pp. 298-314

⁴¹ L.E. Grinin and A.V. Korotayev, "Islamism and Its Role in Modern Islamic Society," Moscow, 2019.

unconnected to any overarching decision-making center.⁴² This view is shared by other researchers, such as Quentin Wiktorovich,⁴³ Mitchell Silber, Erwin Barth,⁴⁴ etc.

A separate group of works deals with the topic of propaganda tools used by leading terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State to recruit new members. It is worth mentioning one of the latest and most significant works - the monograph "Islamic State's Online Propaganda: A Comparative Analysis" (published in London in 2021) by Polish researcher, researcher of Oxford University, Myron Lakomy. Based on the analysis of a number of electronic publications of ISIS, the author shows that this organization relies on thoughtful and highly effective propaganda on the Internet, rather than in the printed publications distributed in the mosques in the old-fashioned way.⁴⁵ When it comes to the content and directions of propaganda, most researchers agree that both the propaganda machine of the Islamic State and the propaganda of al-Qaida are aimed at justifying terror as the only method, in their view, of imposing the "only correct" version of Islam.⁴⁶

In this connection, we should also note the work of one of the experts on Islam in Russia, Dr. R.A. Silantyev, Professor at the Department of Theology and Head of the Laboratory of Destructology at Moscow State Linguistic University. In his article "On the Expansion of Radical Forms of Islam in the Russian Federation", published in 2012 in "Herald of Chelyabinsk State University", he analyzed the ideological aspects of Salafism (Wahhabism) underlying most Islamist theories. He highlighted such features as a literal interpretation of the Koran, the attitude to Jihad as a form of struggle, including armed struggle, against the enemies of Islam, the rejection of any other interpretation of the Koran, except Salafist, sharply negative attitude to other world religions - Christianity and Judaism, whose followers they do not consider "people of the Book", as well as the demand to abandon any secular forms of political government in favor of Sharia. He also examines the history of the spread of Wahhabism in the territory of the Russian Caucasian and Volga Ummah in the 1990s.⁴⁷

In general, a number of authors have devoted their research to a comparative analysis of various Islamist extremist groups. In 2016, for example, Ibrahim Gemey's dissertation "Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: A Comparative Study of the Jihadi Narratives" was defended

⁴² Marc Sageman, "Leaderless Jihad Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century", University of Pennsylvania, 2008, online at: <https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14390.html>

⁴³ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the west". Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , 2005

⁴⁴ Silber, M. D., and Bhatt, A., "Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat". New York City: NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007, online: https://seths.blog/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf

⁴⁵ Miron Lakomy, "Islamic State's Online Propaganda: A Comparative Analysis", London 2021, online at: <https://www.routledge.com/Islamic-States-Online-Propaganda-A-Comparative-Analysis/Lakomy/p/book/9780367699475>

⁴⁶ "Al-Qaeda's propaganda decoded: A psycholinguistic system for detecting variations in terrorism ideology" // "Terrorism and Political Violence", May 2016, online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302633089_Al-Qaeda's_propaganda_decoded_A_psycholinguistic_system_for_detecting_variations_in_terrorism_ideology

⁴⁷ R.A. Silantyev, "On the Expansion of Radical Forms of Islam in the Russian Federation" // Bulletin of Chelyabinsk State University № 22 (276), 2012, online: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/k-voprosu-ob-ekspansii-radikalnyh-form-islama-v-rossiyskoy-federatsii>

and then published at the University of Washington. In it the author explored the main differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as an anti-state movement. Presenting the former as a revolutionary movement and the latter as a state-building organization, he argues that, despite their Jihadi nature, the two groups adhere to different narratives and strategies. In doing so, the author shows that ISIS was created as a mega-state, a Caliphate that viewed at least the entire Muslim world as its future territory. Consequently, this organization de facto directs its activities towards the destruction of all other states, viewing even Islamic countries as traitors of Islam.⁴⁸

The study of similarities and differences between the two major Islamist groups has been continued by other authors. For example, in 2020 the Iranian academic journal "Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World" published an article "Comparative Study of Al-Qaeda and ISIS Groups" by three researchers, Ehtiyar Reza, Alavian Morteza, and Vali Alemeh. In this article the authors outlined the main similarities and main differences between the two terrorist groups. As similarities, they identified the origin of their ideology, apocalyptic worldview, pragmatism, anti-Western vision, belief in a hierarchical structure in their system, militancy, anti-Shia approach, universality, and use of cyberspace. In terms of differences, the authors emphasized different approaches to the idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate, psychological and media tactics, military strategy, differences in views of Islamic identity, and finally, how al-Qaida and ISIS look at women and minorities. The study concluded that despite some identical similarities, these organizations have obvious differences in many aspects, especially in structure, goals, functionality, methods of action or operations, quality of leaders, and means. Despite this, their main goals are almost identical - violence against and destruction of innocent people, as the ideology of both groups assumes that "the rest," those who do not share their views on Islam, their goals and objectives, "deserve to be killed."⁴⁹

If we talk about the global problems of Islamic radicalism, it is necessary to note one of the most recent universal works in this area - the doctoral thesis of the Russian author A.M. Serebrova, "Islamist Radical Movements and Organizations: Stages of Development and Directions of Counteraction", published in 2020.⁵⁰ The author conducted a theoretical and methodological analysis of the problem of international terrorism in general and Islamic terrorism in particular. The genesis of Islamic radical organizations towards extremism and terror was traced, and the historical background of the emergence and evolution of the main Islamic extremist movements was analyzed: "Taliban", "Al-Qaeda" and "Islamic State", features of their ideology and functioning mechanisms, etc. Using the examples of these three

⁴⁸ Gemeah, Ibrahim, "Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: A comparative study of the jihadi narratives", University of Washington, 2016, online at: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/36787/Gemeah_washington_02500_15799.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

⁴⁹ EKHTIARI AMIRI REZA, ALAVIAN MORTEZA, Vali Nataj Alemeh "Comparative Study of Al-Qaeda and ISIS Groups"// "Fundamental and applied Studies of the Islamic World", Spring 2020, vol.2, #, pp. 24-57, online at: <https://www.sid.ir/en/Journal/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=740610>

⁵⁰ A. M. Serebrov, "Islamist radical movements and organizations: stages of development and directions of counteraction," Author's Abstract, M. 2020, online: <https://www.dissercat.com/content/islamistskie-radikalnye-dvizheniya-i-organizatsii-etapy-razvitiya-i-napravleniya-protivodeis>

organizations, the author shows how the process of regionalization leads to the mass creation of entire terrorist networks, managed from a single center, although having a certain degree of autonomy. The thesis also shows how these "organizations act as propagandists of their own model of state structure, which, in their view, being the opposite of the unjust Western model, should lay the foundation of the modern world order." ⁵¹

There are a number of other studies that analytically compare al-Qaida with other radical organizations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad⁵² or the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt.⁵³ They all agreed that al-Qaida either acted as an umbrella organization or provided direct or indirect assistance to regional Islamist structures around the world. There are also reviews of individual fundamentalist organizations around the world, including al-Muhajirun, declared a terrorist organization in a number of countries for recruiting fighters for armed conflicts and terrorist attacks,⁵⁴ the Muslim Brotherhood, which most researchers hold responsible for promoting any form of activity to spread the ideas of a global Caliphate,⁵⁵ and Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat.

There is quite a lot of literature on the latter two organizations because of the different assessments of their activities - from moderate Islamists, whose activities are allowed and even welcomed, to terrorists and extremists, who must be fought by all available methods. For example, Thomas Gugler of Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main describes the Tablighi Jamaat as a "peaceful missionary organization." In his article "The New Religiosity of Tablighi Jama'at and Da'wat-e Islami and the Transformation of Islam in Europe", he compares its ideology and activities with the missionary Sufi movements Da'wat-e Islami and Sunni Da'wat-e Islami and concludes that while their peaceful nature is not in doubt, "the reconstruction of daily life and individual identity markers based on the examples of the Prophet and the salaf (pious ancestors) as they were portrayed in the Hadith literature", contributes to the radicalization of Muslims.⁵⁷ On the other hand, researchers such as Marc Gaboria of France, Alex Alexiev of the United States, and many others assess this movement as hostile to democratic values, whose goal is to "subjugate the world in the spirit of Jihad."⁵⁸

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations", Tel-Aviv University, 2005, online at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46602/mc20.pdf>

⁵³ Mohamed Elaraisy, "THE INTELLECTUAL REVIEWS OF FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC GROUPS' LEADERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE JIHADI ACTION, THE MUSLIM WORLD, AND THE WEST," Kansas, 2010.

⁵⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam", Department of International Studies, Rhodes College, online at: <https://securitypolicy.law.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wiktorowicz.Joining-the-Cause.pdf>

⁵⁵ Leslei Lebl, "The EU, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation", December 2013, online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256821635_The_EU_the_Muslim_Brotherhood_and_the_Organization_of_Islamic_Cooperation

⁵⁶ Edwin Bakker and Roel Meijer, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe", December 2012, online at: <https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-europe/>

⁵⁷ Thomas K. Gugler, "The New Religiosity of Tablighi Jama'at and Da'wat-e Islami and the Transformation of Islam in Europe" // "Anthropos: International Review of Anthropology and Linguistics", January 2010, #105(1), pp. 121-136.

⁵⁸ Gaborieau M., Transnational Islamic Movements: Tablighi Jamaat in Politics. ISIM Newsletter (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World). July 1999. P. 21; Alexiev A. Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions // Middle East Quarterly. Winter 2005. P. 3-11

Also of note is the work of Russian researcher Sergei Markedonov, "The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia's Volga Region," in which he concludes that the ideology, insularity, and closed nature of Tablighi Jamaat make its followers intolerant of other Muslims, not to mention representatives of other religions. Such an environment could potentially lead to an increase in the number of active Islamists who do not limit their activities to missionary work.⁵⁹

Approximately the same characteristics are given to the pan-Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Despite the fact that it operates freely in all European countries except Germany and Russia, the party is characterized by the majority of researchers as extremist or radical. And almost all authors agree that HT is more effective in Western countries than in the East, where in many countries it is banned or operates under strict control. Thus, Madeleine Gruen, senior analyst at NEFA (Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation), notes on the example of the party's activities in the United States: "A component of the Hizbut-Tahrir strategy is to instill in American Muslims a sense of alienation so that they turn away from their country and instead identify themselves as members of the Ummah." It is "a strategy to isolate American Muslims from the rest of society," the author adds.⁶⁰ At the same time, this organization, which seeks to create a worldwide Caliphate, is in stiff opposition to all other Muslim communities that preach different, including classical versions of Islam, which sets against it not only the authorities of Islamic countries, but also ordinary Muslims. Turkish author Ihsan Yilmaz proves this in his comparative study of the party's activities in Britain, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Egypt.⁶¹ It is the factor, in his opinion, that was key to the success of the organization with a low level of Islamic education and, conversely, to its failure in countries with a well-established religious outlook on Islam.

I would also like to mention an article by the Russian author R. Suleymanov, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami in Russia: Ideology, Organization Structure, Activity," in which she proves that despite its declarative renunciation of violence, this party has never condemned terrorist acts, moreover, it allows for a violent takeover of power and actually trains Muslims for subsequent recruitment to participate in terrorist attacks.⁶² The activity and ideology of

⁵⁹ Markedonov S., The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia's Volga Region. A report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January, 2013. P. 29-30, online at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130122_Markedonov_RiseRadicalIslamicVolga_Web.pdf

⁶⁰ Gruen M., "Hizb ut-Tahrir America Uses Social Media to Promote its "Emerging World Order" Conference". The Huffington Post. 22 September, 2015. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hizb-ut-tahrir-america-us_b_611595?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9lbi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnL3dpa2kvSGl6Yl91dC1UYWhtaXJfQWw1cmJlYQ&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAHqPDooOKHd3YnI71XY1o4oUrru7IK6ElPka7lZLmIEtGcOBex4oVVvHKKxAmtIpEdSY4nr0LyYrESxo16S8bp5aYPp3rB_ZdhxeOxsvTcnAEaTinLn9dvEAQzlgemoWlrAOH63_IR8gl6-GLliGcY0t7irSuK7eb66dIV4mbmZaH.

⁶¹ Ihsan Yilmaz, "The Varied Performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Success in Britain and Uzbekistan and Stalemate in Egypt and Turkey"// Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, December 2010, online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321795611_A_comparative_analysis_of_anti-systemic_political_Islam_Hizb_ut-Tahrir's_influence_in_different_political_settings_Britain_Turkey_Egypt_and_Uzbekistan

⁶² Suleymanov R., "Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami in Russia: Ideology, Organization Structure, and Activities," Islam in Russia: Cultural Traditions and Contemporary Challenges. Materials of the international scientific conference / T. G. Tumanyan, ed. - SPb., 2013, pp. 96-100.

Tablighi Jamaat is explored in more detail in an article by I. N. Komissina, "Tablighi Jamaat Movement: Theory and Practice of Radicalism," published in 2011 in the journal "Problems of National Strategy". The author analyzes the main features of this organization and the risks it poses for both ordinary Islamic communities and ordinary Muslims. It points out that despite the outwardly missionary nature of its activities, it does not deny the use of armed jihad.⁶³

The propaganda tools and methods of activity of this organization on the example of Great Britain are described by the Russian researcher E.N. Egorov in his article "Hizb ut-Tahrir in the West: Ideology and Specifics of Activity," which was published in 2017 in the journal "Islamic Studies". The author points out that in its activities in Europe HT increasingly emphasizes work on the Internet, including in the languages of the host countries. He believes that the party seeks to take the place of the official clergy, which, in his opinion, is not fulfilling its duties in educating the young generation of European Muslims. By constantly raising in the information space the problem of the situation of Muslims in the world and agitating for the creation of a single caliphate, "Hizb ut-Tahrir" awakens in European Muslims excessive interest in politics and religion, and at the same time hatred for the institutions of Western democracy.⁶⁴

The history of the emergence and triumph of another Islamist organization, the "Muslim Brotherhood" (MB), is explored in Barbara Zollner's monograph "The Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology," published in 2011. The author also believes that there are so-called "moderate Islamists," to which she includes the MB, arguing that this organization has gradually abandoned radicalism since 1971.⁶⁵

The controversy over how moderate an organization the MB is one of the main issues in the study of this organization. For example, American researchers Robert Lake and Stephen Brook tried to show in their 2007 Foreign Affairs article, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood", that the rejection of jihad and acceptance of democracy, which drew criticism from other Islamist groups, is sufficient evidence that BM has moved away from Islamism, although the authors have no evidence that they have abandoned the demand to abandon the secular form of government in favor of Shariah.⁶⁶

The study of the phenomenon of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was able to gain power in Egypt after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, is the subject of an article by a team of authors headed by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, A.M.

⁶³ I.N. Komissina, "Tablighi Jamaat Movement: Theory and Practice of Radicalism," in Problems of National Strategy. 2011. № 1 (6). C. 60-61, online: <https://docplayer.ru/26048193-Dvizhenie-tabligi-dzhamaat-teoriya-i-praktika-radikalizma.html>

⁶⁴ E.N. Egorov, "Hizbut-Tahrir in the West: Ideology and Specificity of Activity" // Islamology. 2017. № 2. C. 28-36, online: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/hizb-ut-tahrir-na-zapade-ideologiya-i-spetsifika-deyatelnosti>

⁶⁵ Barbara Zollner, "The Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology", 2011, online at: <https://www.routledge.com/The-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hasan-al-Hudaybi-and-ideology/Zollner/p/book/9780415664172>

⁶⁶ Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood" // Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, #2, Mar-Apr. 2007, pp. 107-121, online at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032287?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Vasilyev, "A New Alliance in the Struggle for Leadership in the Arab Region," published in 2019 in *Asia and Africa Today*. It analyzes the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the victory of the Arab Spring in North Africa and the support they received from the Qatar-Turkey alliance.⁶⁷

The analysis of the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood in North Africa is also analyzed in an article by Gumer Isayev, head of the St. Petersburg Center for Middle East Studies, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World in 2011 - 2014 from Triumph to Disaster," which was published on the website of the Russian Council on International Affairs (RIIA) in 2015. The author shows how the Islamist organization, which went the difficult way from an enlightened social movement to the leading political force in Egypt, managed to build close relations with the authorities of a number of Islamic states, collapsed precisely because of the loss of popular support and recognition. In Egypt's twenty-first century history, the political project of the BM was the first successful experience of Islamists coming to power in a secular state through democratic mechanisms. However, the extremism of the BM and their failures in the socio-economic sphere alienated most of their former supporters, which allowed the military to return the country painlessly enough to the path of authoritarian secular rule. As an alternative path, the author shows the development of the political activity of the BM in Tunisia, where the Al-Nahda party managed to maintain its presence in the political system following the path of the moderate Islamists of Jordan and Morocco, who found a compromise with the ruling class and were allowed to participate in some political institutions.⁶⁸

There are quite a few works in the world historiography, where the authors, using the method of comparative analysis, seek to find out the common and distinctive features of terrorist acts and attacks by Islamists in different countries. For example, we can mention a recent study on this topic, the article "A Comparative Analysis of the Nature and Evolution of the Domestic Jihadist Threat to Australia and Canada (2000-2020)" by S. Harris-Hogan, L. Dawson, and A. Amarasingham, published in the Dutch journal "Perspectives of Terrorism" supported by Leiden University.⁶⁹ Such articles perhaps provide a glimpse of the scale of the threat, but they do not provide any clarity in terms of long-term trends and global risks.

This shortcoming is compensated for by works that seek to construct socioeconomic and political models and projections of Islamist terrorism. In this regard, mention should be made of the American Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report "Islam and

⁶⁷ A.M. Vasiliev, T.R. Khairullin, and A.V. Korotayev "New Alliance in the struggle for leadership in the Arab region" // *Asia and Africa Today*, No.10, 2019, pp.2-9, online: <https://asaf-today.ru/s032150750006519-2-1/>

⁶⁸ Gumer Isayev, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World in 2011 - 2014 from Triumph to Disaster," RSMD, June 1, 2015, online: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/bratya-musulmane-v-arabskom-mire-v-2011-2014-gg-ot-triumfa-k/>

⁶⁹ Shandon Harris-Hogan, Lorne L. Dawson, and Amarnath Amarasingham, "A Comparative Analysis of the Nature and Evolution of the Domestic Jihadist Threat to Australia and Canada (2000-2020)"// "Perspectives of Terrorism", vol. 14, #5, online at: <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2020/issue-5/harris-horgan-et-al.pdf>

Models of Terrorism and Violent Extremism," published in 2017.⁷⁰ Based on an analysis of vast layers of statistical material from around the world, the author, Anthony Cordesman, concluded that most terrorist attacks are committed by Islamists in Muslim countries, with ISIS, al-Qaida, al-Nusra, and the Taliban, the main terrorist organizations, accounting for only 17 percent of all terrorist attacks. A large proportion of the attacks are carried out by loners who have been individually radicalized online and are not affiliated with any groups. The same goes for victims - there are 43 times more victims in the Islamic world than in Europe and North America. All told, in 2016, for example, 83 percent of all Islamist attacks and 90 percent of their victims were in Muslim countries. Opinion polls have also shown that extremist activity is supported by an extremely small number of Muslims, both in Asia and in Western countries. And only 17% of them consider religion to be a decisive factor in recruiting jihadists for terrorist organizations. However, the foreign policy of the United States and other Western countries, despite their declared fight against terror, does not meet the popular support among Muslims. Based on the above, the author concludes that the governments of Islamic states are natural allies rather than adversaries of the West in their fight against Islamist extremism.⁷¹

We would like to mention separately works designed to analyze the possible connection between immigration from Muslim countries and Islamist terrorism in Western countries. The impact of terror on immigrants and refugees from Muslim countries is explored in the paper "The European Immigration Crisis: An Analysis of how Terror Attacks have Affected Immigrant and Refugee Population in Western Europe" by Taylor Symek of the University of Central Florida.⁷² Speaking of immigrants, it is necessary to highlight the work of Maria do Ceo Pinto Arena, a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minho, Portugal, who in 2017 published with the support of the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Study, the article "The European Immigration Crisis: An Analysis of How Terrorist Attacks Have Affected Immigrant and Refugee Populations in Western Europe". The article was published in the EUI Working Papers series titled "Islamic Terrorism in the West and International Migration: A 'Far Enemy' or a 'Near Enemy Within?' The Evidence". It analyzes the official investigations into the major terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001 in the United States to the 2016 attacks in Brussels and Berlin. The author's sensational conclusion is that the main Islamist terrorist threat to the West comes not from immigrants or refugees, but from homegrown extremists who were born in those countries and have lived there for generations, "who are inspired by the ongoing Jihad in Syria."⁷³

⁷⁰ Anthony Cordesman, "Islam and the Patterns in Terrorism and Violent Extremism", October 17, 2017, Center for Strategic and International Studies, online at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/islam-and-patterns-terrorism-and-violent-extremism>

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Taylor M. Scimeca, "The European Immigration Crisis: An Analysis of how Terror Attacks have Affected Immigrant and Refugee Population in Western Europe", University of Central Florida, 2017, online at:

<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=honorstheses&httpsredir=1&referer=>

⁷³ Maria do Céu Pinto Arena, "Islamic Terrorism in the West and International Migrations: The "Far" or "Near" Enemy Within? What is the Evidence" // EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2017/28, online at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46604/RSCAS_2017_28.pdf?sequence=1

This category of people, the way they were radicalized and recruited by ISIS to fight in Syria, was studied by the already mentioned Lorne Dawson. In February 2021 she published with the support of the International Center for Counterterrorism in Hague an article entitled "A Comparative Analysis of the Data on Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Who Went and Why?" The author analyzed data, including interviews, of 34 foreign fighters from various countries in Western Europe, Britain, the United States, and Canada. It was proven that their average age is 26 years, 18% of them are women, and 15% are converts to Islam. They are mostly from the lower socio-economic strata of society, and many have previously committed criminal offenses. The author also refutes the widespread myth that ideology, in particular religion, was the main motive for the recruitment and participation of these people in the activities of terrorist groups in the Middle East.⁷⁴

In 2017-19, European and U.S. authorities initiated a number of studies concerning the risks associated with the return of these fighters to Western countries. In 2017, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, a comparative study by a team of authors entitled "Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Europe. Comparative Analysis". The paper analyzes legislative initiatives and law enforcement practices with respect to fighters, citizens of EU states returning to their main place of residence. The aim of the work was to highlight differences and similarities in the understanding of this phenomenon in the monitoring countries, positive and negative consequences of the measures taken, as well as to describe the experience of international cooperation on this issue. A report prepared under the auspices of the European Parliament entitled "The Return of Foreign Fighters to the EU soil. Ex-post Evaluation".⁷⁵ Changes in EU legislation and law enforcement practices in this regard were analyzed on the basis of a comparative analysis in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.⁷⁶

There are also more detailed studies on foreign fighters in the service of terrorist Islamist groups, aiming both to analyze the reasons for their departure and return, as well as the measures taken not only by Western but also by Muslim countries to neutralize them. For example, in 2019, under the auspices of the Royal Institute for International Affairs and with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, "Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia", edited by Thomas Renard, published a volume on the subject.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Lorne L. Dawson, "A Comparative Analysis of the Data on Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Who Went and Why?" // ICCT Research Paper, February 2021, online at: <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/02/Dawson-Comparative-Analysis-FINAL-1.pdf>

⁷⁵ "Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Europe. Comparative Analysis" // Council of Europe, 2017, online at: <http://mastereurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-Europe-.pdf>

⁷⁶ "The return of foreign fighters to EU soil. Ex-post Evaluation" // European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2018, online at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU\(2018\)621811_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf)

⁷⁷ "Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia", Egmont Paper #107, April 2019, online at: <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/04/EP107-returnees-in-the-Maghreb.pdf?type=pdf>

There are quite a few works that aim to study Islamism as it relates to regional issues. For example, in 2009 the article "Updating the European Union's Policies Toward Islamist Parties and Radical Actors" by Amel Boubekour, a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center, was published in Beirut. The author tries to reconcile, in his opinion, the "moderate" part of Islamists, with the EU. The author believes that the marginalization of Islamists can lead to increased violence.⁷⁸

The tools and methods for mobilizing Islamist militants in Europe are the subject of a paper by a group of authors at King's College, University of London, entitled "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe".⁷⁹

Countering Radicalization in Europe by Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon examines the effectiveness of European jihadist deradicalization programs in the Netherlands and Britain.⁸⁰

Given the serious problem associated with Islamic radicalism in the Muslim regions of Russia, there are quite a few works on the subject of regional Islamist threats by Russian authors. In connection with Islamism in the North Caucasus, S.A. Ragozina's monograph "Political Islam Discourse (on the example of the Internet space of the North Caucasus)", published in 2013, is interesting. In it the author analyzed the Russian-language segment of the Internet in this Russian region, which is characterized by the highest level of spread of radical Islam. On the basis of qualitative and quantitative content analysis and event analysis, she showed the continuity of the international discourse of political Islam in the North Caucasus Internet space.⁸¹

In 2017 the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian "Peoples Friendship University" published the second issue of the collection "Islamic Radical Movements on the Political Map of the Modern World," devoted this time to the region of the North and South Caucasus. The work attempts a full-scale analysis of the genesis and evolution of radical Islamic movements in all regions of the Russian North Caucasus and the countries of the South Caucasus. Here we have considered the rise of Islamist movements in the context of the post-Soviet civilizational collapse in which an ideological crisis, mixed with an economic collapse, has led to the rise of nationalist movements built on the so called 'historical legacy', or the revival of religious fundamentalism, often presented as "a return to

⁷⁸ Amel Boubekour, "Updating the European Union's Policies Towards Islamist Parties and Radical Actors", International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009, online at: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/chapters/the-role-of-the-european-union-in-democracy-building/eu-democracy-building-discussion-paper-48.pdf>

⁷⁹ "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe", King's College, London, 2007, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf

⁸⁰ Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe", ICSR, London, 2012, online at: <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf>

⁸¹ S. A. Ragozina, "The Discourse of Political Islam (on the Example of the Internet Space of the North Caucasus)," Moscow, 2013.

origins and moral purity".⁸² This approach largely coincides with the conclusions of the above-mentioned study by German authors J. Kersten and N. Hankel, who investigated the phenomenon of right-wing radicalism revival in the post-socialist space in 2013, and proves that the causes of radicalism revival in this region are the same regardless of the specifics of radicalism.⁸³

However, Russian researchers have published a number of interesting works that address the issue of Islamism in other regions, which is understandable given the links between Islamists in Eastern countries and the Russian Caucasus. For example, the monograph by V.Y. Belokrenitsky and R. R. Sikoyev, "The Taliban Movement and Prospects for Afghanistan and Pakistan," published at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2014, in which the authors examine the origins and most important features of the functioning of the Taliban Islamist regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001), the reasons for its collapse, relocation to Pakistan, and revival with the simultaneous emergence of the Taliban movement in Pakistan.⁸⁴ The specifics of the evolution of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan since the 1970s are traced in the PhD thesis, "Islamic Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries" (2013) by Olga Chekrizova. Olga analyzes the main trends in the evolution of Pakistani Islamism, the problems of activity and interaction of Islamist organizations and movements, the activities of extremist and terrorist groups, and the influence of ethno-regional and territorial aspects. A special place in the work is given to "the study of the combination of local and "imported" elements of radical extremist ideology, the role of 5 religious parties in the political life of the IRP, extremist propaganda and terrorist activity of Islamists."⁸⁵ In 2013, she also published two articles on the same topic in the Journal Vestnik MGIMO. In them the author explores, among other things, the interaction between Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan,

⁸² "Islamic Radical Movements on the Political Map of the Modern World. Issue 2. North and South Caucasus", under the hand of I.V. Afterzevskiy, Institute of Africa RAS, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, 2017, Online:

https://books.google.lv/books?id=Xo1VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5+%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8+%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9+%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7&source=bl&ots=PQX7KnioG_&sig=ACfU3U1ZIQ3JUy_LY1nyexRuDlp1LZUuJw&hl=ru&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjhoKWk4_vAhUH-yoKHddZDnIQ6AEwBnoECAUQAaw#v=onepage&q=%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5%20%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9%20%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7&f=false

⁸³ Joachim Kersten and Natalia Hankel, "A comparative look at right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobic hate crimes in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia" // "Right-Wing Radicalism Today. Perspectives from Europe and the US", London, 2013, online: <https://www.routledge.com/Right-Wing-Radicalism-Today-Perspectives-from-Europe-and-the-US/Mering-McCarty/p/book/9780415627283>, pp. 85-94.

⁸⁴ V.Y. Belokrenitsky and R.R. Sikoev, "The Taliban Movement and Prospects for Afghanistan and Pakistan," Moscow, 2014, online: <https://book.ivran.ru/f/dvizhenie-taliban-i-perspektivy-afganistana-i-pakistana.pdf>

⁸⁵ O.P. Cherkizova, "Islamic Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. D. dissertation abstract, Moscow, 2013, online: https://mgimo.ru/files2/y10_2013/242886/chekrizova_autoref.pdf

and analyzes various options for Pakistan's internal political development, taking into account the factor of Islamism.⁸⁶

Finally, the problem of Islamic extremism in the eastern republics of the former Soviet Union has also been studied in a number of studies by Russian authors. One can highlight the work of A.A. Kazantsev and L.Yu. Gusev in "The Threat of Religious Extremism in the Post-Soviet Space," published in 2017 by the Center for the Study of Integration Prospects at MGIMO University, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The paper concludes that the strongest and most aggressive extremist structures in Central Asia are based in Uzbekistan, which is explained primarily not by the ideological or religious, but by the country's socio-economic problems, as well as its relative closedness for cooperation with external partners. The authors see certain risks in Kyrgyzstan, where there are, in their view, favorable opportunities for the presence of various religious trends. According to the authors, Turkmenistan, despite its strict authoritarian regime, has the highest number of jihadists per capita in the post-Soviet space, and the lowest level of Islamist threat takes place in Armenia due to the minimal presence of Muslims (including ethnic ones) in the religious structure of society.⁸⁷

As we can see, for all the variety of works devoted to the topic of radicalism and extremism, there are few *universal studies* that simultaneously cover the maximum number of factors affecting the state of public safety – anti-extremist legislation and law enforcement practice, general legislation affecting the freedom of activity and popularity of radical organizations, the level of xenophobia in society, the level of crime associated with manifestations of each of the above factors, which as a rule become the subject of a separate study, is not able to explain in full the phenomenon called radicalism or extremism. Only an aggregate analysis of all the factors can claim to be a full-fledged study of the problem. This monograph aims to fill the existing gap.

INTRODUCTION

During the period under review, the risks of extremism, right-wing, and Islamic radicalism significantly worsened against a background of growing xenophobia and social tensions, the migration crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Polarization was recorded globally, between conservative and liberal camps on almost all issues affecting the growing popularity of these organizations, contradictions in approaches to migration intensified, and stigmatization and radical manifestations intensified.

⁸⁶ O.P. Chekrizova, "Peculiarities of the Evolution of Islamic Radicalism in Pakistan" // Vestnik MGIMO, 2013, pp. 108-117, online: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/osobennosti-evolyutsii-islamskogo-radikalizma-v-pakistane/viewer>; O.P. Chekrizova "Islamic Radicalism and Extremism in Northwest Pakistan" // Vestnik MGIMO, 2013, pp. 89-96, online: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/islamskiy-radikalizm-i-ekstremizm-na-severo-zapade-pakistana/viewer>

⁸⁷ A. A. Kazantsev and L. Y. Gusev, "The Threat of Religious Extremism in the Post-Soviet Space," Moscow, 2017. online: https://www.perspectivecenter.org/upload/reports/ugroza_religioznogo_ekstremizma_na_postsovetском_prostranstve.pdf

If in previous historical periods the fight against these phenomena took place in the course and on the background of traditional liberal and democratic procedures for Western countries without the use of harsh restrictive measures, now the situation has changed. During the last 5 years we see that authorities in the OSCE area take rather tough decisions aimed, on the one hand, at toughening anti-extremist and anti-terrorist measures that are inevitably connected with the winding down of democratic freedoms and, on the other hand, at the strengthening of control and neutralization of potential threats that may come from "risk groups". These groups today generally include Muslims, illegal migrants, and asylum seekers, and to a lesser extent far-right and far-left radicals, Islamists, and even certain linguistic minorities.

The fact that there is a tightening of unpopular measures indicates an increase in the threats associated with extremism and radicalism. And this is a justified step, which may well be temporary in nature. But the fact that certain religious and linguistic minorities were actually included in the risk groups indicates, on the one hand, that the authorities in most monitoring countries are beginning to view them as a major source of radicalism and extremism, and this is understandable given the fact that many right-wing radical and populist parties joined government coalitions and determined the policies of their countries in the period under review. On the other hand, it demonstrates the erosion of democratic values in the Western world, which leads to even greater alienation of those very minorities, which become even more vulnerable to radical and extremist challenges.

CHAPTER 1. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES RELATING TO MINORITIES. ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION.

Admittedly, almost all monitoring countries generally have fairly well developed *anti-discrimination legislation*. During the period under review, the authorities of the individual countries have made attempts to close the remaining gaps.

In 2018-20, much has been done to really integrate minorities in Germany. The main changes concerned improving the situation of refugees and asylum seekers seeking training or retraining, relaxing employment legislation, recalculating wage payments when calculating social benefits, simplifying the admission of highly qualified people to the German labor market, and implementing certain new EU regulations at national level.⁸⁸

Separate efforts have been made to improve the situation of women, LGBT persons, etc., in the sense of protecting them from discrimination. For example in 2019, Greece became the ninth country in Europe to adopt a law on non-consensual rape (without physical violence).⁸⁹ On 6 June 2019, it introduced a relevant amendment to the Penal Code. It clearly

⁸⁸ Third Act Amending the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act, online: https://fluechtlingsrat-berlin.de/recht_und_rat/asylg-2018/#1-drittes-gesetz-zur-aenderung-des-staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetzes

⁸⁹ Amnesty International, " ΕΤΗΣΙΑ ΑΝΑΣΚΟΠΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΕΘΝΟΥΣ ΑΜΝΗΣΤΙΑΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ ΤΟ 2019 - ΚΤΑΑΧΩΡΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ? online: <https://www.amnesty.gr/news/ektheseis/article/23220/etisia-anaskopisi-diethnoys-amnistias-gia-tin-eyropi-2019-katahorisi>

states that no physical violence is required for the crime to be considered rape and that the focus is not on resistance. However, these changes still fall short of the recommendations of the UN Committee against Torture that rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered a form of torture. This crucial provision aims to protect women from both domestic violence and discrimination in the workplace.

On 8 March 2018, the Scottish Parliament passed legislation to improve gender representation on public councils, which is in the nature of 'positive discrimination'. In particular, it determined that 50% of non-executive members on public councils should be women in order to reduce gender inequalities in public and private sector boards and institutions.⁹⁰ The law was recently challenged in the High Court of Session of the Scottish Court of Session by For Women Scotland over the inclusion of trans women in the new quota system.⁹¹

In June 2020, the US Supreme Court recognized in *Bostock v Clayton County* that Federal laws prohibiting **sex discrimination in employment** also prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.⁹² However, protection on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity has not yet been defined in areas other than employment.

Nevertheless, in Poland and in the US, where right-wing conservative forces had been in power, there had been policies aimed at restricting LGBT rights. In Poland, for example, this has become quite widespread at the local and regional level. For example, several Polish municipal or regional councils have adopted resolutions referring to their areas as "*LGBT-free zones*". In total, more than 100 municipalities have passed such resolutions, mostly in southern-eastern Poland.⁹³ The European Parliament in its Resolution strongly condemned their adoption (with 463 votes in favor, 107 against and 105 abstentions)⁹⁴. Although the resolutions passed in Poland are non-binding (declaratory only), the European Parliament called on the Polish authorities to condemn these acts and to repeal all the resolutions against LGBTQ rights. Furthermore, MEPs called on the Commission to monitor how all EU funds are used, to remind stakeholders of their non-discrimination obligations, and that such funds should not be used for discriminatory purposes.⁹⁵

US President D. Trump's administration, which has been rather cool about protecting LGBT rights from the start, unlike the previous administration, has banned members of

⁹⁰ Scottish Parliament, Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Bill (2018), 8 March 2018, online at: <https://beta.parliament.scot/bills/gender-representation-on-public-boards-scotland-bill>.

⁹¹ Scottish Legal News, 'Permission Granted for Judicial Review of Act's Definition of 'Woman'', 21 October 2020, online at: <https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/permission-granted-for-judicial-review-of-act-s-definition-of-woman>.

⁹² Supreme Court of the United States, online at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf.

⁹³ D. Uhlig and B. Chyż, "LGBT-free municipalities". See where they are in Poland", July 15, 2020, <https://biqdata.wyborcza.pl/biqdata/7,159116,26130986,gminy-wolne-od-lgbt-zobacz-gdzie-sa-w-polsce-mapy.html>.

⁹⁴ "Parliament strongly condemns "LGBTI-free zones" in Poland", December 18, 2019, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20191212IPR68923/parliament-strongly-condemns-lgbti-free-zones-in-poland>.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

transgender minorities from military service and refused to provide protections prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation for students and employees. All references to LGBTQ people were removed from the websites of the White House, Department of State, and Department of Labor immediately after Trump took office. LGBTQ refugees were banned from entering the country, fleeing discrimination. Some of this discriminatory legislation was introduced under the banner of protecting religious minorities.⁹⁶

The threats posed by violent extremism and terrorism have also led virtually all monitoring countries to undertake a range of legislative efforts.

The general trend has been a **tightening of** anti-extremism legislation as well as an increase in the powers of the intelligence services. In particular, this concerned control of the Internet. On 1 November 2019, for example, a special unit to combat Islamist terrorism and extremism was created within the German Federal Criminal Police Office.⁹⁷ In the Netherlands, measures have been taken to improve the prosecutorial response to extremism and discrimination, as well as to enhance the public's ability to report suspicions of these manifestations to public authorities.⁹⁸ It should be recalled that previously the institution of special prosecutors for discrimination was also established in Spain and a number of other countries.

In Poland, the Law on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing was adopted on 1 March 2018.⁹⁹ On 18 March 2019, Russian President V. Putin signed the Law On Amendments to Articles 7 and 7.1 of the Federal Law "On Combating the Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism" and Articles 7 and 10 of the Federal Law "On the National Payment System", which implies that lawyers, notaries and entrepreneurs providing legal and accounting services will be required to freeze client funds or other assets if the client is on a special list of persons who finance criminal activities or if they suspect that the transactions are carried out for legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime or financing terrorism.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ National Center for Transgender Equality, "Trump's record of actions against transgender people", online at: <https://transequality.org/the-discrimination-administration>

⁹⁷ Bundeskriminalamt. Gründung der Abteilung „Islamistisch motivierter Terrorismus/Extremismus“ (TE), online: https://www.bka.de/DE/DasBKA/OrganisationAufbau/Fachabteilungen/IslamistischmotivierterTerrorismusExtremismus/IslamistischmotivierterTerrorismusExtremismus_node.html?fbclid=IwAR36G5O5iqSXmKvkEmqjKimYNzXgkkcyiSK3A7xWqOLH7w0hgh8Gho7NiBQ

⁹⁸ ECRI REPORT ON THE NETHERLANDS (fifth monitoring cycle), online at: <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-netherlands/168094c577>; ONE WORLD, "WAAROM GAAN RACISTEN IN NEDERLAND ZO VAAK VRIJUIT, ONLINE AT:

<HTTPS://WWW.ONEWORLD.NL/LEZEN/DISCRIMINATIE/RACISME/WAAROM-GAAN-RACISTEN-IN-NEDERLAND-ZO-VAAK-VRIJUIT/>

⁹⁹ Dz.U. 2018 poz. 723. "Ustawa z dnia 1 marca 2018 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz finansowaniu terroryzmu", online at: <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20180000723>

¹⁰⁰ Федеральный закон от 18.03.2019 № 33-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в статьи 7 и 7-1 Федерального закона "О противодействии легализации (отмыванию) доходов, полученных преступным путем, и финансированию терроризма" и статьи 7 и 10 Федерального закона "О национальной платежной системе", онлайн: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903180033>

On 6 June, 2018, the British Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act was passed and amended in May 2019, which filled gaps in the light of “modern patterns of radicalization” and tightened counter-terrorism measures and accountability for a number of crimes.¹⁰¹ In particular, the encouragement of terrorism, the dissemination of publications of terrorist content, and a number of other actions to prepare for terrorist attacks are now punishable by a prison term of up to 15 years.¹⁰²

In addition, it gives the additional powers to the Head of the Home Office, empowering him, with the approval of Parliament, to designate areas outside the country in which United Kingdom citizens, on the pretext of protecting them from the threat of terrorism, may not remain or enter. And those Britons who fail to follow these directions and either enter or fail to agree to leave the designated zone will face up to 10 years in prison. Also under the provisions of the new Act, it will now be illegal to express any support for banned organizations, as well as to publish their symbols: images of flags, emblems or uniforms, which would suggest that the author of these statements and publications could either be a member or supporter of the banned bodies.¹⁰³ According to information available, a new Law on the intelligence services in Britain will be drafted in the near future that will expand their powers. In particular, it is envisaged that a register of foreign agents will be introduced in Britain, as exists today in a number of other countries.¹⁰⁴

On 15 October 2018, the Netherlands adopted amendments to anti-terrorism legislation. This extended the time frame for preliminary investigations for suspects of serious terrorist crimes and facilitated the collection of genetic material from suspects for DNA testing. The law also extended the obligation to report all terrorism offences, including those still in preparation, and established that a judge may deny the right to vote to those convicted of a terrorist offence.¹⁰⁵

On 21 June 2018, Canada passed Bill C-59, which also extends the powers of intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance as well as cyber-attacks.¹⁰⁶

In France, a new Law known as 'Loi Avia' came into force on 24 June 2020, named after parliamentarian Letitia Avia, who belongs to President Macron's 'Republic on the March' party.¹⁰⁷ The Bill's aims are to combat various forms of hate speech on the Internet, terrorist speech, and child pornography. According to it, internet platforms must take down the

¹⁰¹ Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, Published 6 June 2018, Last updated 7 May 2019, online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-border-security-bill-2018#:~:text=The%20act%20will%20ensure%20that,terrorism%20and%20hostile%20state%20activity>.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Covington. "UK Government Considers New Foreign Agents Registration Act", online at: <https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2020/07/uk-government-considers-new-foreign-agents-registration-act.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 34.746, "Versterking strafrechtelijke aanpak terrorisme", online at: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34746_versterking_strafrechtelijke

¹⁰⁶ Bill C-59. Statutes of Canada 2019, Chapter 13. "An Act respecting national security matters", online at: <https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-59/royal-assent>

¹⁰⁷ See : LAW n° 2020-766 of 24 June 2020 aimed at combating hate content on the internet - Legislative files - Légifrance (legifrance.gouv.fr).

publication of "clearly" illegal content within 24 hours of a user or the police complaining about it. In addition, the Law created a special jurisdiction tasked with prosecuting online hate speech, it makes it easier for a person to report hate content to an ISP, and it declared the creation of the Internet Hate Observatory led by the Supreme Council for Audiovisual (CSA), which is the communications regulator.¹⁰⁸

In addition, in 2020, the Government submitted two highly controversial laws to the Parliament. One is the Separatism Act against Islamic extremism, which would significantly affect the rights of the Muslim minority, bring all secondary schools, including private ones, under state control and ban homeschooling of schoolchildren.¹⁰⁹ The second one is the Global Security Act, which seeks to protect police officers from online incitement to violence. Article 24 of this Law makes it an offence to display in the media or on social media a person or transmit information about the identity of any officer on duty "for the purpose of damaging their physical or psychological integrity". The offence carries a penalty of up to one year's imprisonment and a maximum fine of €45,000. The bill has been heavily criticized by journalists and human rights groups, who argue that it would restrict press freedom and lead to a reduction in police accountability.¹¹⁰

On 2 December, 2019, Russia adopted a Law expanding the list of persons prohibited from being founders, participants, and members of non-profit organizations, including public and religious associations. It amended the federal laws "On Public Associations", "On Non-Profit Organizations", and "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" to prohibit NPO and individuals whose accounts have been frozen by the Interagency Commission on Countering Terrorist Financing from becoming founders, as well as members or participants in non-profit organizations.¹¹¹ On 23 May, 2020, Russia also adopted a Law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation (in terms of improving legislation on elections and referendums and ensuring basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participate in referendums for citizens of the Russian Federation)" which prohibits those convicted under "extremist" and "terrorist" articles of the Criminal Code to run for representative bodies of municipal formations and legislative bodies within five years after the removal or expiration of their criminal record.¹¹²

At the same time, lists of banned terrorist organizations and symbols were being expanded in the US, Russia, France, Britain, Germany, and a number of other countries.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ [Dalloz. Actualite. Censorship of the "Avia law" by the Constitutional Council: a red thread for French and European legislators? - Civil | Dalloz News \(dallos-actualite.fr\)](https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/en/civil-law/censorship-of-the-avia-law-by-the-constitutional-council-a-red-thread-for-french-and-european-legislators?cid=1)

¹⁰⁹ Euronews, "France presents 'Law against separatism'", online: <https://ru.euronews.com/2020/12/08/france-separatism-law-draft>

¹¹⁰ The Guardian, "France security law incompatible with human rights, say UN experts", online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/04/france-security-law-incompatible-human-rights-un-experts>

¹¹¹ РАПСИ, "Совфед одобрил поправки о совершенствовании избирательного законодательства", онлайн: http://www.rapsinews.ru/legislation_news/20200520/305822382.html

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ RBB.24, "Berliner Innenverwaltung prüft Verbot von Reichsflaggen", online at: <https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2020/10/berlin-brandenburg-reichsflagge-reichskriegsflagge-verbot.html>; Keller, Jared, "Meet the 'Boogaloo boys,' the violent extremists attracting members of the US military." *Task & Purpose*, 24 June 202, taskandpurpose.com/analysis/boogaloo-movement-explainer. Accessed 30 Aug. 2020.

During the period under review, Germany and Russia passed laws allowing for the revocation of citizenship for persons who have participated in terrorist militias in the Middle East. On 11 October 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an amending law "On the procedure for exit from and entry to the Russian Federation", according to which entry can be denied if a foreigner participates in the activities of an extremist organization.¹¹⁴ In Germany, a similar law was adopted on 8 August 2019.¹¹⁵ An even stricter law was adopted in the Netherlands in 2017,¹¹⁶ by France in 2014,¹¹⁷ Canada in 2015¹¹⁸, and in many other countries.

In fact, only one case of liberalization of anti-extremist legislation took place in the period under review. On December 27, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws to partially decriminalize the Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement to hatred) by introducing an administrative prejudice mechanism.¹¹⁹ The laws introduced the new Article 20.3.1 (incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) to the Code of Administrative Offences, the disposition of which is almost identical to Article 282 part 1 of the Criminal Code, but contains the clause "if these actions do not contain a criminal offence". The suggested penalties include fines of up to 20,000 rubles, up to 100 hours of compulsory labor, or up to 15 days of arrest. Legal entities shall also be liable: they shall be fined in the amount of 250-500 thousand rubles. The limitation period for administrative liability under this article is one year. Part one of Article 282 of the Criminal Code is thus amended with a proviso stating that liability under this article shall be imposed after "bringing to administrative responsibility for a similar offence within one year".¹²⁰ In other words, if the offender has committed an act qualified as incitement to hatred or enmity for the first time, he or she bears Administrative, rather than Criminal, liability. However, after

Lamothe, Dan and Souad Mekhennet, "Soldiers' cases highlight reach of white supremacy in U.S. military." *The Washington Post*, 25 June 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/soldiers-cases-highlight-reach-of-white-extremism-into-us-military/2020/06/25/0203532e-b582-11ea-9b0f-c797548c1154_story.html; LCI, "Islamisme radical : le collectif Cheikh Yassine, une organisation pro-palestinienne habituée des provocations", online at: <https://www.lci.fr/population/islamisme-radical-le-collectif-cheikh-yassine-une-organisation-pro-palestinienne-habituée-des-provocations-2167838.html>

¹¹⁴Федеральный закон "О внесении изменений в ст. 26 Федерального закона "О порядке въезда из Российской Федерации и въезда в Российскую Федерацию", онлайн:

<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201810110030>

¹¹⁵ Drittes Gesetz zur Änderung des Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes, online:

<https://dejure.org/BGBI/2019/BGBI. I S. 1124#:~:text=c%20des%20Dritten%20Gesetzes%20zur,1%20Nr.>

¹¹⁶ Global Legal Monitor, " Netherlands: Two New Sets of Administrative Sanctions Proposed to Fight Terrorism", online at: <https://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/netherlands-two-new-sets-of-administrative-sanctions-proposed-to-fight-terrorism/>

¹¹⁷ LOI n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme, online at: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000029754374/>

¹¹⁸ Department of Justice. Bill C-51, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, online at: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/cuol-mgnl/c51.html>

¹¹⁹ See: СОВА. Информационно-аналитический центр, "Путин подписал законы о частичной декриминализации ст. 282 УК", онлайн: <https://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/news/lawmaking/2018/12/d40472/>

¹²⁰ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ЗАКОН "О внесении изменения в статью 282 Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации", онлайн: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201812280002>

the second case, within a year, the Act is already classified as Criminal. This reform was introduced because of the apparent excessive punishment for the first offence.

In 2020, the first steps were taken towards expanding the legal concept of "extremism" and accountability for radical manifestations. The fact is that, while remaining generally united on the issue of tightening anti-extremist legislation, as well as on the issue of expanding the powers of intelligence agencies, monitoring countries continue to maintain differences on the question of what constitutes extremism. While the US and a number of Western countries are not prepared to consider dissemination of hate ideology as a crime, based on the principles of Freedom of Speech and the First Amendment to the US Constitution, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and a number of other countries consider such crimes as a separate crime. It seems that the situation is beginning to change towards extending responsibility for extremism to the non-violent sphere. On 7 October, 2019, the UK government's Countering Extremism Commission published its findings and recommendations in a report titled Countering Hate Extremism.¹²¹

It defines a new category of extremist behavior beyond terrorism and violent extremism - 'Hate Extremism' (hateful extremism). It is defined as behavior:

- which may incite hatred, or persistent hatred, or be ambiguous about Violence and set out the moral grounds for Violence;
- which is based on Hateful, Hostile or Racist beliefs directed against an alien *group* that is perceived as a threat to the well-being, survival or success of the domestic group (defined as the victim);
- that causes or is likely to cause harm to individuals, *communities* or *society as a whole*.

In April 2020, the Scottish Government began considering a new Hate Crime and Public Order Bill. Central to the Law was the introduction of a new offence of 'incitement to Hatred'. However, concerns on the part of human rights defenders about free speech prevented a move to debate it at the end of 2020.¹²²

The monitoring countries have also paid a great deal of attention in their lawmaking to those target social groups that the authorities consider to be *targets of radicalization*. Their livelihoods have been restricted and the measures taken in relation to them have been aimed at limiting their presence in the country.

For example, the new Refugee Law adopted by the Greek parliament in March 2020 shortened the processing time for asylum applications, simplified the extradition procedure, made it more difficult to admit refugee children to public schools, and increased the time for registered asylum seekers to obtain a work permit. Thus, the new Greek government once

¹²¹ GOV.UK, official website of the UK Government. "Independent adviser calls for overhaul of extremism strategy", online at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-advisor-calls-for-overhaul-of-extremism-strategy>

¹²² Paton, C., 'Changes to Scottish Hate Crime Bill 'under active consideration'', The Scotsman, 27 October 2020, online at: <https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/changes-scottish-hate-crime-bill-under-active-consideration-3016666>.

again sees migrants as a threat to public security and has returned to the path of restricting their rights and reducing their numbers.¹²³

On 24 September, 2018, Italy passed a Law on Immigration Security proposed by Interior Minister and deputy prime minister M. Salvini, who heads the right-wing nationalist party Liga.¹²⁴ The Law was intended to limit the presence of migrants in Italy. It made it easier to deport migrants from the country (the only exceptions were people threatened with death or torture in their homeland) and also increased the penalties for those who organized human trafficking.

In the US, unprecedented measures have been taken "to protect against foreigners". As early as 27 January 2017, President D. Trump, through Executive Order 13769 "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States",¹²⁵ banned all foreigners from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen for short-term entry into the country to combat Islamist terrorists. This initial travel ban was revised twice, first by another executive order issued in March of that year,¹²⁶ and then by a presidential proclamation "Strengthening Screening Capabilities and Procedures for Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats," which was issued on 24 September 2017.¹²⁷ This latest proclamation added Chad, North Korea and Venezuela to the list of countries subject to the ban, so that the ban would not formally discriminate against Muslims. Despite a raft of court challenges, on 26 June 2018, the US Supreme Court upheld Trump's travel ban from several countries.¹²⁸ The conservative majority on the Court agreed with the Trump administration's argument that the so-called "Muslim ban" was designed to protect US national security. The Court found no evidence of discrimination or religious prejudice and ruled that it was an impartial, neutral policy justified by national security concerns.

¹²³ Propaganda, " Το "Ρατσιστικό Μπάμπεκκιου" είναι μια Viral Καφρίλα. Το καινούριο Νομοσχέδιο όμως για το Προσφυγικό θα κάνει τα πράγματα χειρότερα." online at: <https://popaganda.gr/postscripts/la-greca-bellezza-prosfygiko-nomosxedio/>

¹²⁴ Decreto legge Salvini su immigrazione e sicurezza, online at: <https://www.meltingpot.org/+Decreto-legge-Salvini-su-immigrazione-e-sicurezza+.html>

¹²⁵ Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, January 27, 2017, online at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states/>

¹²⁶ Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States, March 6, 2017, online at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2/>

¹²⁷ Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, September 24, 2017, online at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-enhancing-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry-united-states-terrorists-public-safety-threats/>

¹²⁸ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. HAWAII ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 17-965. Argued April 25, 2018-Decided June 26, 2018, online at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf

In July 2018, the Trump administration further narrowed the grounds for asylum.¹²⁹ Victims of domestic violence, victims of persecution by criminal gangs and those facing official charges in their home country have since lost their right to remain in the country.¹³⁰

In November 2018, the Trump administration imposed a ban on asylum for illegal immigrants entering the country bypassing border entry points.¹³¹ The Department of Homeland Security has also pressured the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala to sign "safe third countries" agreements, which require that migrants intending to seek asylum in the US first seek it in those countries.¹³² In cases where an asylum-seeker is already in the US, they will be deported to one of the three countries, but not to their country of origin, making it easier to deport asylum-seekers in cases where they are at risk at home. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, the US government has indefinitely suspended all hearings before the immigration courts, effectively putting asylum-seekers in Mexico and Guatemala in limbo. This temporary suspension of the "safe" agreement with Guatemala came after reports emerged that the US had deported dozens of infected migrants to Guatemala.¹³³ In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, additional asylum restrictions have been imposed. The new restrictions on movement, based on an order issued by the Center for Disease Control, allow the US government to return asylum seekers, including non-accompanied children, at the border. This travel restriction violates both US and International Law.¹³⁴ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued this rule without regard to US ratified treaties, which state that even in emergency situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the US has an obligation to protect refugees and asylum seekers.¹³⁵ In January 2020, the government introduced an additional test for pregnant women to see if the purpose of coming to the US is to have a child, since under US law, a child born in the

¹²⁹ The Texas Tribune, "There are new, tougher guidelines for migrants seeking asylum in the United States", online at: <https://www.texastribune.org/2018/07/12/migrants-asylum-tougher-guidelines/>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Factsheet on the November 9, 2018 Asylum Ban, online at: <https://cliniclegal.org/resources/asylum-and-refugee-law/factsheet-november-9-2018-asylum-ban>

¹³² U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, "FACT SHEET: DHS AGREEMENTS WITH GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR", online at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_1003_opa_fact-sheet-agreements-northern-central-america-countries.pdf.

¹³³ The Conversation, "Migrant caravans restart as pandemic deepens the humanitarian crisis at the US-Mexico border", online at: <https://theconversation.com/migrant-caravans-restart-as-pandemic-deepens-the-humanitarian-crisis-at-the-us-mexico-border-146893>.

¹³⁴ NPR, "Ending 'Asylum As We Know It': Using Pandemic To Expel Migrants, Children At Border", August 6, 2020. online at: <https://www.npr.org/2020/08/06/898937378/end-of-asylum-using-the-pandemic-to-turn-away-migrants-children-seeking-refuge>.

¹³⁵ In particular, it potentially violates three international treaties (which have been signed and ratified by the US): the 1967 Refugee Protocol (which guarantees the human right to seek asylum); the Convention against Torture (which prohibits deportation of asylum seekers to places where they may be injured); the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons Affected by Conflict (which requires the humane treatment of civilian prisoners, even during war). See <https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf>; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx>; <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/c525816bde96b7fd41256739003e636a/a4e145a2a7a68875c12563cd0051b9ae>.

United States automatically becomes a citizen.¹³⁶ These and other government measures have actually led to an almost halving of the rate of immigration to the United States.¹³⁷ President Trump has repeatedly referred to immigrants as potential criminals.¹³⁸ As for the natives of Arab countries, from his point of view, they were the source of extremism in the United States.

On 27 March, 2019, the head of the Russian region Yakutia, Aysen Nikolayev, signed a decree banning the hiring of migrants in the region. The ban does not apply to representatives of states belonging to the Eurasian Economic Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). According to this decree, migrants could not obtain patents for 33 types of economic activity. Among others, they were prohibited from wholesale and retail trade, car repair, construction, courier deliveries, as well as work as public transport drivers, taxi drivers, cafe and restaurant employees, activities in law, accounting, architecture and engineering design, research and development, and other professional scientific and technical activities. Businesses were given three months to bring the number of foreign workers in line with the ban¹³⁹. However, judging from the fact that no scandals or mass exodus of migrants from Yakutia followed, it remained largely "on paper".

In Canada, a discriminatory Bill 21 (Respect for State Sovereignty Act) was introduced by the Quebec provincial Government on 29 March 2019, targeting religious people by banning certain public sector employees who hold senior positions from wearing religious symbols (such as the turban, Jewish kippah and hijab) in the work place. This group includes teachers, police officers, and judges.¹⁴⁰ It has not so much affected these people as it has affected ordinary believers, particularly Muslims. For example, since the introduction of this Bill, Muslim women in Quebec have reported a dramatic increase in harassment and discrimination. In May 2019, "Justice Femme", a Montreal-based organization offering legal and psychological support to women, said it had received more than 40 calls from women who wear the hijab. The women reported incidents ranging from aggressive language to physical abuse. The NGO provided a summary of its findings to elected officials examining the Bill.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Birth Tourism Visa Regulation Rule Change, January 23, 2020, online at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-birth-tourism-visa-regulation-rule-change/>

¹³⁷ NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY NFAP POLICY BRIEF " JULY 2 0 2 0 IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICA'S COMEBACK FROM THE COVID - 19 CRISIS BY STUART ANDERSON, online at: <https://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Immigrants-and-Americas-Comeback-From-The-Covid-19-Crisis.NFAP-Policy-Brief.July-2020.pdf>

¹³⁸ BBC News, "Drug dealers, criminals, rapists': What Trump thinks of Mexicans", online at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-37230916>

¹³⁹ "Как живет Якутия после самого масштабного в своей истории антимигрантского протеста", онлайн: <https://takiedela.ru/2019/04/narod-spit-kak-medved/>, <https://glava.sakha.gov.ru/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/442.pdf>, <https://zona.media/news/2019/03/20/yakutsk>, <https://sakhalife.ru/nakipelo-v-yakutske-mnogotyisyachnyiy-narod-ne-pomeshhaetsya-v-triumfe-na-antimigrantskoe-sobranie/>, <https://www.instagram.com/p/BvJa6ASINqI/>.

¹⁴⁰ Canadian Civil Liberties Association, "Bill-21: the Law against Religious Freedom", online at: <https://ccla.org/bill-21/>

¹⁴¹ CBC, "Muslim women report spike in harassment, discrimination since Bill 21 tabled", online at: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/Muslim-women-report-spike-in-harassment-discrimination-since-bill-21tabled-1.5134539>

A similar ban has been adopted in the Netherlands, where the "Partial Prohibition of Clothing Covering the Face Law" or Burka Ban Law has been in force since 8 January 2019.¹⁴² The Law states that the wearing of clothes covering the face should be banned in public transport and in educational, governmental, and medical institutions, but is still allowed in public places, such as railway platforms, for example. The ban applies to burqas, niqabs, full-face helmets, balaclavas, and masks, but not to headscarves. Article 1 of this Law stipulates that persons who violate the face covering rules must be made aware of the Law and must be given the opportunity to remove the article of clothing or leave the premises. If the person refuses, the police can issue a fine of between EUR 150 and 410. Previously, similar laws had been adopted in a number of countries, such as France, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and partly in Germany.¹⁴³

The United States has pursued a policy of restrictions on Islamist organizations. Between 2010 and 2018, the country adopted 217 so-called "anti-Sharia" laws in 43 states. In 2017/18 14 states passed at least 20 bills banning Sharia.¹⁴⁴ According to these laws, courts "shall not be guided by international law or Sharia law".¹⁴⁵ This law was deemed unconstitutional because it specifically named Sharia as the object of the ban and therefore explicitly discriminated against Islam. Many anti-Sharia bills then removed direct references to Sharia. Instead, lawmakers use different terminology, such as "any foreign law, legal code or system".¹⁴⁶ The anti-Sharia law undermines the legal status of American Muslims. One of the amendments to the Sharia law, "Save Our State", passed in Oklahoma, reinforces racism not only against Muslims but against Arabs in general.¹⁴⁷ The amendment denies American Muslims the use of their citizenship for practical and legal rights, as the laws of several religions function within the broader framework of secular jurisprudence in the US.¹⁴⁸ The First Amendment to the US Constitution states that the Government must protect itself from the imposition of any Religion and at the same time protect the rights of people to practice their Religion.¹⁴⁹ In other words, Americans can follow their own sacred laws if and when

¹⁴² Wet gedeeltelijk verbod gezichtsbedekkende kleding, online at: <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0041161/2019-08-01>

¹⁴³ DW, "Где в Европе запрещено носить паранджу?", онлайн: <https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%B3%D0%B4%D0%B5-%D0%B2-%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%89%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C-%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B4%D0%B6%D1%83/a-44042499>

¹⁴⁴ Unites States Islamophobia Database, HAAS Institute Berkley.

¹⁴⁵ Enrolled House Jointed Resolution 1056 of the State of Oklahoma, May 10, 2010, online: <https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ "FEDERAL JUDGE STRIKES DOWN OKLAHOMA'S ANTI-SHARIAH AMENDMENT, ONLINE AT: [HTTPS://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/08/19/federal-judge-strikes-down-oklahoma's-anti-shariah-amendment](https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/08/19/federal-judge-strikes-down-oklahoma's-anti-shariah-amendment)

¹⁴⁷ "FEDERAL JUDGE STRIKES DOWN OKLAHOMA'S ANTI-SHARIAH AMENDMENT, ONLINE AT: [HTTPS://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/08/19/federal-judge-strikes-down-oklahoma's-anti-shariah-amendment](https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/08/19/federal-judge-strikes-down-oklahoma's-anti-shariah-amendment)

¹⁴⁸ For a full list of anti-sharia bills (both those that were enacted into law and those that did not) see <https://www.splcenter.org/data-projects/tracking-anti-muslim-legislation-across-us>.

¹⁴⁹ Constitution of the United States. First Amendment, online at: <https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/>.

the latter do not conflict with secular Law (such as a law banning polygamy). While many religious groups in the US follow sacred laws and lifestyles and appeal to religious courts (for example, the Roman Catholic Church has some 200 diocesan courts that hear various cases, including annulment of marriage;¹⁵⁰ and, similarly, Orthodox Jews go to Rabbinic courts), the right of American Muslims to observe Sharia Law in areas such as daily prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadan, marriage contracts, charity, and investment rules has been seriously undermined by anti-Sharia law.

Thus, if to analyze legislative activity, we can see that the authorities of most monitoring countries have considered Muslims, natives of Arab countries and migrants as a risk groups, potential targets of radicalization. And the policy towards these groups includes, on the one hand, restrictive measures such as a ban on entry into the country (US), simplified deportation (US, Canada, Italy, Greece, Netherlands), legally reduced grounds for asylum (US), creation of significant integration difficulties (US, Greece, Russia-Yakutia), and on the other, measures for their assimilation (anti-Nikab campaign in Europe, anti-Sharia laws in US). In addition, countries such as France and Greece do not currently recognize the presence of ethnic minorities, which is also a tool for assimilation.

Like restrictive measures, assimilation refers to those groups whose alienation is seen as a threat to public security. But while in the West the focus is on migrants and Muslims, in Ukraine this group includes all linguistic minorities, above all the Russian-speaking minority. Thus, on 25 April 2019, the country adopted a new Language Law No. 2704-VIII "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language".¹⁵¹ The new Law, while declaring the aim to protect the Ukrainian language, deprives Russian and other minority languages of their regional status and drastically reduces their scope of application in public life, including in the private sector. In particular, starting from 2023 (from 2020 for Russian-speaking schools) education since the fifth grade will be only in Ukrainian; 90% of programmes on national TV and Radio channels from 7am to 10pm should be broadcast in the Ukrainian language regardless of their ownership; media published in other languages should simultaneously produce their exact analogue in Ukrainian; in the newspaper kiosks and other media outlets at least half of the products should be in Ukrainian; in movies and video films produced by Ukrainian film companies, 90% of the lines should be in Ukrainian, the remaining 10% should be subtitled; the repertoire of Ukrainian cinemas should not exceed 10% of films in foreign languages in the original (necessarily with subtitles), etc.¹⁵²

At the same time, the Law provides for criminalization:

- for plans to introduce multilingualism, bilingualism or to make another language official in a certain area or in the country as a whole are regarded as serious criminal offences
- attempts to overthrow the constitutional order;

¹⁵⁰ Pew Research Center, "Applying God's Law: Religious Courts and Mediation in the U.S. ", online: https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/08/applying-gods-law-religious-courts-and-mediation-in-the-us/#_ftn1

¹⁵¹ Верховна Рада України, "Проект Закону про забезпечення функціонування української мови як державної", онлайн: https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=61994

¹⁵² Ibid.

- Publicly insulting the state Ukrainian language is punishable by up to three years in prison;
- "willful violation of Ukrainian spelling requirements" in official documents is punishable by a fine;
- The refusal of civil servants and MPs to use the state language in the workplace is punishable by a fine.

Special attention is given to the Russian and Belarusian languages. However, the Law allows secondary schools to teach one or more subjects (such as history or mathematics) in English or in one of the European languages. It cannot be done in Russian (or Belarusian, which is not an EU language either). In addition, print media in Crimean Tatar, English, and European languages are exempt from having to publish a Ukrainian equivalent. Russian-language educational institutions have already been transferred into the Ukrainian language system from September 1, 2020 (above the 5th grade), and Hungarian and Romanian-language education will do so from 2023. All indications are that after the 2014 territorial conflict with Russia, Ukraine views its Russian-speaking citizens as potential foreign agents and seeks to tear them away from their culture and assimilate them, despite the fact that most Russian Ukrainians are patriots of their country. In doing so, the Belarusian language has suffered as a sparring point in order to avoid accusations of anti-Russian nationalism. In this way the old Nationalist slogan "One Country - one Language - one Nation!" is implemented.

As a result, by the beginning of 2020, there were almost 15 thousand schools in Ukraine, of which 13584 were Ukrainian-language schools (92 per cent of the total number of schools), 125 were Russian-language schools (0.85 per cent - less than 1 per cent of schools had 6.9 per cent of Russian language students), 72 were Hungarian (0.49 per cent), 68 were Romanian-language schools (0.46 per cent), 4 were Polish, and 2 were Moldovan. That is, while there are almost a thousand more students studying in Moldovan, there are only 2 educational institutions with Moldovan language of instruction, and 4 with Polish language. At the same time, the disproportion between the number of pupils studying in the Russian language and Russian schools is more than eight times¹⁵³.

After the Language Law came into force, that is, as of the 2020/2021 school year, there were 14.4 thousand schools in Ukraine, of which 13.6 thousand were Ukrainian-language schools (95% of the total), 73 were Hungarian (0.51%), 69 were Romanian (0.48%), 55 were Russian (0.38%), 4 were Polish (0.03%), 1 each were Moldovan and German (0.01%). In these schools there were 4.1 million pupils as of the 2020/2021 school year. Of these, 3.7 million are in the Ukrainian language (90% of the total number of students), 17.9 thousand - in Russian (0.44%), 13.9 thousand - Hungarian (0.34%), 13.5 thousand - Romanian (0.33%), 929 - Polish (0.02%), 176 - Moldovan (0.01%), 160 - German (0.01%).

It should be separately noted that another 672 schools (9.1%) provided education in two or more languages for 373 thousand pupils. Particularly, 603 schools teach in Ukrainian and

¹⁵³ Динамика количества школ и учеников по языкам обучения. УИП. <https://uiamp.org.ua/isl/dinamika-kolichestva-shkol-i-uchenikov-po-yazykam-obucheniya>.

Russian languages (total number of pupils 351 thousand, 112 thousand of them study in Russian), 27 schools - in Ukrainian and Hungarian (8,3 and 3,6 thousand pupils respectively), 19 schools - in Ukrainian and Romanian language (5,6 and 2.7 thousand), 16 schools teach Ukrainian and Moldovan (4.6 and 2.2 thousand), two schools teach Ukrainian and Polish (709 and 157), and one school combines Ukrainian and English (307 and 165), Bulgarian (332 and 46), Crimean Tatar (626 and 64) and Slovak (354 and 138).¹⁵⁴

The Law of Ukraine No. 2673-VIII "On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine (concerning the subordination of religious organizations and the procedure for state registration of religious organizations with the status of a legal entity)" adopted on 17 January 2019 is similar.¹⁵⁵ It stipulates that decisions to change the subordination of a religious community and to make relevant amendments or additions to the Charter shall be made by at least 2/3 of the number required votes to recognize the general meeting of the Community as authorized one in accordance with its Charter (regulations).

This Law resulted in the phenomenon of "Church Raiding", in which small organized groups of supporters of the recently established Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), a Ukrainian-language church that was canonized by the Patriarch of Constantinople, seized churches of the traditional Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) of the Moscow Patriarchate and transferred them to the newly created Church structure with the support of radicals and local authorities. To put additional pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, in December 2018 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed a Law obliging the UOC to indicate in its name its affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church (although the UOC-ROC connection is purely spiritual in nature). From President Poroshenko's point of view, in this way the canonical Church would get a kind of "agent of Moscow" marker in the eyes of believers and of the Society.

However, after prolonged litigation, the Supreme Court of Ukraine suspended the renaming of the Orthodox Church in December 2019 (no final decision has been made yet).¹⁵⁶ It can be assumed that a certain role in this was played by the position of the new Ukrainian Government led by President V. Zelensky, which is not aimed at further inciting Religious conflicts in Ukraine.

Overall, we can conclude that in their efforts to neutralize the threat of radicalization, the authorities of many monitoring countries have found a common trend - the tightening of anti-extremist legislation, the expansion of law enforcement capabilities, including the intrusion into the private lives of citizens, and the infringement of the rights of representatives of certain social groups that they view as potential targets of radicalization. The classification of certain groups as potentially dangerous is arbitrary, based on the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Верховна Рада України, "Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України (щодо підлеглості релігійних організацій та процедури державної реєстрації релігійних організацій зі статусом юридичної особи), онлайн: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=65346.

¹⁵⁶ Верховный суд Украины оставил в силе приостановку переименования УПЦ (МП). Интерфакс, online: <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/630779.html>.

political views of the leaders, their desire to please a xenophobic voter frightened by the migration crisis, as well as the general understanding in Europe of integration processes as assimilations. Separately, LGBT and especially representatives of the transgender groups, who are certainly not potentially dangerous in terms of radicalization, but still remain vulnerable groups that struggle for their rights, should be singled out. Nevertheless, we can see that, taken together, restrictive measures against minorities generally prevailed over measures aimed at their protection during the period under review.

CHAPTER 2. LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES.

In general, enforcement measures can be divided into *anti-discriminatory measures which are* objectively aimed at protecting the rights of citizens and *discriminatory measures which are* objectively aimed at infringing and discriminating against certain social groups. In turn, discriminatory measures are divided into those that are the result of failures in the activities of state bodies, i.e. they are not protected by the Law and are the result of mistakes or criminal activities of civil servants, and those that are the result of legislative activity and are entirely dependent on the Government policy.

1. Anti-Discriminatory Practices.

Two groups of anti-discrimination measures that have been implemented in the monitoring countries can be distinguished in the period under review. These include law enforcement measures against extremist manifestations and hate crimes; and integration processes with regard to immigrants and refugees who have legally obtained the right to reside in a new place. Enforcement measures can be divided into work related to recording, detecting and prosecuting hate crimes, and work related to crime prevention and prevention.

Criminal cases and court sentences for hate crimes.

If to analyze *the number of convictions* for hate crimes, we can see a clear downward trend against the background of an increase in recorded offences. However, it should be taken into account that criminal cases are not initiated in all cases that actually took place.

In Poland, for example, only 5 (!) per cent of all hate crimes are reported to the police, according to OSCE data.¹⁵⁷ According to data on hate crime compiled by the Monitoring, Complaints and Petitions Department of that country's Interior Ministry, the Police Headquarters, the Internal Security Agency, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Ministry of Justice, the National Memory Institute and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, data on hate crimes (including hate speech) are as follows:

2019: 972 cases reported to police; 432 prosecutions; 597 convictions;

2018: 1,117 cases recorded by police; 397 prosecutions; 315 convictions;

2017: 886 cases recorded by police; 320 prosecutions; 260 convictions;

¹⁵⁷ Jedynie 5% przestępstw motywowanych nienawiścią jest zgłaszanych na policję - badania RPO i ODIHR/OBWE, online at: <https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/jedynie-5-przestepstw-motywowanych-nienawiscia-jest-zglaszanych-na-policje-badania-rpo-i-odihrobwe>

2016: 874 cases reported to police; 281 criminal cases; 236 sentenced;
2015: 263 cases recorded by police; 229 prosecutions; 195 convictions.¹⁵⁸

Thus, while in 2015 criminal prosecutions for hate crimes were initiated in 87% of cases, in 2018 the ratio was 35.5% for criminal cases. In 2019, the situation improved slightly, at 61.4%. From 2015 to 2019, only 1,659 cases were initiated in Poland, with 1,603 or 96.6% reaching the stage of court conviction, which is the highest rate in Europe, but considering the average rate of cases initiated, the response rate here is certainly lower.¹⁵⁹

In Germany, the detection rate for politically motivated crime decreased by 4% in 2019 compared to 201 (41.2%/45.3%), while directly for violent hate crimes it remained roughly the same at 59.7-59.9%.¹⁶⁰ However, the Federal Government does not provide the OSCE with information on court sentences.¹⁶¹

In the UK, the ratio of the hate crimes committed to prosecutions was 34% in 2015 – this ratio was already 16% in 2018 and 13% in 2019.¹⁶² With the Crown Prosecution Service attributing this drop mainly to an overall drop in "the number of suspects referred to us *by the police* for a charging decision".¹⁶³ The average rate of bringing cases to trial was over 51%. In terms of prosecution rates compared to the overall number of hate crimes, the picture is even bleaker, down from a quarter to just under ten per cent during the reporting period.¹⁶⁴

In the Netherlands, this Ratio in prosecuted cases was 8.9% in 2017 and 9.5% in 2018. The average rate of cases brought to trial was 17%.¹⁶⁵ In Greece, in 2015, the ratio between officially lodged applications and cases brought to trial was 45%. Overall, until 2018, the number of convictions did not exceed 6 in this country.¹⁶⁶ However, in 2017 only, the total number of hate crimes in Greece according to NGOs was over 300, of which about 100 were violent.¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁸ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Poland, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/poland>.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Bundeskriminalamt, "Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2019 Bundesweite Fallzahlen", online: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2020/pmk-2019.pdf;jsessionid=B600530ABFD066DA33BB4334F1CF1209.1_cid364?_blob=publicationFile&v=1

¹⁶¹ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Germany, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany>

¹⁶² ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: United Kingdom, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/united-kingdom>

¹⁶³ UK Crown Prosecution Service, 'Hate Crime Annual Report 2017-2018', p.6, online at: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-hate-crime-report-2018.pdf> & UK Crown Prosecution Service, 'Hate Crime Annual Report 2018-2019', p.7, online at: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/CPS-Hate-Crime-Annual-Report-2018-2019.PDF>

¹⁶⁴ Dearden, L., 'Less than one in 10 hate crimes prosecuted despite record attacks', *The Independent*, 27 December 2019, online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/hate-crime-attacks-jews-muslims-gay-prosecutions-police-falling-a9257256.html>.

¹⁶⁵ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Netherlands, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/netherlands>

¹⁶⁶ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Greece, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/greece>

¹⁶⁷ Institute for the Study of National Policy and Interethnic Relations, European International Tolerance Centre, Centre for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Intercultural Communications (Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis), European Centre for Democracy Development. " Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crime in

A slightly different picture can be seen in Ukraine. According to OSCE data, the ratio between the total number of crimes and the number of hate crime cases prosecuted in this country was 50% in 2015 and almost 92% in 2019. At the same time, only 18 crimes of the 633 criminal cases, or 2.84%, have reached the Court.¹⁶⁸ In other words, we see that the high rate of prosecutions is fully compensated by the lowest number of cases in Europe that have reached court.

It should be borne in mind that not all sentences in cases of hate crimes were of an accusatory nature. According to the media in Spain, where data on sentencing statistics in these cases are not published, there is one acquittal for every two convictions. As an example, three judgments from 2018 and 2019 are generally cited as key in the area of discrimination and hatred. In the 2018 verdict, the Supreme Court of Spain ruled that firing a Muslim woman for using a veil at work was lawful and therefore not discriminatory.¹⁶⁹ The Court found that the company's decision to ban the wearing of the veil was in line with health and safety requirements. On the other hand, in a 2019 verdict the Provincial High Court of Barcelona convicted a man for posting hateful messages against Muslims on Facebook for eight months in prison under Articles 510 and 173 of the Penal Code.¹⁷⁰ Also in 2019, Madrid's Provincial High Court convicted another man for posting hate songs against Muslims on YouTube.¹⁷¹ The court found that this was a "*clear attack on the dignity of the immigrant collective*" and concluded that there was a clear intent to promote hatred and discrimination against migrants. In 2020, the High Court in Barcelona convicted a man, the leader of a gang who met with homosexuals to harass them, to five and a half years in prison.¹⁷²

An exception to the general rule was Russia, where a decline in sentencing in extremist cases was confirmed by a general decline in the number of the committed crimes. This trend was evident in 2018. The liberalization of the main article of the Criminal Code (282), under which hate speech sentences were handed down, and the transfer of responsibility for a number of acts to the Administrative Code should be borne in mind.

Thus, according to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in 2018, 731 people were convicted under "anti-extremist" articles of the Criminal Code (Art.

Europe. Annual Report", 2018, p. 92, online at: [https://www.civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/PanEuropean-Report-2018\(2\).pdf](https://www.civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/PanEuropean-Report-2018(2).pdf)

¹⁶⁸ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Ukraine, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/ukraine>

¹⁶⁹ Spain / Supreme Court Social Section (Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Social) / ATS 6331/2018 - ECLI: ES:TS:2018:6331A | EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DATABASE (europa.eu, online: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/databases/anti-muslim-hatred/node/6908>

¹⁷⁰ Spain / Barcelona Provincial High Court, Criminal Judgement (Sentencia Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, Sala de lo Penal) / 2018-219 Roj: SAP B 6183/2019 - ECLI: ES:APB:2019:6183 | EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DATABASE (europa.eu), online: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/databases/anti-muslim-hatred/node/6931>

¹⁷¹ Spain / Madrid Provincial High Court, Criminal Judgement (Audiencia Provincial de Madrid, Sala de lo Penal) / SAP M 1843/2019, Rec. 2037/2018, ECLI: ES:APM:2019:1843 | EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DATABASE (europa.eu), online: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/databases/anti-muslim-hatred/node/6932>

¹⁷² "La Audiencia confirma el ingreso en prisión del neozí que vejaba gays", *Sociedad*, 23/07/20, online at: <https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20200723/482476703303/la-audiencia-confirma-el-ingreso-en-prision-del-neonazi-que-vejaba-gays.html>

282, 280, 280.1, 205.2, 354.1, Parts 1 and 2 148, 282.1, 282.2, 205.4, 205.5).¹⁷³ In comparison, in 2016, 662 people were convicted, in 2017 - 786.¹⁷⁴ The growth slowed down due to discussions about the decriminalization of Article 282 of the Criminal Code ("Incitement to Hatred"), under which the people were mostly convicted previously in 2018, 518 people were convicted under it.¹⁷⁵ The total number of hate crimes also decreased by 16.8% in 2018.

The decriminalization of the Article 282 of the Criminal Code at the end of 2018 led to a sharp decrease in the number of convictions in 2019 - only 432 people were convicted. While only 36 people were convicted under the previously "most popular" Article 282 in 2019, 145 people were convicted under Article 280 of the Criminal Code (Public Calls for Extremist Activity) and 126 people under Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code (Public Calls for Terrorist Activity, Public Justification of Terrorism or Propaganda of Terrorism). The Prosecutor-General's Office also confirmed the decrease in the number of convictions. According to its data, the decriminalization of Article 282 has resulted in the number of extremist crimes halving in 2019, from 1,265 to 585.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, 383 people were convicted in 2019 under Article 20.3.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences ("Inciting of Hatred or Enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity"), which replaced Article 282 of the Criminal Code.¹⁷⁷

According to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 220 people were convicted under "anti-extremist" articles in the first six months of 2020. The highest number of convictions was under Article 280 and 205.2 of the Criminal Code, 80 and 73 respectively. In addition, in the first half of 2020, 347 people were convicted under Article 20.3.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, almost as many as in the whole of 2019.¹⁷⁸

The number of convictions for involvement in extremist and terrorist Islamist organizations is interesting. Thus, 62 people were convicted as Islamists in 2018, 78 in 2019, and 34 in the first 11 months of 2020. A significant part of those convicted are adherents of Hizb ut-Tahrir (22 people in 2018, 38 people in 2019, 27 people in 2020). Of these, 4 persons were convicted in Crimea in 2018, 12 in 2019, and 18 in 2020.¹⁷⁹ This is primarily due to the fact

¹⁷³ Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде РФ. Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за 2018 год, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=4894>

¹⁷⁴ Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде РФ. Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за 2016 год, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=3834>; Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде РФ. Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за 2017 год, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=4572>

¹⁷⁵ Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде РФ. Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за 2018 год, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=4894>

¹⁷⁶ Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде РФ. Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за 2019 год, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=5259>; ТАСС, "Число экстремистских преступлений за 2019 год сократилось вдвое: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/8002335>

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде РФ. Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за первый квартал 2020 года, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=5460>

¹⁷⁹ See: <https://graty.me/news/verhovnyj-sud-rf-v-apellyaczii-sokratil-prigovor-po-delu-pervoj-simferopolskoj-gruppy-hizb-ut-tahrir-na-polgoda-kazhdomu-obvinyanom/>; <https://www.interfax-russia.ru/volga/news/desyat-zhiteley-kazani-poluchili-ot-11-do-22-let-kolonii-za-uchastie-v-deyatelnosti-hizb-ut-tahrir>; <https://ovdinfo.org/express-news/2019/12/17/dvuh-figurantov-dela-hizb-ut-tahrir-v-tatarstane-prigovorili-k-17-i-16-godam>.

that this organization is not banned in Ukraine and has established an extensive infrastructure there over the years that Crimea has been part of it. The second most popular (judging by the number of people convicted) is the Tabligi Jamaat movement (21, 17, and 6 people respectively were convicted in 2018, 2019, and 2020).

Preventive and prophylactic measures.

If we analyze national counterterrorism and violent extremism plans, we see that they all consist of 4 blocks: prevention, interdiction, protection, and preparedness to deal with the consequences. In particular, the British CONTEST programme, considered the benchmark for state programmes to counter violent extremism and terrorism, defines the state's actions in the event of terrorist threats as: "prevent, pursue, protect, be prepared".¹⁸⁰

During the period under review, a number of monitoring countries adopted new or updated National strategies to counter Terrorism, Radicalization, and Extremism. For example, in the United States, the "United States National Counterterrorism Strategy" was adopted in October 2018.¹⁸¹ According to this document, "radical Islamist terrorists remain a major transnational terrorist threat to the United States and its vital national interests." The strategy provides intelligence agencies with enhanced powers to control financial flows, material resources, and logistics that could be exploited by terrorists.

At the beginning of 2018, Spain established a National Directorate for Combating Hate Crimes under the Secretariat of State for Security (Ministry of the Interior).¹⁸² One of its main tasks is to coordinate and monitor the implementation of a specific action plan against terror. In 2019, the first Specific Action Plan to Combat Hate Crimes was approved.¹⁸³

A little later, in 2019, Spain approved the current National Strategy against Terrorism, which will run until 2023, replacing the previous 2012 Strategy.¹⁸⁴ The new Strategy is in line with the European counter-terrorism framework and consists of four sections: *prevention*, *protection of citizens*, *prosecution and investigation*, and *response to terrorist attacks*. It pays particular attention to the return to Spain of former IS and al-Qaeda fighters, clearly to the detriment of right-wing terrorism, which, as experience in other countries, above all the US, has shown, could lead to an increase in right-wing extremism in the coming years. As part

¹⁸⁰ GOV.UK. Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), online at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest>

¹⁸¹ National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America, October 2018, online at:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf>

¹⁸² Ministerio del Interior. Delitos de odio, online: <http://www.interior.gob.es/es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/delitos-de-odio>

¹⁸³ Action Plan to Combat Hate Crimes, Ministry of Interior, online at:

<http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/642012/3479677/Plan+de+accion+ingles/222063a3-5505-4a06-b464-a4052c6a9b48>

¹⁸⁴ "Estrategia Nacional Contra el Terrorismo", 2019, online at:

<https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/interior/Documents/2019/260219-EstrategiaContraTerrorismo.pdf>

of this strategy, a Strategic National Plan to Prevent and Counter Violent Radicalization and a Strategic National Plan to Counter the Financing of Terrorism were approved in 2020.

In December 2018, the Canadian Government launched the National Strategy to Counter Radicalization and Violence, which outlines Canada's approach and priorities for preventing radicalization that leads to violence.¹⁸⁵ The Canadian strategy, similar to the UK and other plans, also has three objectives: *early prevention*, which refers to, on the one hand, informing the public about the nature of radical ideologies and methods of population processing, and on the other hand, informing government agencies from the public and civil society institutions about the facts of radicalization of the population; *risk prevention* in the early stages of radicalization, when it is possible to return the object of ideological processing to normal life through interventions. *Disengagement efforts*, i.e. helping individuals who are already members of different types of extremist groups to leave them. These actions are carried out jointly by both civil society institutions, social services, and law enforcement agencies.

Canada is one of the few countries where there are loud voices against the *assimilationist model of integration*. We see there two policy approaches and visions regarding the integration of immigrants and Muslims. The assimilationist approach is adopted in Quebec, where immigrants must speak French and adhere to the *laïcité* tradition. The second model is integrationist and multiculturalist approaches in which different cultures coexist in mutual harmony in accordance with the Charter of Rights and Civil Liberties. Initial observations show that the *assimilationist approach* (imposed by the government) is *less successful* in countering or curbing the *marginalization* and *radicalization* of Muslims. In a 2018 survey conducted by the Angus Reid Institute in partnership with the Canadian Foundation for Interracial Relations, Quebecers claimed that radicalization in their communities was increasing.¹⁸⁶ In other Canadian provinces, the percentage is much lower. 64% of Quebecers believe that radical Islamic sentiment is the biggest problem in 2018. In other provinces, the percentage of respondents expressing such concerns is significantly lower. The reasons for radicalization among Muslims in Canada, and in Quebec in particular, can be explained by several factors. According to the same Angus Reid Institute surveys, economic factors as a reason for radicalization in Canada are lowest (13%), radical Islam is highest (47%), followed by mental illness (37%), feelings of marginalization (34%), online recruitment (24%) and old beliefs (19%).¹⁸⁷ Since the situation is different in different parts of the country, different approaches to addressing radicalization are also required, something that Canada's Strategic National Plan is not yet focused on.

On 29 May, 2020, a new version of the Strategy to Counter Extremism until 2025 was approved in Russia. The Strategy introduced the concept of "Ideology of Violence", defined as a set of views and ideas that justify the use of violence to achieve political, ideological,

¹⁸⁵ "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence", online at: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/index-en.aspx#s3>

¹⁸⁶ David Korzinski, "Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism: Four-in-ten say radicalized individuals live in their communities", online at: <http://angusreid.org/radicalization-homegrown-terrorism/print>

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

religious, and other goals. The definition of "manifestation of extremism" was extended to acts that threaten the Constitutional order and violation of the country's territorial integrity.¹⁸⁸

In 2018, the German National Preventive Programme against Islamist extremism, which has been in place since 2016, was renewed. 100 million euros have been allocated for its implementation.¹⁸⁹ These include preventive measures such as work with municipalities, families and the social environment, including NGOs and migrant associations, work in mosques, houses of worship and religious communities, and in the education sector, including schools. Particular attention was paid to internet activity, including social media. The need for cooperation at the inter-state level, both inside and outside the EU, was also stressed.¹⁹⁰

At the end of November 2020, the German government published a new plan to combat right-wing extremism and racism. More than one billion euros will be allocated for the period 2021-2024 to combat these manifestations. The corresponding budget line for 2021 will be supplemented with a separate sum of 150 million euros.¹⁹¹

During the period under review, *preventive measures* formed a significant part of law enforcement practice. Above all, this concerned the creation of an infrastructure for direct communication between law enforcement authorities and private individuals. This is a two-way communication where, on the one hand, citizens can inform the authorities about discrimination and manifestations of extremism, including impending acts of violence, and, on the other hand, the State can help citizens correctly identify the actions of certain individuals who are either involved in the radicalization of third parties or are the target of radicalization themselves. A classic in this sense is, as already mentioned, the British Channel programme, which is part of the aforementioned CONTEST Programme (from the first letters of the English words Counter-Terrorism Strategy). It targets those the people identified by intelligence agencies or others, including civilian agencies such as educational institutions or individual citizens, as "those who are on the road to radicalization". The Programme provides not only multi-channel alerts to intelligence agencies about radicalization, but also a multi-sectoral response to the involved bodies.¹⁹² Support can include assistance with education or employment, health care support and ideological mentoring to give vulnerable individuals the skills to protect themselves from becoming involved in terrorism or supporting terrorism.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ Официальный интернет-портал правовой информации. "Стратегия противодействия экстремизму до 2025 года", online at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202005290036?index=1&rangeSize=1>

¹⁸⁹ Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamistischen Extremismus, online: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/sicherheit/praeventionsprogramm-islamismus.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Bundesregierung, "Klares Signal gegen Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus", online at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kabinett-rechtsextremismus-1819828>

¹⁹² Details on the Channel programme: <https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/the-channel-programme>.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

In France, in order to facilitate the detection of hate crime, the Ministry of the Interior, together with the Ministry of Justice, is working from 2019 to allow witnesses and victims of hate crime to connect to a platform to communicate with specially trained investigators. Discussions in the form of a chat room will be possible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and will facilitate the collection of information and then the filing of statements.¹⁹⁴

Enough has been done in the Netherlands to establish a reporting system for cases of discrimination and extremism. As already indicated, in 2018, improvements were made to the system for registering complaints of discrimination (NJCM) in this country.¹⁹⁵ Each municipality now has an anti-Discrimination Bureau that is responsible for registering and dealing with complaints about discrimination and hate crime. These bureaus cooperate with the Public Prosecution Service and the police as well as with schools and businesses. In addition, the Public Prosecution Service has a comprehensive criminal database (GPS) that can be used to record all hate crimes (such as attacks, the burning of mosques or the desecration of Jewish cemeteries). Hate crime and discrimination can be reported to the hotline by telephone or on the Internet. In recent years, the Public Prosecution Service has demanded stiffer penalties for violent crimes related to discrimination. However, in 2019, less than two per cent of the discrimination reports resulted in legal proceedings.¹⁹⁶

These kinds of structures exist in a wide range of monitoring countries. In some countries, such as Spain, special bodies have been set up that are strictly focused on certain social groups. For example, there are organizations such as the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination (which has been active since 2018) and its attached Network of Centres for Victims of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination; the National Roma Council; the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants; the Spanish Observatory against Racism and Xenophobia (OBERAXE)¹⁹⁷; Special Prosecutors for discrimination and hate crimes; and the Public Defender's Office (ODH). Measures and initiatives at the local level are also crucial. Examples include the police unit dealing with diversity and hate crimes in Madrid, the Anti-Discrimination Office in Barcelona, or the Diversity Coexistence Plan in Guipuzcoa (Basque Country).

The second area of preventive measures is to prevent the financing of extremism and terrorism and to combat money laundering. In previous years, all monitoring countries adopted laws to combat the financing of terrorism and extremist activities.

At the EU Council meeting on 4 November 2020, EU ministers discussed conclusions on combating money laundering and terrorist financing, which aims to provide guidance to the

¹⁹⁴ _Ministere de l'Interieur, "Statistiques 2019 des actes antireligieux, antisémites, racistes et xénophobes": <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/Communiqués/Statistiques-2019-des-actes-antireligieux-antisemites-racistes-et-xenophobes>

¹⁹⁵ _ECRI REPORT ON THE NETHERLANDS (fifth monitoring cycle), p. 11, online at: <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-netherlands/168094c577>

¹⁹⁶ One World, "WAAROM GAAN RACISTEN IN NEDERLAND ZO VAAK VRIJUIT?", ONLINE AT: <https://www.oneworld.nl/lezen/discriminatie/racisme/waarom-gaan-racisten-in-nederland-zo-vaak-vrijuit/>

¹⁹⁷ OBERAXE also runs training programmes on human rights and non-discrimination for law enforcement officials, health workers or educators, as well as awareness-raising campaigns on rights and resources - *author's note*.

European Commission ahead of legislative proposals in 2021 on a single set of rules, EU-level supervision, and a coordination and support mechanism for the financial intelligence units of EU member states. The problem is that so far the EU uses directives in this area that require subsequent implementation in national legal systems. This leads in some situations either to incomplete implementation of all directives or to excessive transposition of the EU directive into national law, resulting in the national legislator introducing additional or stricter rules than the directive itself requires.¹⁹⁸ In all likelihood, the EU is moving towards uniform rules that will not need additional implementation in national legislation.

Much of the work in the period under review has focused on identifying terrorist organizations and activists of extremist and terrorist groups. In compiling a list of measures to counter extremist activity, executive agencies around the world rely both on intelligence information provided by special agencies and civil society, as well as on their definitions of extremism and international obligations. Above all, it is a matter of defining *a list of extremist organizations* that require special attention by the intelligence services. These organizations are generally banned or suspended and their members are subject to state harassment or control.

Lists of extremist and terrorist organizations exist in many countries around the world. The only difference is the selection criteria, which is also based on national definitions of extremism. As a rule, the decision to list and ban an organization is made by the courts. In *the Netherlands*, for example, the grounds for banning and dissolving an organization are (a) Holocaust denial, provided that the expression is clearly intended to insult or incite hatred, discrimination or intolerance; (b) intolerance (on grounds of race, religion, etc.); and (c) insults, if they publicly denigrate specific people.¹⁹⁹ In Germany and Russia, such lists include organizations that preach hatred against a social group and engage in extremist and terrorist activities.

As of 17 July 2020, there were 76 international terrorist organizations on the UK register. Most of them are Islamist and 14 Northern Irish organizations.²⁰⁰ In the US, there were 69 organizations listed as international terrorist groups in 2020. A further 13 were removed from it for various reasons, mostly after the organization ceased to exist.²⁰¹ In Germany, there are several lists of banned extremist organizations: right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, foreign extremist organizations (except Islamist organisations), Islamist extremist organizations.²⁰² At the time of preparation of the expert opinion, the total number

¹⁹⁸ M. Bartosiewicz, "Walka z praniem pieniędzy i finansowaniem terroryzmu - zmiany coraz bliżej", Rzeczpospolita, November 19, 2020, online: <https://www.rp.pl/Prawo-karne/311199916-Walka-z-praniem-pieniedzy-i-finansowaniem-terroryzmu---zmiany-coraz-blizej.html>

¹⁹⁹ Uitspraken, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:3931, online at: <https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:3931>

²⁰⁰ Home Office. PROSCRIBED TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS, p.3, online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/901434/20200717_Proscription.pdf

²⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations", online at: <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>

²⁰² Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Arbeitsfelder", online at: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/>

of these organizations was 42.²⁰³ Meanwhile, there are official lists of non-banned organizations with extremist features. There are many more of these.²⁰⁴

Efforts to update the lists are ongoing. In December 2019, the German branch of the right-wing extremist group Combat 18, based in the UK, was banned. Lawyers for the group filed a lawsuit against the German Interior Ministry. In September 2020 the High Administrative Court ruled that the ban was valid. Combat 18 expresses a commitment to National Socialist ideology and distributes hate publications. The group is closely associated with neo-Nazi music groups. Its very name demonstrates its sympathy for Adolf Hitler (AZ 6 VR 1.20).²⁰⁵ In March 2020, the Islamist organization Hezbollah was banned for activities contrary to Criminal Law and against the idea of international understanding.²⁰⁶

Equally important is the Berlin court decision allowing the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to label the "Identity Movement" as a right-wing extremist movement. It is an international right-wing radical network, originally originating in the UK and France. The particular danger of the "Identity Movement" lies in its "pseudo-intellectual" image. "The Movement" positions itself as a supposedly legitimate defender of the ethnic majority in European states on the basis of the theory of "Identitarianism", against the "threat" posed by Islam. In June 2020, despite ostensibly peaceful forms of protest, a Court found the Movement to be right-wing extremist. The main argument: not only is the ideology of the "Identitarians" racist, but their calls for "racial purity" and recognition of members of certain ethnic groups as "second-class people" may well encourage the movement's supporters to become violent. (AZ 1 L 188/20).²⁰⁷

Germany also has a nationwide list of "anti-constitutional symbols" (usually related to National Socialism: swastikas, SS runes, the Hitler salute, etc.) as well as lists drawn up by the constitutional protection offices of the states, which include the symbols of contemporary banned neo-Nazi organizations.²⁰⁸ The "Imperial Military Flag" (the flag of the armed forces of the German Empire before 1921), for example, was not officially banned until recently. Extreme right-wingers use it at demonstrations as a symbol of commitment to their ideology, for fear of displaying "Third Reich" flags, swastikas or SS runes, for which there is immediate punishment. In the autumn of 2020, the process of banning this symbol also began, as a reaction to its mass appearance in 2019-2020 Radical Right protests,

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Bayerische Staatskanzlei, "Verzeichnis extremistischer oder extremistisch beeinflusster Organisationen (nicht abschließend)", online at: https://www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/BayVV_108268-0

²⁰⁵ "BVerwG: Verbot der Vereinigung "Combat 18 Deutschland" bleibt vollziehbar", *Kostenlose Urteile*, online: https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/BVerwG_6-VR-120_BVerwG-Verbot-der-Vereinigung-Combat-18-Deutschland-bleibt-vollziehbar.news29240.htm

²⁰⁶ Bundesamt für verfassungsschutz. "Verbotene islamistische Organisationen", online: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/verbotene-organisationen-islamismus>

²⁰⁷ "Verfassungsschutz darf "Identitäre Bewegung" als "gesichert rechtsextremistisch" bezeichnen", *Free judgements*, online: https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/VG-Berlin_1-L-18820_Verfassungsschutz-darf-Identitaere-Bewegung-als-gesichert-rechtsextremistisch-bezeichnen.news28905.htm

²⁰⁸ Recht gegen Rechts Platform, online: <http://www.recht-gegen-rechts.de/gesetze-gegen-rechts/die-wichtigsten-paragrafen.html>

including the symbolic "storming of the Reichstag" carried out in August 2020 on the steps of the Reichstag - a protest against restrictions in connection with the COVID-19 epidemic. In Bremen, the "Imperial Flag" has already been declared unconstitutional; Berlin is next in the line.²⁰⁹ There are voices in favor of a nationwide ban.²¹⁰

In addition to right-wing symbols and organizations, Islamist associations and symbols are also banned. The constitutional protection office (Bundesverfassungsschutz, BfV) informs about this on its website. The most recent ban was issued in March 2020 for Hezbollah symbols.²¹¹ The state agencies publish brochures explaining what Islamism is, its methods, the difference between Islam and extremism and "political Islam".²¹² Separate information is provided for Muslim youth in order to prevent them from being drawn into Islamist structures, such as the Salafists, who often present themselves as a special Islamic youth subculture (website of the North Rhine-Westphalia state interior ministry).²¹³

The Russian Ministry of Justice publishes two lists of organizations recognized by Russian courts as carrying out extremist activities. One list includes bodies that have been liquidated and banned, the other includes organizations whose activities have been suspended. In addition, a list of Russian and international organizations recognized as terrorist is published on the website of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) and the website of the FSB. In December 2020, 33 Russian and international Islamist, right-wing and left-wing extremist organizations were listed as terrorist organizations, while 79 Russian extremist groups were on the list of banned organizations.²¹⁴ The activities of one organization were suspended.²¹⁵

The French government has also been active in banning extremist organizations. This is especially true for NGOs that refuse to recognize the French model of secularism and are

²⁰⁹ "Berliner Innenverwaltung prüft Verbot von Reichsflaggen", *RBB-24*, online:

<https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2020/10/berlin-brandenburg-reichsflagge-reichskriegsflagge-verbot.html>

²¹⁰ "Kommt ein Verbot von Reichskriegsflaggen?", *Sonntagsblatt*, online:

<https://www.sonntagsblatt.de/artikel/familie/kommt-ein-verbot-von-reichskriegsflaggen>

²¹¹ Bundesamt für verfassungsschutz. "Verbotene islamistische Organisationen", online:

<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/verbotene-organisationen-islamismus>

²¹² See: Mecklenburg Vorpommern, Ministerium für Inneres und Sport Abteilung Verfassungsschutz, "Islamistische Aktivitäten erkennen", online: https://www.verfassungsschutz-mv.de/static/VERF/Dateien/Broschueren/Broschre_Islamistische_Aktivitten_erkennen.pdf

²¹³ Ministerium für Inneres und Kommunales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, "Extremistischer Salafismus als Jugendkultur Sprache, Symbole und Style", online:

https://www.land.nrw/sites/default/files/asset/document/extremistischer_salafismus_als_jugendkultur_internet.pdf

²¹⁴ Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации, "Единый федеральный список организаций, в том числе иностранных и международных организаций, признанных в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации террористическими", онлайн: <http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm>

²¹⁵ Национальный антитеррористический комитет, "Перечень общественных объединений и религиозных организаций, иных некоммерческих организаций, в отношении которых судом принято вступившее в законную силу решение о ликвидации или запрете деятельности", онлайн: <http://nac.gov.ru/terroristicheskie-i-ekstremistskie-organizacii-i-materialy.html>; Экстремизму.нет, "Запрещенные организации. Список экстремистских и террористических организаций, деятельность которых запрещена на территории России", онлайн: <https://extremizmu.net/zapreshhennye-organizacii/#extremizm>

suspected of channeling funds to jihadist groups. Several such NGOs have been banned since the beheading of teacher Samuel Paty on 16 October 2020. The first is "Collectif Cheikh Yassine", named after the late religious leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.²¹⁶ "Collectif Cheikh Yassine" was banned on 21 October 2020. The Government then opposed the "Charity Baraka City Foundation", known for raising money to help the needy in 26 Muslim countries. Led by Salafist Idriss Sikhamedi, who refused to accept French secular laws and publicly condemn ISIS or al-Qaeda, Charity Baraka city's assets were frozen and the foundation was banned on 28 October 2020.

Finally, on 2 December 2020, the "Collectif Contre islamophobie en France" (CCIF), which also refused to recognize secularism laws, was banned. A week before the ban, it decided to move its assets, headquarters, and activities to an undisclosed foreign country. In total, about 26,000 people who pose a potential threat to the State are in the French Extremists List.²¹⁷

The main medium of radicalization today is the Internet environment. According to research conducted by Dutch experts based on interviews with detainees on terrorist charges, social media played an important role in their radicalization, especially if they belonged to Internet groups with a "charismatic leader".²¹⁸ All monitoring countries in the last 20 years (after the terrorist attack in the US on 11.09.2001) have legislated for greater state control of the virtual environment. Special units to control the spread of extremism on the Internet have been created and operate within special services.²¹⁹ The procedure of blocking Internet resources for inciting hatred online is also widely used.

Blocking procedures in most countries can be initiated on the basis of Internet monitoring as well as notifications from authorities, organizations, and citizens. In *the Netherlands*, for example, discriminatory statements on the Internet can be reported to the Internet Discrimination Hotline (MiND Nederland). The line registers and processes all reports. The hotline assesses reports of discrimination on the Dutch Internet. If MiND considers that a particular allegation is a report of content that poses a threat to public safety, it sends a request to the provider to remove the content. In exceptional cases, it contacts the police.²²⁰

The same thing is happening in *the UK*. The UK Government website GOV.UK has information with a telephone number to call to report material on the internet that advocates "terrorism or extremism". Specifically mentioned are articles, images, speeches, or videos promoting

²¹⁶ [Assassinat de Samuel Paty - Wikipédia \(wikipedia.org\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Samuel_Paty)

²¹⁷ Those figures are given by terrorism expert Yves Trotignon, cf. <https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/terrorisme/20180326.OBS4169/surveillance-des-fiches-s-nous-n-avons-pas-les-moyens-humains-de-tout-suivre.html>

²¹⁸ Ljubic, V., Versteegt, I., Weerman, F., Thijs, F., van Prooijen, J. W., el Bouk, F., & van de Weijer, S. (2020). Testing a Threat Model of Terrorism: A multi-method study about socio-economic and psychological influences on terrorism involvement in the Netherlands. In *Understanding Recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 147-171). Springer, Cham.

²¹⁹ Zriadili Národnú jednotku boja proti terorizmu a extrémizmu, online at:

<https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/418554-zriadili-narodnu-jednotku-boja-proti-terorizmu-a-extremizmu/>

²²⁰ MiND. Meldpunt Internet Discriminatie, online at: <https://www.mindnederland.nl/&prev=search&pto=aue>

terrorism or encouraging violence; websites of terrorist or extremist organizations; and videos of terrorist attacks.²²¹

Some countries, such as Russia,²²² have open official lists of banned Internet resources, but in most countries such lists remain closed, formed only by decision of courts or authorized executive bodies. This is the case in Germany, the Netherlands, and others. However, the blocking of websites follows more or less the same procedure.

According to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office, in 2019, more than 81,000 internet sites containing information on terrorist and extremist threats, including calls for mass unrest and violence, were blocked. Illegal information was removed from 45,000 websites.²²³ According to the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (*Roskomnadzor*) more than 17,000 materials with DAESH propaganda were blocked in 2018, more than 20,700 in 2019. 17,000 Hizb ut-Tahrir materials were blocked in 2018, more than 14,700 in 2019. In 2018 almost 5,000 materials of the Ukrainian Right Sector, UNA-UNSO, UPA, Trident im. Stepan Bandera, "Bratstvo", "Azov" battalion, in 2019 - already more than 12,100 such websites were blocked.²²⁴

Active prosecution of online radicalizers led to a sharp decline in violent hate crime in Russia from 2015 to 2018, but the number of convictions for non-violent acts related to the dissemination of hateful views increased sharply.²²⁵ Roughly the same thing happened in Spain, where social media users were prosecuted - and some were sentenced to prison - for satirical tweets or songs on charges of glorifying terrorism and humiliating victims of terrorism. In Russia, such a measure was deemed excessive in 2018, resulting in the liberalization of Article 282 of the Criminal Code ("Inciting hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity"), which removed criminal liability for a number of offences if committed for the first time, replacing it with administrative liability.

Other law enforcement measures to counter extremism that are actively used in different countries include the *monitoring of individuals suspected of extremist activity as well as* restrictive measures against those who *pose a danger to public order*. States generally distinguish between those who are *strongly* suspected of involvement in extremist and terrorist *offences*, and those who are only *suspected of involvement in* extremist organizations

²²¹ GOV.UK, "Report online material promoting terrorism or extremism", online at: <https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism>

²²² "ЕДИНЫЙ РЕЕСТР доменных имен, указателей страниц сайтов в сети «Интернет» и сетевых адресов, позволяющих идентифицировать сайты в сети «Интернет», содержащие информацию, распространение которой в Российской Федерации запрещено", онлайн: <https://eais.rkn.gov.ru/>

²²³ "Число экстремистских преступлений за 2019 год сократилось вдвое", ТАСС, онлайн: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/8002335>

²²⁴ Федеральная служба по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций, "Результаты деятельности Роскомнадзора", онлайн: <http://www.rkn.gov.ru/plan-and-reports/reports/p449/>

²²⁵ Institute for the Study of National Policy and Interethnic Relations, European International Tolerance Centre, Centre for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Intercultural Communications (Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis), European Centre for Democracy Development - "Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crime in Europe. Annual Report", 2018, p.103, online at: [https://www.civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/PanEuropean-Report-2018\(2\).pdf](https://www.civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/PanEuropean-Report-2018(2).pdf)

or merely autonomous extremist activity. Some are investigated and others are checked and their socio-political and other activities are monitored. In Germany, such persons are categorized as "potential terrorists". A potential terrorist (in German "Gefährder", literally "threatening") is someone who may pose a threat to public safety because certain "facts support the assumption that he or she may commit a serious crime." Such assumptions are mainly based on conclusions drawn by the intelligence services.

Persons who pose a potential threat cannot be imprisoned unless they are found guilty of an actual crime, even if they hold certain beliefs or pose a potential threat. Such people are within the control of the intelligence agencies, and the extent of this control varies depending on the country and the degree of danger as assessed by the intelligence agencies. There are quite a few such people. The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimates the number of left-wing radicals alone at 33,500. Of these, 9,200 were deemed "militant" in 2019 and placed on special watch lists. Of these, 7,400 belong to the Antifa movement. However, only two are potential terrorists.²²⁶ The list of potentially dangerous Islamist extremists at the end of 2019 is defined as 28,020.²²⁷ Of these, the police and intelligence services consider 774 radical Islamists as potential terrorists. Of these, 450 people reside in Germany. The rest have left the country. Among right-wing extremists, there are only 28 potential terrorists²²⁸ with a potential of 32,080 at the end of 2019.²²⁹

In recent times, such persons have been dismissed from the civil service, with the courts generally taking the side of the employer. For example, a civil servant of the Bundeswehr (working profession) was a member of a right-wing extremist group. He regularly expressed his commitment to an ultra-right-wing worldview and posted relevant messages on social media. In December 2018 the German Ministry of Defence terminated the contract with him on this basis. In July 2019, the Berlin labor court ruled that the dismissal was lawful, which is certainly significant (AZ 60 Ca 455/19).²³⁰

²²⁶ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Was ist Linksextremismus?", online at:

<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-linksextremismus/was-ist-linksextremismus>

²²⁷ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Islamistisches Personenpotenzial", online at:

<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten-islamismus/islamistisches-personenpotenzial-2019>

²²⁸ Deutsche Welle, "Germany's terrorism watch list: What you need to know", online:

<https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-terrorism-watch-list-what-you-need-to-know/a-46728126>

²²⁹ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Rechtsextremistisches Personenpotenzial (Gesamtübersicht)", online:

<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-rechtsextremismus/zahlen-und-fakten-rechtsextremismus/rechtsextremistisches-personenpotenzial-2019>

²³⁰ Arbeitsgericht Berlin, "Kündigung eines Mitarbeiters der Bundeswehr wegen Verbindungen in die rechtsextreme Szene", Pressemitteilung Nr. 19/19 vom 17.07.2019, online:

<http://www.berlin.de/gerichte/arbeitsgericht/presse/pressemitteilungen/2019/pressemitteilung.829850.php>

The French "Fiche-S" high-security watchlist includes around 26 000 people (Islamist, right-wing, left-wing, and other extremists) who pose a potential threat to the State.²³¹ 4,000 of them are considered as very dangerous.²³²

Russia's current "List of Terrorists and Extremists" includes 10,359 people (Russian citizens).²³³ There were 418 people on the Foreign Terrorist and Extremist List as of December 2020.²³⁴

Thus, we can see that each country has its own principles for the inclusion of potentially dangerous actors on the watch lists. Moreover, within the lists, there are their own subdivisions. For example, a report by the German Constitutional Protection Office published in the summer of 2018 identifies three distinct groups of potential Islamist terrorists: on the one hand, lone actors who are radicalized, as well as very small groups of extremists. On the other, people who are returning from jihadist-controlled regions of the world. And, finally, so-called "militant squads" that are sent by terrorist networks such as the Islamic State (IS) to carry out elaborate attacks.²³⁵ The intelligence services of different countries regularly add to or reduce their lists. In 2020, for example, three people were removed from the Russian list, but an additional 21 people were included. Inclusion and de-listing are based on the results of special services operational activities, as well as interactions with civil society and individual citizens.²³⁶

A number of countries actively practice preventive registration of potentially dangerous citizens, deprivation of citizenship of persons with dual citizenship on suspicion of belonging to terrorist organizations and their deportation to their home country, closure of so-called "radical mosques", etc. In France, for instance, in December 2020, there was an active discussion on the monitoring of 76 and closure of 18 mosques deemed "radical".²³⁷ In 2018, three such mosques were closed in the country.²³⁸ And the French agency in charge of

²³¹ Deutsche Welle, "Germany's terrorism watch list: What you need to know", online:

<https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-terrorism-watch-list-what-you-need-to-know/a-46728126>

²³² Those figures are given by terrorism expert Yves Trotignon, cf.

<https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/terrorisme/20180326.OBS4169/surveillance-des-fiches-s-nous-n-avons-pas-les-moyens-humains-de-tout-suivre.html>.

²³³ Росфинмониторинг, Российские физические лица, "Перечень террористов и экстремистов (действующие)", онлайн: <http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act>

²³⁴ Росфинмониторинг, Иностранные физические лица, "Перечень террористов и экстремистов (действующие)", онлайн: <http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act>

²³⁵ Those figures are given by terrorism expert Yves Trotignon, cf.

<https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/terrorisme/20180326.OBS4169/surveillance-des-fiches-s-nous-n-avons-pas-les-moyens-humains-de-tout-suivre.html>.

²³⁶ Росфинмониторинг, Иностранные физические лица, "Перечень террористов и экстремистов (действующие)", онлайн: <http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act>

²³⁷ Le Figaro, "Séparatisme: 76 mosquées dans le collimateur de l'État", online: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/islamisme-76-mosquees-dans-le-collimateur-de-l-etat-20201202>

²³⁸ Вести FM, "Глава МВД Франции объявил о закрытии трех мечетей за радикальную пропаганду", онлайн: <http://radiovesti.ru/news/778226/>

national security (SCRT) has an estimate of 124 Salafist mosques in France with a radicalized asset of 2,450 people.²³⁹

France, the Netherlands, Germany, and a number of other countries are actively pursuing arrest and deportation from the country as a form of countering Islamist extremism. For example, after the 16 October 2020 terrorist attack in Paris, French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanen said he intends to demand the urgent deportation of 231 people from the country on charges of radicalization, according to Radio France International. In addition, according to Europe 1, Gerald Darmanen intends to raise the issue of tightening the rules for granting political asylum. The issue was discussed at a meeting of the Defence Council at the Elysee Palace on 18 October.²⁴⁰ The results of the discussion are not known.

One of the preventive measures against Islamist terrorism used in Germany is also the forced deportation of persons deemed potentially dangerous for whom there is strong evidence of links to terrorist organizations. To simplify the control of deportees in the FRG, the practice is to place them in solitary confinement in a regular prison. Recently, the courts have tended to side with the authorities in these matters. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has also taken this position in the period under review.²⁴¹ However, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer expressed doubts about the sufficiency of the applicable measures and said that the Interior Ministry is considering the possibility of preventive arrest of particularly dangerous Islamists. According to the minister, the practice of deportation is not a comprehensive response to the radicals' challenges: more than half of the dangerous Islamists have German citizenship.²⁴²

Since 2016 the Netherlands has been actively practicing deportation without trial, but only on the basis of suspicions by the intelligence services. The Minister of Justice and Security can revoke the citizenship of a person aged at least 16 with dual nationality who is outside the Kingdom if it becomes known that he or she has joined an organization that is on a list of terrorist organizations involved in national or international armed conflicts and is considered a threat to national security.²⁴³ It is only since 2017 that deportees have been able to challenge their deportation in court.²⁴⁴ In doing so, serious contradictions arise. For example, on 19 November 2019, Turkey extradited to the Netherlands a woman whom it

²³⁹ Cedric Mathiot "Philippe de Villiers, le complotisme à grande audience", *Liberation*, 18.11.16., online: https://oeilsurlefront.liberation.fr/les-intox/2016/11/18/philippe-de-villiers-le-complotisme-a-grande-audience_1527562

²⁴⁰ "После исламского теракта Франция начнет высылать мигрантов", *Эксперт*, онлайн: <https://expert.ru/2020/10/18/frantsiya-vyishlet-231-migranta/>

²⁴¹ "Deutschland darf Islamisten vor Abschiebung im Gefängnis festhalten", *Die Welt*, 02/07/20, online: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article210877511/EuGH-Urteil-Deutschland-darf-Islamisten-vor-Abschiebung-im-Gefaengnis-festhalten.html>

²⁴² EU-Info. Deutschland, "Seehofer prüft Ausweitung von Gewahrsam für gefährliche Islamisten, online: <http://www.eu-info.de/dpa-europaticker/307598.html>

²⁴³ Global Legal Monitor, "Netherlands: Two New Sets of Administrative Sanctions Proposed to Fight Terrorism", online at: <https://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/netherlands-two-new-sets-of-administrative-sanctions-proposed-to-fight-terrorism/>

²⁴⁴ Global Legal Monitor, "Netherlands: Three New Laws Adopted to Further Counterterrorism Efforts", online at: <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/netherlands-three-new-laws-adopted-to-further-counterterrorism-efforts/>

accused of trying to join IS fighters. However, it emerged that she had previously been stripped of her Dutch citizenship at the suggestion of the country's intelligence services. This was announced in a letter to the Parliament by Justice Minister Ferd Grapperhaus and Foreign Minister Stef Bloch. The woman was banned from entering the Netherlands and taken into custody when she arrived at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport.²⁴⁵

Integration of migrants and refugees.

An important factor of anti-Discrimination law enforcement practice is the activity of the executive authorities to integrate migrants and refugees. In this case we are referring specifically to legal migrants and persons who have been officially granted refugee status. During this time period, new state support programmes for migrants have emerged in the Federal Republic of Germany, which have fundamentally revised the work of the previous ones. This is primarily due to the fact that Germany (pre-1990 West Germany and the unified German state) has considerable experience in integrating and adapting residents with a migration background. Standardized programmes at Federal, Land (state), and Municipal (municipality) level have been in operation for a long time. They are renewed and financed and/or the responsible public authorities offer slightly modified initiatives adapted to the current challenges and filled with new content. NGOs can participate there and can apply and receive funds to implement their own projects. The main grant providers are the Federal Office of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, other Federal and Lands ministries, the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, the state "Federal Agency for Political Education", the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, political foundations financed from the State budget, as well as smaller Lands and Municipal structures.

The Polish Government provides serious assistance to NGOs in the integration of migrants. In 2019 alone, Polish NGOs assisted 2,825 people from 90 countries.²⁴⁶

In an interview on 4 December 2020, French President Macron, reiterated his commitment to make Arabic language learning possible in public schools so that second generation immigrants do not feel alienated from their family culture. In the same speech, he also expressed his desire to establish a commission to ensure that streets in French cities are named after African or Arab figures who have contributed to French history or upheld the values of freedom and universalism.²⁴⁷ Add to this the French president's call for the training of imams in France,²⁴⁸ and we can conclude that gradually there is an understanding in France that denying the existence of national minorities in their country is more like an ostrich with its head buried in the sand. This does not make the number of those who do not

²⁴⁵ "Two foreign terrorists extradited to Netherlands: Ministry", *Balticom*, November 20, 2019, online: <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-foreign-terrorists-extradited-to-netherlands-ministry-148880>

²⁴⁶ See details online: <https://ocalenie.org.pl/>

²⁴⁷ [Emmanuel Macron et les "violences policières" | Brut.](#)

²⁴⁸ Europe 1. "Séparatismes : Macron annonce la mise en place d'un label de formation des imams", online at: <https://www.europe1.fr/politique/separatismes-macron-annonce-la-mise-en-place-dun-label-de-formation-des-imams-3995734>

want to assimilate into French society any smaller, but in fact this group grows year by year and, in the absence of state control, becomes radicalized.

According to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), there have been four notable improvements in the Netherlands in 2018 in the areas of LGBTQ rights, civic education, integration policies, and traditional Roma camps.²⁴⁹ The first improvement concerns the 2018 Emancipation Memorandum, which includes specific measures to emancipate and promote LGBTQ social welfare and recognition. The second concerns the nationwide anti-Discrimination campaign of 2018, which includes public events such as the abolition of slavery and educational measures to promote tolerance and equality in schools as a mandatory element of civic education. The third improvement relates to the expansion of integration policies at national level, leading to increased assistance to immigrants and refugees in Dutch municipalities. The fourth improvement is defined as "ending the national policy of reducing the number of traditional Roma camps". It refers to the 2018 Anti-Discrimination Manual, which includes a specific section on policies on nomadic camps.

The fact that the authorities acknowledge their guilt towards a particular social group is of no small importance when it comes to integration. For example, in July 2020 the Spanish government, through Spanish Vice-President Pablo Iglesias, publicly apologized to Roma for the institutional racism to which they had been subjected for centuries in Spain.²⁵⁰

The period under review also witnessed progress towards socio-group equality in Canadian Law enforcement agencies. This is a critical position because it has long been proven that the greater the diversity and representation of different groups in law enforcement, the lower the level of institutional profiling in the police and other law enforcement agencies. In terms of gender parity, women currently account for approximately 48 per cent of the force, while they make up only 20.8 per cent of police officers.²⁵¹ And in the higher ranks of the police force, we see a higher percentage of women (13% of senior officers in 2016), which is a very significant increase from only 6% in 2006 and less than 1% in 1986. Again, the proportion of female officers at the rank of non-commissioned officer and senior officer has tripled. In retrospect, the trend of increasing female representation is increasing, while male representation is decreasing.²⁵² We see roughly the same trend, albeit less pronounced, with regard to the recruitment of LGBT persons into the police force.²⁵³ The situation is even better for the recruitment of Indigenous people in Canada into the police service.²⁵⁴

²⁴⁹ Council of Europe, "ECRI - Country monitoring in the Netherlands", online at:

<https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/netherlands>

²⁵⁰ "Pablo Iglesias pide "perdón" al pueblo gitano por el "racismo institucional" hacia ellos en la historia de España", *EPSocial*, online:

<https://www.europapress.es/epsocial/igualdad/noticia-pablo-iglesias-pide-perdon-pueblo-gitano-racismo-institucional-ellos-historia-espana-20200730140754.html>

²⁵¹ Statistics Canada, "Police resources in Canada", March 28, 2018, online at:

<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54912-eng.htm>

²⁵² Ibid, p.147.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p.149.

Also noteworthy is the ruling of the Gliwice Voivodeship Administrative Court in Poland of 14 July 2020, which invalidated the anti-LGBT ruling of the Isteba City Council. Firstly, the decision is important as it is the first decision on complaints by the Ombudsman against discriminatory decisions by individual local governments to oppose so-called "LGBT ideology".²⁵⁵ Secondly, it should be noted that prior to this decision, other administrative courts had rejected complaints by the Ombudsman against anti-LGBT decisions.²⁵⁶

2. Discriminatory practices.

As already stated, discriminatory practices are divided into those *that are lawful*, i.e. state-sanctioned, and those *that are unlawful*, i.e. resulting from the illegitimate activities of officials. The latter one includes *racial, religious, ethnic, and gender profiling*, including issues of discrimination against certain social groups in public authorities. For example, in Canada, the minorities (including Muslims) have a disproportionate level of contacts with both the criminal justice system and the police. They are treated differently and perceive a difference. Compared to other racial communities, blacks are significantly more vulnerable to the arbitrary use of coercive force by the police, such as arrest, detention or shooting.²⁵⁷ Canadian civil society institutions engaged by the authorities to counter radicalization within Muslim communities have also made this point. They speak of the selective nature of security practices that view Muslims as dangerous and violent, and far from recognizing them as victims of Islamophobic violence.²⁵⁸

The same thing is happening in the United States. Law enforcement in the United States is disproportionately focused on Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous minorities. This leads to higher rates (compared to Whites) of arrests, police violence and murders, and convictions of members of these communities. Subsequent arrests and convictions prevent members of minority communities from accessing jobs, housing, education, public assistance, and the right to vote.

Nevertheless, accusations of racial profiling made against the police are often based on the fact that these cases were initiated by whites and involved blacks. None of them contained direct insults or racist statements. For example:

- On 12 April 2018, two African-American men at a Starbucks coffee shop in Philadelphia were waiting to meet a business partner. The men asked to use the restroom, but were refused permission because they had not bought anything. When the men still hadn't bought anything while waiting, the manager asked them to leave. As they waited for their partner and did not leave, the manager called the police, who

²⁵⁵ K. Kubicka-Żach, "WSA stwierdził nieważność uchwały anty-LGBT w Istebej - to precedens", July 14, 2020, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/external-news/1795663799?keyword=uchwa%C5%82y%20lgbt&cm=SREST>

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ "Five charts that show what systemic racism looks like in Canada", CTV-News, June 4, 2020, online: <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/five-charts-that-show-what-systemic-racism-looks-like-in-canada-1.4970352>

²⁵⁸ Cm: Fahad Ahmad, "Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization. The Securitization of Muslim Civil Society in Canada", online at: <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S1521-613620200000025007/full/html>

arrested them, handcuffed them and charged them. They were later released and the charges against them were dropped.²⁵⁹

- On 29 April 2018, a white woman called police in Oakland, California, because she noticed a group of black people in a public park preparing to barbecue with what she said was the wrong type of grill. The incident took place in a "designated barbecue area" in the park, where barbecuing is a regular pastime. The police detained and questioned the family for an hour before releasing the detainees.²⁶⁰
- In May 2018, four African-American men were loading their luggage into a car, preparing to leave, when seven police cars blocked their exit and stopped them. A police sergeant approached, ordered them to put their hands in the air and told them that a police helicopter was also following them. The police received a report from a (white) neighbor that she did not recognize them and they may have robbed the house. The guests showed the sergeant their documents and contacted the owner of the house to confirm that they were guests. The guests were held for 45 minutes before they were released.²⁶¹
- On 8 May 2018, a black graduate student at Yale University decided to take a nap in her dormitory after a long paper-writing session. The white graduate student entered the room, turned on the lights and told the black student that she had no right to sleep there; she then called the campus police. When the police arrived, the black graduate student had to spend almost an hour to prove that she had a right to be in the dormitory.²⁶²

As can be seen, in all of these cases, the accusations of racial profiling were based on the opinion of the victim, on the fact that the complaints to the police were made by whites, and on the Anglo-American legal tradition which states that any offence against a member of a vulnerable group is very likely to be a hate crime. Nevertheless, this is a widely held view that is easily contested in Eastern Europe, but not in America and far from all Western European countries. This is fraught with another problem when a vulnerable minority begins to abuse its vulnerability and ends up being invulnerable even when committing offences, as we have sometimes seen in the BLM riots. And this is another problem that could grow in the coming years into a significant threat to public security for a number of countries, especially the US.

However, this does not mean that racial profiling does not exist in U.S. law enforcement. In fact, a new concept has emerged such as racial profiling "by proxy," in which police officers follow the orders of their superiors by focusing their patrols on vulnerable groups who may not be committing anything illegal.

²⁵⁹ Scott Neuman, Men Arrested in Philadelphia Starbucks Reach Settlements, Nat'l Pub. Radio (May 3, 2018).

²⁶⁰ Carla Herreria, Woman Calls Police on a Black Family for BBQing at a Lake in Oakland, Huff. Post (May 11, 2018).

²⁶¹ Three Black People Checked out of Their Airbnb Rental. Then Someone Called the Police on Them, CNN (May 10, 2018).

²⁶² Elliot Hannon, A Black Graduate Student at Yale Says a White Student Called Police on Her for Napping in a Common Room During an All-Nighter, Slate (May 9, 2018).

As a result of the George Floyd death in May, 2020 and the country-wide protests that followed, U.S. President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order on **“Safe Policing for Safe Communities.”**²⁶³ It is hoped the order will lead to comprehensive police reforms that will make the eligibility of the police for federal grants dependent on a rigorous process that will involve training regarding use of force and de-escalation techniques; performance management tools, such as early warning systems that help to identify officers who may require intervention; and best practices regarding community engagement. It is hoped that an information sharing database that will track information related to use of excessive force, including such information as the termination or decertification of law enforcement officers, criminal convictions of law enforcement officers, and instances in which an officer under investigation related to the use of force resigns or retires, will also come into being. Additionally, it is hoped that these reforms will include strategies to incorporate social workers and mental health professionals when responding to certain situations.

The problem of racial profiling of the police has also been recognized by French President Emmanuel Macron. In an interview he gave to the online publication "Brut" on 4 December, he admitted that the police are more likely than other citizens to pay attention to non-whites.²⁶⁴ He announced that starting in January 2021, the Government would launch an online survey on identity checks, allowing citizens to report their experiences of discrimination. Later, he said, the Government would create an online platform that would allow citizens to immediately report abuses by the police in cases where they have been subjected to discriminatory practices.

According to the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and related Intolerance (2019), in recent years there has been substantial evidence of ethnic profiling by the Dutch municipal police and the Royal Netherlands *Marechaussee* Police.²⁶⁵ The Police and the Minister of Security and Justice have developed measures to prevent ethnic profiling by increasing diversity within the police, providing training and awareness-raising for police officers, investing in police-community relations and facilitating complaints about ethnic profiling.

In the early months of 2018, the police launched a pilot project (called the MEOS pilot project) that aims to record the frequency of traffic stops and identity checks of a single person or vehicle, and to measure various performance criteria.²⁶⁶ In June 2020, MPs voted in favor of calls to require the police to keep active records of the number of people who die each year during or after arrest. It also includes the number of police officers who have been prosecuted for violence as well as the number of police officers who are aware of measures

²⁶³ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-safe-policing-safe-communities/>.

²⁶⁴ Emmanuel Macron et les "violences policières" | Brut., online at: <https://www.brut.media/fr/news/emmanuel-macron-et-les-violences-policieres--24172b20-9dc8-42e6-9f05-f52acb63cf71>

²⁶⁵ OHCHR, "End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Hague (7 October, 2019), online: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25100&LangID=E>

²⁶⁶ "Briefing of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe, in view of its fifth report on the Netherlands", online: <https://njcm.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Submission-NJCM-on-ECRI-CoE-5th-monitoring-round-Netherlands-20180615.pdf>

and tools to counter ethnic profiling.

The problem of racial profiling in Germany led the Berlin Chamber of Deputies (Landtag) to pass a controversial anti-Discrimination law.²⁶⁷ The main stumbling blocks in the Law were two provisions: the delegation of the power to sue to a public organization and the need for police officers to prove that they do not discriminate in their actions when complaints are received. Opponents of the Law (MPs and ministers from CDU/CSU and FDP at various levels and police unions) believe that such a rule violates the presumption of innocence of a policeman, forcing him to look for excuses for his actions within the Law as well. Some Länder Interior ministers and local police chiefs have emotionally stated their refusal to send police units to the German capital to assist Berlin's law enforcement forces, as they do not want to create difficult legal situations for their subordinates.

In October 2020, statistics were published by the UK Office for National Statistics which showed that black people were eighteen times more likely to be stopped.²⁶⁸ In addition, for the first time in Europe, Britain has had a problem with the police implementing institutional profiling by technical means, namely the trial of facial recognition and search technology. In March 2020, the Equality and Human Rights Commission asked the police and the UK Home Office to stop the public use of facial recognition technology because it was found to reinforce racial discrimination and suppress freedom of expression.²⁶⁹ In particular, evidence was found that because the technology was largely trained on Caucasoid race faces, the algorithms used for identification "disproportionately misidentify specifically black people and women" and therefore potentially "replicate and reinforce patterns of discrimination within the police".²⁷⁰ Such a problem arose in the summer of 2020 when police were warned against using facial recognition at Black Lives Matter protests in the UK because of such inaccuracies.²⁷¹

Returning to the second issue of stop and search, the wave of debate over police interdiction of minorities in the UK on suspicion of criminal activity has again peaked amidst increased activity by the BLM. In October 2020, for example, it was discovered that the Metropolitan Police had made several mistakes in using the practice.²⁷²

²⁶⁷ Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz (LADG) Vom 11. Juni 2020, online:

<https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/recht/ladg/materialien/>

²⁶⁸ Vikram, D., 'Black people nine times more likely to face stop and search than white people', *The Guardian*, 27 October 2020, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/oct/27/black-people-nine-times-more-likely-to-face-stop-and-search-than-white-people>.

²⁶⁹ Grierson, J., 'Review of UK hate crime law to consider misogyny and ageism', *The Guardian*, 16 October 2018, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/12/halt-public-use-of-facial-recognition-tech-says-equality-watchdog>.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Boland, H., 'Police warned not to use facial recognition at UK Black Lives Matter protests', *The Telegraph*, 11 June 2020, online at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/06/11/police-warned-not-use-facial-recognition-uk-black-lives-matter/>.

²⁷² Dodd, V., 'Met police criticised for multiple errors in stop and search practice', *The Guardian*, 28 October 2020, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/oct/28/met-police-criticised-for-multiple-errors-in-stop-and-search-practice>.

According to the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), ethnic profiling of Roma exists in Greece. The CPT delegation had received a large number of credible testimonies about the excessive use of force in arresting Roma, as well as migrants, and the physical and psychological ill-treatment during interviews with police officers. The alleged ill-treatment consisted mainly of punches to the face, fists and kicks, as well as blows to the body and head with truncheons and metal objects. He also received some allegations concerning hitting with a stick on the soles of his feet (falaka) and putting a plastic bag over his head during police interrogation, reportedly in order to obtain a confession and a signed statement. None of the persons alleging ill-treatment were allowed to make a phone call or contact a lawyer during the initial police interrogation. In addition, there were numerous reports of verbal abuse of detainees, including racist/xenophobic remarks made by police officers.²⁷³

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe has published its fifth report on the situation in Russia on 5 March 2019.²⁷⁴ It draws attention to the misuse of anti-extremist legislation by law enforcement agencies and the large number of people on the terrorist and extremist watch lists. The fourth Opinion on the Russian Federation of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted on 20 February 2018, also refers to the "excessive application of anti-extremism laws to Muslims and adherents of 'non-traditional' religions".²⁷⁵ The claim of extremely inflated lists of extremists in Russia is hardly true, since as of 2020, as already pointed out, there were 10,359 Russian and 418 foreign nationals on them.²⁷⁶ This is significantly less than, for example, the size of the French "Fiche-S" watch list, which includes about 26,000 people (Islamist, right-wing, left-wing, and other extremists) who pose a potential threat to the state,²⁷⁷ or the list of potentially dangerous Islamist extremists in Germany alone, which stood at 28,020 people at the end of 2019.²⁷⁸

However, accusations of profiling against Muslims are fair, even though it occurs when it comes to the work of Russian law enforcement agencies against Islamist extremists to identify individuals involved in the terrorist activities. At the time of writing, the most recent case occurred in Astrakhan on 27 November 2020, where police took several dozen Muslims to police stations after performing prayers at the Astrakhan Red Mosque.²⁷⁹ A few hours later, the detainees were released home. The police said that these were measures to search for

²⁷³ CPT. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, online at: <https://rm.coe.int/16809e2059>

²⁷⁴ Доклад ЕКРП по Российской Федерации. Пятый цикл мониторинга, онлайн: <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-russian-federation-russian-translation-/1680934a98>

²⁷⁵ Council of Europe, КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ РАМОЧНОЙ КОНВЕНЦИИ О ЗАЩИТЕ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ МЕНЬШИНСТВ. "Четвертое заключение по Российской Федерации. Принято 20 февраля 2018 г", онлайн: <https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-committee-opinion-on-the-russian-federation-russian-langu/1680908b0d>.

²⁷⁶ Росфинмониторинг, Российские физические лица, "Перечень террористов и экстремистов (действующие)", онлайн: <http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act>

²⁷⁷ Deutsche Welle, "Germany's terrorism watch list: What you need to know", online: <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-terrorism-watch-list-what-you-need-to-know/a-46728126>

²⁷⁸ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Islamistisches Personenpotenzial", online at: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten-islamismus/islamistisches-personenpotenzial-2019>

²⁷⁹ "Силовики задержали десятки верующих у мечети в Астрахани", *Кавказский Узел*, 27.11.2020 г., онлайн: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/356957/>

people hiding from the investigating authorities and the courts. Muslims were offended that such checks were being carried out in mosques on Friday prayers. They claim that the checks were conducted on religious grounds and it was humiliating for them. One of the worshippers said he was photographed and fingerprinted at the department. "The data was recorded, interviewed. They questioned me about nothing. They asked me personally: "How are you?" They talked about some anti-terrorist raids. Something to do with Karabakh. I did not understand anything. I think it is not normal. I lost a whole day," the believer complained.²⁸⁰ Human rights activists believe that the police in this case violated the Law, because according to the current legislation, fingerprinting must be carried out within the framework of some legal proceedings - either administrative or criminal. "Fingerprinting can be taken only if," says Dmitry Piskunov, a Lawyer of the Committee Against Torture, "when the person cannot be identified in any other way - the person does not identify himself or cannot name himself, there are no documents".²⁸¹ However, he admits that this is possible if there is a criminal case which the police can check for any involvement in.

Similar information was received in the period under review from other regions of the country as well. For example, on 7 February 2020 in Nizhniy Novgorod, representatives of law enforcement agencies conducted document checks of Muslims on the territory of the Cathedral Mosque.²⁸² On 13 October 2018 in Mytishchi, Moscow region, people in military uniforms and wearing masks detained several dozen Muslims as they left a mosque in a private sector on the sixth Lestny Lane. According to the police, they were informed that a mass gathering of people was taking place here. The worshippers were taken to the police station, held there for five hours without being questioned and then released without a protocol being drawn up.²⁸³

In Ukraine, the same problem exists. On 31 January 2020, the Migration Service conducted a raid to identify illegal immigrants during Friday prayers at the Mosque of the Islamic Cultural Centre "Alrayid" in Kiev on Degtyarevskaya street. At the end of the prayers, the worshippers were waited on two buses by officers of the State Migration Service and armed police officers equipped with special equipment.²⁸⁴ The leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Refat Chubarov, protested about this on his Facebook page, accusing Ukrainian law enforcers of "blatant and massive human rights violations".²⁸⁵ The State Migration Service commented on the incident: "The State Migration Service respects representatives of religious and national minorities. During the inspection, Migration Service officers and the police did not enter the mosque, the rights of believers were not violated, and there was no discrimination

²⁸⁰ "Задержания мусульман в Астрахани силовики объяснили поиском преступников", *Кавказский Узел*, 28.11.2020., онлайн: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/356981/>

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² "Мусульман Нижнего Новгорода оскорбил пятничный рейд правоохранителей", *Islam News*, онлайн: <https://islamnews.ru/news-musulman-nizhnego-novgoroda-oskorbil-pyatnichnyy-reyd-pravookhraniteley-video/>

²⁸³ "В Подмоскowie силовики задержали несколько десятков мусульман; через пять часов их отпустили из полиции без протоколов", *Медиазона*, 13 октября 2018 г., онлайн: <https://zona.media/news/2018/10/13/musulmane>

²⁸⁴ "Под Киевской мечетью задерживали мусульман", *Украинская Правда*, 31 января 2020 г., онлайн: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2020/01/31/7239053/>

²⁸⁵ Фейсбук, *Рефат Чубаров*: <https://www.facebook.com/dogrujol/posts/2650833985011739>

on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, or citizenship. However, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport had a different reaction to the event.²⁸⁶ "It is important to note," said a representative of the Ministry, "that Friday is a prayer day for Muslims. We must agree that no one would want to be humiliated, especially during such a sacred act as prayer. Therefore, the "timing and location" of the operation "raises a number of questions, both moral and legal. We understand the indignation of the Muslim community and want to assure you of our support, which follows primarily from a spirit of solidarity".²⁸⁷

Discriminatory actions also include *the violation of minority rights* on the basis of existing Legislation or executive decisions, which also occurred in almost all monitoring countries during the period under review. Sometimes the judiciary has also defended the perpetrators of discriminatory acts. On 15 March 2018, for example, a video was shown on television during a political debate which began with the text "Islam is...". It was followed by words such as "Islam is..." "discrimination", "violence" and "terror". The final sentence "Islam is killing" dripped blood from the letters. The broadcast sparked public outrage and criminal charges were brought against party leader Geert Wilders for discriminatory insults against Muslims and inciting hatred and discrimination against Muslims.

The court ruled that the Statement was not punishable because the propaganda video was directed against *a Religion* and not against *a Social Group*. This decision was challenged by several human rights organizations, which filed a complaint with the court against the decision not to prosecute, but on 18 December 2018 the court finally found the complaint unfounded.²⁸⁸

Between October 2017 and January 2019, 163 lawsuits were also filed in US courts alleging that US citizen Muslims violated their right to practice their religion while in prison, indicating that many state prisons do not allow incarcerated Muslims to practice their faith.²⁸⁹ Meanwhile, Islam is the fastest growing religion in US prisons, with a population of 18% Muslims (compared to 1% in the general population); 80% of all prison conversions are to Islam. Black Muslim organizations such as The Nation of Islam and Moorish Science Temple of America began working with prisoners back in the 1940s.

The treatment of Muslims varies across state prisons. The prisons of 17 states specifically allow religious headgear. An increasing number of states are fully compliant with Muslim dietary requirements (halal). However, there are states that still make it difficult or impossible to access alternative food. In Nevada, for example, in order to receive a halal meal, an inmate must undergo a dietary interview. In North Dakota, there is a '60-day sincerity test' for anyone

²⁸⁶ "В Миграционной службе прокомментировали "кричащие" задержания под мечетью", *Украинская Правда*, 31 января 2020 г., онлайн: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2020/01/31/7239074/>

²⁸⁷ "В правительстве прокомментировали проверку документов у мусульман", *Украинская Правда*, 2 февраля 2020 г., онлайн: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2020/02/2/7239150/>

²⁸⁸ Rijksoverheid. Discriminatiecijfers in 2018, online at: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/04/16/discriminatiecijfers-in-2018>

²⁸⁹ Muslim Advocates, "FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF FREE EXERCISE FOR ALL: Muslim Prisoner Accommodation in State Prisons", online at: <https://muslimadvocates.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/FULFILLING-THE-PROMISE-OF-FREE-EXERCISE-FOR-ALL-Muslim-Prisoner-Accommodation-In-State-Prisons-for-distribution-7-23.pdf>.

who changes religion and has new religious dietary requirements within the practice. Meanwhile, religious practice in US prisons is legally protected by Law, which states that the Government cannot prevent prisoners from freely practicing their religion without good reason.

The representatives of the US transgender minorities has also faced problems. For example, in October 2018, US representatives at the UN worked to remove references to transgender people from UN human rights documents. On May 11, 2018, the Justice Department's Bureau of Prisons adopted an illegal policy of almost entirely housing transgender people in federal prison facilities that match their sex assigned at birth, rolling back existing protections. On 23 March 2018, the Trump administration announced a plan to implement its discriminatory ban on transgender military service.²⁹⁰

On 20 March, 2018, the Department of Education announced that the Trump administration refused to allow transgender students to use bathrooms and locker rooms based on their gender identity, even though this contradicts numerous court rulings confirming that transgender students are protected by the Law. On 18 February, 2018, the Ministry of Education announced that it would summarily dismiss complaints from transgender students regarding their discrimination on the basis of gender identity.²⁹¹

On April 6, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a "zero tolerance" policy for undocumented immigrants, which ended up separating hundreds of immigrant *children* from their families. Under this policy, federal prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings against all adult migrants entering the country illegally, resulting in the separation of families as children cannot be detained with their parents. More than 5,000 children have been separated from their families at the US-Mexico border.²⁹² As of October 2020, it is estimated that more than 500 children's parents have still not been found.²⁹³

As a result of the implementation of the so-called "Salvini Law" on immigration in Italy, numerous local NGO activists who rescued illegal immigrants at sea who had made their way to the coast in unsuitable boats have been put at risk. Those responsible have been fined and punished according to the Law; a new decree introducing fines of between 10,000 and 50,000 euros and 2 years in prison for such activities makes it a *de facto* crime. According to official immigration figures released by the Italian authorities at the end of 2018, the number of illegal immigrants in Italy was 562,000, and in the following two years (2019-2020),

²⁹⁰ "Trump Memo Disqualifies Certain Transgender People From Military Service", online at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/23/596594346/trump-memo-disqualifies-certain-transgender-people-from-military-service>.

²⁹¹ "The Education Department Says It Won't Act On Transgender Student Bathroom Access", online at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/02/12/585181704/the-education-department-says-it-wont-act-on-transgender-student-bathroom-access>

²⁹² "The Trump Administration Human Rights Tracker", online at: <https://trumphumanrightstracker.law.columbia.edu>.

²⁹³ "Parents Of 545 Children Separated At U.S.-Mexico Border Still Can't Be Found", online at: <https://www.npr.org/2020/10/21/926031426/parents-of-545-children-separated-at-u-s-mexico-border-still-cant-be-found>.

thanks to the restrictions of Salvini's law, the number of illegal immigrants increased by 120,000-140,000, reaching 610,000 at the end of 2019.²⁹⁴

In March 2020, the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) found that conditions of migrant detention in Greece, particularly in the Evros and Samos regions, could amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.²⁹⁵ Their report highlighted structural deficiencies in Greece's detention policy for asylum seekers. Migrants continue to be held in detention centres consisting of large barred cells, overcrowded beds, with poor lighting and ventilation, dilapidated and broken toilets and washrooms, insufficient personal hygiene and cleaning products, inadequate food, and no access to daily outdoor exercise. The situation is further exacerbated by severe overcrowding in some of these facilities. In addition, migrants are not given clear information about their situation.

CAT found that families with children, unaccompanied and separated children, and other vulnerable persons (physically or mentally ill or pregnant women) were detained in appalling conditions without adequate support. CAT called on the Greek authorities to end the practice of detaining unaccompanied children and children with parents in police facilities. Instead, they should be transferred to suitable foster care facilities, taking into account their specific needs.²⁹⁶

The report also highlights that the CPT has again received consistent and credible allegations of migrants being pushed across the border over the Evros River into Turkey. A telling manifestation of this practice is a two-and-a-half-year-old girl who was separated from her mother and father and five other siblings along with her older brother at the age of 21. The entire family crossed the Greek border on 29 February 2020, were detained in a field and taken to the Poros Refugee Reception Centre.²⁹⁷

The officers, dressed in camouflage uniforms and wearing balaclavas on their faces, allegedly confiscated the migrants' mobile phones as well as their personal bags and kicked anyone who did not obey their orders to stay where they were. After about six to seven hours, the camouflaged officers allegedly loaded most of the migrants, including the mother and her four children, onto about six vehicles and ferried them to the Evros River, where they were put into wooden boats and transferred to the Turkish side. A day later the father and another brother were similarly pushed back across the river. All of the family's belongings, including a rucksack with clothes and identity and property documents, as well as money, were allegedly confiscated by the officers. The brother and his younger sister were taken to the

²⁹⁴ DOSSIER STATISTICO IMMIGRAZIONE 2020, ONLINE AT:

[HTTP://WWW.INTEGRAZIONEMIGRANTI.GOV.IT/ATTUALITA/NOTIZIE/PAGINE/DOSSIER-STATISTICO-IMMIGRAZIONE-2020.ASPX](http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/attualita/notizie/pagine/dossier-statistico-immigrazione-2020.aspx)

²⁹⁵ Observatory of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean, "Council of Europe's anti-torture Committee calls on Greece to reform its immigration detention system and stop pushbacks", online at:

<https://refugeeobservatory.aegean.gr/en/council-europe%E2%80%99s-anti-torture-committee-calls-greece-reform-its-immigration-detention-system-and>

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

police and border police station in Feres and two days later to another reception centre in Filakio. They were handed papers for deportation to Afghanistan.²⁹⁸

During the period under review, cases of discrimination against religious missionaries and representatives of certain religions were recorded in Russia. Article 5.26. of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), in place since 2016, established a number of restrictions on the activities of religious organizations in terms of carrying out missionary activities.²⁹⁹ On 13 March 2018, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation ruled that the sign of missionary activity of a religious association is "dissemination by citizens, their associations of information on a particular religious doctrine to persons who, not being its followers, are involved in their number", and missionary activity itself is "carried out by a special circle of persons (the religious association, its members, other citizens, and legal entities in the established order)". Thus, the fact of implementation of missionary activity can be considered proven only if all these attributes are present in the activities of the religious association.³⁰⁰ Despite this, there have been a number of violations on the part of law enforcers, resulting in administrative fines being imposed on people who were not missionaries. As a result, on 2 July 2019, a review of judicial practice on cases under Article 5.26 of the CAO "Violation of legislation on freedom of Conscience, freedom of Religion and Religious associations", approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 26 June, was published. The Supreme Court stressed here that *neutral information about the doctrine and activities of a religious association should not be considered as missionary work*, nor should the publication of links to Internet resources of religious associations on the Internet.³⁰¹

Nevertheless, there were further abuses, which consisted of law enforcement officials freely interpreting the essence of "missionary activity" and where it should be applied. In particular, in Mordovia, several Evangelical Christian Baptists of the Reconciliation Church were fined for engaging in missionary activity in a municipality other than that in which their congregation was registered. As a result, on 10 October, 2019, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation ruled on a complaint from the Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists "Reconciliation" in Yoshkar-Ola regarding restrictions on missionary activity. The CC ruled that a local religious organization may carry out these activities on the entire territory of the

²⁹⁸ Council of Europe, "Report to the Greek Government on the visit to Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 13 to 17 March 2020", online at: <https://rm.coe.int/1680a06a86>

²⁹⁹ КоАП РФ, Статья 5.26. "Нарушение законодательства о свободе совести, свободе вероисповедания и о религиозных объединениях", онлайн:

http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34661/ca82e094f1dcf553b6a4bfa7b9a3271b38922c98/

³⁰⁰ ГАРАНТ.РУ, Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 13 марта 2018 г. № 579-О "Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданина Степанова Сергея Николаевича на нарушение его конституционных прав пунктом 1 статьи 24.1, пунктом 2 статьи 24.2 Федерального закона «О свободе совести и о религиозных объединениях» и частью 4 статьи 5.26 Кодекса Российской Федерации об административных правонарушениях", онлайн: <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/71808862/>

³⁰¹ ГАРАНТ.РУ, "Обзор судебной практики по делам об административных правонарушениях, предусмотренных статьей 5.26 «Нарушение законодательства о свободе совести, свободе вероисповедания и о религиозных объединениях» Кодекса Российской Федерации об административных правонарушениях (утв. Президиумом Верховного Суда РФ 26 июня 2019 г.)", онлайн: <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/72184004/>

relevant constituent entity of the Russian Federation, not just the territory of the settlement (municipality) in which its members reside.³⁰²

Interestingly, in March 2018 the lighting of candles in the Hanukkah menorah at the organization's office in Moscow in December 2017 was deemed "missionary,"³⁰³ and in February 2019 a lecture by Israelis at a seminar for Jewish youth at the Novosibirsk Jewish Community Centre entitled "Jewish Lifehacker" was deemed "missionary."³⁰⁴ The paradox is that proselytizing and missionary work is forbidden in Judaism. As a result, the foreigners were fined and expelled from the Russian Federation with the wording "for Violating the Rules of Stay".

On 14 January 2020, the Constitutional Court ruled on a complaint from the Association of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Russia (Mormons). The Constitutional Court upheld the right of religious organizations to hold worship services in administrative buildings - both those belonging to the religious organization and those provided to it by their owners - and affirmed the right of the owner to provide his residential premises to the religious organization for the purpose of holding worship services.³⁰⁵ This decision was also the result of abuse by the executive authorities. All of this suggests that the lack of clear wording in the law inevitably shifts the issue of implementation of the law to the law-enforcer, which often leads to abuses.

During the period under review, there was discrimination against members of the Jehovah's Witnesses Religious Community, which has several million members worldwide.³⁰⁶ On 20 April 2017, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation declared the activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia Management Centre as extremist and banned the activities of all 395 branches in Russia.³⁰⁷ On August 17, 2017 the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation included the "Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia" and its 395 local religious organizations in the list of banned organizations in Russia.³⁰⁸ As a result, a number of believers were affected and continued to hold worship services, including in private flats. As of April 2020, at least 18 Jehovahists had to resign from their jobs due to pressure from law enforcement agencies. In addition, more than 200 "Witnesses", including

³⁰² РАПСИ, "Миссионеры могут проповедовать вне местонахождения религиозной организации — КС", онлайн: http://www.rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20191024/304942095.html

³⁰³ Facebook. Константин Андреев, "КАК ЕВРЕЕВ НАКАНУНЕ ПЕЙСАХА ХОТЕЛИ ИЗ РОССИИ ВЫДВОРИТЬ, НО РЕШИЛИ С ИСХОДОМ ПОВРЕМЕНИТЬ", онлайн: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=10204638419078616&id=1779367858

³⁰⁴ "Необычные туристы: в Новосибирске оштрафовали миссионеров, прилетевших из Америки и Израиля", *Комсомольская Правда*, 13 февраля 2019 г., онлайн: <https://www.kp.ru/online/news/3385603/>

³⁰⁵ "Конституционный Суд РФ подтвердил право религиозных организаций проводить богослужения в административных зданиях", *Религия и Право*, онлайн: http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=519&ELEMENT_ID=8208

³⁰⁶ Википедия, "Свидетели Иеговы", онлайн: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B8_%D0%98%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8B

³⁰⁷ "Верховный суд РФ признал "Свидетелей Иеговы" экстремистской организацией и ликвидировал ее", ТАСС, 20 апреля 2017 г., онлайн: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/4198959>

³⁰⁸ "Свидетели Иеговы" включены в список запрещенных в России организаций", *Интерфакс-Религия*, 17 августа 2017 г., онлайн: <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=67938>

people with no criminal record, were placed on the "List of Persons Involved in Extremism and Terrorism", which prevented them from receiving salaries, pensions, etc.³⁰⁹ By November, this number had risen to 310.³¹⁰ In May 2020, two Jehovah's Witnesses with dual citizenship were stripped of their Russian citizenship.³¹¹ Interestingly, in December 2018, President Putin said at a meeting of the Presidential Council on Human Rights that it was not at all necessary to enlist "representatives of religious communities" in "some destructive, not even terrorist organizations".³¹²

During the period under review, there were several cases in which regional authorities resisted the construction of mosques - in the Rostov³¹³ and Saratov regions (the Saratov City Duma adopted a special amendment prohibiting the construction of a mosque in one of the districts).³¹⁴ On December 4, 2019, the Sverdlovsk Regional Court approved the decision of the Tavda District Court to revoke the residence permit of Baptist pastor Helmut Behringer, who has lived in Russia for 25 years. The revocation of his residence permit was initiated by the FSB, which stated that the pastor was a "proponent of violent change in the constitutional order of the Russian Federation", calling for "opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church".³¹⁵

Discrimination in Ukraine during the period in question primarily affected ethnic and linguistic minorities, as well as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC). In 1990-1991 there were 4,633 Russian-language schools in Ukraine (21 per cent of the total number of schools in Ukraine - 21,900). From 2014 to 2020, the total number of Russian-language schools decreased fivefold. This was a consequence of a deliberate policy of forcing the Russian language out of the Ukrainian education system. And given the provisions of the language law, there are 55 Russian-language schools (after grade 5) left in Ukraine in the 2020/2021 school year only. It can be rather seen as an exception, as according to the Law there should not have been any at all. This has led to a significant increase in the average number of scholars studying in Russian per Russian-language school:

³⁰⁹ Свидетели Иеговы в России, "Общество теряет добросовестных тружеников из-за развязанной травли за веру", онлайн: <https://jwrussia.news/news/2020/04/13.html>

³¹⁰ Свидетели Иеговы в России, "Уже 400 жертв правовой коллизии. Растет число Свидетелей Иеговы, обвиняемых в экстремизме", онлайн: <https://jwrussia.news/news/2020/11/1.html>

³¹¹ Свидетели Иеговы в России, "Гонения выходят на новый уровень: Феликс Махаммадиев стал первым Свидетелем Иеговы, которому аннулировали гражданство", онлайн: <https://jwrussia.news/news/2020/05/6.html>; "Второй осужденный Свидетель Иеговы, уроженец Великого Новгорода Константин Баженов, лишился российского гражданства", онлайн: <https://jwrussia.news/news/2020/05/9.html>

³¹² "Путин назвал чушью запрет свидетелей Иеговы", *BBC News*, онлайн: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-46598425>

³¹³ "Ростовские мусульмане попросили вернуть мечеть на улице Красноармейскую", онлайн: https://yandex.ru/turbo/don24.ru/s/rubric/obschestvo/rostovskie-musulmane-poprosili-vernut-mechet-na-ulicu-krasnoarmeyskuyu.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop

³¹⁴ "Землю не приняли в ислам. Депутаты Саратовской гордумы изменили назначение принадлежащего ДУМСО участка", *Коммерсант - Саратов*, 25.09.20, онлайн: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4503406>

³¹⁵ "Суд в Екатеринбурге аннулировал ВНЖ баптистскому пастору Хельмуту Берингеру. Он живет в России уже более 20 лет", *Новая Газета*, 4 декабря 2019 г., онлайн: <https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2019/12/04/157412-sud-v-ekaterinburge-annuliroval-vid-na-zhitelstvo-baptistskomu-pastoru-helmutu-beringeru>

while in 2010 there were on average 561 pupils per Russian-language school, in 2020 there will be 2,250 (one thousand more than, for example, in Moldovan schools).³¹⁶

Characteristically, this has not happened with the Hungarian language. The number of scholars studying in Hungarian has been decreasing since 2004 and has started to increase since 2014. This growth has not been affected by the adoption of the Language and Education Law. The reason for this may be the increase in the number of children of Hungarian origin and the growth of ethnic patriotism in the Hungarian community, which has thus consolidated itself against laws discriminating against national minorities. In 2020, the increase in the number of pupils, compared to the lowest figure in 2013-2014, was 14.6%. Parallel to this, after a decline since 2006, the number of Hungarian-language schools started to increase from 66 to 73 in 2020-2021.³¹⁷

Talking about elementary school (up to fifth grade), for the school year 2020/2021, there are 672 Russian-language schools, 100 Hungarian, 88 Polish, 17 Moldovan, 6 Polish, 2 Crimean Tatar, and 1 each for English, Bulgarian, German, and Slovak language in Ukraine.³¹⁸ Thus, education in minority languages has been steadily supplanted in the country. It is envisaged that Russian-language schools will be closed in Ukraine altogether. At the same time, the social demand for education in Russian remains significant: on average, there are 2,250 pupils per one Russian-language school in 2020, while there are 276 pupils per one Ukrainian school. The average workload of Russian-language schools is 8 times higher.³¹⁹

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC) is also an object of discrimination in Ukraine. It is the oldest Orthodox Church country whose connection to the Orthodox Church in Moscow is purely spiritual but not administrative. However, the new Law No. 2673-VIII "On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine (concerning the subordination of religious organizations and the procedure for state registration of religious organizations with legal personality)" adopted on 17 January 2019 was actively used by the authorities to raid UOC property in the interests of the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine (PCU), which is formally subordinate to Patriarchate in Constantinople.³²⁰

There are individual examples of such Church raiding:

- In February 2019, in the village of Gnezdichne, Ternopil region, special police units, militants of radical organizations with red and black stripes on their sleeves, and supporters

³¹⁶ Український інститут політики, "Динамика количества школ и учеников по языкам обучения в Украине", онлайн: <https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/publikatsii/dinamika-kolichestva-shkol-i-uchenikov-po-yazykam-obucheniya-v-ukraine/>

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ответ Министерства образования и науки 25.11.2020 № 04-13/25 на № 6/н от 16.11.2020.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Верховна Рада України, "Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України (щодо підлеглості релігійних організацій та процедури державної реєстрації релігійних організацій зі статусом юридичної особи), онлайн: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=65346.

of the PCU beat up believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, including the priest, the abbot of the congregation, while seizing the UOC Church.³²¹

- In the city of Berestechke, Volyn region, PCU activists led by the Chairman of the City council seized the Cathedral of the canonical Church, a historical monument, sawing down part of the doors with a chainsaw in the presence of police. In May 2020, by order of the head of the Volyn Regional State Administration, Y. Pohulyayko, this Church was handed over for permanent use to the PCU congregation that seized it.³²²
- Clashes broke out regularly around the Church in the village of Luka-Meleshkivska in Vinnytsia region. On 16 March 2019, UOC believers, together with their rector, were locked in their own church by supporters of the PCU, who prevented worship services from taking place in the Church. Archbishop Varsonofiy of Vinnitsa and Barskiy, who arrived at the Church, was physically assaulted by supporters of the PCU and mass clashes ensued. On 15 June 2019, several members of the UOC congregation and its clergy were beaten during an attempt to seize the Church during the service. On 30 June, worshippers were taken out of the temple one by one and kicked on the ground during the service. In September and October 2019, seizure attempts were again made, during which the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church were threatened and stones were thrown at them. Another attempted takeover took place in May 2020.³²³
- In April 2019, supporters of the PCU seized a UOC Church in the village of Kopytiv, Rivne region, beating worshippers who had gathered in front of the Church to pray (one of the parishioners was hospitalized). Eyewitnesses note that the seizure of the temple was led by officials. The police were also on the side of the PCU activists. The policemen did not interfere in what was happening, but then began to help them.³²⁴ In fact, it can be stated that often the local authorities have acted in active association with representatives of the PCU and have exerted direct pressure and discrimination against parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The main reason for this appears to have been President Petro Poroshenko's policy of forming a de facto state Church loyal to him.

CHAPTER 3. XENOPHOBIA.

***Xenophobia* is intolerance of the alien, the unfamiliar, the foreign, the fear of conditioned "outsiders".** This fear is born out of a lack of understanding of the cultural, social, and historical traditions of one's neighbors, as well as an aversion to changes in the social environment. Both are the result of their own cultural group traditions, the influence of political and religious myths, and a general lack of education. At the heart of xenophobia

³²¹ "На Тернопольщине полиция и неизвестные с боем брали в плен храм". *News24*, онлайн: <https://news24ua.com/na-ternopolshchine-policiya-i-neizvestnye-s-boem-brali-v-plen-hram>.

³²² "Сторонники ПЦУ захватили Свято-Троицкий собор УПЦ в городе Берестечко на Волини". *Православная жизнь*, онлайн: <https://pravlife.org/ru/content/storonniki-pcu-zahvatili-svyato-troickiy-sobor-upc-v-gorode-berestechko-na-volyni>

³²³ "На Вінниччині попри перешкоди прихильників «ПЦУ» Божественна літургія в храмі с. Лука-Мелешківська відбулася (+відео). УПЦ, онлайн: <https://news.church.ua/2019/03/16/na-vinnichchini-popri-pereshkodi-prixilnikiv-pcu-bozhestvenna-liturgiya-v-xrami-s-luka-meleshkivska-vidbulasya-video/>

³²⁴ "Сторонники новой Православной церкви Украины (ПЦУ) захватили Свято-Иоанно-Богословский храм канонической Украинской православной церкви (УПЦ) и избили его прихожан". *News.ru*, онлайн: <https://news.ru/europe/neskolko-chelovek-postradali-pri-zahvate-hrama-upc/>.

is social frustration, i.e. the contradiction between inner expectations/beliefs/beliefs and reality. Xenophobia is a necessary condition for the radicalization of society, while radicalization in turn leads to the formation of persistent radical and extremist views, which, in turn, are a necessary condition for the hate crime.

Surveys conducted during the period under review show that Xenophobia is on the rise in the monitoring countries. These include Racism, Migrantophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and a number of other issues. For example, in 2019, only 47 per cent of Canadians thought racism was a serious problem in Canada, but in 2020, 60 per cent of Canadians thought it was.³²⁵ The long-term nature of the problem is indicated by age differentials: respondents aged 18 to 34 were more likely (70 per cent) to think racism was a serious problem for Canada, outstripping of respondents aged 35 to 54 (60 per cent) and those aged 55 and over (52 per cent).³²⁶ 28 per cent said they had personally been a victim of racism, up five points from last year. Almost half (48%) agree (12% completely/36% somewhat) that institutions such as the Government, police, court, education system and journalists tolerate racism. This leaves 37% who disagree and 14% who have no opinion on the issue.³²⁷ 63% of Canadians support the BLM movement to some extent.³²⁸

Migrantophobia is also a serious problem in Canada. A Canadian Citizenship Institute-Leger survey shows that 64 per cent of new Canadians fear increased discrimination in the face of the pandemic, and many report harassment. The survey shows that 63% of immigrants worry about this every time they take public transport.³²⁹

Overall, 57% of those surveyed consider Islamophobia to be an increasingly worrying problem in Canada, a figure that rises to around 70% when looking only at Liberal, Social Democrat (New Democratic Party) and Greens supporters.³³⁰ Canadians are much less comfortable accepting a Muslim into their family compared to people of other religious faiths. 31% of respondents felt uncomfortable about a family member being engaged to a Muslim.³³¹ 46% of Canadians under the age of 35 would feel uncomfortable with a prime minister who wears a hijab. And the number increases in older age groups, reaching 76 per cent among citizens over 65.³³²

³²⁵ "More Canadians say racism is a 'serious problem' today than 1 year ago: Ipsos poll", *Global News*, July 24, 2020, online at: <https://globalnews.ca/news/7213279/canada-systemic-racism-poll/>

³²⁶ Ipsos, "Majority (60%) See Racism as a Serious Problem in Canada Today, Up 13 points Since Last Year", online at: <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/majority-60-see-racism-serious-problem-canada-today-13-points-last-year>

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ "More Canadians say racism is a 'serious problem' today than 1 year ago: Ipsos poll", *Global News*, July 24, 2020, online at: <https://globalnews.ca/news/7213279/canada-systemic-racism-poll/>

³²⁹ Cision, "Poll shows the impact of discrimination on Canadian immigrants amid COVID-19", online at: <https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/poll-shows-the-impact-of-discrimination-on-canadian-immigrants-amid-covid-19-848855621.html>

³³⁰ *The Canadian Muslim Forum (FMC-CMF) & Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME)*, "A Grave Problem: EKOS Survey on Islamophobia in Canada", online at: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cjpme/pages/4101/attachments/original/1517850987/CJPME-CMF_Survey_on_Islamophobia_-_2018-02-06-FINAL.pdf?1517850987

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.

35% consider prejudice against Jews in Canada to be a serious problem. Meanwhile, prejudice against minorities in general was considered a serious problem by 59% of respondents. Notably, these numbers are similar to the 2018 Canadian Jewish opinion poll.³³³ Interestingly, the survey found that Canadians do not support the equivalence of criticism of Israel and Zionism with anti-Semitism, a formula promoted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). This suggests that most Canadians do not agree that Canadian politicians characterize Palestinian solidarity as anti-Semitic. At the same time, most Canadians described the following four statements as anti-Semitic:

- Painting a swastika on the Israeli consulate (91% - consider this an anti-Semitic display).
- Allegations that Jews control the World's Media (73% said this was evidence of anti-Semitism).
- Comparing contemporary Israeli politics with Nazi politics (61% consider it anti-Semitism).
- Accusing Jewish Canadians of being more loyal to Israel than to Canada (58% see this as anti-Semitism).

On the other hand, a significant proportion of respondents did not consider the following statements to be anti-Semitic:

- Accusing Israel of human rights violations against Palestinians (80% not anti-Semitic).
- Claiming that Israel illegally expels Palestinians from their land. (79% do not classify them as anti-Semitic)
- Call for a boycott of Israel because of alleged human rights violations (76%).
- Establishment of university campus groups critical of Israeli government policies (74%).
- Suggestions that Israeli laws restricting the movement and residence of Palestinians are similar to South Africa's apartheid laws (69%).

And those respondents most likely to perceive criticism of Israel as legitimate were also the most sensitive to negative statements about Canadian Jews, including "the claim that Jews control the World's Media" and "accusing them of being more loyal to Israel than to Canada". Conversely, those respondents who are most likely to say that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic are also most likely to say that statements critical of Canadians of Jewish origin are not anti-Semitic.

According to a Pew Research Center poll, a majority of US adults believe that the legacy of slavery continues to have an impact on black people in American society. More than four in ten Americans believe that the country has not progressed enough towards racial equality,

³³³ CJPM, "SURVEY: CANADIANS REJECT EFFORTS TO BRAND CRITICISM AND PROTEST OF ISRAEL AS ANTISEMITIC", OCTOBER 7, 2020, ONLINE AT: [HTTPS://WWW.CJPME.ORG/PR_2020_10_07_SURVEY_R3](https://www.cjpme.org/pr_2020_10_07_survey_r3)

and there is some scepticism, especially among blacks, that African Americans will ever have equal rights with white people.³³⁴

58% of Americans surveyed say race relations in the US are bad, with blacks particularly pessimistic about the country's progress in inter-racial relations. More than eight in ten black adults say the legacy of slavery affects blacks in America today, including 59% who say it has a major impact. 78% of African Americans think the country has not progressed far enough when it comes to giving blacks equal rights with whites people, and 50% are convinced that it is unlikely the country will eventually achieve racial equality. 51% of Americans think the same of their Hispanic compatriots.³³⁵ On the contrary, 59% say that being white *helps* people get ahead. Opinions on the situation of Asians or Native Americans are more mixed.³³⁶

According to the 2019 Index compiled by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding Islamophobia, 62% of Muslims experience religious discrimination in the US. Muslim women report higher levels of discrimination (68%) than men (55%). By comparison: 43% of Jews report religious discrimination and 36% of white evangelicals report also experiencing it. 41% of Muslim women experience gender discrimination within their community, the highest of all groups surveyed. At the same time, 52% of Muslim women report experiencing gender discrimination in general from American society, much higher than among the other groups of women surveyed (36% or less).³³⁷

A majority of Americans (62%) believe that immigrants strengthen the country with their hard work and talent. Only 28% say immigrants are a burden to the country because they take jobs, housing, and health care away from Americans, according to a Pew Research Center survey. In 2018-2019, attitudes towards immigrants have split sharply along party lines. For example, Democratic Party supporters saw immigrants as a strength of the US (83%) and only 11% said immigrants were a burden. On the other hand, only 38% of Republicans and Independent Republicans said that immigrants strengthen the country, while 49% said they are a burden.³³⁸

Attitudes towards legal and illegal immigrants also vary. For example, in 2018, 38% of 2,000 Americans surveyed said legal immigration to the US should be kept at current levels, while 32% said it should be increased; 24% said legal immigration should be decreased.³³⁹ A majority of Democrats (84%) said they sympathize with immigrants who are in the US

³³⁴ Pew Research Center, "Race in America 2019", online at: <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-america-2019/>

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, "American Muslim Poll 2019: Predicting and Preventing Islamophobia", online at: <https://www.ispu.org/american-muslim-poll-2019-predicting-and-preventing-islamophobia/>.

³³⁸ Pew Research Center, "Majority of Americans continue to say immigrants strengthen the U.S. ", January 31, 2019, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/31/majority-of-americans-continue-to-say-immigrants-strengthen-the-u-s/>

³³⁹ Pew Research Center, "Shifting Public Views on Legal Immigration Into the U.S. ", June 28, 2018, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/>.

illegally, while only 48% of Republicans shared this positive attitude.³⁴⁰ Interestingly, a majority of Americans (69%) are more sympathetic to illegal immigrants than to legal immigrants.

In 2019, a majority of Americans (61%) supported same-sex marriage, while 31% opposed it. 72% of Americans said they generally agree with homosexuality.³⁴¹

In a 2017 survey, 54 per cent of Native Americans living on tribal lands or in other Native areas said they faced racial or ethnic discrimination at the hands of the police and when applying for jobs. Three out of ten American Indians said they had experienced personal discrimination because they were Native.³⁴²

With regard to European Xenophobia, the situation in the key positions "anti-Roma sentiment - anti-Semitism - Islamophobia, Migrantophobia - Homophobia", taking into account the dynamics in previous years, is as follows (data are based on a 2019 study by the American Pew Research Center).

It is clear that there has been a general decline in Xenophobia in the UK since Brexit. Anti-Gypsy sentiment in particular has almost halved. Public opinion has become more tolerant towards migrants, among whom there were many Roma, after it became clear that their uncontrolled access to the country would be stopped.

The anti-Roma situation in Poland is slightly better than in previous years, since the organized Xenophobic campaigns, traditionally organized by right-wing parties on the eve of elections, have ceased.

In Greece, anti-Roma sentiment has been growing for several years in a row due to the general policy of the authorities towards Radical Right Xenophobic campaigns and towards minorities in general. The level of Xenophobia in Italy (83%) has remained at approximately the same level as in previous years. There has been a drop in the Netherlands and France.

Although the level of Roma-phobia in France has fallen, it still has the lowest tolerance rate (compared to other social groups) for the Roma minority (36%), which numbers no more than 350 000 people, 20 000 of whom came from Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia.³⁴³


³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Pew Research Center, "Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage", online at: <https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/>.

³⁴² NPR, "Poll: Native Americans See Far More Discrimination In Areas Where They Are A Majority", online at: <https://www.npr.org/2017/11/14/563306555/poll-native-americans-see-far-more-discrimination-in-areas-where-they-are-a-majority>.

³⁴³ Comission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L'Homme (CNCDH). "Roma", online: https://www.cncdh.en/en/thematic_files/roms

**Figure 1: Anti-Roma sentiments in Europe
in 2014-2019³⁴⁴**



Until 2019, the Pew Research Center did not take measurements in Russia and Ukraine and estimates were based on research by the well-known Russian analytical Levada Center and the Ukrainian analytical agency ZN.UA. In 2017, the Levada Center estimated anti-Roma sentiment in Russia at 17%, based on a question to respondents on whether Roma should be restricted from living in Russia.³⁴⁵ Since 2018, the Levada Center changed the wording of the question to "Do you agree with keeping Roma out of Russia," which was perceived by many as a question about foreigners. It was answered positively by 41% of those surveyed in 2019.³⁴⁶ The Pew Research Center, using its own methodology (the exact wording of the question is not known), identified anti-Rom sentiment in the Russian Federation at 52%.³⁴⁷ Thus, the sharp increase in anti-Roma sentiment in the Russian Federation is most likely a consequence of the difference in the methodology of assessments by different sociological centres. During the Period under review, no massive changes in attitudes towards Roma were recorded in Russia. The Ukrainian agency ZN. UA, also in 2017, assessed Romaphobia in Ukraine at 51%, based on the question whether respondents would like to see Roma among their neighbors. Pew Research estimated anti-Roma sentiment in Ukraine at 53% in 2019.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴ Pew Research Center, "Minority Groups", October 14, 2019, online at:

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/>

³⁴⁵ Левада-Центр, "Ксенофобия в 2017 году", онлайн: <https://www.levada.ru/2017/08/23/16486/>

³⁴⁶ Левада-Центр, "Ксенофобия и национализм", 23.09.2020, онлайн:

<https://www.levada.ru/2020/09/23/ksenofobiya-i-natsionalizm-2/>

³⁴⁷ Pew Research Center, "Minority Groups", October 14, 2019, online at:

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/>

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

Given that indicators of Xenophobic attitudes in other countries are based on the findings of Pew Research, in order to provide data on the same methodology, the authors of this Report decided to use the Pew's data in further assessment of Xenophobic attitudes in Russia and Ukraine as well.

It should also be noted that although the level of anti-Roma feelings in Spain is estimated by Pew Research at 42%, the European agency *Eurobarometer* estimated this level at 65%.³⁴⁹

We can see that anti-Semitism levels are falling in a number of countries or have remained at the same level for several years. These are, for example, Britain (6% - up 1 point on 2017), Germany (6%), the Netherlands (5%), and France (6%), which, according to Pew Research, has shown a serious drop in anti-Semitic sentiment of 14%.

High levels of anti-Semitism are traditionally displayed by Greece, although there also saw a drop of 17% due to the crackdown by law enforcement agencies on the main right-wing Golden Dawn party, as well as Poland (31%).

The average level of anti-Semitism in 2019 from the countries monitored we see in Italy (15%) - a drop of 10 percentage points compared to 2017, Russia (18%), Spain (19%), and Ukraine (11%). Moreover, due to the fact that Pew Research has not previously produced an estimate for Russia, in previous years it was based on data from the Russian sociological institute Levada-Centre.

Generally, data from national sociological centres and human rights organizations differ from that of Pew Research. For example, data from the French National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH), 20% of the French say that Jews "have too much power in France" and 33% say that for them "Israel is more important than France", which is clearly evidence of anti-Semitism.³⁵⁰

The situation regarding anti-Semitism in the Netherlands remains very favorable. In 2018, 65% of Dutch respondents agreed with the statement that anti-Semitism is a problem in society and 55% believe that anti-Semitism is on the rise.³⁵¹ More than 90% of those surveyed in 2019 indicated that they had a very favorable or mostly favorable opinion of the Jewish people, while the proportion of respondents with an unfavorable opinion of the Jewish people was only 5% overall.^{352 353}

³⁴⁹ European Commission. Public Opinion, online at:

<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/surveyKy/2251>

³⁵⁰ Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme (CNCDH), "Les Essentiels on the 2018 report on the fight against racism", pp.65-74, online: <https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/les-essentiels-2018-report-fight-against-racism>

³⁵¹ Special Eurobarometer 484: Perceptions of antisemitism, online:

https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2220_90_4_484_ENG


³⁵² Statista, "Attitudes towards Jews in the Netherlands 2019", online at:

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1087359/attitudes-towards-jews-in-the-netherlands/>

³⁵³ Pew Research Center, "Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden", online at:

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-strength-than-a-burden/>

**Figure 2: Dynamics of anti-Semitic attitudes
in 2014-2019.³⁵⁴**



Regarding anti-Semitic prejudice in the UK, it is worth recalling that one of the largest (n = <1,000,000) studies on attitudes towards Jews and Israel has been published during the study period. In 2019, the "Campaign Against Anti-Semitism" in the UK (in partnership with King's College of London) found out that over a third (37%) of people in British society believed at least one anti-Semitic claim (such as Jewish control of business) was true, although only a small proportion (i.e. less than 20%) of British adults fully agreed with these claims. Moreover, 14% suggested that association with Israel has made Jewish people less loyal to Britain.³⁵⁵

Perhaps the most revealing finding was the prevalence of anti-Semitism amongst the extreme left in British politics - 58% of those who believe they hold "very left" views hold two or more of the anti-Semitic views suggested by the researchers. The Report concludes by pointing out how left-wing anti-Semitism - particularly within the UK Labour Party - has converged with the anti-Semitism of those who consider themselves to be of the extreme right.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ Pew Research Center, "Minority Groups", October 14, 2019, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/>

³⁵⁵ Campaign Against Antisemitism, 'Antisemitism Barometer 2019', online at: <https://antisemitism.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Antisemitism-Barometer-2019.pdf>, pp.8 & 15.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

In October, Russia released a Report by the independent SOVA Center for Information and Analysis on anti-Semitism in the Russian Federation for June-September 2020.³⁵⁷ This quarterly report, as well as SOVA's monthly monitoring of Xenophobic and Radical manifestations since January 2020³⁵⁸, indicate that Russia is likely to approach to the end of the year with a similar or even lower number of anti-Semitic manifestations than in 2019³⁵⁹ and 2018.³⁶⁰ Judging by this data, from January to September 2020, there were no attacks on Jews and a minimal number of anti-Semitic statements on social media and in the media.

A Levada Center Report on Xenophobia and Nationalism in Russia released in September 2020 shows that Jews have become a more desirable minority compared to other groups - Chinese, Ukrainians, Chechens, people from Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Roma and migrant workers.³⁶¹ That is, the social distance between Jews and the ethnic majority is steadily shrinking. Its coefficient is 4.23 points, and for Ukrainians, traditionally more closed to Russians, it is 4.67, for Chechens - 5.21, and for Roma - 5.83. Consequently, Roma are treated worst and Jews - best in 2020. Interestingly, the number of people willing to see Jews among their family members increased by more than 6 times, those willing to see them among close friends - by 3 times, etc.³⁶²

It should also be noted that Polish experts saw a sharp upsurge of anti-Semitic sentiment in Poland in 2018. This happened after Article 55a of the Law "On the Institute of National Remembrance" was introduced. It stated that "any person who publicly and contrary to the facts holds the Polish Nation or the Polish State responsible or jointly responsible for Nazi crimes committed by the German Third Reich (...) or other crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes, or grossly reduces the responsibility of the actual perpetrators of these crimes, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment of up to 3 years." It thus makes it a criminal offence to hold the Polish People or the Polish State responsible for or complicit in Nazi crimes committed by the German Third Reich.

The new Law has caused controversy both in Poland and abroad, especially in Israel and the USA. International Jewish non-governmental organizations have protested this to Poland. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum expressed this concern: "The Law will chill free and open dialogue concerning Polish history during the Holocaust, including in Polish schools

³⁵⁷ Российский Еврейский Конгресс, Информационно-аналитический центр "Сова", "ОТЧЕТ ОБ АНТИСЕМИТИЗМЕ В РОССИИ 2020", онлайн: <https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/upload/iblock/5c8/5c89380158b47b5999606a33a3162f1e.pdf>

³⁵⁸ Facebook, "SOVA Center for Information and Analysis", online at: <https://www.facebook.com/sovacenter/>

³⁵⁹ Российский Еврейский Конгресс, Информационно-аналитический центр "Сова", "ОТЧЕТ ОБ АНТИСЕМИТИЗМЕ В РОССИИ 2019", онлайн: https://rjc.ru/uploads/default/files/SOVA_Report_2019_A4_RUS_print.pdf

³⁶⁰ "Защитим Будущее. Третья Московская Международная Конференция по противодействию антисемитизму, расизму и ксенофобии", онлайн: <http://mcca.ru/ru/news/29>

³⁶¹ Левада-Центр, "Ксенофобия и национализм", 23.09.2020, онлайн: <https://www.levada.ru/2020/09/23/ksenofobiya-i-natsionalizm-2/>

³⁶² Ibid.

and universities and in the media".³⁶³ The Centre for Holocaust Studies in Poland called "the adopted Law a tool designed to facilitate ideological manipulation and imposition of the historical policy of the Polish State." The new Law would constitute an unprecedented (and unknown in the Democratic System) interference in the debate on Polish history".³⁶⁴

Eventually, due to the diplomatic crisis, this provision was abolished on 27 June 2018. However, the situation has led to an increase in anti-Semitic rhetoric, especially online. As Polish expert Prof. R. Pankowski, associate professor of sociology at Collegium Civitas Warsaw, wrote, "the surge of Hostility towards Jews and the Jewish State in the Polish media and politics in early 2018 took many observers by surprise. For some, it was shocking to observe a virtual tidal wave of anti-Semitism in the mainstream discourse of one of the largest European Union member states in a territory that was the epicenter of the Holocaust during the German occupation. It was also a great shock, since over the years bilateral relations between Poland and Israel have been particularly cordial and fruitful".³⁶⁵

Almost all of the monitored countries showed either a decline or approximately the same levels of Islamophobia as in 2016-2017. Among the monitored countries, Spain (42%; +2%), Russia (19%; +5%), Poland (66%; +4%), and Ukraine (21%; +6%) showed a slight increase (see: fig.3).

Nevertheless, the differential in levels of Islamophobia between countries is still large. In Greece, for example, it is 57% (-8%), in Italy 55% (-5%), and in Poland 66%. The overall drop is explained in Britain by exit from the EU, which generally satisfied people who feared uncontrolled Muslim migration into the country; in France, Germany, and Greece - by a slight decline in the inflow of immigrants during the pandemic and certain measures that the authorities took against radical Islamists during the Period.

However, other studies cast doubt on the validity of Pew Research's estimates. For example, a report by the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNC DH) claims that 44% of French people see Islam as a threat to French identity, and 59% oppose the wearing of the Muslim hijab in the streets. Overall, the Commission estimates the level of Islamophobia in France in 2018-19 to be around 40%.³⁶⁶


³⁶³ USHMM Deeply Concerned over Legislation to Criminalize References to Poles's Complicity in Nazi Crimes, online: <https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-releases/museum-statement-on-holocaust-legislation-in-poland>

³⁶⁴ Polish Center for Holocaust Research, "Current statement Center's regarding the changes to the law about the Institute of National Remembrance 29.01.2018", online at: <https://www.holocaustresearch.pl/index.php?mod=news&show=349&lang=en>

³⁶⁵ R. Pankowski, "The Resurgence of Antisemitic Discourse in Poland", Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2018, https://www.nigdywiecej.org//docstation/com_docstation/20/r._pankowski_the_resurgence_of_antisemitic_discourse_in_poland._is_1557696865.pdf

³⁶⁶ Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme (CNC DH), "Les Essentiels on the 2018 report on the fight against racism", online: <https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/les-essentiels-2018-report-fight-against-racism>

Figure 3: Dynamics of anti-Islamic sentiment in Europe in 2014-2019. ³⁶⁷



All is not so simple with Islamophobia in Britain either. Despite the apparent decline in anti-Islamic prejudice in general in British society, in October 2018 a poll of over 43,000 people conducted by the British anti-fascist NGO Hope not Hate found that while general attitudes towards multiculturalism are softening, the exact opposite is happening with Islam. For example, 32% of those surveyed believed that there were Muslim 'no-go zones' regulated by Sharia law in the UK, a view supported by 49% of Brexit referendum voters, demonstrating (in the eyes of the authors) that opposition to the EU and prejudice against Islam are 'clearly interlinked issues for many'.³⁶⁸ Moreover, in a separate survey conducted by Pew Research, 36% of UK respondents said they would not be prepared to accept a Muslim as a member of their family, and 46% believe that indigenous UK national cultures are superior to other cultures.³⁶⁹ In addition, another 2019 poll, Hope Not Hate (n = <5000), found that 35% of the public believe Islam is a threat to the British way of life and 30% are willing to support a campaign to stop the construction of mosques.³⁷⁰ On top of this, an enquiry into anti-Muslim

³⁶⁷ Pew Research Center, "Minority Groups", October 14, 2019, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/>

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Joshi, O. & Evans, J., 'British attitudes on national identity and religious minorities not unique in EU', *Pew Research Center*, 19 February 2019, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/19/british-attitudes-on-national-identity-and-religious-minorities-not-unique-in-eu/>

³⁷⁰ Perraudin, F., 'Third of Britons believe Islam threatens British way of life, says report', *The Guardian*, 17 February 2019, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/17/third-of-britons-believe-islam-threatens-british-way-of-life-says-report>

attitudes within the UK Conservative Party in 2020 found that more than half of party members saw Islam as a threat to the British way of life.³⁷¹

A recent survey on Discrimination and Intolerance against Muslims in Spain, published in 2020,³⁷² found that most people are strongly opposed to the opening of mosques and feel uncomfortable in the presence of a woman wearing a veil, or in the presence of Muslims in their neighborhood. Similarly, half of respondents felt that Spanish families would not want Muslim children in the same class as their children.

An interesting study was done in 2019 on the spread of Islamophobia in the media and communication in Spain. It showed that 43% of all media and social networks allowed Islamophobic material to be published to some extent. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that Islamist terrorist organizations have included Spain among their targets, considering the country as a "Christian-occupied land". On the other hand, there was a correlation between terrorist attacks and outbreaks of Islamophobia in the country. Each attack was followed by a rise in Islamophobia in Spain, although less than in the United States after 9/11, in the UK after 7/7 in London, and in France in 2012 after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris and the attacks in Nice and Nantes. Moreover, when analysing social media, the most Islamophobic material was posted on Facebook.³⁷³

According to a 2018 Pew Research Center survey of 18 countries where half of the world's migrants live, most people in those countries agree that immigrants strengthen their State. A majority of respondents in 10 of the 18 countries surveyed see immigrants as a force rather than a burden.³⁷⁴ These include some of the world's largest migrant-receiving countries: the US, Germany, the UK, France, and Canada (each of which received more than 7 million immigrants in 2017).³⁷⁵

On the contrary, the majority of respondents in the three countries surveyed - Poland, Greece, and Russia - consider immigrants to be a burden on their countries. With the exception of Russia, each of these countries has less than 5 million immigrants.³⁷⁶

³⁷¹ Gayle, D., 'Half of Conservative party members believe Islam is threat, poll finds', *The Guardian*, 30 September 2020, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/sep/30/half-of-conservative-party-members-believe-islam-is-threat-poll-finds>.

³⁷² RESULTADOS ENCUESTA SOBRE INTOLERANCIA Y DISCRIMINACIÓN HACIA LAS PERSONAS MUSULMANAS EN ESPAÑA, online: http://www.inclusion.gob.es/oberaxe/ficheros/documentos/Resultado_encuesta_musulmanes_11112020.pdf


³⁷³ Islamophobia in Spain, *Ethical Journalism Network*, online at: <https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/resources/publications/saving-the-news/islamophobia-spain-2019>

³⁷⁴ Pew Research Center, "A majority of Europeans favor taking in refugees, but most disapprove of EU's handling of the issue", online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/19/a-majority-of-europeans-favor-taking-in-refugees-but-most-disapprove-of-eus-handling-of-the-issue/>

³⁷⁵ Pew Research Center, "International migrants by country", online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/interactives/international-migrants-by-country/>

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

**Figure 4: Dynamics of anti-migrant sentiment in Europe
in 2014-2019.³⁷⁷**



Greeks' views on immigration are extremely negative. Regarding the sociological survey "Dyaneosis 2020" published in March 2020, 92% of respondents said that the number of immigrants in their country is "too high" - there is not a single population group that disagrees with this - while the vast majority believes that immigrants increase crime, increase unemployment, have a negative economic impact (64% of villagers believe this), do not "help solve demographic problems", and do not "enrich our culture". Only one in five believe that illegal immigrants in Greece should be integrated into society, while the opinion that children of legal immigrants born in Greece should immediately acquire Greek citizenship has fallen from 75.2% in April 2015 to 58% in December 2019. Only 3.2% of respondents believe that immigrants should be fully integrated into Greek society, 16.4% believe that they should be integrated under certain conditions, 21.2% believe that they should remain in temporary accommodation centres and 27.9% believe that all immigrants should be deported urgently.³⁷⁸

According to the *Ebert Foundation*, negative attitudes towards migrants in Germany have continued to be consistently high since 2014. Compared to 2016, denial of asylum seekers increased today (every second respondent answered positively to at least one question related to negative attitudes towards this group), despite the fact that the number of asylum seekers was decreasing in the period in question.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁷ Pew Research Center, "A majority of Europeans favor taking in refugees, but most disapprove of EU's handling of the issue", online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/19/a-majority-of-europeans-favor-taking-in-refugees-but-most-disapprove-of-eus-handling-of-the-issue/>

³⁷⁸ Dianeoz. ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΕΡΕΥΝΑΣ ΚΑΑΙ ΑΝΑΑΛΥΣΗΣ, "Τι Πιστεύουν Οι Έλληνες Το 2020", online: <https://www.dianeosis.org/2020/03/ti-pistevoun-oi-ellines-to-2020/>

³⁷⁹ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, "Mitte-Studie", online at: <https://www.fes.de/forum-berlin/gegen-rechtsextremismus/mitte-studie>

According to Eurobarometer, positive attitudes towards migrants from other EU and non-EU countries increased markedly in the UK - from 58% in 2017 to 64% in 2018 and from 54% to 62% for EU and non-EU migration³⁸⁰ - while only 13% cited it as the most important issue they had personally faced (4% below the EU average).³⁸¹

In 2018, 50% of Dutch residents had a positive view of "non-Western" immigrants. Paradoxically, 55% believe that immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their country.³⁸²

In Russia in September 2020, 73% of respondents according to the methodology of the Russian analytical Levada-Centre were in favor of limiting the inflow of migrant workers.³⁸³ The growth of Migrantophobia is illustrated by the anti-migrant riot in Yakutsk in March 2019, the reason for it was the rape of a local resident by a visitor from Kyrgyzstan. About three thousand people came to a meeting on 18 March at the Triumph sports complex with the authorities about the incident. The mayor, Sardana Avksentieva, promised to intensify the fight against illegal migration. The Head of the Republic has taken unprecedented discriminatory measures to keep migrants out of this Russian region. He also promised to identify and deport illegal migrants and introduce new restrictive and prohibitive measures if necessary. In the end, however, most of these measures remained "on paper", as their presence in the region, especially in certain sectors of livelihood, was economically feasible. However, the media reported about threats to migrants from locals, pogroms of stalls, etc.³⁸⁴

High levels of homophobia are demonstrated in countries with traditional lifestyles where religious views on family and marriage are deeply rooted in the lives of citizens, regardless of whether or not people are actually religious and perform religious rituals. For example, 47% of the Greek population have negative attitudes towards LGBT persons, 69% in Ukraine and 74% in Russia.

³⁸⁰ Eurobarometer 90, 'National Report United Kingdom', Autumn 2018, online at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/standard/surveyky/2215>, pp.6-7.


³⁸¹ Eurobarometer 91, 'National Report United Kingdom', Spring 2019, online at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/87480>, p.2.

³⁸² Pew research Center, "Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden", online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-strength-than-a-burden/>

³⁸³ Левада-Центр, "Ксенофобия и национализм", 23.09.2020, онлайн: <https://www.levada.ru/2020/09/23/ksenofobiya-i-natsionalizm-2/>

³⁸⁴ See in detail: <https://takiedela.ru/2019/04/narod-spit-kak-medved/>, <https://glava.sakha.gov.ru/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/442.pdf>, <https://zona.media/news/2019/03/20/yakutsk>, <https://sakhalive.ru/nakipelo-v-yakutke-mnogotyisyachnyiy-narod-ne-pomeshhaetsya-v-triumph-na-antimigrantskoe-sobranie/>, <https://www.instagram.com/p/BvJa6ASINql/>.

Figure 5: Homophobia in Europe 2014-2019³⁸⁵



However, this sample does not speak so much about the homophobia of the population in the monitoring countries, but rather about what citizens think about whether society should accept homosexuality - which is how the question was phrased by the Pew Research interviewer. Meanwhile, this is by no means always the same. For example, according to the Russian Levada Center, published in May 2019, 47% believe that members of the LGBT community in Russia should enjoy the same rights as other citizens. This is the highest level of support for equal rights for LGBT people for the last 14 years. 43% opposed equal rights for gays and lesbians. However, only 3% of those surveyed said they had a positive attitude towards homosexual people. 56% of those surveyed said they viewed them rather negatively, while 39% said they viewed them neutrally.³⁸⁶

To a large extent, attitudes towards different social groups depend on *the position of the media*, on the light in which and how often information about representatives of these groups is presented. The influence of the social media is of great importance, since the online discussion has no boundaries. The *position of official authorities* towards minorities is also important. For instance, a big influence on the formation of homophobic attitudes in Poland has been the fact that for a while 100 municipalities, mostly in south-east Poland, have passed resolutions declaring those areas "LGBT-free zones". Media coverage of the debate on the issue has significantly increased the homophobic audience.³⁸⁷ A similar situation had previously occurred in Russia where the debate and adoption of the so-called Gay

³⁸⁵ Pew Research Center, "Minority Groups", October 14, 2019, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/>

³⁸⁶ "Почти половина россиян за равные права для ЛГБТ. Но большинство геев не любит", *BBC News. Русская служба*, 23 мая 2019 года, онлайн: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-48378460>

³⁸⁷ D. Uhlig, B. Chyż, 'LGBT-free municipalities'. See where they are in Poland", July 15, 2020, <https://biqdata.wyborcza.pl/biqdata/7,159116,26130986,gminy-wolne-od-lgbt-zobacz-gdzie-sa-w-polsce-mapy.html>.

Propaganda Law led to a sharp increase in the media in the mid-2010s. Periodic statements by Western leaders about Muslims as the main threat to stability, about it being "offensive" when someone wears a hijab, and the very adoption of anti-hijab laws in many monitoring countries led to a situation where more and more people began to feel comfortable expressing anti-Islamic views, as they began to feel that this hateful rhetoric had become "normal" and therefore acceptable. Consequently, as the surveys showed, the number of people holding negative views against Muslims was increasing.

Overall, we can see that the level of Xenophobia gradually increased during the period in research, but a number of countries recorded a decline in Xenophobic sentiments, which is attributed to the resolution of problems caused by the migration crisis, gradual adaptation of people to the changes in the socio-cultural environment, and simply the weariness of society from many years of protest.

CHAPTER 4. HATE CRIME.

A hate crime is a crime motivated by prejudice and hatred towards other social groups that endangers the security not only of individuals but also of society as a whole. To be a hate crime, the crime act must meet two criteria: first, the act must constitute a crime under national Criminal Law; and second, the act must be motivated by prejudice.

Depending on the legal tradition, hate crime are defined differently in different countries.

For example, from the perspective of Anglo-American Law, *a hate crime* (or *bias-motivated crime*) is interpreted as any crime in which the offender "intentionally selects the victim or, in the case of property crimes, the property that is the object of the crime on the basis of the *real* or *perceived* race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, sex, disability, or sexual orientation of any person."³⁸⁸ That is, these are additional circumstances that aggravate liability, sometimes transforming an act into a violent extremism crime, but not separate codified crimes.³⁸⁹ Moreover, not every State in the United States has a concept of the hate crime. Some states, such as Arkansas, South Carolina, and Wyoming, do not have such a law. This is primarily due to the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which protects freedom of speech and the right of everyone to express and disseminate any views, including extremist views. Thus, in itself, incitement to hatred, if it is in no way related to violence, propaganda, and the preparation of any ideologically motivated violence, "including its justification for the achievement of certain social, economic, and political goals", is not a crime in terms of Anglo-American Law.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁸ Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, H.R. 2647, October 28, 2009, online at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/matthew_shepard_and_james_byrd_jr_hate_crimes_prevention_act

³⁸⁹ U.S. Code, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Part I. Crimes, Chapter 13. Civil Rights, § 245, online at: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/245>

³⁹⁰ "The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency", USAID, 2011, p.2, online at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf

Within this tradition follows Canadian Law, which defines a hate crime as a criminal offence committed against a person or property motivated by hatred/prejudice of the suspect/offender against a racial, religious, ethnic, sexual orientation, or disability group, as well as the law of several European countries.³⁹¹ This leads to some difficulties, as articulated by J.M. Berger, a Researcher with the US Counterterrorism Strategic Communications Project.

"We do not consider political movements and groups extremist as long as they do not commit violent acts," he wrote. As a result, "we (in the US) have a big problem".³⁹² The State is unable to effectively control the spread of hatred among whole groups, which inevitably leads to the radicalization of their individual representatives and provokes them to violence. In other words, the reasons that lead to violence remain outside the scope of existing legislation.

Meanwhile, as the process of radicalization has progressed, and as hate speech has led not just to an increase in Xenophobia, but also to the humiliation of entire social groups, the creation of a climate of fear and so on, many European countries have gradually begun to revise their understanding of hate crime to include incitement to hatred against other social groups without the aim of committing violent acts. The need for this has been very clearly outlined by the UK's independent Government Adviser on Extremism and Head of the Commission for Countering Extremism, Sara Khan. On 7 October 2019, she submitted her Commission's Report entitled "Challenging Hateful Extremism".³⁹³

It defined for the first time a new category of extremist behavior beyond terrorism and violent extremism - 'Hate Extremism' (Hateful Extremism). It is defined as behavior:

- that can incite and amplify hate, or engage in persistent hatred, or equivocate about and make the moral case for violence
- that draw on hateful, hostile or supremacist beliefs directed at an out-group who are perceived as a threat to the wellbeing, survival or success of an in-group
- that cause, or are likely to cause, harm to individuals, communities or wider society.³⁹⁴

In doing so, Sara Khan argued for the need to broaden the concept in this way:

- "Hateful extremism threatens our ability to live well together. From inspiring acts of violence and terrorism, to the incitement of hatred and hostility often aimed at those with a protected characteristic, extremists are having a devastating impact on

³⁹¹ Government of Canada. Department of Justice. "Disproportionate Harm: Hate Crime in Canada", online at: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/crime/wd95_11-dt95_11/p2.html

³⁹² Julia Simms, "Are We Talking About Extremism All Wrong?", "New America", online at: <https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/are-we-talking-about-extremism-all-wrong/>

³⁹³ GOV.UK, official website of the UK Government. "Independent adviser calls for overhaul of extremism strategy", online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-advisor-calls-for-overhaul-of-extremism-strategy>

³⁹⁴ GOV.UK, official website of the UK Government. "Commission for Countering Extremism launches a legal review to examine effectiveness of existing legislation relevant to hateful extremism", published 10 June 2020, online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commission-for-countering-extremism-launches-a-legal-review-to-examine-effectiveness-of-existing-legislation-relevant-to-hateful-extremism>

victims, on cohesion in our towns and cities and in undermining the social fabric and democratic norms of our country. Hateful extremism demands a response.

- ... Our ability to counter repeat and persistent offenders is inconsistent and often ineffective. When extremists engage in terrorist activity, they are often caught by robust counter-terrorism legislation. But when they incite hatred, engage in persistent hatred or justify violence against others, extremists know they will not cross over into the threshold of terrorism. As a result, many extremist actors and organizations, whether Far Right, Islamist or other, continue to operate with impunity in our country both online and offline.
- Extremists seek to restrict the rights and fundamental freedoms of others. They attempt to normalize and mainstream their extremist worldview which degrades our democracy and the values we hold dear. It is the state's responsibility to defend those rights and values and to do so in line with the rule of law".³⁹⁵

In effect, Sara Khan was raising the issue of extending the concept of the hate crime beyond acts of violence against specific individuals.³⁹⁶ In this way, the UK has provided a rationale for why hate speech or incitement to hatred against particular social groups should be treated as Hate crime.

But Britain itself is only discussing the possibility of such innovations in its legislation. For now, the situation is the same as it was 20 years ago. The Public Order Act 1986, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 contain provisions prohibiting hate crime.³⁹⁷ In addition, sections 18 and 19 of section 5 of the Public Order Act state that offences or written material intended to incite racial hatred, or material capable of inciting racial hatred, are prohibited.³⁹⁸ However, it should be borne in mind that these articles only apply if there are victims and witnesses to the crime in question. At present, British Law criminalizes a wide range of such crimes, provided that they are violent in nature or *cause fear and suffering to a particular individual*. Moreover, as in American Law, non-violent hate crime is not codified as separate offence, but is merely aggravating factor in the commission of ordinary crime.

However, legislation in other European countries is beginning to move gradually towards extending liability for hate crime to non-violent acts involving incitement to hatred against social groups. In some of these countries, incitement to hatred becomes a crime under a number of conditions that are difficult to meet. For example, in Italy and Ukraine, it is only when hate speech, for example, is addressed to a mass audience "with the aim of changing their behavior". Obviously, it is virtually impossible to prove it.³⁹⁹ Spain's legislation is

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ GOV.UK, official website of the UK Government. "Independent adviser calls for overhaul of extremism strategy", online at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-advisor-calls-for-overhaul-of-extremism-strategy>

³⁹⁷ UK Government. Public Order Act (1986), Section 5, online at:

www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/5.

³⁹⁸ UK Government. Public Order Act (1986), online at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64.

³⁹⁹ The White Book of Nazism, M. 2014, p.10, online: <https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/upload/iblock/536/53696d10e55cf280dc6c79ad3adb6c24.pdf>

structured roughly along similar lines.⁴⁰⁰ In the Netherlands, as we have already seen, the Law requires direct reference to the targeted group in the process of inciting Hatred, which, in particular, made it possible to incite hatred against religion, but not against the members of the religious community, with impunity.⁴⁰¹

Nevertheless, a number of countries have moved specifically towards separately codifying the hate crime as criminal acts that involve not only violence, but also incitement to hatred against certain social groups. These include Germany, Poland, Russia and, more recently, France.⁴⁰² In Germany, *spreading hatred* is a criminal offence. Article 86 of the Criminal Code criminalizes dissemination of propaganda by anti-Constitutional organizations, and Article 86a criminalizes propaganda using their symbols. Art. 130 ("Incitement"), which also covers incitement to racial hatred, is one of the most important tools in the fight against right-wing extremism and Xenophobia contained in the Criminal Code. Organizations that promote Racist ideology or justify or incite racial hatred and racial discrimination are liable to prosecution under Articles 129 and 129a of the Penal Code. On 19 March 2015, the German Penal Code was supplemented with Article 46.2, which requires courts to take the hate motive into account when sentencing. This is a crucial reform that puts an end to the loyalist attitude towards racism and discrimination in German courts.⁴⁰³

In Poland, Article 256 of the Criminal Code, adopted back in 1997, criminalized incitement to hatred based on national, ethnic, racial, political, or religious affiliation or lack of religious affiliation, and also prohibits propaganda of fascist or other totalitarian ideologies. Penalties under this article include fines, restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to two years."⁴⁰⁴

In France, Law No. 2019-222 of 23 March 2019 "On the Reform of Justice" for 2018-2022 (Article 71) criminalized Article 24 of the Law on Security and the Fight against Terrorism No. 2012-1432. It introduced a penalty against persons who "incite *discrimination, hatred or violence* against a person or *group of persons because of* their origin or their membership or non-membership of an ethnic group, nation, race or a particular religion" of one year in prison and a fine of €45,000.⁴⁰⁵

In Russia, Article 282 of the Criminal Code states that "actions aimed at inciting Hatred or Enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion, as well as membership of any social group, committed publicly, including through the media or information and

⁴⁰⁰ Gobierno De Espana. Circular 7/2019, de 14 de mayo, de la Fiscalía General del Estado, sobre pautas para interpretar los delitos de odio tipificados en el artículo 510 del Código Penal, online: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2019-7771

⁴⁰¹ Rijksoverheid. Discriminatiecijfers in 2018, online at:

<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/04/16/discriminatiecijfers-in-2018>

⁴⁰² See Chapter 1 in detail - *Author's note*.

⁴⁰³ BRD Strafgesetzbuch, online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/>

⁴⁰⁴ U S T AWA z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny, online:

<https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19970880553/U/D19970553Lj.pdf>

⁴⁰⁵ LOI n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la justice, art. 71, online at: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/LEGIARTI000038262626/2019-03-25/>

telecommunications networks, including the Internet, by a person after being held administratively liable for a similar act for one deprivation of liberty for a period of between two and five years.”⁴⁰⁶

The fact that different countries have different criteria for identifying and classifying such crimes certainly makes comparative analysis of the level of radicalization of monitoring countries in terms of this parameter difficult. Among other things, it should be kept in mind that many countries do not keep statistics on hate crimes, keep them in bad faith or even keep them classified. As a rule, in these cases, researchers use the statistics of NGOs, but they are not always comprehensive and objective. Also, in the countries with "closed" or "semi-closed" statistics or where there is falsification of data, there is usually a high degree of "domesticisation" of hate crime, i.e. the transformation of hate crimes in police reporting into domestic crimes. Thus, when assessing the level of hate crime in different countries, all of these factors need to be taken into account.

In these circumstances, the only correct way to assess the dynamics of hate crime remains the method of comparing statistics for each country individually, without attempting to compare all monitoring countries in terms of the number of crimes committed and reported. Such an analysis makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of the authorities' policies to combat such crimes in a relatively effective manner. It is important to compare not only the total number of hate crimes in different years, but also the ratio to violent crimes (where such statistics exist), since when crime rates are high, low statistics on violent acts indicate that the authorities have managed to contain the violence by suppressing the spread of hatred, for example on the Internet. And vice versa.

Let's look at hate crimes in monitoring countries separately by the each country of the Monitoring..

UNITED KINGDOM.

For the most part, we see a direct link between the rise in such crimes and high-profile Islamist terrorist attacks. For example, between March and June 2017 in the UK (*see Figure 6*) there was a significant increase in racially and religiously motivated hate crimes immediately following the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Manchester and London.

During the reporting period, the UK saw a steady but stable increase in overall hate crime rates in 2017-19 - up 17% in March 2017/2018, 10% in March 2018/2019 and a decline in the trend to 1.6% in 2019/2020.⁴⁰⁷ A more stable trend was observed in violent hate crime.

⁴⁰⁶ See: "Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации", онлайн:

http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/


⁴⁰⁷ UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017/18', London: HM Government, 16 October 2018, online at:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf; UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2018/19', London: HM Government, 15 October 2019, online at:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/839172/hate-crime-1819-hosb2019.pdf

The UK Home Office states that racially motivated hate crime is the largest component of these offences (76% in 2017-2018, 76% in 2018-2019 and 72% in 2019-2020). Importantly, sexual orientation (27% in 2017/2018, 25% in 2018/2019 and 19% in 2019/2020), transgender identity (32% in 2017/2018, 37% in 2018/2019 and 16% in 2019/2020) and disability (30% in 2017/2018, 14% in 2018/2019 and 9% in 2019/2020) were the largest increases in this sector. This can be attributed to a greater awareness of both subjects and police of the reporting mechanisms and an understanding of how they would proceed, should such incidents occur, in the Court.⁴⁰⁸

Figure 6: Dynamics of Hate crime in England & Wales 2013-2020⁴⁰⁹



Outside events clearly influenced the surge in racially motivated hate crime - the Brexit referendum in 2016 and the Islamist terrorist attacks in the UK in 2017, which resulted in 62,685 and 71,251 reported crimes since March 2016, are evidence of this.⁴¹⁰ There have been also spikes in subsequent years, most significantly in June and July 2020 following the

[-crime-1819-hosb2419.pdf](#); & UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019/20', London: HM Government, 28 October 2020, online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020>.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017/18', London: HM Government, 16 October 2018, online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf & UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2018/19', London: HM Government, 15 October 2019, online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/839172/hate-crime-1819-hosb2419.pdf

Black Lives Matters protests and counter-protests by far-right groups in England and Wales following the death of George Floyd on 25 May in the US.⁴¹¹

The clear drop in the trend in Hate crime in 2019-20 suggests that post-Brexit hate levels have started to fall, as indicated above, people have gained confidence that the uncontrolled influx of immigrants is coming to an end. The mood of radical right-wing residents has begun to change and the number of such crimes has gone down along with the decline in Xenophobia, as we saw in Chapter 3.

It should also be added that the proportion of crimes committed online was 2% of all reported crimes in 2018,⁴¹² indicating that a significant proportion of acts related to spreading hatred against social groups remain outside the scope of the Law.

In addition to the officially reported statistics, the Period under review saw a marked increase in Hate crimes reported by victims to outside non-governmental agencies. The Community Security Trust (CST), a body specifically set up to protect the UK Jewish community, reported that it also recorded its second-highest annual rate of anti-Semitic incidents in January-June 2018.⁴¹³ Specifically, the CST recorded 122 anti-Semitic attacks and 78 incidents of damage and desecration of Jewish property.⁴¹⁴ In particular, anti-Semitic attacks on social media, as well as through anti-Semitic literature produced en masse or sent via email, saw the largest increase. The CST was unable to identify with certainty any one factor that had contributed to the increase in offending. However, the 2018 data report suggests that the ongoing controversy over anti-Semitism in the UK Labour Party may have been one such factor. In 2019, the CST recorded an all-time high number of incidents after 2018 - with a slight drop in 2020 - all again consistent with the discourse about Jews and anti-Semitism in the news concerning the UK Labour Party.⁴¹⁵

The number of hate crimes in Scotland fell by 7% in 2018/19 compared to 2017/18, with 4,914 cases. Of these, 2,880 were racially motivated hate crimes, 1,216 were LGBT hate crimes, 529 were religiously motivated hate crimes, and 289 were crimes motivated by hatred towards people with disabilities.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹¹ UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019/20', London: HM Government, 28 October 2020, online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020>.

⁴¹² UK Home Office, 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017/18', London: HM Government, 16 October 2018, online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf

⁴¹³ Community Security Trust, 'Anti-Semitic Incidents: Report 2018', 2019, online at: <https://cst.org.uk/data/file/2/9/Incidents%20Report%202018%20-%20web.1549538710.pdf>, p.4.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Community Security Trust, 'Anti-Semitic Incidents: Report 2019', 2019, online at: <https://cst.org.uk/data/file/9/0/IncidentsReport2019.1580815723.pdf>. & Community Security Trust 'Anti-Semitic Incidents: January-June 2020', 2020, online at: <https://cst.org.uk/data/file/c/5/Incidents%20Report%20Jan-Jun%202020-1.1596720071.pdf>.

⁴¹⁶ Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal Service, "Hate Crime in Scotland, 2018-19", online at: <https://www.copfs.gov.uk/media-site/media-releases/1845-hate-crime-in-scotland-2018-19#:~:text=The%20main%20findings%20are%3A,became%20available%20in%202003%20D04.>

There was an increase in hate crime in Scotland in 2019/20 with 5'612 cases, up 12.4% on the previous reporting period. There were 3'038 racist crimes, up 4% on 2018/19, 1'509 reported LGBT hate crimes, up 19% on a year ago, 660 religious hate crimes (+20%) and disability hate crimes rose to 387 (+25%).⁴¹⁷

FRANCE.

The sharp increase in crime, especially violent crime, in France (*see Figure 7*) is linked to data on crimes against Christians that were added to our statistics in 2018-19. These crimes differ from others in that the number of violent crimes (mainly vandalism against property of religious communities) there is dramatically higher than the number of non-violent crimes. In addition, there has been a sharp increase in the number of calls to the police by LGBT victims, which has been linked to the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the Medical Assisted Procreation Act for lesbian and single women, which was passed in 2020 after a long debate.⁴¹⁸

According to government sources, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in France increased by 27% in 2019 compared to 2018. Of the 687 reported incidents, the number of violent acts in this sector has decreased (151) and the number of threats has increased (536). Recall that these figures are clearly disproportionate to the small number of Jews in France, who make up less than 1% of the population.

The number of racist incidents was 1,142, an increase of +132%. There were not as many anti-Muslim incidents (154), but their number is increasing (+ 54%). Of these, 63 were crimes of a violent nature - two shootings in mosques, in Brest (June 2019) ⁴¹⁹and Bayonne, where two old worshippers were seriously injured.⁴²⁰

The issue of anti-Christian attacks in monitoring countries in general and France in particular is very poorly researched. 1'052 such a crimes were reported in 2019 (1'063 in 2018). There were 996 reported violent acts and 56 threats. The leadership of the Catholic Church in the country attributes this to the fact that most of the actions are actually committed by thieves who break into church premises to steal money or valuables. In November 2019, thieves even used heavy vehicles to demolish the main gate of the Cathedral in the town of Oloron-Saint-Marie: a method commonly used by terrorists. The conservative Catholic website Aletheia reports on one mass desecration of about 100 graves in the

⁴¹⁷ Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal Service, "Hate Crime in Scotland, 2019-20", online at: <https://www.copfs.gov.uk/media-site-news-from-copfs/1887-hate-crime-in-scotland-2019-20#:~:text=Racial%20crime%20remains%20the%20most,percent%20compared%20to%202018%2D19.>


⁴¹⁸ Projet de loi relatif à la bioéthique (SSAX1917211L), online: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/dossierlegislatif/JORFDOLE000038811571/>

⁴¹⁹ "Fusillade devant la mosquée de Brest : ce que contient la lettre laissée par le tireur présumé", *Ouest France*, <https://www.ouest-france.fr/bretagne/brest-29200/mosquee-de-brest-le-geste-d-un-desequilibre-6421069>

⁴²⁰ "Augmentation générale des actes racistes et antisémites en France en 2019", *Le Monde*, online: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/01/27/en-2019-hausse-des-actes-racistes-et-antisemites-en-france_6027341_3224.html

cemetery of Cognac.⁴²¹ The ideological reasons for those crimes which were not committed by thieves are poorly understood: some experts tend to think they were committed by anarchists or satanists.⁴²²

Figure 7: Dynamics of Hate crime in France in 2014-2019.⁴²³



Regarding attacks on LGBT persons, according to Government data, 1,870 cases were recorded in 2019, compared to 1'380 in 2018.⁴²⁴ 28% of these incidents were acts of violence and 33% were threats, for 39% the form of the crime was not specified.

At the same time, on 18 June 2020, the French National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) published in 2019 its Report on combating Racism, anti-Semitism and Xenophobia, which diverges from other data in estimating the number of Hate crime in the country. Thus, the Commission estimates that a total of 5,730 hate crimes were committed in 2019. 5,730, which is 825 more cases than the Government has indicated. The CNCDH, however, always has different statistics from those of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 2018,

⁴²¹ "1.052 actes antichrétiens recensés en France en 2019", online: <https://fr.aleteia.org/2020/01/27/1-052-actes-antichretiens-recenses-en-2019/>

⁴²² L'Observatoire de la Christianophobie, online: <https://www.christianophobie.fr/>


⁴²³ See: Gouvernement, "Bilan 2018 des actes racistes, antisémites, antimusulmans et antichrétiens", 12 février 2019, online: <https://www.gouvernement.fr/bilan-2018-des-actes-racistes-antisemites-antimusulmans-et-antichretiens>; Ministère De L'Intérieur, "Statistiques 2019 des actes antireligieux, antisémites, racistes et xénophobes", online: <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/Communiqués/Statistiques-2019-des-actes-antireligieux-antisemites-racistes-et-xenophobes>

⁴²⁴ "Les actes homophobes ou transphobes ont connu une hausse en 2019", *Le Monde*, online: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/05/16/les-actes-homophobes-ou-transphobes-ont-connu-une-hausse-en-2019_6039893_3224.html

for example, they reported 5,170 crimes (3,580 according to the Government). Meanwhile, it estimates the number of violent crimes in 2019 at 540 cases.⁴²⁵

ITALY.

Figure 8: Dynamics of Hate crime in Italy, 2014-2019. ⁴²⁶



Given that, compared to previous periods, there has not been a dramatic increase in Xenophobia in Italy, the significant increase in Violent crime in 2018-19 indicates an improvement in the recording of crimes by the police rather than a serious deterioration in the actual crime situation.

Nevertheless, the low difference between violent and non-violent crimes in the period under review suggests that the authorities are not responding to the spread of hatred, preferring to deal specifically with violence, which takes hate-motivated acts outside the scope of legislation and law enforcement practice.

In 2019, of all 1,119 hate crimes, there were recorded 310 involved incitement to violence, 241 - involved physical violence, and one case involved a murder. The main target group was Immigrants and, more generally, foreigners. Among these crimes, incitement to violence, desecration of graves, physical attacks and threats were the most frequent. The second

⁴²⁵ "Racisme, antisémitisme et xénophobie : quelle situation en France en 2019 ?", online: <https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/274826-racisme-antisemitisme-et-xenophobie-en-france-en-2019>

⁴²⁶ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Italy, online at: <https://www.hatecrime.osce.org/italy>.


target group to which the perpetrators directed their aggression was People with disabilities.⁴²⁷

Although the number of hate crimes has increased in Italy over the last two years (2018-2020). The Research conducted in 2019 showed that Italians believe that the measures taken by the Italian authorities to combat discrimination are quite effective.⁴²⁸ It seems that the authorities are increasingly aware of the danger of rising crime. In any case, in October 2019, the Italian Senate voted to create a special Committee to combat racial hatred, headed by Holocaust survivor Senator Liliana Segre.

POLAND.

Since 2016 there has been a decrease in the overall number of hate crimes recorded in Poland (see Figure 9). Until 2019, this was also accompanied by a decrease in violent crime, indicating the effectiveness of law enforcement. However, the increase in Violent crimes in 2019 by more than 100% is an alarming signal, as it indicates that the police are either not registering all hate crimes, or that the level of radicalization of the population as well as the activity of extremist groups is actually increasing.

Figure 9: Dynamics of Hate crime in Poland, 2015-2019.⁴²⁹



⁴²⁷ Statista, "Number of hate crimes recorded by the police in Italy in 2019, by type", online: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/660660/hate-crimes-recorded-by-the-police-italy-by-type/>.

⁴²⁸ Statista, "Opinion on an Extraordinary Commission to combat all forms of racism, anti-Semitism, incitement to hatred and violence in Italy in 2019", online: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1068249/opinion-on-an-extraordinary-commission-against-racism>.

⁴²⁹ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Poland, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/poland>;

It is likely that both statements are true. The rather high level of Xenophobia in Polish society, as well as the claims of the Polish Ombudsman, confirmed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights data on the actual scale of hate crime in Poland, primarily against Ukrainians, immigrants from African countries, and Muslim countries, prove this. In their view, it far exceeds the official statistics.

The Office of the Ombudsman (BO) and the OSCE estimate that the police record only 5% (!) of all hate crimes. In addition, the scale of the crimes themselves is increasing.⁴³⁰ A report on a survey conducted by BO and OSCE/ODIHR was published in December 2018. The fieldwork took place between 5 February and 6 June 2018. A group of 273 Ukrainians (Kraków), 194 Muslims, and 176 sub-Saharan Africans (Warsaw) were asked to describe "criminal events they had experienced in 2016 and 2017 in Poland and to indicate any offences that had the characteristics of hate crimes". (...) Of all the communities surveyed, sub-Saharan Africans were the most affected by hate crime (43%). Of the Ukrainians surveyed, 18.5% said they had been victims of such crimes. As well as 8% of Muslims, they reported that they had suffered from it. In all groups the most common type is insult, cited by 17% of Ukrainian respondents, 7% of Muslim respondents, and 38% of African respondents. Physical aggression also appeared to affect African nationals the most, with 17% reporting that they had been physically assaulted.⁴³¹

GERMANY.


The analysis of information on hate crime in Germany (*see Figure 10*) is still complicated by the fact that the authorities include these statistics in the broader concept of "politically motivated crimes". As a consequence, racist incidents and cases of institutional discrimination have to be found in more general statistics. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the same crime can be counted several times in Germany - for example, an attack on a refugee from Syria can be classified as a crime against foreigners and, at the same time, against refugees and Muslims.

Overall, we can state that after the unprecedented rise in hate crime during the height of the migration crisis and the equally unprecedented drop in these crimes in 2017, when the country saw a turning point and the authorities brought the situation under control, life is gradually returning to a normal rhythm. A slight rise in violent crime rates in 2018 was offset by a nearly 16% drop in hateful violence in 2019. Overall, it can be stated that the authorities are definitely in control and are cracking down hard on bias-related offences.

⁴³⁰ Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, "Jedynie 5% przestępstw motywowanych nienawiścią jest zgłaszanych na policję - badania RPO i ODIHR/OBWE", online: <https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/jedynie-5-przestepstw-motywowanych-nienawiscia-jest-zglaszanych-na-policje-badania-rpo-i-odihrobwe>.

⁴³¹ Ipsos, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich. "Survey on the nature and scale of unreported hate crimes against members of selected communities in Poland Survey report", p.4, online: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/8/412445.pdf>.

Figure 10. Dynamics of Hate crime in Germany, 2014-2019.⁴³²



In 2018, there were 48 attacks on mosques if only physical damage to property or violent acts are counted. Under a broader interpretation of 'attack' (see below), the number of such manifestations reached 184.⁴³³ The total number of attacks on mosques, houses of worship, and Muslim cultural centres, as well as on members of the country's Muslim population with anti-Islamic overtones - 813 cases.⁴³⁴ According to the leadership of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, not all of the victims have reported to the police, so the actual number of such crimes must be higher.⁴³⁵

In 2019, there were 110 attacks on mosques only⁴³⁶ and 871 hate crimes against Muslims.⁴³⁷ The *brandeilig.org* initiative keeps its own statistics on attacks on mosques, according to which around 100 such crimes have already been committed in 2020 (end of November). By

⁴³² OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Germany, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany>; Bundeskriminalamt, "Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2019 Bundesweite Fallzahlen", 12. Mai 2020, s.4, online: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2020/pmk-2019.pdf;jsessionid=B600530ABFD066DA33BB4334F1CF1209.1_cid364?_blob=publicationFile&v=11

⁴³³ "Islamfeindlichkeit: Mehr Angriffe, kaum Konsequenzen", 27. Februar 2020, online: <https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Islamfeindlichkeit-Mehr-Angriffe-kaum-Konsequenzen-4669057.html>

⁴³⁴ Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 19/17069 19. Wahlperiode, 06.02.2020, "Antimuslimischer Rassismus und Diskriminierung von Muslimen in Deutschland", online: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/170/1917069.pdf>

⁴³⁵ Marion Trimborn, "MUSLIMS IN GERMANY. More than 570 attacks on Muslims and mosques since the beginning of the year", *Neue OZ*, 13.12.2018, online: <https://www.noz.de/deutschland-welt/politik/artikel/1608908/mehr-als-570-angriffe-auf-muslime-und-moscheen-seit-jahresbeginn>

⁴³⁶ Fabian Goldmann, "Mehr Angriffe auf Moscheen. Muslimische Organisationen fordern Polizeischutz, der Heimatminister wiegelt ab", *ND*, 07.07.2020., online: <https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/1131093.muslime-mehr-angriffe-auf-moscheen.html>

⁴³⁷ Quantara.de, "2019 gab es in Deutschland fast 900 Angriffe auf Muslime", online: <https://de.qantara.de/content/2019-gab-es-in-deutschland-fast-900-angriffe-auf-muslime>

"attack", the group's activists, like most human rights defenders, mean a wide range of illegal actions, including right-wing extremist graffiti, protests in front of mosques with right-wing slogans, damage to doors, windows or walls, arson, and actions that deliberately insult the dignity of believers. Examples from 2020: attempts to prevent prayers at the mosque in Magdeburg (May), damage to property at a mosque in Nordenham (August), swastikas on the wall of a mosque in Berlin (October) and other manifestations.⁴³⁸

German NGO, which independently keep statistics on manifestations of hatred and discrimination against minorities, traditionally provide different, higher data. They recorded Xenophobic leaflets, stickers, graffiti and stickers, verbal abuse on public transport and in the street, discrimination in state institutions, etc. For example, the Berlin Registry for the Documentation of Right-wing extremism and Discrimination cited 3,277 cases of racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Roma manifestations, far-right expressions, hatred against Muslims, hatred against the LGBTQ community, discrimination against persons with disabilities, social Chauvinism, and the glorification of Nazism in its final report for 2019.⁴³⁹ In 2018, 3,405 cases were recorded.⁴⁴⁰ NGOs are in a better position to capture such manifestations, as victims show more trust in NGOs than in official Law enforcement agencies.

THE NETHERLANDS.

The Netherlands is one of the most difficult countries in terms of disclosing information on extremist crimes. According to data provided by its Government to the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 3,299 hate crimes occurred there in 2018, down 7.7% from 2017. The number of crimes fell by another almost 39% in 2019, a record of sorts in Europe. Since the state does not provide data on violent hate crimes, we can use data from NGOs. In particular, data from the Kantor Center in Tel- Aviv on the Netherlands, published by ODIHR, speaks of 49 violent hate crimes in 2019.⁴⁴¹ All in all, this allows us to conclude that the hate crime situation in this country is developing in a positive scenario.

Nevertheless, several terrorism-related crimes were committed in the Netherlands in 2019. On 18 March 2019, for example, a man shot random tram passengers in Utrecht, killing four of them and seriously injuring two. In a handwritten note left at the scene of the attack and during later interviews with a police investigator, he cited religious motives for his actions, including the alleged derision of the country's indigenous people about Islam. Immediately after the attack, the Government briefly raised the terrorist threat level in Utrecht to "critical", the highest level. The prosecutor charged the man, *Gokmen Tanis*, with multiple counts of murder with terrorist intent.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁸ Initiative gegen Moscheeangriffe, online: <https://brandeilig.org/category/brandeilig/year/2020/>

⁴³⁹ Register Berlin, "Jahresbericht 2019 der Berliner Register erschienen", online:

<https://berliner-register.de/content/jahresbericht-2019-der-berliner-register-erschienen>


⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Ministry of Justice and Security. National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, "NCTV Terrorist Threat Assessment: an attack is conceivable, with the threat posed mainly by lone actors", online at:

<https://english.nctv.nl/topics/terrorist-threat-assessment-netherlands/news/2020/11/03/nctv-terrorist-threat-assessment-an-attack-is-conceivable-with-the-threat-posed-mainly-by-lone-actors>

Figure 11. Dynamics of Hate crime in the Netherlands, 2014-2019.⁴⁴³



On 23 July 2019, a District Court in The Hague found *Oussama Ahraf Ahlaf*, who returned from the Netherlands, guilty of committing a war crime in Syria. The suspect was photographed posing next to a crucified corpse, thereby degrading the personal dignity of the victim. The court sentenced the suspect to seven and a half years in prison.⁴⁴⁴

On 14 October 2019, an Amsterdam district court convicted 20-year-old *Javed Sultani* for stabbing two American tourists at Amsterdam Central Station on 31 August 2018. The court found him guilty on two counts of attempted murder with terrorist intent and sentenced him to 26 years and eight months in prison (the maximum for the charge), as well as paying nearly \$3.5 million in damages to the victims. Sultani, who was born in Afghanistan and lives in Germany as an asylum seeker, went to the Netherlands to carry out the attack because he believed politician *Geert Wilders* was insulting his religion.⁴⁴⁵

On 18 November 2019, a district court in The Hague convicted Junaid Iqbal, 27, a Pakistani national, for planning a terrorist attack on politician *Geert Wilders* and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. In August 2018, Iqbal travelled to The Hague and posted a video on 'Taseboot' threatening to kill Wilders after the latter announced a cartoon competition for the Prophet Muhammad.⁴⁴⁶

Thus, we see that, on the one hand, the actions of Islamic extremists provoke right-wing

⁴⁴³ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Netherlands, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/netherlands>

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.


radicals to retaliate, and, on the other hand, the provocations of the far-right lead to acts of terror by the Islamists.

In addition to the above, in 2019, Dutch courts convicted seven people for financing terrorism in Syria and sentenced them to nine months' of imprisonment. As of December 2019, the Government's national terrorist watch lists list 139 individuals and four organizations whose assets have been frozen.⁴⁴⁷

SPAIN.

Although data collection has improved considerably in recent years, underreporting of hate crime in *Spain* remains an acute problem. This makes it difficult to get a complete picture.⁴⁴⁸

Figure 12. Dynamics of Hate crime in Spain, 2016-2019⁴⁴⁹



It is estimated that the majority of hate crimes are not reported and are therefore not included in official data. Since 2013, the Ministry of the Interior has published an official report containing information on hate crime every year. Meanwhile, the total number of reported crimes has steadily increased: from 1,172 in 2013 to 1,706 in 2019.⁴⁵⁰ In 2018, the total number was 1,598 (up from 1,419 in the previous year). In 2019, an increase to 1,706 was recorded.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ María Álvarez Del Vayo, "El odio que no se cuenta", 4 July 2019, online <https://civio.es/2019/07/04/el-odio-que-no-se-cuenta/>

⁴⁴⁹ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Spain, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/spain>

⁴⁵⁰ Ministerio Del Interior, "Informe sobre la evolución de los delitos de odio en España", 2013, online: <http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/642012/3479677/Informe+sobre+los+delitos+de+odio+en+Espa%C3%B1a+2013.pdf/6f10f526-80f7-47a0-911b-d27c61c6cf40>

In terms of evolution by the type of hate crime, anti-Semitism remains the rarest in Spain (9 crimes in 2018 and 5 in 2019), while racism and Xenophobia are among the highest (426 in 2018 and 515 in 2019). There were recorded 69 hate crimes against religion in 2018 and 66 in 2019, respectively. Meanwhile, there is no separate section on Islamophobic hate crimes in the statistics. It is true that in 2019 the category "crimes against Roma" was included in the statistics for the first time (14 crimes of this type were recorded), which was a positive and welcome step. In addition to the official statistics, some civil society organizations, such as SOS Racism or Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, also collect data. This organization estimates that about 4,000 hate crimes and incidents take place in Spain every year.⁴⁵¹

RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Russia experienced two serious drops in the overall number of hate crimes - in 2018 and 2019. According to the experts, these were caused by the decriminalization of Art. 282 of the Russian Criminal Code "Incitement to Hatred or Enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity". The punishment of imprisonment for the first offence of distributing extremist materials and displaying prohibited symbols was replaced by Federal Law No. 521-FZ with an administrative fine.⁴⁵² The liberalization mainly concerned the first part of Article 282, i.e. minor acts, such as 'likes' on the Internet, careless statements on social networks, display of extremist symbols, etc. The Law came into force in 2019, but investigators already at the end of 2018, knowing about the forthcoming reform, preferred not to initiate criminal proceedings under this Article.

In both 2018 and 2019, violent crime statistics were largely unaffected - their numbers continued to decline in line with a tradition established since 2015. For example, while in 2018 the total number of extremist crimes was 1,265 cases, of which 73 were violent (including terrorism), in 2019 the ratio was 585 to 74.

In addition, the already mentioned data on administrative cases related to Article 20.29 of the Administrative Offenses Code "Dissemination of extremist materials" can be cited. In 2018, 1,964 people were punished under this Article, in 2019 - 1,591, and in the first six months of 2020 - 856.⁴⁵³ Thus, in general, there is a reduction in both criminal and administrative cases under "light" anti-extremist articles.


Considering that the number of violent crimes has not increased for two years, it can be concluded that the authorities have the situation under control.

⁴⁵¹ Movimiento contra la Intolerancia. Informe Raxen Racismo, Xenofobia, Antisemitismo, Islamofobia, Neofascismo y otras manifestaciones de Intolerancia a través de los hechos Especial 2018, online: <http://www.informeraxen.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/RAXEN-ESPECIAL-2018.pdf>

⁴⁵² Федеральный закон от 27 декабря 2018 г. N 521-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в Кодекс Российской Федерации об административных правонарушениях", онлайн: <https://rg.ru/2018/12/29/fz-521-dok.html>

⁴⁵³ Судебный департамент при Верховном суде РФ. Данные судебной статистики, Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России, онлайн: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=4759>, <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=5259>, <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=5460>

Figure 13. Dynamics of Hate crime in Russia, 2014-2019.⁴⁵⁴



If to speak about Xenophobic attacks, in 2018 the monitoring recorded 6 deaths and 29 victims, in 2019 - 6 deaths and 58 victims, in 2020 (in 11 months) 1 deaths and 25 victims. Despite the fact that every such attack is a tragedy, it can be stated that the number of attacks is still at a low level compared to the second half of the noughties, when the number of deaths sometimes exceeded a hundred per year and the number of victims was in the hundreds.⁴⁵⁵

The two largest cities in the country - Moscow (and the Moscow Region, which in fact represents a single region with it) and St Petersburg (and the Leningrad Region) - remain the main centers where such crimes have been committed. Another notable trend in recent years is an increase in attacks against LGBT people, which corresponds to the level of homophobia in the country (see Chapter 3). In 2018 hate crime victims included (or were perceived to be LGBT or suffered because they tried to protect them) one dead and four injured (approximately 8% of all victims), in 2019 three dead and 13 injured (i.e. a quarter of all victims), and in 2020 11 injured (i.e. 40% of victims).⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁴ Генеральная прокуратура Российской Федерации. Портал правовой статистики. Зарегистрировано преступлений экстремистской направленности, онлайн: http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart

⁴⁵⁵ Московское Бюро по Правам Человека, "Агрессивная ксенофобия: краткие итоги 2009 г., онлайн: <http://pravorf.org/index.php/smi-review/204-mbhr-short-review-2009>

⁴⁵⁶ See in detail: <http://www.xgay.ru/news/rainbow/2020/12/09-43215.htm>, https://www.znak.com/2020-09-25/sud_arestoval_obvinyaemogo_v_nhttp://www.xgay.ru/news/rainbow/2020/12/10-43220.htm, <https://lgbt.net.org/ru/newseng/kurskaya-policiya-otkazyvaetsya-vozbuzhdad-delo-po-faktu-izbieniya-transgendernogo-cheloveka>, <https://7x7-journal.ru/news/2020/07/27/v-arhangelske-policiya-vozbudila-delo-v-otnoshenii-kassira-supermarketa-za-izbienie-lgbt-aktivistovapadenii-na-geev-v-ekaterinburge>, <https://www.idelreal.org/a/30855586.html>, https://www.e1.ru/news/spool/news_id-69492135.html, <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/734870>, <https://paperpaper.ru/muzhskoe-gosudarstvo-i-dvach-travya/>, <https://zona.media/news/2020/02/26/zalina>, <https://openmedia.io/news/n2/blogger-olya-tykva-soobshhila-cto->

The number of xenophobically motivated acts of vandalism also remains small and is gradually decreasing. According to the RF Prosecutor General's Office, there were 4 acts of vandalism in 2018 and 6 in 2019. However, according to non-governmental organizations, there were 36 such acts in 2018, 31 in 2019, and 24 in 2020 (in 11 months). Moreover, unlike the situation with Xenophobic attacks, acts of vandalism are not concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg - in 2018 they were noted in 25 regions, 23 regions, in 2020 - in 12 regions (St. Petersburg was the place of concentration of such incidents this year - seven were noted there). Anti-Semitic incidents are significant among them (9 in 2018, 8 in 2019 and 4 in 2020).⁴⁵⁷

The second highest number of attacks were incidents targeting Orthodox churches, worship crosses, etc. (9 in 2018, 4 in 2019). In 2020 the anti-Orthodox incidents were at the top of the list, with six cases. In terms of anti-Muslim vandalism, there was 1 incident each in 2018 and 2019 and two incidents in 2020. Protestant-owned sites and Buddhist temples each had one incident in all three years. In 2019 there was one anti-Chinese incident, one anti-Catholic incident, one incident targeting Crimean Tatars and in 2020 there was one incident targeting Pagans. Two acts of anti-Caucasian vandalism were also noted in 2018, with another such act recorded in 2020.⁴⁵⁸ Two incidents targeting Jehovah's Witnesses were reported in 2019. The direction of the remaining acts of vandalism could not be established.⁴⁵⁹

ej-i-eyo-blizkim-ugrozhayut-fanaty-muzhskogo-gosudarstva, <https://zona.media/news/2020/09/23/ussr-still-kills>, <https://www.nsk.kp.ru/online/news/4052137>

⁴⁵⁷ See in detail: <https://www.facebook.com/ilya.raskin.16/posts/154717804205622>, <https://mr-7.ru/articles/174689/>, <https://www.city-n.ru/view/407982.html>, <https://prokuror-eao.ru/po-faktu-izobrazheniya-natsistskoj-svastiki-na-fasade-zhilogo-doma-prokuraturoj-goroda-birobidzhana-prinyaty-mery-reagirovaniya>, <https://stmegi.com/posts/61786/v-istoricheskoy-rezidentsii-glav-khabada-poyavilis-antisemitskie-graffiti/>, <https://v102.ru/news/91897.html>, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3991751/>, <https://29.xn-b1aew.xn--p1ai/news/item/12422120/>, <https://qha.com.ua/ru/proisshestviya/na-gore-chatirdag-v-okkupirovannom-krimu-spilili-pravoslavni-krest/190404/>, <https://62.xn-b1aew.xn--p1ai/news/item/12915050/>, <https://www.newsru.com/religy/13aug2018/karel.html>, <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=70978>, <http://stv24.tv/novosti/vandaly-izurodovali-chyornoj-svastikoj-poklonnyj-krest-na-meste-drevnejshago-v-stavropolskom-krae-xrama/>, <https://66.ru/news/society/216456/>, <https://xn-b1aew.xn--p1ai/news/item/14906161>, <http://rk.karelia.ru/accident/vandaly-razgromili-tserkov/>


⁴⁵⁸ See in detail: <https://vn.ru/news-ogromnuyu-svastiku-narisovali-vandaly-v-skvere-sibiryakov-gvardeytssev/>, <https://tvernews.ru/news/244800/>, <https://novostivolgograda.ru/news/incident/18-09-2019/pod-volgogradom-zaderzhan-oskvernitel-memorialnogo-znaka-v-pamyat-o-rasstrele-evreev>, https://astrakhanpost.ru/pod-astraxanyu-vandaly-razgromili-musulmanskie-mogily/?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop, https://www.interfax.ru/moscow/646063?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop, <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=72223>, <https://prichod.ru/opyt-prihodov/34085/>, <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=73443>, <https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/6557700>, <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=73709>, https://www.sibreal.org/a/30365724.html?fbclid=IwAR1bXFh3B-uwXK1qYiMqjgDFC1e_ccyBB3uLFhHR6nyo64JXElyQldhkB2s, <https://fedpress.ru/news/86/society/2175203>, <https://www.bankfax.ru/news/131801/>, <https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2019/05/10/151548-v-sevastopole-vozbudili-delo-o-vandalizme-posle-povrezhdeniya-memoriala-uchastnikam-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny>.

⁴⁵⁹ See in detail: <https://zona.media/news/2020/07/29/ferma>, <https://lechain.ru/news/napadeniya-antisemita-na-evrejskuyu-obshinu-na-vostoke-moskvy/>, <https://ura.news/news/1052433594>, <https://realnoevremya.ru/news/178418-v-elektrogorske-vandaly-povredili-musulmanskiy-centr>, <https://www.fontanka.ru/2020/04/08/69079270/>, https://vk.com/wall65162828_9921, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/01/27/boga_net/, <https://moe-online.ru/news/city/1059947>, <https://www.fontanka.ru/2020/04/08/69077932/>, <https://tvk6.ru/publications/news/49585/>, <https://78.ru/news/2020-02-01/podzhog-hrama-apostola-petra-v-veslom-poslke-popal-na-video>.

UKRAINE.

Figure 14 presents data on hate crime in Ukraine reported by Ukrainian official Representatives in the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). This data differs from the official data of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, which also, like the official OSCE data, does not include violent crimes.⁴⁶⁰

Figure 14. Dynamics of Hate crime in Ukraine, 2014-2019.⁴⁶¹



Nevertheless, data from two NGOs - the Ukrainian "Nash Svit" and the Israeli "Kantor Center" at Tel Aviv University - provide an approximate figure for such crimes in 2019 - 162 cases.⁴⁶²

A primary analysis of even the approximate data suggests that such a small difference between the total number of hate crime and violent Xenophobic crimes suggests that a significant proportion of crimes, especially those of a non-violent nature, are not being recorded. The second conclusion is that the authorities do not respond appropriately to hate speech, which leads to the radicalization of the population. This is also indicated by the low

<https://ufa.mk.ru/incident/2020/11/05/posle-prizyva-obshhestvennoy-aktivistki-neizvestnye-podozhgli-krest-v-beloreckom-rayone.htm>, <https://vecherka.su/articles/news/160866/>, https://vladnews.ru/2020-06-02/172868/vladivostoke_policija, <https://35.xn-b1aew.xn--p1ai/news/item/20943320/>, <https://komiinform.ru/news/195794>, http://lench.chel.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=press_dep&op=1&did=380 <https://nevnov.ru/810640-v-peterburge-avtory-ekstremistskikh-graffiti-otvetyat-za-vandalizm-v-sude>, <https://www.spb.kpru/online/news/3846562/>, <https://www.chel.kp.ru/daily/21712087/4322345/>, <https://nevnov.ru/816006-v-peterburge-avtorov-graffiti-so-svastikai-nachal-iskat-policija>, <https://jwruussia.news/news/2019/06/909.html>

⁴⁶⁰ Офіс Генерального Прокурора України. Статистична інформація, онлайн:

<https://old.gp.gov.ua/ua/statinfo.html>

⁴⁶¹ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Ukraine, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/ukraine>

⁴⁶² Ibid.

number of crimes that have reached a court.⁴⁶³ Only 18 cases or 2.84% of the 633 criminal cases initiated between 2015 and 2019 for such crimes reached court sentences.⁴⁶⁴

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During the period 2018-2020, the authors were not able to identify a single court verdict with a real term of imprisonment. All of the decisions found in the Court Register provided for either "reconciliation of the parties" or fines and other non-custodial penalties. Moreover, all of the verdicts we found in the time period concerned discrimination against citizens on the basis of religion, and the victims of discrimination were mostly Jehovah's Witnesses. Not a single conviction was found for discrimination on ethnic, linguistic, or other grounds.

If we look at the Statistics of crimes against specific social groups, the most affected were parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC), Jews, and members of the LGBT community. Separately, cases of vandalism of cemeteries and graves of victims of the Nazis and World War II heroes should be mentioned.

According to the LGBT Human Rights Centre, 106 cases of discrimination and offences against the LGBT community were recorded between January and August 2020.⁴⁶⁷ The largest number of cases, 67, involved insults, threats and humiliation, 45 cases of physical violence of various kinds, 10 cases of Homophobia in the family, 9 cases of illegal collection of confidential information, 7 cases of blackmail, damage to property and homophobic appeals. There was also one case each of murder and torture. The most frequent offences were committed in Kyiv, Odessa, Zhytomyr, and Kharkiv.

Separately, the public manifestations of hatred and prejudice against ethnic Russians and Jews living in Ukraine are worth mentioning. For example, an article by Grigory Omelchenko, Hero of Ukraine, Lieutenant General, and honorary Head of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, was published on the web-site "Ukraina Moloda" (*Young Ukraine*) in July 2020. He repeatedly stressed that a Russian or Jew cannot rule by Ukraine and, judging by the overall tone of the article, should "know their place in the Ukrainian Nation State".⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶³ See Chapter 2, p.19.

⁴⁶⁴ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Ukraine, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/ukraine>

⁴⁶⁵ See Chapter 2, p.19.


⁴⁶⁶ ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting: Ukraine, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/ukraine>

⁴⁶⁷ Правозахисний ЛГБТ Центр "Наш світ", онлайн: https://gay.org.ua/publications/Situation_of_LGBT_in_Ukraine_Jan-August_2020_UKR.pdf.

⁴⁶⁸ "Україна — держава українців, а не москалів: відкритий лист до Володимира Зеленського", *Україна Молода*, 14.07.20., онлайн: <https://umoloda.kyiv.ua/number/3612/188/148047/>.

CANADA.

Figure 15. Dynamics of Hate crime in Canada, 2015 -2019⁴⁶⁹



According to the Police of Canada, there were 1'817 hate crimes reported in 2018, down 12% from 2017, and 1'946 cases in 2019, which was already 6.63% more than a year before.⁴⁷⁰ The Government does not publish data on violent hate crime, but the "Kantor Centre" gives a figure of 42 crimes for 2019.⁴⁷¹ This ratio indicates, in principle, a stable situation, but if we look at the ratio of hate crime in the regions of Canada per 100,000 population, we see that Quebec and Ontario were the two Canadian provinces with the highest share of such crimes and the highest risks in 2019.⁴⁷²

It is important that the Canadian authorities are aware of the importance of combating hate crime and radicalization that ultimately leads to these crimes. Particular attention in this case is drawn to the Internet.⁴⁷³ However, going back to the 2018 Angus Reid Institute Survey in Quebec (see Chapter 2), we see that radical Islam (47%) and feelings of marginalization (34%) are identified as the main reasons for radicalization. Internet recruitment ranks third on this list. However, this only applies to Quebec so far. It should

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Statistics Canada. Police-reported hate crime, number of incidents and rate per 100,000 population, Census Metropolitan Areas, online at: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510019101>

⁴⁷¹ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Canada, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/canada>

⁴⁷² Statistics Canada. Police-reported hate crime, number of incidents and rate per 100,000 population, Census Metropolitan Areas, online at: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510019101>


⁴⁷³ Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada. "Canada joins Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online", May 15, 2019, online at: <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2019/05/15/canada-joins-christchurch-call-action-eliminate-terrorist-and-violent>

also be noted that, according to leading Canadian Hate crime researchers, between 80 and 85 per cent of hate crimes go unreported.⁴⁷⁴

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The number of hate crimes in the *United States* has increased by more than 24% in the last five years. While in 2015 there were 6,885 such crimes, in 2019 there were already 8,559 cases. Nevertheless, the situation has remained relatively stable from 2017 to 2019.⁴⁷⁵

Figure 16. Dynamics of Hate crime in the United States of America, 2015-2019⁴⁷⁶



According to the FBI, most of these crimes were violent in nature.⁴⁷⁷ Of the 8,559 crimes committed in 2019, 64.4% were crimes against the Persons; 32.8% against the Property; 2.8% against the Society; 9.6% in Schools and Colleges; and 4.4% in Churches, Synagogues, Temples, and Mosques.⁴⁷⁸

According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, perpetrators of hate crime vary in motives,

⁴⁷⁴ Jacky Habib, "Far-right extremist groups and hate crime rates are growing in Canada", online at: <https://www.cbc.ca/passionateeye/features/right-wing-extremist-groups-and-hate-crimes-are-growing-in-canada>

⁴⁷⁵ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. United States of America, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/united-states-america>

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ By virtue of the First Amendment to the Constitution in the US, as in many other countries in the OSCE area, it is not a crime to incite hatred against a social group without the purpose of violence against an individual - *author's note*.

⁴⁷⁸ The United States Department of Justice. Hate Crime Statistics. FBI Releases 2019 Hate Crime Statistics, online at: <https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics>

backgrounds, demographics, criminal history, and goals.⁴⁷⁹ Of the 6,406 known hate crime offenders, 52.5% were white American, 23.9% were African American, and 14.6% were persons whose race was not identified. 57.6% of hate crimes committed in the US in 2019 were motivated by race, ethnicity or descent; 20.1% by religion; 16.7% by sexual orientation; 2.7% by gender identity; 2% by disability and 0.9% by gender. The majority of hate crimes were occurred in California, New York, Washington DC, New Jersey, and Texas.⁴⁸⁰

Interestingly, in the months leading up to and immediately following Donald J. Trump's election in 2016, the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes increased and surpassed the number of crimes occurring after September 11, 2001.⁴⁸¹ Immediately after the 2016 election, the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes increased by 19%.⁴⁸²

According to the FBI, blacks, Jews, gays, and Hispanics saw the largest increase in hate crime in 2019.⁴⁸³ According to an analysis of FBI data by the University of California's Centre for the Study of Hate and Extremism (CSHE), the number of *hate murders* reached 51 in 2019, the highest number in almost 3 decades. The next highest number of hate murders occurred in 2018, when 24 murders were committed. The third highest number occurred in 1993 and 1995, with 20 murders in each of these periods.⁴⁸⁴

As already pointed out, the majority of hate murders in 2019 were committed by white supremacists (39 of 51 victims), including the 23 victims killed them in the August 3, 2019 by the mass shooting in El Paso, Texas.⁴⁸⁵

According to experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the terrorist threat in the U.S. is likely to worsen in 2021. The most significant terrorist threat comes from white supremacists, followed by anarchists and religious extremists inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁷⁹University of Maryland. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism "START", "Motivations and Characteristics of Hate Crime Offenders", online at: <https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/motivations-and-characteristics-hate-crime-offenders>

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Pew Research Center, "Assaults against Muslims in U.S. surpass 2001 level", online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/>

⁴⁸² US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, "2016 Hate Crime Statistics", online at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/18/cair-hate-crimes-against-muslims-spike-after-trump-win>.

⁴⁸³ The United States Department of Justice. 2019 Hate Crime Statistics, "About Hate Crime Statistics, 2019, online at: <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2019>

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.


⁴⁸⁵ Jessica Kwong, "Who is Patrick Crusius? El Paso Shooter Identified By Police", *Newsweek*, 8/3/19, online at: <https://www.newsweek.com/who-el-paso-shooter-1452468>

⁴⁸⁶ Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, June 2020, "The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States," online at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-terrorism-problem-united-states>.

GREECE.

According to official data, 164 hate crimes were registered in Greece in 2018.⁴⁸⁷ No data on violent crimes are available. In 2019, according to the Greek police, there were 282 such crimes, almost 72% more than in the previous year, and 52 violent crimes, 49% less than in 2017. This picture shows that the police paid significant attention to the problem in 2019, tackling the spread of hatred even at the non-violent stage. Suffice it to say that 92 criminal cases were opened for incitement to hatred, which, based on previous years' experience, is a lot for this country.

Figure 17. Dynamics of Hate crime in Greece, 2015-2019.



According to official data, 164 hate crimes were registered in Greece in 2018.⁴⁸⁸ No data on violent crimes are available. In 2019, according to the Greek police, there were 282 such crimes, almost 72% more than in the previous year, and 52 violent crimes, 49% less than in 2017. This picture shows that the police paid significant attention to the problem in 2019, tackling the spread of hatred even at the non-violent stage. Suffice it to say that 92 criminal cases were opened for incitement to hatred, which, based on previous years' experience, is a lot for this country.

Interestingly, NGOs reported only about 108 crimes in 2019. This also indicates that the police have become less secretive about these offences. Characteristically, of the 282 incidents, in 232 cases the police initiated criminal proceedings themselves after the crime was committed or after a complaint was filed by the victims, while in the remaining 50

⁴⁸⁷ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Greece, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/greece>

⁴⁸⁸ OSCE ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Greece, online at: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/greece>

incidents criminal proceedings were initiated on the instructions of the prosecution authorities who ordered a preliminary investigation.⁴⁸⁹

Thus, we have to conclude that there has been a generally small but steady increase in hate crime in the monitoring countries during the period under review. The most favorable situation, indicating the authorities' control over the radicalization of society, was in Germany, Russia, Greece, and the Netherlands. Certain risks are emerging in the United States, as already demonstrated by the BLM campaign, and in Poland, where, for various reasons, the proportion of violent crimes is increasing while the overall number of extremist crimes is falling.

CHAPTER 5. RADICALS AND EXTREMISTS.

There are the specific people behind any hate crime. These are either radical and extremist groups or the so-called "lone wolves", as they were characterized by the US Patriot Act in its 2005 edition, i.e. independent individuals who have been radicalized independently, for example on the Internet.⁴⁹⁰ Very conventionally, all extremist groups can be divided into right-wing, left-wing, and Islamist groups. This chapter focuses on two of them - right-wing radicals, and Islamists - because statistics show that the crimes committed by these two extremist groups outnumber those committed by left-wing radicals in both number and damage. It is right-wing radicals and Islamists that are responsible for terrorist acts with a high number of victims, murders, bodily injuries, and threats. Left-wing extremists are more likely to commit acts of vandalism and resist the police.

Different monitoring countries have their own assessments of the risks posed by right-wing radicalism and Islamic extremism. In many Western countries, such as the U.S., after the decline of right-wing extremism in the 1990s and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, experts and law enforcement agencies disproportionately shifted their attention from the right-wing extremism to the Islamic extremism.⁴⁹¹ As a result, these countries experienced a surge in right-wing extremist violence in the 10s of the 21st century. In the United States, for example, according to the Anti-Defamation League, far-right criminals were responsible for 98 per cent of all extremist murders in the country in 2018, although this is certainly not the case in all countries.⁴⁹²

The Radical Rights.

The political differentiation of radical rights and right-wing extremist organizations follows the structure of their social base. **The largest and most influential group** consists of *moderate radical-populist forces*, usually represented in central or more often local

⁴⁸⁹ Racist Violence Recording Network. Annual Report - 2019, online at: <http://rvrn.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ETHSIA-EKTHESH-2019-english.pdf>

⁴⁹⁰ Public Law No. 109-160 (30.12.2005), S. 2167. United States Congress.

⁴⁹¹ See: "Then and Now: Right-Wing Extremism in 1995 and 2015), Anti-Defamation League Report, 2015.

⁴⁹² The Anti-Defamation League Center on Extremism (2019) Murder and extremism in the United States in 2018, online at: <https://bit.ly/2VLy5If>; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/14/fbi-and-dhs-warned-of-growing-threat-from-white-supremacists-months-ago/>.

legislative bodies, who are Eurosceptics (in the EU), oppose refugees and migrants, but try to distance themselves from direct racist or otherwise discriminatory appeals against minorities (the exceptions, perhaps, are Muslims, who are associated with migrants, about whom there is a long-standing controversy in monitoring countries, and ethnic Russians in Ukraine, who are associated with aggressors by local nationalists). Behind them are frightened everyday people who have lost their jobs or income, or who simply have not accepted the changes in the socio-cultural environment resulting from the migration crisis, etc.

These forces are now widely or relatively well represented in parliaments in Italy (League of the North - 37.0% and Five Star Movement - M5S - 32.7% in the 2018 elections), Poland (Confederation for Freedom and Independence - 6.81% of the vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections (11 MPs),⁴⁹³ Spain (Vox (Voice) party - 14.3% of the vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections, 52 seats in parliament, España 2000 Party, retains some seats in local councils in the Madrid area), France (National Front - 13.2% of the vote in the last parliamentary elections), the Netherlands (Forum for Democracy (FvD) party - 15.08% in the last regional elections for Senate 2019, Freedom Party - 13.3% in the House of Representatives), Russia (Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) - 13.14% in the last parliamentary elections and Rodina Party - 1.5%), Ukraine (Svoboda Party, which has some representation in local government), Greece (Greek Solution Party - 4.18% in the 2019 European Parliament elections, 10 MPs in the country's parliament), and Germany (Alternative for Germany - AfD - 12.6 %). This also includes the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which essentially fulfilled its Programme by winning the Referendum on Brexit.

These parties advocate leaving or limiting their participation in the EU (in EU member states), stopping or limiting immigration, immediate deportation of illegal immigrants, strict State control of Muslim communities, etc. The popularity of these parties has increased in recent years due to factors such as the migration crisis, economic problems related to the transfer of industries to poor countries, etc. The moderation of these parties lies in the fact that, having entered the representative bodies on the wave of protest sentiments, they seek to retain and strengthen their positions and expand their electoral base. To do this, they try to make their ideology more attractive and acceptable, including to those social groups who were not their electorate before and even against whom they had previously opposed.

For example, Marine Le Pen was forced to radically change the ideology of her Party, making it quite tolerant towards Gays and Jews. For that she even expelled her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, from the Party. For example, in July 2020, she tweeted in memory of the victims of the Rafael du Vel d'Viv, the 1942 round-up of Parisian Jews that resulted in the deportation of over 13,000 people. In the same message, Le Pen assured that her Party was the best bulwark for Jews against the "new preachers of hatred" who are Islamists.⁴⁹⁴ The same can be said of

⁴⁹³ Результаты выборов 2019 года в польский парламент, PKW,

<https://sejmsenat2019.pkw.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/pl/wyniki/sejm/pl>

⁴⁹⁴ "Marine Le Pen salue la "mémoire" des victimes du Vel d'Hiv", *Le Point*, 16/07/2020, online:

https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-salue-la-memoire-des-victimes-du-vel-d-hiv-16-07-2020-2384573_20.php#

the Freedom Party in Netherlands, whose Leader has renounced anti-Semitism and sexism in his public speeches. The Russian moderate right-wing parties are developing in a similar vein and no longer mention the "Jewish conspiracy" in their speeches. Instead, they speak under the slogans "Stop humiliating Russians!" and "For the Russian people!" The "Rodina Party"⁴⁹⁵ advocates recognizing Russophobia as a "State crime similar to treason against the Motherland", demands the introduction of a visa regime "with all states provoking mass migration to Russia" and a "ruthless fight against any manifestations of ethnic criminality".⁴⁹⁶

However, these parties should not be hastily reclassified from "radical right" to "centre-right". Their birthmarks are still there, although they are stubbornly trying to hide them. The German Alternative for Germany (AfG) is a vivid example of this. It is currently represented in the Bundestag, all 16 Landtags, and in the overwhelming majority of municipalities. The Party dominates in the Right wing of legal politics in Germany. Realizing the necessity of changing its image to a more respectable one, the AfG Board decided in March 2020 to liquidate its most radical faction called "the Wing".⁴⁹⁷ However, this has had no effect on the position of the faction's leaders. They have not only relinquished their positions within the Party, but they have managed to defeat moderate Eurosceptic currents politically, becoming the main driving force in a number of Lands Party organizations. Björn Hecke, described by many observers as a "classical" right-wing extremist, was re-elected as Chairman of the Party's faction in the Landtag of Thuringia, has again run for the post of AfG leader in that Land and has maximum support from his fellow Party members. A number of AfG politicians who try to create an image of "patriots resisting Globalism for the sake of German interests", far from the Radical right rhetoric, in practice maintain contacts with relevant organizations and networks, employ people with neo-Nazi backgrounds, speak at extreme right events, cooperate with pan-European structures of the extreme rights.

This also includes Marine Le Pen's statement on the need to close all mosques in France. Her Party's official policy is to ban the wearing of all religious signs, including the Jewish kippah and Christian symbols, and to ban the sale of all types of ritually slaughtered meat, including kosher meat, ostensibly to combat the wearing of Islamic dress and the funding of "radical" mosques. This also includes participation in anti-Semitic rallies in Poland by activists of the ruling Law and Justice Party, which has been highlighted even by the politically correct European Jewish Congress.⁴⁹⁸

On some issues, however, some parties do make adjustments to their odious programs. For example, the Italian League, which emerged in 1989 as a separatist "League of the North" and whose aim was to separate the North of Italy from its main part and create a State there with racist manifestations not only against migrants but also against the southern

⁴⁹⁵ Родина – motherland (rus), *author's note*

⁴⁹⁶ Сборник "Политические партии в Российской Федерации". Выпуск 5. 2016 год. — сс. 152—153.

⁴⁹⁷ Reiner Burger, "So kämpft der „Flügel“ der AfD ums Überleben", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 20/03/20, online: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-gegen-afd-der-fluegel-kaempft-ums-ueberleben-16687932.html>

⁴⁹⁸ Eytan Halon, "Antisemitism in Poland being 'normalized,' European Jewish group warns", *Jerusalem Post*, online at: <https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Antisemitism-in-Poland-being-normalized-European-Jewish-group-warns-503992>

population of Italy, is now a perfectly respectable Party, it was inside of the Government Coalition and popular in the South, since it has renounced both separatism and racism against southerners. Ultimately, in recent years we have seen a clear trend of ideological, formal and practical drift of these right-wing parties towards the centre, especially with regard to the parties represented in parliaments.

Their danger is that, unlike small non-parliamentary extremist right-wing parties and groups, they can have serious electoral potential. The French “National Association”, for example, is now a well-established Party with 6 MPs, 1 senator; 21 MEPs; 306 municipal councilors; 58 regional parliamentarians and 2 mayors in towns of 30,000 or more (after the June 2020 elections, the RN governs a total of 11 cities). Party leader Marine Le Pen is expected to run for President in the 2022 presidential election, making it to the second round, where she is expected to garner 40-45% of the vote, according to the polls.⁴⁹⁹ In the 2015 regional elections, 32.45% of homosexual couples voted for her, although a few years ago the Party was an anti-LGBT bastion and in 1984 Jean-Marie Le Pen called homosexuality “a biological and social anomaly”.⁵⁰⁰ Many French Jews are also enticed by the National Rally's tough stance on Muslims. These parties, their media and communications, their regional branches and activities are a tool and medium for the primary radicalization of the population.

The second group of far-right parties and organizations consists of *small non-parliamentary groups with a radical aggressive-nationalist and neo-fascist persuasion*, whose activities, however, develop within the constitutional framework. With few exceptions, they do not fight for seats in parliaments, but for the street; their social base is marginalized, disillusioned with the existing political system and wishing to change it through active street action, although not yet beyond the legal framework.

There are a lot of such organizations in monitoring countries. Some of them are traditional, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPDG) or the Republican Party in the FRG, the Fratelli d'Italia (Italian Brothers) which is the successor of the historical neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano/ Alleanza Nazionale (Italian Social Movement/National Alliance) in Italy, the British National Party, etc. There are new and newer organizations - a direct product of recent times. They arise, they die, they are reborn again.

These are mainly national organizations, although global networking groups are also present, such as PEGIDA, which has transformed itself from Germany's most influential Radical Right NGO into a small but international networking group, or “Students for Western Civilisation”, etc.

⁴⁹⁹ BFM.TV, 4/10/2020, “PRÉSIDENTIELLE 2022: UN SONDAGE DONNE MACRON ET LE PEN AU COUDE-À-COUDE AU PREMIER TOUR”, ONLINE: [HTTPS://WWW.BFMTV.COM/POLITIQUE/PRESIDENTIELLE-2022-UN-SONDAGE-DONNE-MACRON-ET-LE-PEN-AU-COUDE-A-COUDE-AU-PREMIER-TOUR_AD-202010040044.HTML](https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/presidentielle-2022-un-sondage-donne-macron-et-le-pen-au-coude-a-coude-au-premier-tour_ad-202010040044.html)

⁵⁰⁰ Clement Parrot, “Le Front national est-il vraiment devenu “gay friendly”? *Franceinfo*, online: https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/marine-le-pen/le-front-national-est-il-vraiment-devenu-gay-friendly_2061745.html

Of the national organizations that were active during the period under review, the most prominent are the following:

CANADA.

In Canada, the local "Centre against Bias and Extremism" has identified some 300 small far-right groups.⁵⁰¹ In recent years, their demographic and educational composition has changed. It is no longer only the marginalized youth who are members there. The Centre estimates that "the far-right is gradually becoming a movement of middle-aged and middle-class adults - often highly educated and employed."⁵⁰² In 2020, the number of far-right extremist groups across Canada has increased by 30% since 2015.⁵⁰³ Most of these groups are organized around ideologies against certain religions and races, with anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish sentiments being the most common, followed by hatred of immigrants, Indigenous people, women, LGBTQ communities, and other minority groups. The most prominent of these groups are:

- **Atalante Quebec** is a far-right French-Canadian nationalist group based in Quebec.
- **Canadian Coalition for Concerned Citizens (CCCC)** - An Islamophobic group that opposes immigration and especially Muslim immigration.
- **ID Canada** (pre-2014 **Generation ID Canada**) is a white Nationalist and Hate group in Canada, formed in 2014 and renamed ID Canada in 2017.
- **La Meute**, also known as the *Wolf Pack*, focuses much of its energy on Islam, but also extends its hostility to non-white immigrants in general. Founded in 2015, it soon claimed 40,000 members online. It is generally considered the largest far-right group in Quebec.
- **Mankind Against Pedophiles and Predators (MAPP)** - A homophobic and transphobic group that accuses the LGBTQ+ community of paedophilia.
- **The New Constitution Party of Canada** is a supremacist, anti-Semitic and "anti-Marxist" group based in Toronto and led by James Sears. It is not registered as a political party in Canada and focuses on spreading Hate speech through the thematic website *Your Ward News* and *YouTube* videos hosted by Sears Company.
- **PEGIDA** is an international network organization. In 2018, **PEGIDA** established at least four national chapters and several city chapters in Canada. They continue to stoke fear of terrorist attacks by radical Islamists, fear of the collapse of Western values and fear of the loss of Judeo-Christian culture. PEGIDA is particularly active in numerous rallies.
- **Soldiers of Odin** is an anti-immigrant, white supremacist group.
- **Students for Western Civilisation** is a pan-European nationalist and autonomist student group based in Toronto, Canada.
- **The National Citizens Alliance (NCA)** is a far-right federal political party in Canada. It is headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, and is led by long-time candidate Stephen Garvey,

⁵⁰¹ OntarioTech University. Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism, online at:

<https://socialscienceandhumanities.ontariotechu.ca/centre-on-hate-bias-and-extremism/index.php>

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Jacky Habib, "Far-right extremist groups and hate crime rates are growing in Canada", online at:

<https://www.cbc.ca/passionateeye/features/right-wing-extremist-groups-and-hate-crimes-are-growing-in-canada>

a proponent of far-right conspiracy theories. Critics describe the party as white, nationalist and Islamophobic.

- **The National Socialist Labour Revival Party** is a white nationalist and neo-Nazi party based on the doctrine of fascism, particularly active in Scarborough (Greater Toronto Area).
- **The Northern Guard** is an anti-Muslim biker group and an offshoot of the organization Soldiers of Odin.
- **Wexit** is a secessionist federal political party that opposes immigration, advocates secession of Western Canada and supports the preservation of conservative values.

In 2020, an online report supported by Public Safety Canada showed that over the past five years, the number of acts of terror committed by the far-rights has increased by 320 per cent, supported by an increasingly interconnected and internationalist right-wing extremist community.⁵⁰⁴ It argues that central to this increase in activity is the use of social media, which enables a wide range of right-wing extremists to mobilize through recruitment, broadcast misinformation and propaganda, harass opponents and coordinate activities, including publicity stunts, protests and acts of violence. The social media platforms used include popular Internet platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, as well as a constellation of marginalized forums, including ultra-libertarian platforms with weak content moderation policies such as Gab, and specially created extremist hubs such as Iron March and Fascist Forge.⁵⁰⁵

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

As already pointed out, right-wing extremism has caused significantly more damage to the US in terms of homicides and violence than Islamist extremism in recent years, although authorities emphasize combating the latter phenomenon. The far-rights were responsible for 98% of all extremist killings in the country in 2018.⁵⁰⁶ 2019 was the sixth deadliest year since 1970, when there were 42 extremism-related killings. 2018 also saw a record number of hate groups (1,020), including a sharp increase (43%) in LGBT hate groups.

There are purely American reasons for the growth of right-wing extremist violence and the growth of Radical Right organizations. The most important of these are a long tradition of immigration, nativism and xenophobia (manifested in the perception of the loss of white identity and the risk of losing the white majority in the country after a while), easy access to

⁵⁰⁴ ISD. An Online Environmental Scan of Right-wing Extremism in Canada, online at: <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/An-Online-Environmental-Scan-of-Right-wing-Extremism-in-Canada-ISD.pdf>

⁵⁰⁵ ISD, "An Online Environmental Scan of Right-wing Extremism in Canada". Interim Report, online at: <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/An-Online-Environmental-Scan-of-Right-wing-Extremism-in-Canada-ISD.pdf>

⁵⁰⁶ The Anti-Defamation League Center on Extremism (2019) Murder and extremism in the United States in 2018, online at: <https://bit.ly/2VLy5lf>; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/14/fbi-and-dhs-warned-of-growing-threat-from-white-supremacists-months-ago/>.

firearms,⁵⁰⁷ the election of the first African-American president in 2008 and the subsequent election of the right-wing conservative president Donald J. Trump in 2016. Finally, the growing distrust of established institutions and the polarization (including value polarization) of the leading political parties, with Republicans and Democrats becoming increasingly distant from the political centre and demonstrating increasingly negative attitudes towards their opponents, thus contributing to an overall polarization of the political landscape and discourse).⁵⁰⁸ Surveys and opinion polls bear witness to all this.⁵⁰⁹

Despite ideological differences, Radical Rights are united by a desire for a future that is "conducive to white identity". Other dominant ideologies include anti-Immigrant Xenophobia (including Islamophobia), racism, anti-LGBT views, and anti-Semitism. As we mentioned already, a large proportion (almost a quarter) of right-wing extremist groups are based in California, Texas, and Florida.⁵¹⁰ Of the 940 such groups registered in 2019, almost a third (391) are white supremacists.⁵¹¹ There are other groups (174) not included in this number that hold a single issue (such as anti-LGBT or anti-Muslim positions). In addition, there are 20 anti-immigrant groups across the country. Five hundred and seventy-six groups espouse anti-Government extremist views, with 181 groups undergoing military training, making such groups considered "militias".⁵¹²

The second group of Radical Rights (see above) in the United States includes the following most prominent organizations:

- **American Renaissance** is an online group present on various internet platforms. In July 2020 "American Renaissance" suspended its accounts on major projects such as Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and Amazon. However, the company's content remains available on other accounts such as Parler, Telegram, BitChute, and Gab. American Renaissance also organizes conferences, for example, they attracted 300 participants in 2017. Following the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020. "American Renaissance" published materials in support of policing and white identity, which were attacked by supporters of the 'left'.

⁵⁰⁷ The United States is the only G7 country to rank in the top 20 for gun deaths, online at: <https://www.wired.com/story/guns-in-america-five-charts/>. On the relationship between gun ownership and recent mass shootings, see Lin PI, Fei L, Barzman D, Hossain M (2018) "What have we learned from the time trend of mass shootings in the U.S.?" PLoS ONE 13(10):1-13; Reeping PM, Cerdá M, Kalesan B, Wiebe DJ, Galea S, Branas CC (2019); "State gun laws, gun ownership, and mass shootings in the US: cross sectional time series". BMJ 364:1542.

⁵⁰⁸ In October 2020, for example, eight out of ten Democratic and Republican voters said their differences with other party voters concerned "core American values," and nine out of ten were worried that a victory for the other party's candidate would cause "long-term damage" to their country - see <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/>. See also PEW Research Center, "Partisanship and Political Animosity," online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/8-partisan-animosity-personal-politics-views-of-trump/>, online at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/8-partisan-animosity-personal-politics-views-of-trump/>.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ "The Year in Hate and Extremism 2019," Southern Poverty Law Center, March 18, 2020, online at: <https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/03/18/year-hate-and-extremism-2019>

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² Ibid.

- The **American Identity Movement (AIM)** is a movement advocating a white American identity, focuses on recruitment through social media and the Internet, as well as through meetings and online forums, active on college campuses.⁵¹³
- **The League of the South** is a separatist group which identifies itself as "neo-conservative" with a base in Killen, Alabama, which calls for a "second Southern secession". Its leader Michael Hill said in August 2019 that the US was in the early stages of a "war for white survival". The league is characterized by violent anti-Semitism. It promotes international editions of its propaganda, including in Russian, Hungarian, and Chinese languages.⁵¹⁴
- **The National Socialist Movement (NSM)** is defined as the largest neo-Nazi group in the United States, with 61 local branches and additional branches abroad. The NSM positions itself as America's leading white civil rights organization. In 2016, the NSM formed a national far-right alliance (Aryan Nationalist Alliance) which included the Traditionalist Workers Party and the League of the South (in 2017, ANA was renamed the Nationalist Front).
- **Vanguard America** is another neo-Nazi group that was founded in 2014 in New Mexico and has branches across the US. It operates primarily online. In 2016-2017, the group posted propaganda leaflets on US campuses.

POLAND.

Neo-Nazi and overtly radical groups calling for violence are marginalized in Poland. The most significant and isolated incident was made public by TVN. The so-called "Hitler's Birthday" was organized by the association "Pride and Modernity" in May 2017, after which the issue of the Organization's closure came up.⁵¹⁵ Nevertheless, moderate Radical Right and nationalist bodies in Poland are quite active. Here are the most prominent ones:

- **Independence March Association**

The main organizer of the Independence March on 11 November in Warsaw (Polish Independence Day). Objectives of the organization: to form the social foundations of Polish independence and sovereignty by "demonstrating the paramount importance of the Catholic faith in public life; spreading knowledge of Polish history; preserving and spreading national, civic and cultural traditions; building a sense of national community; initiating and supporting cultural and patriotic events; organizing conferences and trainings; conducting publishing and information activities."⁵¹⁶

⁵¹³ For example, AIM leaders worked through the online forum Iron March, which is now defunct. The oldest online neo-Nazi forum, Stormfront, was removed by its online host in August 2017 but reappeared a few months later. Other forums such as the Daily Forums have moved their operations to the dark web, accessible only through encrypted software - *author's note*.

⁵¹⁴ SPLC, "Comrade Hill: League of the South reaching out to Russia", online at: <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/07/23/comrade-hill-league-south-reaching-out-russia>; "LEAGUE OF THE SOUTH", ONLINE AT: <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/league-south>.

⁵¹⁵ „Stowarzyszenie „Duma i Nowoczesność” rozwiązane”, Superwizjer TVN, August 7, 2019, <https://superwizjer.tvn.pl/aktualnosci.984,n/urodziny-hitlera-stowarzyszenie-rozwiazane.296795.html>.

⁵¹⁶ Stowarzyszenie Marsz Niepodległości, online: <https://marszniepodleglosci.pl/en/cel/#>

- **The National Movement (*Ruch Narodowy, RN*)**

Political party since 2015

Candidate for President of the Republic of Poland in the 2020 elections: Mr Krzysztof Bosak (4th result of the first round of the presidential election: 1,317,350 votes = 6.78%)⁵¹⁷

Proponents of "Polexit", i.e. Poland's exit from the EU.⁵¹⁸

The main aim of the Ruch is to defend and strengthen the Polish national identity based on Catholicism. The party believes that modernity and cosmopolitanism must be combated. The Ruch also declares protection of the family, understood as marriage between a woman and a man. The RN wants to guarantee patriotic education and stop "liberal-leftist" propaganda. The State, its Culture and Economy must be sovereign.⁵¹⁹

- **National Radical Camp (*Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR*)**

The National Radical Camp is a movement whose aim is "National activism". Thus, the ONR is the co-organiser of the Independence March in November. It also opposes "left-wing propaganda" and carries out charitable activities.⁵²⁰ In its ideological Declaration the ONR declares that: Redemption is the ultimate Goal of man and the Catholic Church is the pillar of Polish existence; the Nation is the highest earthly value; biological racism must be condemned, but ethnic homogeneity must be preserved.⁵²¹

FRANCE.

After the National Alliance took a new course, seeking to distance itself from overtly extremist groups by banning dual membership with them and sometimes excluding militants with a record of Racism, anti-Semitism, and/or violence, many disaffected former members and newcomers to the Radical Right scene began to view *Marine Le Pen's* Party as renegade and believed that the parliamentary option would not bring any real break with the country's detrimental 'State System'. Many of them have left the Party and joined more radical groups or created new ones. While such groups do not advocate terrorism, those associated with them are drifting towards violence and are part of a wider group that is prone to violence against political opponents and minorities.

The following organizations belonging to the group of active Radical Rights not represented in power in France can be named:

⁵¹⁷ Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej, PKW, June 28, 2020,

<https://prezydent20200628.pkw.gov.pl/prezydent20200628/pl/wyniki/1/pl>

⁵¹⁸ „Polexit. Bezpieczne wyjście awaryjne”, May 1, 2019, https://ruchnarodowy.net/wp-content/uploads/PolExit-Bezpieczne-wyj%C5%9Bcie-awaryjne-ver1_2.pdf

⁵¹⁹ Ruch Narodowy, „Deklaracja ideowa i postulaty”, <https://ruchnarodowy.net/deklaracja/>

⁵²⁰ „Czy jest ONR?” <https://www.onr.com.pl/czym-jest-onr/>

⁵²¹ ONR, „Nowa Deklaracja Ideowa Obozu Narodowo-Radykalnego”, <https://www.onr.com.pl/deklaracja-ideowa/>

- **Parti de la France (Party of France)** - The Party qualifies secularism as the "Trojan horse of Islamisation", which should be replaced by a privileged relationship with the Catholic Church. The Party advocates stopping migration flows by returning the "foreign population" to the country of origin.
- **Génération identitaire (Identity Generation)** is an extreme right-wing nationalist social and political movement founded in 2012. It espouses white racism, neo-Fascism, and Islamophobia. Members of the movement have been repeatedly convicted by the courts for *inciting* racial hatred. In its practices, the organization tends to intimidate immigrants, Muslims, and political opponents. It commits illegal but not terrorist acts, such as displaying a banner with the slogan "Justice for Anti-White Racism Victims" during a rally in support of the BLM on 13 June 2020.⁵²²
- **Action Française (AF) (French Action)** is the oldest nationalist and monarchist political movement in France, supporting the Bourbon branch of Orleans, which was popular in the first half of the twentieth century in France, founded in 1898. Adheres to the ideology of Integral Nationalism, which proclaimed the restoration of the French monarchy, the abolition of Parliamentarianism and Decentralisation. The doctrine of the League of Royalists was also anti-German, anti-Protestant, and anti-Semitic. After the Second World War the movement eventually abandoned anti-Semitism.
- **Bastion Social (Social stronghold)** is a French neo-Nazi organization founded in early 2017 by former members of the student association Groupe Union Défense. Another significant part of its members came from Action Française. It was set up in the image of two other European far-right organizations with long experience, such as CasaPound and Hogar Social Madrid . The organization defined itself as a movement of a national-revolutionary character, defending national preferences. Its main slogans were "Autonomy, Identity, Social justice". Its main courses of action were against immigration, for leaving the European Union, and in general against everything foreign. The main aim of this new project was to try to unite all French extra-parliamentary extreme right-wing forces, but without success. The organization was outlawed by the French authorities in 2019 and currently operates illegally.
- **Parti Nationaliste Français (French Nationalist Party)** is an extreme right-wing nationalist movement. Eurosceptics, it advocates restriction of Immigration and forced Repatriation of all "economically undesirable immigrants". The organization was dissolved in 2013 but reinstated in 2015.

Overall, all these groups have no serious impact on mainstream Society, although they serve as an effective tool for radicalization. The number of activists has been quite stable for 10

⁵²²Romain Herreros, Pierre Tremblay, "Marche pour Adama Traoré: Génération identitaire provoque avec une banner", *HuffPost*, online: https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/marche-pour-adama-traore-generation-identitaire-provoque-avec-une-banderole_fr_5ee4c8dac5b696952d232a26

years, with a core of around 1,000 core activists and 2,000 sympathizers.⁵²³ Unofficial figures from sources close to the police say that 390 of them legally own weapons. Unofficial sources from the penitentiary administration say that in December 2020 39 radical right activists were in prison for offences ranging from street fighting with political opponents to suspected terrorism.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Today, there are three main organizations that can be called Radical Right street parties:

- The **English Defence League (EDL)** is an "anti-Islamisation" Street Movement. The group positions itself as a Movement against Islamism and Islamic extremism, but its statements and actions are more broadly anti-Islam and anti-Muslim.⁵²⁴ The organization was founded in 2009. In its early stages, it was able to mobilize thousands of "loyal foot soldiers" for its events, but in 2019 the EDL was only able to organize one demonstration. The scale of the actions has also decreased significantly - the maximum turnout during the monitoring period was only around 200 activists.⁵²⁵
- **Britain First, BF** is a far-right Party formed by former members of the once popular but then defunct radical right British National Party (BNP). However, the EDL is not the only Street Movement to emerge after the collapse of the BNP. In May 2011, another anti-Islamic protest movement and political party, Britain First, emerged on the UK cultural-nationalist scene. The Party gained notoriety for its 'mosque invasions', 'Christian patrols' and demonstrations in the UK in areas with large Muslim populations, clearly designed to provoke minority communities. Despite gaining a significant number of followers online (almost 2.3 million Facebook followers), it was also a large offline group, gaining maximum strength in 2017.⁵²⁶
- **Football Lads Alliance, FLA.** Formed in June 2017 by property manager and Tottenham fan John Meighan, the Movement successfully held its first demonstration on 24 June 2017 immediately following several terrorist attacks in the UK, mobilizing nearly 10,000 supporters for its first London protest.⁵²⁷ In a subsequent protest on 7 October 2017, the group managed to mobilize again in central London, fielding nearly 30,000 activists marching under the banner of 'uniting against extremism' and

⁵²³ "Quand l'ultradroit veut passer à l'action". *InterFrane*, online: <https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/secrets-d-info/secrets-d-info-24-novembre-2018>

⁵²⁴ EDL Website. 'Mission Statement', online at: www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/mission-statement/

⁵²⁵ Hope not Hate, '2018 State of Hate: Far Right Terrorism on the Rise', January-February 2018, online at: www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/State-of-Hate-2018.pdf, p.19.

⁵²⁶ Doherty, S., 'Britain First's leaders "shouting and banging" outside a Ramsgate home "left a toddler traumatised"'. *Kent Live*, 31 January 2018, online at: www.kentlive.news/news/kent-news/britain-firsts-leaders-shouting-banging-1141962.

⁵²⁷ Smith, M. and Shifrin, T., 'Eyewitness report from first FLA demo: Football Lads Alliance puts thousands on the streets', *Dream Deferred*, 24 June 2017, online at: www.dreamdeferred.org.uk/2017/06/a-second-warning-thousands-on-the-streets-of-london-as-far-right-reorganises/.

lobbying for a harder line against Islamist terrorists.⁵²⁸ During a protest on 24 March 2018, around 7,000 more people in Birmingham demonstrated against terrorism and extremism - with the emergence of a splinter group, the Democratic Football Lads Union (DFLA).⁵²⁹ On 16 April 2018 it was announced that John Meighan had left the FLA. The group's last protest was organized on 13 June 2020 - a demonstration against the demolition of statues as part of the BLM protests this summer - although the number of activists numbered in the hundreds.⁵³⁰

- **Patriotic alternative, PA** is a Radical Rights group mainly engaged in racist propaganda, distributing themed stickers, publishing video blogs on social media and organizing small rallies on the theme of "white identity", etc.⁵³¹
- **Hundred Handers, HH (Hundred Hands)** is a neo-Nazi organization whose activities differ little from PA, but from more intransigent positions.⁵³²

GERMANY.

There are a number of traditional far-right parties in Germany, which existed before the country's reunification. They are close to neo-Nazism or share much of the Nazi outlook (the National Democratic Party of Germany, the NPDG, and the "Republicans"). The NPDG continued to lose even the little influence it had during the period in question and became a completely marginal party. The number of members in 2019 was estimated at 3,600 (2018: 4,000). The Republicans have had serious financial difficulties since the mid-2010s. They could not even take part in local elections. Many functionaries urged them to vote for AdG. The party was dissolved in 2018-2019. The two formerly relatively influential Radical Right parties, the Citizens' Movement for Germany and the German People's Union, ceased to exist before the period in question (2017 and 2012 respectively).⁵³³

The new far-right parties that can be categorized as the second type are:

- **The Third Way Party (Der Dritte Weg)** was formed in 2013 by former NPDG officials who considered the course of their party too "conciliatory". The party had 580

⁵²⁸ Chaplain, C., 'Football Lads Association march: Thousands gather in central London in anti-extremism protest'. *The Evening Standard*, 7 October 2017, online at: www.standard.co.uk/news/london/football-lads-association-march-thousands-gather-in-central-london-in-antiextremism-protest-a3652981.html.

⁵²⁹ *BBC News*, 'Birmingham Football Lads Alliance demo: Thousands march in city', 24 March 2018, online at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-43527109.

⁵³⁰ Bryant, B. and Frymorgen, T., 'Football Lads Alliance: "We could have a civil war in this country"'. *BBC Three*, 1 May 2018, online at: www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/e5ee9e0a-18d7-49a4-a3c2-80b6b4222058.

⁵³¹ Murdoch, S., 'Patriotic Alternative: Uniting the Fascist Right?', *Hope not Hate*, 17 August 2020, online at: <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/2020/08/17/patriotic-alternative-uniting-the-fascist-right/>.

⁵³² Davis, G., 'Exposed: The anonymous Nazi activist behind the Hundred Handers network', *Hope not Hate*, 11 August 2020, online at: <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/2020/08/11/exposed-the-anonymous-nazi-activist-behind-the-hundred-handers-network/>

⁵³³ Statista, "Mitgliederzahlen der rechtsextremen Parteien in Deutschland von 2005 bis 2019", online: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/4760/umfrage/entwicklung-der-mitgliederzahlen-von-rechtsradikalen-parteien/>

members in 2019.⁵³⁴ Third Way activists take part in demonstrations against migration and refugee reception. In 2020, they were visible at rallies against quarantine restrictions caused by the pandemic. The Party has tried to hold its own socially significant actions, for example, it applied in 2018 and 2019 to hold a sports tournament in Erfurt called "Jugend im Sturm" (German: Jugend im Sturm, association with the word "Volkssturm" from the Nazi period). The applications were rejected by the city administration.⁵³⁵ Ideologically, it stands for the "third way", understood as a rejection of Communism and Capitalism as well as Islamophobia and Migrantophobia.

- **"Die Rechte (The Right for National Referendums, Sovereignty and Defence of the Homeland)** is a Radical Right party founded by several prominent West German neo-Nazis as well as former members of the National Resistance Dortmund, which was banned in 2012. While the Party managed to carry out some activities in 2014-2016, a year later it already had to struggle for survival, due to conflicts in the leadership and insufficient funding. Since 2019, "Die Rechte" has become more active. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, they supported Ursula Haverbeck, a well-known neo-Nazi activist who served a prison sentence for repeated Holocaust denial. On 20 April 2019, Hitler's birthday, the party held a neo-Nazi rally with like-minded activists from France, the Czech Republic, Poland and other countries.⁵³⁶ In 2020 "Die Rechte" organised a "national solidarity action" in Dortmund against measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus. A number of planned marches were banned as neo-Nazi.⁵³⁷ As of 2018, an estimated 600 people were members of the Party. Almost all of them live in the Ruhr region. Party cells in the rest of Germany either exist only on paper or have already been officially dissolved.

SPAIN.

In recent years, the number of relatively moderate Radical Right parties has been growing, as has the number of right-wing supporters. The success of the Radical Right populist Party VOX (see above) in the last elections testifies to this. There are also a number of smaller street organizations active in the country. The most significant among them are the following:

- **Hogar Social Madrid, HSM (Social House of Madrid)** is a neo-Nazi group that has declared itself a charity, positioning itself as a successor to the Italian Casa Pound, but in fact repeating the practices of the Greek Golden Dawn. The organization specializes in running charity programmes (mainly food distribution) "for ethnic Spaniards only". The group has several dozen young neo-Nazis, most of whom are under 30. It has organized several demonstrations in front of City Hall in Madrid against

⁵³⁴ Verfassungsschutzbericht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen über das Jahr 2019, online: https://www.im.nrw/system/files/media/document/file/VS_Bericht_NRW_2019.pdf

⁵³⁵ Christian Unger "Die gefährliche Parallelwelt der rechten Kampfsportler", *Berliner Morgenpost*, 24.09.2019, online: <https://www.morgenpost.de/politics/article227183009/Die-gefaehrliche-Parallelwelt-der-rechten-Kampfsportler.html>

⁵³⁶ Verfassungsschutzbericht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen über das Jahr 2019, online: https://www.im.nrw/system/files/media/document/file/VS_Bericht_NRW_2019.pdf

⁵³⁷ "Rechte Reaktionen auf Corona", online: <https://www.hagalil.com/2020/03/rechte-reaktionen-auf-corona/>

immigration, in which several hundred people took part, and attacked a mosque and the Islamic Cultural Centre in the Spanish capital. Actively engaged in attempts to unite all far-right forces. Recently they seem to be losing supporters and have been replaced by another organization called Bastion Frontal.

- **Bastion Frontal, BF** - emerged in 2019 and declared itself the successor to the cause of HSM, which is in decline due to internal contradictions and divisions. The timing of its creation was not accidental, the organizers tried to take advantage of the context of the socio-economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the various hoaxes and criminalization campaigns launched against the most vulnerable groups in society to spread their racist and homophobic ideas. The new organization announced itself publicly via social media, posting a video in which some fifteen militants appeared in an abandoned building and made graffiti in memory of Tommy Lindh, a young 19-year-old Swedish nationalist who was allegedly stabbed to death by a Sudanese man while trying to protect a 14-year-old Swedish girl from rape.
- **Iberia Cruor, IC (Blood of Spain)** is a Radical Right youth organization with several branches in the Spanish provinces. Positions itself as an NGO whose aim is "to create an alternative, youth, patriotic and dissident space".⁵³⁸ The organization positions itself as a fighter against globalisation, which "destroys the Identity of every Nation by devoting itself to a consumerist, materialistic, individualistic system without its own Identity". Also practices handing out food to white Spaniards.

Spanish Radical Rights, unlike their foreign counterparts, are very active in terms of creating a unified platform. In the coming years, attention should be drawn to the fact that many of them are networking and coordinating their organizations. In July 2020, Hacer Nación, a platform uniting many of them, was launched as an alternative to Vox neoliberalism.⁵³⁹

ITALY.

Neo-fascist groups are fairly well represented in Italy. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, Italy has historically never fully and seriously undergone a process of Denazification. This means that it was the only country in Western Europe to have a neo-fascist party legally sitting in Parliament in the post-war period. This led to a certain legitimization of the far-right in the Italian public consciousness. Given that the two most popular right-wing populist parties - the League and the Five Stars - have now become more respectable and have lost some of their overtly neo-fascist features (they belong to the first group of Radical Right parties mentioned above), today we can talk mainly about the three best known organizations belonging to the second group:

- **CasaPound Italia (Pound's Italian House)** - named after the pro-fascist American poet *Ezra Pound*. In 2007, CasaPound underwent official state registration as a social

⁵³⁸ Iberia Cruor, online at: <https://iberiacruor.es/quienes-somos/>

⁵³⁹ "Movimientos sociales neofascistas: la extrema derecha más allá de Vox", online:

<https://www.lamarea.com/2020/11/20/movimientos-sociales-neofascistas-la-extrema-derecha-mas-alla-de-vox/>

movement "CasaPound Italia". Today it is an Italian neo-fascist movement with a network of extreme right-wing social centres. The organization positions themselves as a supporter of the so-called "third position", i.e. those fighting against Capitalism and Communism. Strongly opposes immigration and European integration. Claims to be anti-Zionist, but several activists have been expelled from the Movement for anti-Semitism. Advocates the withdrawal of US military bases from Italy. Actively involved in trade union work.

- **Forza Nuova, FN (New Force)** is an Italian far-right political party founded in 1997. While CasaPound Italia is a more secular and socially-oriented organization, FN focuses more on religious issues (its members are Catholic traditionalists, like its founder Roberto Fiore, a former neo-fascist terrorist). Forza Nuova's ideology is based on extreme nationalism, Catholic traditionalism, and the legacy of Italian fascism.
- **Fratelli d'Italia, FI (Italian Brothers)** is a far-right party that has declared itself the successor of the oldest neo-fascist party Movimento Sociale Italiano. It opposes same-sex marriage and gay civil unions, as well as immigration and multiculturalism.
- **Movimento Fascismo e Libertà - Partito Socialista Nazionale , MFL - PSN** (Movimento Fascismo e Libertà - National Socialist Party) was founded in 1991. The only official party in Italy with "Fascismo" on its logo. In general it is an ultra-nationalist party with tendencies towards a third position (between capitalism and communism).
- **Italia agli Italiani (Italy for Italians)** is an extreme neo-fascist party that emerged in 2018 from the merger of the *Forza Nuova* (New Force) and *Tricolor Flame* parties for electoral purposes. It advocates neo-fascism, hardline Euroscepticism (demanding exit from the EU), and social conservatism.

GREECE.

Greece is an example of how a neo-fascist party, even when it enters Parliament, not only does not abandon its hate speech, but does not even abandon its unlawful actions. This is the "Golden Dawn" party, which for 27 years managed to become one of the most popular neo-Nazi parties, had serious representation in Parliament (its support reached 20% in 2013) and enjoyed the support of a significant part of the military and law enforcement officers. The Party was the first in Europe to carry out racist charity work, distributing food to ethnic Greeks, collecting and donating the blood of "pure-blooded Greeks" to hospitals in Athens, etc. It also carried out criminal activities, which included the assault and murder of migrants and anti-fascists. Eventually, after years of proceedings, the Party was finally banned by the Court of Appeal in Athens as a criminal organization. That is why it will not be on our list of contemporary far-right organizations. A number of parties and organizations are now fighting for the Golden Dawn voter:

- **The Greek People's Patriotic Union (LEPEN)** is a Party founded in 2016 by members who split from Golden Dawn. The Party led by West Greek regional councilor *Christos Rigas*. It is anti-migrant and anti-Islamic and positions itself as a "pure nationalist". He organized several mass actions against refugees, during which the refugees were attacked by the Radical Rights.⁵⁴⁰
- The **Patriotic Radical Union (PATRIE)** is an Ultra-Nationalist Party, founded in 2018 by former Golden Dawn member and MEP *Eleftherios Sinadinou*, has one seat in the Greek parliament, and in 2019 announced a merger with another right-wing radical party, LAOS.
- The **Orthodox Appeal (LAOS)** is the oldest Greek Nationalist Party, founded in 2000, but relegated to the background of the electoral successes of Golden Dawn. It takes a strong anti-Immigrant stance, calling for the forced repatriation of those refugees who will not be needed by the Greek economy.
- **National Popular Consciousness (ELASIN)** is a far-right party founded in 2019. It is mainly composed of former members of Golden Dawn. It stands on hardline anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic positions. In December 2020, it announced a merger with LEPEN.
- **Greeks for the Fatherland** is a far-right party formed in April 2020 - one of the last formed by former Golden Dawn activists. It stands on the same neo-fascist politics and actively opposes multiculturalism.
- **The New Right** is a far-right Nationalist Party in Greece, one of the few new right-wing parties that did not emerge from the wreckage of Golden Dawn. The Party was founded in 2016 by *File Kranidiotis*, a lawyer and former adviser to former Prime Minister *Antonis Samaras*, after Kranidiotis was expelled from New Democracy. The Party is openly opposed to Islam, immigrants and refugees. However, Kranidiotis constantly talks not about immigration, immigrants and refugees, but about the "Islamic Colonisation" of Greece and Europe, which must be fought. The Party has recently put forward its proposals for the "de-Islamisation" of Greece, which can be seen as universal anti-Islamic demands in Europe:
 - A ban on funding by Islamic organizations from abroad.
 - Exceptional use of the Greek translation of the Koran in mosques.
 - Legislation on Islam, using Austria as an example. A ban on the use of Islamic symbols in public places.
 - A ban on the use of any kind of Islamic headdress, as well as any clothing hiding the face. High fines in case of violation of this legislation.

⁵⁴⁰ "Λαϊκή Ελληνική Πατριωτική Ένωση: Οι Λ.Ε.Π.ΕΝ της Ελλάδος (Η ηΧρυσή Αυγή αλλιώς)", online: <https://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/laiki-elliniki-patriotiki-enosi-oi-lepen-tis-ellados-i-i-xrysi-aygi-allios>

- Investigating the legitimacy of the aims and activities of each organized Islamic structure, e.g. unions, clubs, associations, etc.
 - Prohibition of Sharia Law in all parts of the country. If Sharia is applied, the consequence would be deprivation of citizenship, if this were to happen, and immediate deportation.
 - The beginning of a political debate on whether Islam is really a religion, given that its holy book is regarded as law by Muslim communities.
 - Closure of all illegal mosques and Islamic houses of worship.
 - Closing of the first [official] mosque in Athens.⁵⁴¹
- **The Greek Socialist Resistance (ESA)** is a neo-Nazi organization, close in ideology to other such organizations. It uses the emblem of the British Fascist Union as the emblem of *Oswald Mosley's* British Union of Fascists (BUF).

As we can see, the process of consolidation of Radical Right and neo-Nazi forces, which was inevitable after the collapse of Golden Dawn, is taking place in Greece. As the social base for such parties exists and numbers at least 10%, we will see numerous mergers and acquisitions in the coming years. The only question is how many Radical Right parties will remain on the Greek political scene.

THE NETHERLANDS.

Despite the low level of Xenophobia, the ultra-right parties are in a strong position in this country. The moderate Eurosceptic parliamentary party *Freedom Forum* actively challenged the Islamophobic *Freedom Party* in the recent regional elections to the Upper House of Parliament of the country - Senate. As for the second group of parties, they are also present in the Dutch political spectrum:

- **The Dutch People's Union** is a neo-Nazi party openly sympathetic to the Third Reich and advocates the merger of the Netherlands with the Flemish region of Belgium. It takes a strong anti-Islamic and anti-Migrant stance.
- **The Racial Volunteer Force group** is a neo-Nazi group that stands far to the right of all existing organizations in its ideology. Known for holding an anti-Israel demonstration outside the Israeli embassy in Amsterdam in September 2019. In their

⁵⁴¹ "ΕΠΙΚΗ ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΗ-ΚΟΛΑΦΟΣ τουΘΑΝΟΥ ΤΖΗΜΕΡΟΥ στην ΕΙΣΑΓΓΕΛΙΑ ΡΑΤΣΙΣΤΙΚΗΣΒΙΑΣ", online at: <https://www.dimiourgi.axana.gr/%CE%B3%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%86%CE%B5%CE%B9%CE%BF-%CF%84%CF%85%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%85/%CE%B4%CE%B5%CE%BB%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%84%CF%85%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%85/3026-%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B7-%CE%B1%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%B7-%CE%BA%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%86%CE%BF%CF%83-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%B8%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%84%CE%B6%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%B1%CE%B3%CE%B3%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CF%83%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B7%CF%83-%CE%B2%CE%B9%CE%B1%CF%83>

social media groups, the "race volunteers" call Adolf Hitler their "Führer" and protest against the "shady deals of the Zionist lobby", including anti-Muslim MP *Geert Wilders*. They call him a "Zionist pig", apparently recalling his changing positions on the Jewish question for electoral purposes.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

The mass Radical right movement was defeated by the Russian authorities in the mid-2010s - the main organizations were banned and their leaders were imprisoned or fled abroad. This was compounded by a split in the Radical Right milieu in connection with the events in Ukraine, when the nationalists were divided into pro-Government and pro-Ukrainian groups, which provoked a split and weakening within the entire Radical Right movement. All of this together led to a sharp drop in the number of mass events that had once been the "show of force" for the nationalists. Of all the "alternative calendar" events built by them in the 2000s-2010s, only the Russian March on 4 November remained relatively mass, but it split into several marches in Moscow (sometimes up to four), the number of which also fell sharply - to 100-200 people (the exception was one of the "marches" in 2019, which brought together up to 800 people, but this was probably due to the presence of leftist activists there, who tried to unit with the Nationalists in the anti-Putin protest) , and in the regions the matter is increasingly limited to displaying banners and distributing leaflets.⁵⁴²

Of the moderate Radical Right groups that currently exist and are active in the country, but which are not represented in the legislature, the following can be highlighted:

- The **Russian Imperial Movement, RID**, is a networked Nationalist and Monarchist organization covering many regions of Russia and several other countries. Its ideology: Orthodox Imperial Nationalism, understood as a desire to restore Russia to its pre-revolutionary borders, fighting illegal immigration, Russophobia, totalitarian heresies, and Church schisms. The organization declares that it is engaged in military-sports training and even has its own military-sports club, the "Imperial Legion", in St Petersburg, which appears to be its main source of existence. Representatives of the Russian Imperial Movement were involved in the conflict in Ukraine on the side of pro-Russian forces: together with the "Rodina" party, they created the "Movement For Novorossiia", engaged in military training of volunteers in St. Petersburg, and the Imperial Legion battalion formed under their aegis participated in battles in Slavyansk and Nikishino (Ukraine). At the beginning of 2015, they left Donbass.⁵⁴³ At the same time, RID actively worked towards establishing an international network of the Radical Right organizations, for which it held several meetings in 2017 with the US Traditionalist Workers Party, a far-right organization advocating Christian nationalism and white Supremacism, and with the Swedish Nordic Resistance

⁵⁴² Информационно-аналитический Центр "СОВА". "Русский Марш-2019" в Москве", онлайн: <https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2019/11/d41663/>

⁵⁴³ "США признали террористами националистическую организацию «Русское имперское движение», *Новая газета*, 6 апреля 2020 г., онлайн: <https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2020/04/06/160476-ssha-priznali-terroristami-natsionalisticheskuyu-organizatsiyu-russkoe-imperskoe-dvizhenie>

Movement, the organization responsible for the terrorist attacks in Gothenburg in 2016-17. At the time, Swedish radicals planted bombs near the premises of left-wing activists and twice near refugee residences. According to Swedish prosecutors, the perpetrators of the attacks were allegedly trained in a RID "paramilitary camp" near St Petersburg. The international activities gave grounds to the US State Department to include the RID on the US list of terrorist organizations, which is compiled precisely from those entities involved in international terrorism. Thus, the Russian Imperial Movement became the first right-wing radical organization to be added to the list at all (previously only Islamist terrorist groups had been added to it).

Formally, given its links to possible terrorist groups in Sweden and its alleged assistance in training fighters at its sports bases, the RID could be classified as a terrorist organization under international norms. But the fact that the US authorities have listed the RID as the first right-wing extremist terrorist organization, but have not included the truly transnational terrorist organizations that are directly represented on US territory and have themselves participated in violent crimes (such as *the Atomwaffen Division (AWD)* or *the Base* - represented by their non-US organizations, as required by law, or B&H and the Ukrainian Azov regiment), is surprising. According to a number of experts, the inclusion of the RID on the US list has less to do with the fight against terrorism than with the desire of the Trump administration to secure the support of some moderate liberals on the eve of the election, and to maintain a certain level of US-Russian confrontation.⁵⁴⁴ The organization itself is not on Russia's list of extremist and terrorist organizations and its activities have not been suspended. It has not been seen to be involved in illegal activities in Russia. However, its website and media have long been banned and are on the Russian List of extremist materials.⁵⁴⁵

- **The Double Eagle Society (renamed "Tsargrad" on 22 November 2020)** is an NGO for the Development of "Russian Historical Enlightenment", with 73 regional and 16 local branches across the country. Since 2017, the organization has been led by *Konstantin Malofeev*, a well-known entrepreneur, head of the "Tsargrad group of companies", owner of the nationalist TV channel of the same name, and since April 2019 deputy head of the international public organization World Russian People's Council, established at the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The manifesto of the NGO includes a list of "Great victories of Russian arms", which significantly begins with the victory over the Khazar Kaganate in the tenth century, which many nationalists regard as the "overthrow of the Jewish yoke". As one of its main objectives, the society puts "the reunification of the Russian people", i.e. the incorporation of the territories of neighboring countries where Russians live (or should live, according to the authors of the manifesto). "Tsargrad" claims to "unite

⁵⁴⁴See: Алексей Грязев, Алексей Поплавский, "Удобная цель: почему США преследуют русских монархистов", *Газета*, 07.04.2020, онлайн: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2020/04/07_a_13039981.shtml

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

...all healthy forces of Russian society, ready not only in word but also in deed to oppose any revolutionary unrest in protection of peace and order in Russia". There are also other traditional nationalist statements - about "combating Russophobia in all its manifestations" and "protecting the domestic labor market from the influx of low-skilled labor from the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia".⁵⁴⁶

At the same time, the NGO seeks to extend its genealogy to the pre-revolutionary "Black Hundreds" – anti-Semitic Pogrom organization, clearly stating that it "is a continuator of the ideas and traditions of the Union of Russian People".⁵⁴⁷ Malofeev himself on November 22, 2020 said that "Tsargrad" will participate in the 2021 election campaign to the State Duma as a public "controller", checking the views of candidates, and promised that "every possible legal resistance will be provided to candidates caught in Russophobia, insulting the feelings of believers, distortion of historical truth, and belittling the importance of the feat of the people in defending the Fatherland, in order to prevent such figures from getting into power".⁵⁴⁸ This statement seems to conceal the unpreparedness of Tsargrad to take part in the elections - the movement has not even attempted to transform itself into a political party in order to be able to take part in the election.

UKRAINE.

The Ukrainian phenomenon is that while the Radical Right parties have an overall rating of 2-3%, their programme has in fact become a State Programme. Indeed, all the demands of the far-right, starting with the discrimination of national minority languages, the closure of their schools, the glorification of the World War II collaborators, and up to the refusal to implement the Minsk agreements and the so-called "Steinmeier formula", have been met by the authorities. The ruling parties have practically taken over the nationalist agenda.

Since April 2015, there has been a Law on the legal status and commemoration of fighters for Ukraine's independence in the twentieth century. This Law, among others, glorifies members of Radical Right and militarist organizations who cooperated collectively or individually with the Nazi regime and fought against the anti-Hitler coalition countries. In particular, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the People's Revolutionary Organization, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of Ataman Taras Borovets (Bulba) "Polesskaya Sech", the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army, and the Ukrainian General Liberation Council are recognized and glorified as fighters for Ukrainian independence. Article 6 of this law stipulates that persons who publicly show contemptuous attitude towards fighters for Ukraine's independence or obstruct the implementation of the rights of fighters for independence shall be held responsible in accordance with the current legislation of Ukraine. Moreover, public denial of the fact of "legitimacy of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century" is considered an outrage against the

⁵⁴⁶ Манифест Общества "Царьград", онлайн: <https://rusorel.info/manifest/>

⁵⁴⁷ "Турнир по регби в День Союза Русского Народа", *Царьград*, онлайн: <https://rusorel.info/turnir-po-regbi-v-den-soyuza-russkogo-naroda/>

⁵⁴⁸ See: <https://www.facebook.com/malofeevkvm/posts/170093161502209>

memory of the fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century, a humiliation of the dignity of the Ukrainian people, and is unlawful. Thus, the glorification of Nazi collaborators, which is a manifestation of indirect anti-Semitism, has since April 2015, thanks to the efforts of the ruling parties, become part of the State ideology of Ukraine.

On 26 September 2017, a new Law "On education" came into force, banning the teaching of any language other than Ukrainian in secondary schools from 2018. From 2020, this rule will also apply to primary schools (see Chapter 1). This decision leads to the assimilation of minorities, which is in line with the typical demands of Radicals. In fact Ukraine is not implementing the Minsk agreements either and President Volodymyr Zelenski has stated that he would like to withdraw from them, but is not doing so only because it would be followed by the lifting of sanctions against Russia.⁵⁴⁹ Objectively, therefore, the political regime in Ukraine is moving ideologically closer to the Radical Rights.

Nevertheless, the far-right parties themselves have low ratings. For example, their common candidate in the last Presidential election *Ruslan Koshulinsky* received only 1.62% of the vote,⁵⁵⁰ the neo-fascist Svoboda Party garnered only 2.15% in the 2019 Parliamentary elections,⁵⁵¹ and in the local elections of October 2020 it garnered the support of a total of 3.3% of voters. This is because the majority of radicalized citizens voted for those large, formally right-wing, so-called "pro-European" parties that have a better chance of winning. This refers primarily to former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and his European Solidarity Party, which has practically adopted the slogans of the Radical Rights.

When it comes to the relatively moderate far-right parties, the following can be highlighted:

- **The Svoboda Party** is the oldest Ukrainian nationalist party, founded before the collapse of the USSR in October 1991 by its permanent leader to this day, *Oleh Tyahnybok*, as the "Social National Party of Ukraine". In 2004, it was renamed the All-Ukrainian Association "Svoboda" (Freedom). The Party advocates building Ukraine as a State of the Ukrainian Nation, which is understood in a purely ethnic sense. "Svoboda" demands that the "Nationality" box be returned to Ukrainian passports and birth certificates, as it was in the USSR, and that the percentage of ethnic groups represented in all areas of life - in educational institutions, the armed forces, government, health care, culture, and education, as well as in business ownership. All state institutions, including all schools, should be exclusively in Ukrainian but minorities are encouraged to establish schools in their own languages. The proportion of the Ukrainian language in the media should correspond to the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in the country's population - at least 78 per cent. The

⁵⁴⁹ "Zelensky says he would like to withdraw from the Minsk agreements", online: <https://ria.ru/20201225/donbass-1590874587.html>

⁵⁵⁰ Results of the first round of the Ukrainian presidential election. Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, online: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/wp300pt001f01=719.html>.

⁵⁵¹ The results for the laggard-mandate electoral constituency. Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, online: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2019/wp300pt001f01=919.html>.

Language law adopted in 2012 should be abolished and replaced by a Law on the Protection of the Ukrainian Language (*zakhist Ukrayynskoi movy*). As can be seen, the second part of the programme has been implemented by the authorities in the last five years.

- **The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists** is a Radical Right political party founded in 1992. It is characterized by anti-Semitism and Russophobia (Jews and Russians are declared the main enemies of Ukraine), as well as Holocaust denial. The ideologists of the Party claim that 150,000 Jews served in the Wehrmacht and therefore there can be no question of their total extermination during World War II. The Party glorifies collaborators and one of the leaders of independent Ukraine during the 1918 civil war S. Petlyura, well known for organizing Jewish pogroms.
- **National Corps** is a nationalist organization established in 2016 on the basis of the public organization Azov Civil Corps. It is a Eurosceptic party opposed to European integration and rapprochement with the West, while declaring Russia Ukraine's main enemy. It advocates the Ukrainianisation of the entire education system and the glorification of Bandera and all World War II collaborators. Members of the National Corps, together with representatives of other far-right organizations, regularly hold torchlight marches in Ukrainian cities to mark the birthday of OUN leader Stepan Bandera and the anniversary of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army⁵⁵². The aesthetics of the events, held by men in camouflage with torches, are an obvious reference to the Third Reich.

The **third group** of far-right parties and organizations are those that can be classified as *extremist and terrorist*. Their activities go beyond the law, they aim to destroy existing socio-political systems and are characterized not only by hatred, but also by violence against minorities and adherents of opposing views.

These include, above all, *international extremist network groups* with branches in a number of countries:

- This is primarily **The Atomwaffen Division (AWD)**, which has 20 cells across the US, as well as branches in the UK, Canada, Germany, the Baltic States, and other European countries. AWD draws inspiration from the cult-like beliefs of *Charles Manson* and the neo-Nazi ideas of *James Mason*, as well as anti-Semitic, anti-LGBT, and apocalyptic views.⁵⁵³ The aim of the organization was to establish a National Socialist government and spread the ideas of "total Aryan victory" through a violent "white revolution" and "race war".⁵⁵⁴ Members of

⁵⁵² "A march for Bandera with torches and red caps marched through Kiev. How it was". *Strana. ua*. <https://strana.ua/news/179220-den-rozhdenija-bandery-1-janvarja-marsh-vo-svoboda-i-natskorpusa-v-kieve-onlajn.html>.

⁵⁵³ Stanford, Center for the International Security and Cooperation, online at:

https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/atomwaffen-division#text_block_23243

⁵⁵⁴ *Jonah Engel Bromwich*, "What Is Atomwaffen? A Neo-Nazi Group, Linked to Multiple Murders", *New York Times*, Feb. 12, 2018, online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/us/what-is-atomwaffen.html>; Mathias, Christopher (January 31, 2018). "1 Neo-Nazi Group. 5 Murders In 8 Months". HuffPost. Archived from the original

the organization organized training sessions on how to use firearms. In August 2017, active duty Marine and AWD cell leader *Vassilios Pistoris* attacked counter-protesters at a United Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.⁵⁵⁵ Police also suspect several AWD members in several killings that took place in 2017-2018. These include the January 2018 stabbing of 20-year-old University of Pennsylvania student Blaze Bernstein in California, allegedly for being gay;⁵⁵⁶ and the December 22, 2017 murder of 17-year-old AWD member Nicholas Jump by his girlfriend's parents in Reston, Virginia, because they encouraged their daughter to break up with Jump because of his extremist views, etc.

In March 2020, the Atomwaffen Division was disbanded after several of its members, including its former leader *John Cameron Denton*, were arrested by the FBI on harassment charges that included anti-Semitic and racist threats against journalists. In September 2020, two of the arrested AWD members pleaded guilty to federal conspiracy charges. Due to the lack of legislation in the US to prosecute its own extremists as terrorists, an attempt was made in March 2020 to designate AWD as a foreign terrorist organization, but this decision was later reversed. Under this pressure, the organization declared itself dissolved, but later reorganized into the **National Socialist Order (NSO)** in July 2020. The official programme of the NSO echoed that of the AWD in its allegiance to Adolf Hitler and its total rejection of the current world order and its desire to overthrow "Jewish-controlled" governments around the world (although it does claim to be a US-based organization). AWD's **Sonnenkrieg** and **Feuerkrieg** units, which were considered British branches of the organization, were banned in February and July 2020 respectively.

- Another widespread example of international extremist organizations is the world-famous **Blood & Honour (B&H)**, an international neo-Nazi network whose ideology is based on the National Socialist doctrine of Nazi Germany. Through its armed **Combat 18 (C18)** unit, the group committed violent acts, including murders and bombings. B&H was founded in the UK in 1987 and grew throughout the 1990s, establishing branches across Europe by the end of the decade. B&H crimes have occurred in North America and in several EU member states. In January 2012, four B&H members in Tampa, Florida, were convicted of the 1998 murders of two homeless men who were murdered because the group considered them "inferior". In February 2012, members of B&H and C18 bombed a building occupied mostly by Romani families, including children, in the city of Aš, Czech Republic.
- **The Base** (whose name is derived from the translation of al-Qaeda) is another violent neo-Nazi anarchist network founded in the US in June 2018, allegedly by *Rinaldo Nazzaro*, a US intelligence officer suspected of spying for Russia.⁵⁵⁷ The base focuses on training its

on March 26, 2019. Retrieved February 15, 2018; "Report: Suspect in Penn Student's Murder Has Neo-Nazi Ties". Philadelphia. January 29, 2018. Archived from the original on June 19, 2019. Retrieved February 15, 2018

⁵⁵⁵ "He's a proud neo-Nazi, Charlottesville attacker - and a U.S. Marine, YouTube video, 3:02, posted May 3, 2018, by ProPublica. Cited in "White Supremacy Groups in the United States," Counter Extremism Project, p. 10. Pistoris was martialled, jailed, and discharged after his identity was publicly revealed.

⁵⁵⁶ *Joe Trinacria*, "Report: Suspect in Penn Student's Murder Has Neo-Nazi Ties", online at:

<https://www.phillymag.com/news/2018/01/29/suspect-penn-student-murder-neo-nazi-ties/>

⁵⁵⁷ *Daniel De Simone, Andrei Soshnikov & Ali Winston*, BBC News, online at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51236915>

members (in camps across the US) to wage racial warfare. It seeks to recruit current and former military personnel. It is an international network with cells in the US, Canada, Europe, South Africa, and Australia. It distributes manuals on lone wolf attacks, bomb-making, counter-surveillance, and guerrilla warfare.

- **Hammerskin Nation** is the largest and most organized skinhead network in the USA.⁵⁵⁸ It was formed in 1988 (out of skinheads from the punk music scene; the group continues to organize the annual Hammerfest white music concerts; with the latest concerts taking place in California in October 2018 and in Europe in November 2019) and has cells all over the world, including Canada.⁵⁵⁹ Over the years the Hammerskins have been accused of various violent crimes including murder, assault, arson, vandalism, stalking, and other hate crimes. Becoming a member of the Hammerskins is relatively difficult: the vetting and initiation process takes years.
- **The Ku Klux Klan (KKK)** is an ultra-conservative, secret fraternal organization dedicated to the supremacy of Anglo-Saxon Protestant society, operating in the territories of the USA and Canada. Defends such ideas as white supremacy and white nationalism. In the middle of the twentieth century the Ku Klux Klan also opposed American Catholics, black people, and communism. The Third Klan (nowadays) is against homosexuals, Muslims, and tolerance. This organization is associated with the emergence of the concept of the Lynch trial.
- **Three per cent** is one of the three main components of the anti-Government militia movement in the US and Canada. The reference to the Three Percent stems from the dubious historical claim that only 3 per cent of American colonists fought against the British during the War of Independence.⁵⁶⁰ Members of the Movement are heavily armed and actively engaged in paramilitary training "in the interest of defending Canada's traditional heritage against enemies both foreign and domestic". They believe the invasion of Islam is inevitable and oppose it. They are also well known to monitor mosques for terrorist activity.

As for national Extremist organizations, the picture is as follows:

UNITED STATES. There are a number of extremist organizations in the country that cannot be prosecuted for terrorism or violent extremism due to the peculiarities of US law. Among these, most are so-called militia organizations, i.e., groups of heavily armed people engaged in hand-to-hand combat training, participating in and organizing racially motivated riots, such as in the recent BLM events. These include **the Nationalist Social Club** (year established -2019), **the Rise Above Movement** (2017), **the Oath Keepers** (2009), the **Patriotic Movement** (established in the 1990s, brings together a range of disparate far-right

⁵⁵⁷ ADL, The Hammerskin Nation, online at:

<https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/hammerskin-nation>.

⁵⁵⁹ "Racist, Violent, Unpunished: A White Hate Group's Campaign of Menace", online at:

<https://www.propublica.org/article/white-hate-group-campaign-of-menace-rise-above-movement>

⁵⁶⁰ SPLC, ANTIGOVERNMENT MOVEMENT, ONLINE AT: [HTTPS://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/antigovernment](https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/antigovernment).

armed militia groups that harbor racist, xenophobic, extremist, anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic, and anti-immigrant feelings), **the Wolverine Guards** (2019), and **Bugaloo** (2019). The latter two differ in that they belong to so-called political anti-Government organizations. The former came to prominence when it organized a plot to kidnap Michigan Governor *Gretchen Whitmer* in October 2020 and forcibly overthrow the Government. Fourteen people were arrested in the case.⁵⁶¹ "Bugaloo" is known for calling for a second Civil war and the overthrow of the Government.

FRANCE. A large part of hate crime in France, as in most other monitoring countries, are committed by lone perpetrators. Since 2015, for example, three such plots to assassinate a political figure, including President *Emmanuel Macron*, have been uncovered in the country. Some of them set up their own marginal organizations, often consisting of several terrorists and unconnected to any other group. In June 2017, for example, *Logan Alexandre Nisin*, 21, was arrested near Marseille for intending to kill then-Interior Minister *Christophe Castaner* and left-wing MP *Jean-Luc Melenchon*. He 're-established' the so-called '**Organisation armée secrète**' (OAS), the clandestine organization of the same name set up by the French military in 1961 to defend the French presence in Algeria by all means, including large-scale terrorism. The aim of Nisin's new organization was to force Muslims to remigrate to North Africa through intimidation and terror.

Another, more serious organization was the **Action des force opérationnelles** (AFO) (Force opérationnelles). It is a terrorist right-wing organization which aims to rid France of the Islamic presence. The group, which included former military, police, and gendarmerie officers aged between 32 and 69, planned to attack radical imams and former Islamic terrorists who had been released from prison, as well as women wearing the veil and ordinary Muslims. Among the plans revealed during their police interrogation was one nicknamed the "halal project" - poisoning halal meat in supermarkets with a potent pesticide. During the search, 39 firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition were seized from their possession, most of which were stored without proper authorization. Materials for making explosives were seized.⁵⁶²

One can also name a far-right group prone to violence, **Les Zouaves**, named after the French army light infantry used in colonial North Africa from 1830 to 1961. They attack not only Muslims but also Jews, homosexuals, leftists, and those who are critical of violence and paganism (the group consists mainly of pagans). The group is known for its attacks on members of the "Yellow Vests" Movement in 2019 and other acts of hooliganism. On the international scene, the Zouaves are known to have contacts with Ukrainian nationalists, Olena Semenyaka of the political wing of the Azov paramilitary organization National Corp. Some activists from this organization, along with other far-right activists, have taken part in

⁵⁶¹"Who Are the Wolverine Watchmen, the Group Allegedly Part of Thwarted Plan to Kidnap Michigan Governor?" *Inside Edition*, October 14, 2020, online at: <https://www.insideedition.com/who-are-the-wolverine-watchmen-the-group-allegedly-part-of-thwarted-plan-to-kidnap-michigan>

⁵⁶²*Nicolas Henin*, "The Significance of the AFO Case in the French Fight Against Jihadist Terrorism", online at: <https://eeradicalization.com/the-significance-of-the-afo-case-in-the-french-fight-against-jihadist-terrorism/>

combat operations in eastern Ukraine on the side of paramilitary units of Ukrainian nationalists. Another French right-wing group, **Unité continentale** (Continental Bloc), participated in combat operations on the other side, fighting for the DNR, allegedly together with Russian neo-Nazis from the banned Russian National Unity (RNE).⁵⁶³

GREECE. The **Black Line** (Μαύρος Κρίνος) - positioned themselves as a *left-wing* neo-Nazi anti-Islamic group. During the period of monitoring, they fought against Islamist militants in Syria, believing that that was where the "front line" of the struggle for European civilization was located. Its organizational structure resembles the model of organizations such as the "Atomwaffen Division". There are also a number of neo-Nazi martial arts clubs, such as **Pro Patria**, founded by a small group of far-right martial artists in Athens in 2014. The club organizes and runs mixed martial arts tournaments for like-minded individuals across Europe. Pro Patria's founders came from various ultra-nationalist backgrounds, including the defunct Golden Dawn political party, the white supremacy advocacy group Blood & Honor, and local armed groups such as Combat 18 and the Wandering Nationalists (AME).⁵⁶⁴ "The Wandering Nationalists, **Ανένταχτοι Μαϊάνδριοι Εθνικιστές (AME)** is a neo-Nazi organization active in rallies and protests against immigrants and Muslims. It has a strong anti-Turkish bias. Activists from the Organization have been known to attack and beat up left-wing groups. They have also made anti-Semitic statements and have repeatedly desecrated the Jewish cemetery in Larissa.⁵⁶⁵

ITALY. There are several right-wing extremist organizations in the country, but their influence is limited. **Nuovo MSI - Destra Nazionale (New Right Nationalists)** is an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist political party known for creating illegal armed units such as **the National Guard** (*Guardia Nazionale Italiana*) and **the Black Patrols** (*Ronde Nere*). It promotes homophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-migrant sentiments.

GERMANY. Here the activities of **the Identity Movement** (Identitäre Bewegung) and a number of so called "partnerships" should be highlighted. "The Identity Movement" (IM) is a right-wing extremist organization, part of an international network originally established in Britain and France (see Chapter 2).⁵⁶⁶ It is an anti-Islamic far-right organization which advocates a racially homogenous European culture and opposes multiculturalism. It has as its program demands such as the forced repatriation of all 'non-Western' immigrants. According to the Ministry of the Interior, between April 2017 and August 2018, authorities recorded 114 IM-related offences, the vast majority of which were such as stickers in the

⁵⁶³ Nicolas Lebourg, "The French Far Right in Russia's Orbit", online at: <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01815852/document>

⁵⁶⁴ Bloody Elbow, "Building Castles: Neo-Nazi fight clubs on the rise in Athens", online at: <https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2020/1/8/21054569/neo-nazi-fight-clubs-greece-fighting-fascism-golden-dawn-mma-feature>

⁵⁶⁵ See Athens Voice, online: https://www.athensvoice.gr/politics/43063_anentahtoi-maiandrioi-ethnikistes-sta-dexia-tis-ha; "Αυτός είναι ο γνωστός δικηγόρος που εμπλέκεται με την ακροδεξιά οργάνωση", online: <https://www.ereportaz.gr/aytos-einai-o-dikigoros-poy-empleketai-me-tin-akrodexia/>

⁵⁶⁶ Free judgements, "Verfassungsschutz darf "Identitäre Bewegung" als "gesichert rechtsextremistisch" bezeichnen", online: https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/VG-Berlin_1-L-18820_Verfassungsschutz-darf-Identitaere-Bewegung-als-gesichert-rechtsextremistisch-bezeichnen.news28905.htm

wrong place, spraying walls, and holding unregistered gatherings. In Munich in August 2018, there were incidents involving sedition and the use of banned symbols.⁵⁶⁷ In June 2020, a Movement activist was sentenced to 8 months' suspended imprisonment for attacking two police officers with pepper spray in front of the DI house in Halle (Saale) in 2017.⁵⁶⁸

"Comradeships" (Kameradschaften), "Free comradeships" - Most of the "comradeships" (associated with the word "camerad," an informal soldier's term in *Wehrmacht*) were dismantled by the police in the mid-2010s. Although experts estimate that these structures are no longer sufficiently capable of carrying out attacks, one cannot claim that the right-wing extremist underground in Germany has been completely defeated. In November 2020, for example, the prosecutor's office brought charges against 12 members of the so-called **"Group S"** who had been arrested in February this year. The structure was organized along the lines of the Finnish far-right "Self-Defence", which is close to the principle of "comradeships". Right-wing radicals planned to attack politicians, anti-fascist activists, and mosques in order to destabilize the situation in the country and raised funds to purchase weapons.⁵⁶⁹ In early December 2020, it became known that the neo-Nazi group **Sturmbrigade 44** had been banned. It had 11 members, two of whom were already serving sentences for other crimes. The group used a wide range of Nazi symbols. The two "fours" in the name correspond to the fourth letters of the alphabet and the first letters of the Dirlewanger Division, an SS unit commander, *Oskar Dirlewanger*, revered in right-wing extremist circles. Edged weapons have been found in the flats of members of the group.⁵⁷⁰ In 2020, two other neo-Nazi groups were banned. They were organized according to a slightly different principle than the "comradeships" but espoused the same ideology: the aforementioned **"Combat 18"** and the **"Northern Eagle"**.

The German organization **"Citizens of the Reich"** is worth mentioning separately. This is a network of often unconnected organizations (the Free State of Bavaria, the Himgau Community, the Republic of Free Germany, and others). Their members believe that the "Third Reich" did not cease to exist when Germany surrendered in 1945. They do not recognize the FRG as a legitimate State. Some groups print their own "passports" and "banknotes" and hold "elections" for "deputies" to the self-proclaimed "Reichstag". Demonstrations, rallies and other actions are also staged. A certain percentage of "Reich citizens" live in communes and, wishing to reduce contact with the State to a minimum, engage in agriculture and their own cottage industry. For a long time "Reichsbürgers" were not considered dangerous or violent. Rather, they were perceived as members of a strange subculture. The situation changed after the murder of a police officer by a member of the

⁵⁶⁷ "Identitarian movement commits over 100 crimes", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 24/08/2018, online: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/identitaere-bewegung-begeht-ueber100-straftaten-15753899.html>

⁵⁶⁸ "Identitäre Bewegung Rechter Aktivist verurteilt nach Angriff auf Polizisten", *Mitteldeutsche Zeitung*, 24/06/2020, online: <https://www.mz-web.de/halle-saale/identitaere-bewegung-rechter-aktivist-nach-angriff-auf-polizisten-verurteilt-36905198>

⁵⁶⁹ "Suspects from right-wing extremist vigilante groups", *Tagesschau.de*, online: <https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/gruppe-s-111.html>

⁵⁷⁰ "Well-networked right-wing extremists", *Tagesschau.de*, online: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/sturmbrigade-44-aufloesung-103.html>

group in 2016. The killer was sentenced to life imprisonment.⁵⁷¹ Firearms were found in the possession of members of the group. The "Reich citizens" are now under surveillance by the German security services. Between 2019 and 2020, the flats of its members were regularly searched. Activists of the NPO "United German Peoples and Tribes" are considered particularly dangerous (21 flats were searched in March 2020 by 400 police officers). The NGO was deemed extremist and banned.⁵⁷² The group denies not only the FRG as a State, but also Democracy in general, preaches anti-Semitism, and denies the Holocaust. Of an estimated 19,000 "Reichsbürger" members, 950 are recognized as right-wing extremists.⁵⁷³

The total number of German residents "involved in the right-wing extremist spectrum" was 32,000 in June 2020 (2019: 24,000). Between June 2019 and June 2020, 13 people were victims of right-wing extremists.⁵⁷⁴ The largest terrorist attacks during this period took place in October 2019 in Halle/Zaal (attack on a synagogue and a Turkish café, two dead and three wounded)⁵⁷⁵ and in February 2020 in Hanau (attack on two hookah houses, 11 dead and five wounded).⁵⁷⁶ The most high-profile crime by right-wing radicals was the murder of *Walter Lübke* (CDU), head of the Kassel District Government. He was killed by a shot to the head on the terrace of his own house on 1 June 2019. The murderer and his assistant were found and detained. Both are right-wing extremist activists.⁵⁷⁷ The motive for the crime was Lübke's political stance: he was purposefully in favor of accepting refugees from crisis regions of the world and insisted on providing humanitarian aid to those in need.

UNITED KINGDOM. Of the right-wing extremist groups in Britain, **National Action (NA)**, is the first to be mentioned. Founded in 2013, this neo-Nazi organization quickly established itself as one of the most violent and disturbing movements ever to emerge from the extreme right in Britain. Uncompromising adherents of National Socialism and outspoken admirers of Hitler who preach racial exclusivity, members of the group came to public attention in 2014 after publicly trolling Liverpool Labour MP *Lucianne Berger*, a Jewess by birth.⁵⁷⁸ In

⁵⁷¹ "Life imprisonment for Reichsbürger after murder of police officer", *Zeit Online*, online: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-10/reichsbuergerbewegung-urteil-mord-polizisten-wolfgang-p>

⁵⁷² "Hochgefährliche Spinner", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/03/2020, online: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/verbotene-reichsbuerger-gruppe-rechtsextrem-und-hochgefaehrlich-16686793.html>

⁵⁷³ Federal Ministry of the Interior, for Building and Home Affairs. Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019, online: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2019-kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

⁵⁷⁴ "Ministers reckon with more than 100 right-wing extremist threats", *Die Welt*, 19/06/2020, online: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article209931591/IMK-in-Erfurt-Zahl-der-rechtsextremen-Gefaehrder-steigt.html>

⁵⁷⁵ "Halle's mayor Wiegand: Danger to synagogue not foreseeable before attack", *Sachsen Anhalt*, 28/10/2020, online: <https://www.mdr.de/sachsen-anhalt/landespolitik/u-ausschuss-zum-anschlag-auf-synagoge-in-halle-102.html>

⁵⁷⁶ "Germany commemorates the victims of racism", *Zeit Online*, online: <https://www.zeit.de/thema/hanau>

⁵⁷⁷ "Der Mord am Kasseler Regierungspräsident", *Zeit Online*, online: <https://www.zeit.de/thema/walter-luebcke>

⁵⁷⁸ *Press Association*, 'Racist troll guilty of harassing Labour MP with antisemitic posts', *The Guardian*, 7 December 2016, online at: www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/07/racist-troll-guilty-harassing-labour-mp-luciana-berger-joshua-bonehill-paine.

June 2015, the situation took a more sinister turn when NA activist *Zak Davies* was convicted of attempting to murder a Sikh doctor with a hammer and machete.⁵⁷⁹

Moreover, in the summer of 2019, one of NA's most senior activists, *Jack Renshaw*, was found guilty of preparing an act of terrorism and sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting to murder West Lancashire MP *Rosie Cooper*.⁵⁸⁰ After the group was declared a terrorist group in December 2016, monitoring revealed news of the group's continued activities under the new names **Scottish Dawn** and **NS131**.⁵⁸¹ Arrests and ongoing trials of individuals linked to National Action continue - military personnel and more than a dozen others have recently gone on trial.⁵⁸² They have been charged with a variety of crimes, including terrorist offences,⁵⁸³ participation in a banned organization,⁵⁸⁴ making an improvised bomb,⁵⁸⁵ sexual offences,⁵⁸⁶ and several attempted murders.

Another example of right-wing extremist groups in the UK is the **Sonnenkrieg Division**, also banned in 2020. It is a neo-Nazi group that is a UK-based branch of the US-based "Atomwaffen Division" and maintains links with it via email and chat rooms. The group came to light when, in December 2018, British intelligence agencies received information that members of the group were discussing online the assassination of Prince *Harry* for being a "race traitor" who should be shot for marrying *Meghan Markle* of "mixed race". In addition, members discussed that police officers should be raped and killed and white women who are meeting with the color persons should be hanged.⁵⁸⁷

In early December 2018, police arrested three suspected members of the Sonnenkrieg branch as part of an "ongoing investigation into the activities of the extreme right". On 18 June 2019, Sonnenkrieg members *Dunn-Koczorowski* and 19-year-old *Michal Szewczyk* were jailed for terrorist offences. According to the Prosecutor, the men promoted "participation

⁵⁷⁹ BBC News, 'Lee Rigby revenge attacker Zak Davies given life sentence', 11 September 2015, online at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-north-east-wales-34218184

⁵⁸⁰ BBC News, 'Jack Renshaw: MP death plot neo-Nazi jailed for life', 17 May 2019, online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-48306380>.

⁵⁸¹ Cockburn, H., 'National Action: Neo-Nazi group's aliases 'Scottish Dawn' and 'NS131' banned under terrorism laws, says Home Office'. *The Independent*, 28 September 2018, online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/national-action-neo-nazi-scottish-dawn-ns131-banned-terrorism-laws-home-office-british-soldiers-west-a7971906.html>.

⁵⁸² *Hope not Hate* 'National Action', February 2017, online at: www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/the-hate-files/national-action/.

⁵⁸³ Dearden, L., 'National Action: 'Miss Hitler' contestant and three fellow neo-Nazis convicted of terror offences', *The Independent*, 18 March 2020, online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/national-action-neo-nazi-terrorist-miss-hitler-alice-cutter-trial-a9345291.html>.

⁵⁸⁴ Press Association, 'Four UK neo-Nazis jailed for membership of National Action', *The Guardian*, 9 June 2020, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jun/09/four-uk-neo-nazis-jailed-for-membership-of-national-action>.

⁵⁸⁵ BBC News, 'Neo-Nazi pipe bomb teenager admits terror offence', 16 July 2018, online at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-44848985>.

⁵⁸⁶ Dearden, L., 'Jack Renshaw: Neo-Nazi paedophile who plotted to kill Labour MP jailed for life', *The Independent*, 17 May 2019, online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/jack-reshaw-trial-jail-sentence-rosie-cooper-labour-neo-nazi-a8918206.html>.

⁵⁸⁷ "UK to ban neo-Nazi Sonnenkrieg Division as a terrorist group", *The Guardian*, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/24/uk-ban-neo-nazi-sonnenkrieg-division-terrorist-group>

in "an all-out attack" on the system", with Dann-Kochorowski proclaiming that "terror is the best political weapon, as nothing makes people more afraid than the fear of sudden death", and were determined to act. Dunn-Kochorowski was sentenced to 18 months in prison for encouraging terrorism, while Shevchuk was sentenced to four years in prison for encouraging terrorism and keeping documents that could be useful to a terrorist, such as bomb-making instructions.⁵⁸⁸

RUSSIA. After the defeat by the authorities of the former and quite strong Russian right-wing radical movement in the mid-2010s, there are almost no active organized far-right groups left in the country. However, we can mention the group "**Citizens of the USSR**" or "**Union of Slavic Forces of Russia**" - "**USSR**", existing since 2010. It is a right-wing extremist organization, whose members do not recognize the collapse of the USSR and official Russian documents, carry old Soviet Union passports and refuse to obey Russian laws, considering them contrary to the laws of the non-existing USSR. According to Russia's FSB, the Movement had 150,000 followers in 2018.⁵⁸⁹ The ideological basis of the group is Russian aggressive nationalism, neo-paganism, and anti-Semitism. For example, two activists of this organization found a potential assassin in September 2020, to whom they gave the personal details of the Chairman of the Jewish Community in Krasnodar, Yuri Tkach, who had been recruited. They gave to the executant an "installation knife and means of conspiracy" and promised a high position in their organization if Y.Tkach was "successfully eliminated". The assassination attempt was interrupted already at this stage, because the "killer" turned out to be an operative policeman working undercover, and only staged the attempt. However, the order itself can be considered as a real threat, since the "citizens of the USSR" in Krasnodar had previously been distinguished by aggressive anti-Semitism and marginality. In addition, the regional activists of the organization sent letters calling for revolution to the military units stationed in their districts, as well as to the units of the State's security service (FSB).⁵⁹⁰

Other new organizations that have become prominent include the group **Men's State**, which emerged on the social network "Vkontakte" in 2016 and espouses the so-called national patriarchy (nationalism with a strong admixture of male chauvinism). In 2020, the group's supporters moved from online threats to real attacks. In particular, in August 2020, they attacked blogger Yana Leonova for posting videos of herself dancing on a pole dressed as a Catholic nun on Instagram. An unidentified man wearing a mask and, on a scooter, caught up with her and punched her in the face as she was returning home from a friend's house.⁵⁹¹

In the context of harsh measures taken by Russian law enforcement agencies against right-wing radicals, many activists have to act alone. In the period under review, this was reflected in their active participation in election campaigns. Some of them were successful, primarily

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ "FSB invades 'USSR'", *Kommersant* (Ekaterinburg), 22.03.2020, online: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3579737>

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ "Popular blogger who danced in nun costume gets her face smashed", RIA NEWS, 26.08.2020, online: <https://ria.ru/20200826/blogger-1576310822.html>

due to the support of leftist and liberal parties and organizations, which sought to create a united front to fight pro-presidential candidates. For example, this tactic, along with some Communists and Democrats, resulted in the election of the locally prominent nationalist *Rostislav Antonov*, known for his harsh anti-migrant statements, to the Novosibirsk City Duma.⁵⁹²

UKRAINE. The right-wing extremist organizations in Ukraine may well include **Right Sector**, **S14**, and **the National Guard's Azov regiment**. The Right Sector emerged as a confederation of several far-right organizations during the "Euromaidan" events. On 22 March 2014, a closed congress in Kiev decided to transform "Right Sector" into a political party "on the legal and personnel basis" of the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA-UNSO), which was renamed the Right Sector party. However, as stated, in addition to the Right Sector party, the public organization and the so-called "power bloc" continued to exist. On 21 July 2015, an extraordinary all-Ukrainian congress announced the renaming of the Right Sector into *the National Liberation Movement* (Ukr. *Natsionalnyy vyzvolnyy rukh*) *Praviy sektor* due to the beginning of a "new phase of revolutionary struggle". The military wing of the Movement is the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps (leader *Andriy Stempitsky*), and the political wing is the Right Sector Party (*Andriy Tarasenko*). There is also a "youth movement" - *Right Youth*. The original core of the grouping was made up of nationalist football fans, who were traditionally stationed in the right sector at the stadium. Hence the name "Right Sector" (RS).

The ideology of the party can be described as Ukrainian integral nationalism (see below), bordering on fascism. They advocate the "derusification of Ukraine, the glorification of the executioners of World War II and the civil war (1918-20)" and the national revolution". In fact, all the demands of the RS in today's Ukraine are fulfilled. A report published in early June 2016 by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions listed the Right Sector as a "violent militia that operates as an independent force thanks to high-level official condonation and with near total impunity". This includes violence against people (journalists, writers) whose beliefs they do not agree with, as well as threats of violence against lawyers and judges.⁵⁹³

S14 is a Radical Right public association which declares a commitment to Ukrainian nationalism with features of a neo-Nazi group. It carries out so-called "direct action", i.e., attacks on communists, socialists, leftists, and Roma. Ideologically, it stands for Ukrainian integral nationalism. S14 is not a political party. It began as a typical street militant group, but is now gradually adding social activism to its function. According to various versions, the name derives either from the encrypted name "Sich" (Sich), or from a reference to the well-known neo-Nazi symbol "14/88". The leader of the group is *Yevhen Karas*. S14 receives state funding. Thus, a number of NGOs founded by S14 members received 900 thousand hryvnias (almost \$30 thousand) in 2019 from the State Service for Veterans of War and anti-Terrorist

⁵⁹² "Novosibirsk City Council renewed by more than 50%", *Sibkray. ru*, online:

<https://sibkray.ru/news/2126/937993/>

⁵⁹³ UN Human Rights Council. Thirty-second Session . "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on his mission to Ukraine", online: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/091/45/PDF/G1609145.pdf?OpenElement>

Operations, and 200,000 HRN from the Kyiv City State Administration. Also, the Head of S14, E. Karas is a member of two public councils - by the Ministry of Youth and Sports and by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau.⁵⁹⁴

The Azov National Guard Regiment is an active unit within the military subdivision #3057 of the Eastern Operational-Territorial Division of the National Guard of Ukraine.⁵⁹⁵ The battalion "Azov" was created after the Euromaidan victory. It comprised groups of nationalists actively involved in the protest movement - activists of the so-called Automaidan and ultra-nationalists ("black men") of one of the right-wing radical leaders, Mosiychuk. The battalion also includes Kiev ultras from among football fans.⁵⁹⁶ The regiment receives official weapons from the Ukrainian Interior Ministry and is also funded from the state budget from 2014. Also, the main sources of funding and supply of equipment to the regiment are private donations, support of the volunteer movement, charitable foundations, and assistance from businessmen. Charity concerts are regularly held in Ukrainian cities in support of the regiment. People who do not hide their neo-Nazi, far-right, and nationalist convictions serve in this military unit.⁵⁹⁷ In particular, the commander of Azov, Lieutenant Colonel *Andriy Biletsky*, who is also head of the nationalistic organizations SNA ("Social National Assembly") and "Patriot of Ukraine", believes that the historical mission of the Ukrainian nation is to "lead the white race crusade against the sub-humans led by the Semites" and social-nationalism will raise "the shield of all ancient Ukrainian Aryan values".⁵⁹⁸

The Azov regiment's ultranationalist ideology has repeatedly been the subject of criticism both inside Ukraine and from Western countries. For example, in October 2019, a group of 40 congressmen from the US Democratic Party sent an appeal to the State Department demanding that Azov be recognized as a terrorist organization. The statement notes that Azov openly invites neo-Nazis into its ranks, and "in the relatively short history of this group, the UN has documented human rights violations and cases of torture." The congressmen in the appeal also pointed out that Brenton Tarrant, who shot 50 people in a New Zealand mosque in March 2019, was linked to Azov and trained at their base.⁵⁹⁹ The UN and human rights organizations have repeatedly testified to the kidnapping, torture and rape of civilians by Azov soldiers.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁴"How Ukraine pays the far-right. Under Zelensky, funding for S14 radicals increased". Strana. ua. 26.08.2020, online: <https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/286150-hosudarstvo-oplachivaet-radikalnye-dvizheniya-v-ukraine.html>.

⁵⁹⁵ National Guard of Ukraine, online: <https://ngu.gov.ua/ua/news/rozyasnennya-shchodo-statusu-specpidrozdilu-azov>

⁵⁹⁶ "Dynamo Kiev ultras group joined Azov battalion", *Rosbalt*, 4 June 2014, online: <https://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2014/06/04/1276864.html>

⁵⁹⁷ *Oren Dorell*, "Volunteer Ukrainian unit includes Nazis", *USA Today*, online: <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937/>

⁵⁹⁸ "Ukrainian Social-Nationalism", online: <https://archive.fo/20130423165229/http://rid.org.ua/?p=256#selection-501.0-501.30>

⁵⁹⁹ "The connection between Azov and terrorist attacks in America is obvious". Why the US wants to equate Ukraine's National Guard regiment with IS. Country. ua. 22.10.2019. URL: <https://strana.ua/news/229127-azov-khotjat-vnesti-v-spisok-terroristov-ssha-cto-eto-oznachaet.html>.

⁶⁰⁰ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine 14 March 2014. - 31 January 2017", online: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportCRSV_RU.pdf; Office of the United Nations High

Ukrainian Interior Minister, Arsen Avakov, provides significant support and patronage to the "National Corps" and "Azov". Ukrainian media and political experts have regularly reported on the ties between the radicals and the Interior Minister since 2014. Azov fighters and members of the National Corps are reportedly used by Avakov to exert forceful pressure on his political opponents and supporters of a peaceful end to the conflict in Donbas. Following a demand by a group of congressmen to recognize Azov as a terrorist organization, Avakov publicly supported the regiment twice over a ten-day period. First, during a meeting with the head of the US mission to Ukraine, Christine Quinn, Avakov said that the congressmen's appeal was "discrediting the unit and its fight for the territorial integrity of Ukraine".⁶⁰¹ Avakov also visited Azov's base in Mariupol, where he called the regiment "one of the most professional and trained units" and declared "maximum support for those who defend Ukraine".⁶⁰²

The Ideology of the Far Right.

The main ideological underpinnings of all far-right organizations are Xenophobia, hostility towards minorities, supremacism, including racism, and ethno-nationalism with various biases. For example, in 2019, Canada conducted a large-scale research study with 45 respondents from 4 English- and French-speaking provinces in the country who belonged to 41 right-wing moderate current groups. The results of the survey showed that the main driving force behind these far-right groups is the demonization of Muslim immigration as a way of moving towards a more general critique of immigration, multiculturalism, and liberalism. At the same time, most far-right interviewees argued that Muslim immigration is only "the tip of the iceberg" and all forms of immigration pose a serious danger to society as a whole. From this point of view, Islam is only a "symptom" and immigration a "real disease".⁶⁰³

A common ideological platform for most of the far-right is also considered to be the Alt-Right (Alternative Right), a doctrine based on the thesis of the need to defend "traditional identity", "Western values", and to fight against multiculturalism, free immigration, and free trade, since the latter hits local producers and the working class. Alt-Right generally rejects the Western democratic ideal and prevailing conservatism, criticizes multiculturalism and the thesis that minority rights should be protected. Different radical forces interpret the alt-right

Commissioner for Human Rights, "Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 February - 15 May 2016", online: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_14th_HRMMU_Report_RUSSIAN.pdf

⁶⁰¹ Avakov has decided that since the US Congress associates Azov with terrorists, it is a "quality mark". Strana. ua. 25.10.2019. URL: <https://strana.ua/news/229778-avakom-prokommentiroval-initsiativu-konhressmenov-vkljuchit-azov-v-terroristicheskij-spisok.html>.

⁶⁰² Avakov comes to Mariupol to express support for Azov, which the USA is going to equate with terrorists. Country. ua. 28.10.2019, online at: <https://strana.ua/news/230338-hlava-mvd-avakov-podderzhal-polk-azov-v-mariupole-foto.html>.

⁶⁰³ Aurélie Campana, Université Laval; Samuel Tanner, Université de Montréal. "Anti-Muslim Ordinary Racism and the Banalization of Far-Right Ideology", Research Report, 2019, online at: https://www.tsas.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/RR2019_01_Campana_Tanner.pdf

in different ways. Moderate forces see it as an ideology of traditional identity, while extremists see it as a doctrine of racial identity.⁶⁰⁴

When talking about the ideology of the right-wing radicals, the role of the Catholic Church cannot be overlooked. Despite the openly tolerant position of Pope Francis, a rather powerful opposition has developed within the Catholic Church which actively engages with the extreme right, offering them ultra-Catholicism as a new and certainly powerful ideological base. This is happening in virtually all the countries of the conventional West - from Italy, where a well-organized far-right Catholic opposition has formed within the Church, to Poland, where the hierarchs of the Catholic Church are among the main advisers to the right-wing populist PiS Government on the problems of migrants, Muslims, and refugees. Even in the US there is a whole group of opposition-minded Catholic priests and activists who consistently oppose the Vatican leadership and the Pope personally (as an example, the Church Militant website).⁶⁰⁵ These circles reject the Pope's ecumenism, his openness to other religions, his criticism of anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism, and his support for LGBT people in Catholic circles. This is in addition to disagreement on theological and doctrinal issues.

The confrontation escalated after the publication of one of the latest (8 April 2016) Papal encyclicals, *Amoris Laetitia* (Joy of Love), in which he calls for the acceptance of immigrants and welcomes diversity. In opposition to this encyclical, 80 senior members of the Catholic clergy turned out, of whom 45 sent formal letters of objection to the Pope, something that seemed impossible in previous times. Ultra-Catholic radicalism also makes extensive use of the Internet. There are a number of well-known websites and blogs which are Catholic in form but Radical Right in content, actively using hate speech towards minorities and other religions.⁶⁰⁶

The ideological basis of the Ukrainian radicals is worth mentioning separately. It differs significantly from the generally accepted ideology of right-wing radicals in other countries. The ideological basis of modern Ukrainian nationalism, as it was 100 years ago, is again the theory of Ukrainian Integral Nationalism. The Author of this theory is an Ukrainian nationalist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Dmytro Dontsov, although the universal theory of integral nationalism had been formulated before his time by the French philosophers Charles Morras and Maurice Barrès. They contrasted it with the principles of humane liberalism and placed the illiberal, totalitarian nature of nationalism at the centre: all citizens should obey the same rules and regulations and share the same enthusiasm, and all individual freedoms should be subordinated to the Idea of Nationalism.

⁶⁰⁴ "How Donald Trump's New Campaign Chief Created an Online Haven for White Nationalists", *Mother Jones*, online at: <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/stephen-bannon-donald-trump-alt-right-breitbart-news/>

⁶⁰⁵ National Catholic Reporter, online at: <https://www.ncronline.org>

⁶⁰⁶ CM: CENTER FOR MONITORING AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS AT THE MOSCOW INSTITUTE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC POLICY AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS STUDIES, "CONTEMPORARY FAR-RIGHTS. Right radicalism in Europe: ideology, social basis, prospects", pp15-20, online at: <https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/contemporary-radicalism-eng.pdf>

At the same time, integral nationalists refuse to cooperate with other nations. Dontsov tried only to apply these principles on Ukrainian soil. He contrasts the Ukrainian nation - the "svidovye" (conscientious) - with the Ukrainian people. He declares the independence of Ukraine to be not the only end in itself. The primary and main goal, according to Dontsov, is the creation of the European Ukrainian Nation through the purification of the Ukrainian people, during which any popular in the late 19th and early 20th century ideas of friendship between the nations, or, even more so, federalism or autonomy, both within Poland and within Russia are discarded. Dontsov called for an orientation to the pan-European (West-European) values of "racial hygiene", popular in the 19th century, and stood up for the struggle and resistance to Russian imperial nationalism and Polish chauvinism, against the dominance of alien ideas and ideals. To substantiate his views, Dontsov put forward the theory of the existence of two worlds ("Latin-German" and "Moscow-Asian"), which are constantly at war with each other. The boundary of these "worlds" runs along the eastern part of the ethnic borders of Ukraine and Belarus. This is how Dontsov justified the necessity of orientation of Ukrainian foreign policy towards Europe. Dontsov also shared the general tenets of the nationalist theory of etatism, advocating a strong independent Ukrainian state.

Thus, we can see that the number of far-right organizations, from moderate to extremist, is growing all over the world, despite the active actions of the authorities to control their activities. When talking about these organizations, we cannot overlook the role of far-right loners who do not belong to any of them, but act independently, based on their own beliefs, which are formed either under the influence of the virtual environment or under the influence of their immediate environment. It was the loners who planned and carried out the lion's share of terrorist attacks, and it was thanks to them that the number of acts of terror by right-wing groups, for example in Britain, exceeded the number of attacks organized by Islamist extremists during the period under review.⁶⁰⁷ It is not surprising, therefore, that right-wing groups outnumber Islamist extremists in terms of their resort to terrorism during the period under review.

Islamists.

Today, despite the fact that most hate crimes are committed by right-wing radicals, governments of monitoring countries rate Islamic extremism as the most dangerous. This is because Islamists commit more high-profile crimes and because, in many cases, it is Islamist terrorist attacks that provoke the creation of right-wing groups and mass hate crimes against Muslims.

Islamism is a religious and political ideology and practical activity aimed at creating conditions under which any contradictions within society and the state where there is a Muslim population, as well as interstate relations involving them, would be resolved on the basis of Shariah norms. Thus, it is a radical, but far from extremist ideology. The radicalism of Islamism is that literal adherence to Sharia law leads to the denial of gender equality,

⁶⁰⁷ Williams, T., 'Teen neo-Nazi satanist spared jail after admitting terror offences', *The Metro*, 2 November 2020, online at: <https://metro.co.uk/2020/11/02/teen-neo-nazi-satanist-spared-jail-after-admitting-terror-offences-13523592/>.

freedom of conscience, and other democratic values, as well as generating reactionary utopian aspirations to revive the Muslim Middle Ages.

Islamism acquires the features of an extremist movement when Islamists begin to impose their vision of Islam on so-called 'ethnic Muslims' and implement Sharia law without prior arrangement in secular countries, especially in countries with a democratic form of government where Muslims are a minority. This becomes particularly evident when they start practicing Jihad against all infidels, both non-Muslims and, crucially, those Muslims who are not and do not wish to be Islamists. The latter tends to turn into terrorist activities, including the use of suicide bombers against a random set of people in places where they are concentrated (so-called "blind" terrorist attacks).

Islamists have divided Europe into different zones. The zones of Jihad are France, Germany, the US, Belgium, Russia, and several other countries. The logistical or transit zones are Italy, Greece, and Ukraine. In these countries the Islamists try to behave inconspicuously, without resorting to terrorist acts so as not to provoke the authorities. There are branches of ISIS and al-Qaida in these countries that produce false documents and finance terrorist activities, including the movement of cash, weapons, transit of fighters, etc. It is not without reason that Italian prosecutor Stefano D'Ambruso stated that "Italy is like a big document factory for al-Qaida and other organizations and the militants are totally dedicated to this task."⁶⁰⁸

According to the American classification proposed by the RAND think tank, Islamist movements are divided into "conservative-fundamentalist" (or "fundamentalist, based on sacred texts") and "radical-fundamentalist" (jihadist) movements.⁶⁰⁹ Following the RAND qualification, these two groups share the following characteristics in terms of their aims, ideology, attitudes towards terrorism and violence:

1. Radical-fundamentalist features:

- The Political objectives take precedence and Islam is used to solve political problems.
- A literal interpretation of Islamic texts, but introduces new political ideas and emphasizes the obligation to be involved in Jihad.
- It declares the need to change the existing social and political order and establish a State based on the strict observance of Shariah.
- Democracy is declared to be "the religion of the infidels". This thesis is based on the belief that political legitimacy comes from the God. Consequently, state governance should be exercised by religious professionals responsible only to God. Some groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, seek to establish a worldwide Caliphate.
- The Western concept of Human rights and Freedoms is denied. It is believed that only the full establishment of Sharia will guarantee a just society. There is a negative

⁶⁰⁸ Stefano Dambruso and Guido Olimpio, *Milano-Baghdad* (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), p. 53 (transl.); cf. Lorenzo Viadino, *Il Jihadismo autoctono in Italia: Nascita, Sviluppo, e Dinamiche di Radicalizzazione*, (Rome: ISPI, 2014).

⁶⁰⁹ Rabasa A.M. et al. *The Muslim World after 9/11*. RAND Corporation, 2004. P. 7-12. online at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.pdf

attitude towards granting rights to religious minorities and Muslims who do not share these views.

- Willingness to use violence and threats to put these concepts of Islam into practice.
- Direct links to terrorism and terrorist organizations.⁶¹⁰

2. Conservative-fundamentalist features:

- The objectives are predominantly religious.
- Literal interpretation of Muslim religious texts.
- Political conservatism, recognition of the supremacy of religious law in all spheres of life.
- The declaration that political legitimacy is derived from God alone, although some democratic elements are allowed, such as the rule of political leaders, who nevertheless rule only according to Shariah and are consulted by theologians (ulema).
- The Western concept of Human rights and Freedoms is denied. It is argued that only the full establishment of Shariah guarantees a just society. However, unlike radical fundamentalists, they allow the status of "zimmies" (non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state) for *non-Muslim* communities.
- Reactionary in terms of social attitudes, especially with regard to women's dress and rules of behaviour. Men's behaviour is also restricted, but to a lesser extent.
- Links to terrorism are mostly indirect, but there are contacts between fundamentalist groups and extremists at various levels.
- Variation in attitudes towards violence - depending on the situation and stage of historical development.⁶¹¹

Analysis of these attributes suggests that in the process of radicalization of ethnic Muslims, one group complements the other. Conservative fundamentalists are engaged in propaganda of Islamism among ethnic Muslims, including not just moderates, but even those who do not observe religious traditions. The aim is to intimidate them by forming in their minds an image of a Western civilization hostile to Islam, which is allegedly having a detrimental effect on the entire world, including the Islamic world.⁶¹² The elements of Islamic Salafist doctrine, often perverted by Islamists, are actively used for this purpose, such as the understanding of Jihad, and also the spontaneous dissatisfaction of a certain part of the population with the social, economic, or foreign policy of the country of residence. The fundamentalist conservatives seek to represent it as a policy inherent in all countries that do not use Sharia as a state and legal system. The conclusion that follows from the propaganda of such

⁶¹⁰ Rabasa A.M. et al. The Muslim World after 9/11. RAND Corporation, 2004. P. 7-9. online at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.pdf

⁶¹¹ Rabasa A.M. et al. The Muslim World after 9/11. RAND Corporation, 2004. P. 7-12. online at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.pdf

⁶¹² Allan, H., Glazzard, A., Jespersen, S., Reddy-Tumu, S., & Winterbotham, E., 'Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review', *Royal United Services Institute*, 16 October 2015, online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0899d40f0b64974000192/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf.

organizations is always the same: the West has declared war on Islam. And since this is so, "Islam is equally at war with the West and Muslims must choose a side in this war."⁶¹³

The second group (radical-fundamentalist according to the RAND qualification), to which Hizb ut-Tahrir belongs, are jihadist recruiters who complete the process of radicalizing Muslims. As a rule, they also carry out the main task of committing terrorist attacks in monitoring countries or forming militant groups to be sent to the Middle East and North Africa.

Organizations of the first type include mainly Salafi groups such as the **Muslim Brotherhood** (operating legally in monitoring countries other than Russia),⁶¹⁴ **Tablighi Jamaat, TD** (banned in Russia), **Minhaj-ul-Koran International, MK**, as well as the Turkish group **Islamic Society Milli-Gerus (MG)**. All these organizations are international networks supported by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and other Muslim countries and specialized Islamic foundations.

- **The Muslim Brotherhood, MB** is an international Salafist religious and political association whose aim is to build a society based on "Islamic justice", with strict adherence to Sharia law, the Islamic way of life, in the countries where Islam has spread. The Muslim brothers are convinced that the Islamic way of development is leading to this goal. One of its aims is the creation of a "world caliphate". They are actively working on cultivating the Islamic population in Europe. In a number of countries of the Islamic world, primarily in Egypt, but also in Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Syria and Bahrain, the organization is considered terrorist and is banned.

- **Tablighi Jamaat, TD, is** a religious movement banned in Russia and a number of other CIS countries. Tablighi professes an extremely conservative form of Islam, according to which the only righteous way of life for a Muslim can only be the most precise observance of the commandments of the Koran, which includes dress, diet, behavior, rejection of democracy and everything "Western", minimal contact with non-Muslims, and other rules. The aim is the "return of true Islam", the Ummah. The Movement is characterized by a negative attitude towards any "Western" democratic values, secular world view, non-Muslim laws, condemning any likening to "non-Muslims" (representatives of other religions and cultures). Armed Jihad with the aim of establishing the Islamic faith and subduing unbelievers is recognized by the ideologists of the Tablighi Jamaat, but it is stated that preaching activities (tabligh) should be carried out at this time. Jihad is generally interpreted broadly and also includes the performance of the regular fivefold Namaz.

- **Minhaj-ul-Quran International, MK** is an international Islamist non-governmental organization aiming to spread religious teachings around the world. It has branches in

⁶¹³ HOPE Not Hate", January-February 2016, Issue no.23, p.41

⁶¹⁴ "US intends to recognise Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists", BBC News, Russian Service, online: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-48119168>

Greece, Britain, Pakistan, India, and Norway. In their sermons they call for harsh repression of apostates from Islam, including murder.⁶¹⁵

- **"The Islamic Society of Milli Görüş, MG is a** religious and political pro-Turkish movement. It is described as one of the "leading Turkish diaspora organizations in Europe" and is also described as the largest Islamic organization active in the West. It has some 90,000 members across Europe, including 50,000 in Germany. The ideologues of the movement believe that the Muslim world is currently in decline, due to the misuse of Western technology and attempts to adopt Western values, above all secularism. In Western Europe, particularly in Germany, the movement controls many mosques and is a major religious movement.⁶¹⁶

- **Hezbollah** is a pro-Iranian group operating mainly in the Middle East. It is recognized as a terrorist organization in Canada, the United States, Israel and Egypt, by the Arab League (since March 201), in the Gulf States and partly in the EU, Australia, and the UK. Despite this, in some EU countries the organization is presented as a less radicalized Islamist propaganda structure. Alongside common Islamist values, it promotes anti-Semitism.

As a rule, international radical networks operate either independently or through their national partner organizations. Sometimes this practice is combined. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most active of these organizations in Europe, has been active with **the Muslim American Society (MAS)**⁶¹⁷, **the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)**, the **Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)**, the **North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)**, and **the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)**.⁶¹⁸ In 2007, many of these organizations were co-defendants in the **Holy Land Foundation's** terrorism financing trial.⁶¹⁹ Organizations collaborating with the Muslim Brotherhood in the US also include: **"Islamic Relief USA"**, which is accused of collaborating with Hamas and Hezbollah and distributing texts glorifying Jihad and anti-Semitism, **the Islamic Society of Boston**, **the Ikhwan/American Brothers**, etc. Interestingly, after September 11, 2001, Qatar and Turkey replaced Saudi Arabia as the main sponsoring countries of Islamic organizations of this type in the US.⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁵ "Afsløret på video: Imam opfordrede til drab", *Jyllands-Posten*, online: <https://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/article3340832.ece/>

⁶¹⁶ Millî Görüş - Millî Görüş online: https://ru.gaz.wiki/wiki/Milli_G%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F

⁶¹⁷ Muslim American Society, "What is MAS' relationship with the intellectual legacies of other Islamic movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)?" , online at: <https://www.muslimamericansociety.org/faq/what-is-mas-relationship-with-the-intellectual-legacies-of-other-islamic-movements-especially-the-muslim-brotherhood-ikhwan/>.

⁶¹⁸ Islamist Watch, online at: <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/money-politics/organizations/>.

⁶¹⁹ U.S. Department of Justice, "Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case Holy Land Foundation and Leaders Convicted on Providing Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization", online at:

<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences-holy-land-foundation-case>.

⁶²⁰ The Century Foundation, "The Turkish Future of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", online at: <https://tcf.org/content/report/turkish-future-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/>

In France, the Muslim Brotherhood operates through the umbrella organization **Muslims of France**, formerly known as the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF). One of the hot topics in 2020 is that this offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the Turkish-sponsored **Milli Görüs**, is part of **the French Muslim Worship Council (CFCM)**, which is a state-recognized religious institution.

In the Netherlands, BM operates independently, actively acquiring real estate in the country. It also actively cooperates with **the Nida Muslim Party**, which has recently participated in municipal elections in the country,⁶²¹ **the Islamic Cultural Centre Essalam (ICCE)**; **the Middenweg Centre (MDC)**, and **the El Tawhid Mosque** in Amsterdam, which is seen as a haven for terrorists who are actively recruiting young people to join extremist groups. According to the Dutch intelligence service, the Muslim Brotherhood's activities could, in the long term, threaten the democratic rule of law in the Netherlands.⁶²²

In Germany, the Muslim Brotherhood was renamed the **German Muslim Community** in 2018. The group's aim is the widespread application of Sharia law as the only acceptable system of ethical, moral, legal, and religious values. They are especially concerned with violations of their system of values which are not "criminal" under German law, such as the consumption of alcohol, adultery, and the renunciation of Islam. A number of mosques and Islamic centres in Germany, such as those in Aachen and Munich, are either closely linked to the BM or are under their control. The Brotherhood also influences the Central Council of Muslims of Germany, the largest representation of Muslim interests in contacts with government agencies, and is part of the network's international structures.⁶²³ As part of the network, there is an officially registered NGO, German Muslim Youth. The "Community" is also joined by the radical **Islamic Centre of Hamburg** with a similar ideological platform, although this is largely an independent structure. The BM is also very active in Greece.

Tablighi Jamaat is also active in Germany, Russia (although recognized there as an extremist organization), Ukraine, and the UK. It is the largest Islamic network in the world (80 million people), based in India and spread mainly in Asia and the Middle East, but partly in Europe as well. Formally, the Tablighi claim to be apolitical⁶²⁴ and have no record of terrorist activity, but they continue to feature in intelligence reports, both because of their radical world view and because of their active recruitment of supporters, mostly young German and British Muslim residents from disadvantaged families and poor social backgrounds. Its activists are quite radical, reject a value system that does not conform to their views, and are strongly influenced by preachers who may change their strategy over time. This is recognized as dangerous.

⁶²¹ European Center for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, online at: <https://en.europarabct.com/>

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, "Die Muslimbruderschaft in Deutschland", online: <https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/islamismus/290422/die-muslimbruderschaft-in-deutschland>

⁶²⁴ Hamburg.de, "Islamismus. Tabligh-i Jama'at (TJ)", online: <https://www.hamburg.de/innenbehoerde/islamismus/511912/tabligh-i-jama-at/>

At the same time, organizations that are not linked to international networks but are actively engaged in the promotion of Islamist values are widespread. In the Netherlands, for example, Salafis freely engage in educational and political activities. 13 per cent of Islamic schools in the Netherlands are affiliated with a Salafi organization. In some schools Salafi teachers provide children with extracurricular activities (in Islam and Arabic). One school, **Amsterdam Cornelius Haga Lyceum**, was excluded from state funding in 2019 after rumors that a board member was accused of showing support for Islamic extremists on social media.⁶²⁵

In Germany, the local "**Furkan Community**", which was founded in Germany in 1994, is well known. The most active branches are located in Dortmund, Berlin, Munich, and Hamburg. It has its own print edition, online TV channel, and websites. Furkan's ideology is similar to the tenets of other Islamist groups, but it is more specifically formulated than "only" adherence to the Koran and Shariah, and targets Muslims living in Western states. It focuses on the personality of the radical preacher *Alparslan Kuytul*. The main theses are: Western civilization is inherently hostile to Muslim civilization; the only way is a Muslim revival, a Muslim cannot follow Western laws, as that would inevitably lead to a violation of the canons of Islam; there can be no compromise, so one must be in opposition to the Western value system and social practices, for example not participating in elections and denying democracy as such. When it comes to the possibility of using violence, Kuytul's starting point is: violence can be rejected now, but the preacher does not rule out the 'necessity' of using it in the future if, in his view, the foundations of Islam are threatened.⁶²⁶ As we can see, this ideology is very similar to that of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamist organizations.

There are also a number of organizations that occupy a transitional niche between conservative and radical fundamentalist organizations, serving as a direct link between people who have passed the primary stage of radicalization and terrorist bodies. This includes, primarily, **Hizb ut-Tahrir** (HT), which operates legally in all monitoring countries except Russia and Germany.⁶²⁷

- **Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami** (*Islamic Renaissance Party*), HT is an international pan-Islamic political party founded in East Jerusalem in 1953. In 2003, Germany banned Hizb ut-Tahrir for anti-Semitism and denying Israel's right to exist, but the movement itself denies that it is anti-Semitic. The organization was banned in Russia the same year.⁶²⁸ The Russian Supreme Court's decision on this matter, SCPI 03-116, states that HT aims to eliminate non-Islamic governments and establish Islamic rule on a worldwide scale by re-establishing a "World Islamic Caliphate", initially in regions with predominantly Muslim populations, including Russia and the CIS countries. In doing so, the Supreme Court cited such practices

⁶²⁵ "Counter-Terrorism Coordinator warns for Islamic school in Amsterdam", *Trouw*, online: <https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/coordinator-terrorismebestrijding-waarschuwt-voor-islamitische-school-in-amsterdam~b045b5a6/>

⁶²⁶ Sicherheit für Nordrhein-Westfalen, online: <https://www.im.nrw/furkan-gemeinschaft>

⁶²⁷ Bundesverwaltungsgericht, *Lexetius.com*, online: <https://lexetius.com/2006,604>

⁶²⁸ Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 14 February 2003 N GCPI 03-116, online: <http://nac.gov.ru/zakonodatelstvo/sudebnye-resheniya/reshenie-verhovnogo-suda-rf-ot-14-fevralya.html>

of the organization as "militant Islamist propaganda, combined with intolerance towards other religions; active recruitment of supporters; and deliberate efforts to create divisions in society" in support of its decision.⁶²⁹

In 2004, 2005, and 2009, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. State Department recognized Hizb ut-Tahrir as a group that operates non-violently but contributes to the spread of extremist sentiment among Muslims. The US Senate and State Department recognized Hizb ut-Tahrir as a group that operates non-violently but promotes extremist sentiment among Muslims⁶³⁰ and, because of its support for anti-Western ideology, has the potential to provide ideological support for terrorism.⁶³¹ In most Muslim states, the organization is officially banned and prosecuted. In most European countries (except Germany and Russia) Hizb ut-Tahrir operates legally. Its members practice radical Islam and call for the establishment of a Caliphate in the Islamic world, rejecting Western-style democracy and Human rights.

The organization preaches hatred of all other ideologies and religions except Islam. It denies secularism, civil and political freedoms, and stresses that Muslims should not under any circumstances accept democratic values, especially freedom of religion, expression and individual liberty, including political freedoms. At the same time HT considers it possible to use force against their implementation.⁶³²

Hizb ut-Tahrir is active in Britain, Russia (recognized as a terrorist organization there), Ukraine, and a number of other monitoring countries. Part of a wider transnational pan-Islamist movement for the restoration of the "World Caliphate" and finding its ideological basis in a radical critique of Western democracy, Hizb ut-Tahrir emerged in these countries even before 11 September 2001 to mobilize young Muslims into their movement.⁶³³ It is the outwardly non-violent nature of groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that prevents authorities in many countries around the world from banning the organization.⁶³⁴ However, in a number of countries, the activities in which HT is de facto engaged are considered socially dangerous.

Although Hizb ut-Tahrir in its propaganda does not call for going to hot spots, but all their activities create an ideological ground for it. The organization preaches hatred towards all other ideologies and religions except Islam, it denies secularism, civil and political freedoms and stresses that a Muslim must not under any circumstances accept democratic values, especially freedom of religion, self-expression and individual freedom, including political

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Country Report on Terrorism, 2009", online at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009//index.htm>

⁶³¹ Senate Hearing S. HRG 109-818, "Islamist Extremism in Europe. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION", online at: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg33941/html/CHRG-109shrg33941.htm>

⁶³² A. Verkhovsky, "Is Hizb ut-Tahrir an extremist organisation?", online: <https://www.sova-center.ru/religion/publications/2005/10/d6036/>

⁶³³ *The Guardian*, 'Background: the Guardian and Dilpazier Aslam', 22 July 2005, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/jul/22/theguardian.pressandpublishing1>.

⁶³⁴ Morris, N., 'PM forced to shelve Islamist group ban,' *The Independent*, 18 July 2005, online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20060719172827/http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article1183364.ece>.

freedom. At the same time it considers the use of force against their realization, intimidation and coercion of civilians as possible.⁶³⁵

Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a case involving HT, recognized as early as 2013 that its activities could be restricted by the State because its ideology contradicts the values of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.⁶³⁶

The legal Islamist educational organizations are also active in the monitoring countries. Part of them are closely affiliated with organizations that have been declared as terrorist in those countries. In the United States, for example, the **Islamic Circle of North America** (ISNA) is active, proclaiming its official mission to 'establish the Islamic system of life' in the world, 'whether it relates to beliefs, rituals and morals or to economic, social or political spheres'.⁶³⁷ It is the main representative body of the **Jamaat-e-Islami** movement. In 2017, the US government declared the Head of Jamaat-e-Islami branch in Pakistan and Kashmir a "Global Terrorist". Among these organizations, it should be noted also **IRFAN-Canada Foundation** actively cooperating with Hamas and Hezbollah, etc.

After the legal and semi-legal propagandists, illegal organizations, directly linked to terrorist groups in the Middle East, are already stepping up to the challenge of radicalization. Their task is to recruit people for terrorist organizations to be sent to the Middle East and North Africa or to carry out terrorist attacks in monitoring countries. They are also divided into international and local. The international include **al-Qaeda** and the remaining **Islamic State** (ISIS) cells. These are international networked terrorist organizations.

Al-Qaida operates as a network of Islamic extremists and Salafi jihadists. The organization has been designated as a terrorist group by the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union, the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, and other countries. Al-Qaida has claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in various countries, including the 1998 US Embassy bombings, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the 2002 Bali bombings.

Al-Qaida's ideology is based on Qutbism, a system of views on Islam developed in the 1980s by a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Sayyid Qutb*, later executed in Egypt. The central tenet of Qutbist ideology is that the Muslim community is not a follower of "true Islam", which "died out over several centuries",⁶³⁸ having reverted to godless ignorance (*jahiliyya*) and must be restored. The basic ideological tenets of Qutbism later laid the ideological foundation for many Islamist movements. They consist of the following:

- the observance of Shariah as the sacred law, without which Islam cannot exist;

⁶³⁵ A. Verkhovsky, "Is Hizb ut-Tahrir an extremist organisation?", online: <https://www.sova-center.ru/religion/publications/2005/10/d6036/>

⁶³⁶ European Court of Human Rights. CASE OF KASYMAKHUNOV AND SAYBATALOV v. RUSSIA, (*Applications nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06*), online at: <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117127#%7B%22itemid%22%3A%22001-117127%22%7D>

⁶³⁷ See: <https://isna.net/mission-and-vision/>.

⁶³⁸ Qutb, Sayyid, *Milestones*, The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1981, p. 9.

- adherence to Shariah as a complete way of life;
- The rejection of Western, non-Islamic values, including those of socialism, nationalism, and consumer capitalism;
- vigilance against "Western and Jewish plots against Islam";
- A two-pronged approach to "infidels" - preaching and converting to Islam (especially with regard to so-called "ethnic Muslims"); Jihad with the aim of violently destroying *Jahiliyya* structures.
- the importance of offensive Jihad to wipe out *Jahiliyyah* not only from the Islamic homeland, but also from the face of the earth.⁶³⁹

If al-Qaeda's goal is to destroy abandoned Muslim states and societies through violence, the Wahhabis of the Islamic State have traditionally been in favor of killing infidels. According to ISIS, Islamist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hamas are too moderate. They believe that God's commandments should be carried out immediately rather than over a long period of time. According to ISIS ideology, all Muslims who support secular or elected rule are apostates and deserve to die.

ISIS operated from 2013 to 2019 as an unrecognized Shariah quasi-State in parts of Syria and Iraq. Since 2019, it has been operating underground following the loss of territories under its control. ISIS ideology is based on Sunni-Islamic Wahhabism, which emphasizes a literal interpretation of the Koran. It originated in Arabia in the 18th century and is currently the religion of Saudi Arabia.

Unlike Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida, for whom the Caliphate is either a spiritual idea or a distant future goal, ISIS seeks to build a worldwide Caliphate "here and now" - first in the Middle East and then worldwide.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS supporters are the most difficult Islamists to control. Unlike other organizations, they do not even have formal official representations in monitoring countries, operating in a legal public sphere. Their cells are completely underground. Their networks, interconnections, and structures are extremely convoluted. While Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, are integrated into organizational structures, their individual representatives at various stages can be more or less radical and prone to violence, the supporters of these organizations are loners or individuals belonging to small cells. The authorities usually apply particularly harsh measures to them: travel bans, confiscation of foreign passports, restrictions on the validity of domestic passports, and other sanctions.

In addition to international terrorist organizations, one can also name local ones pursuing the same objectives. First and foremost is **al-Muhajirun**, who have been implicated in a terrorist plot since 2007, in May 2013 against a member of the British Army, in a terrorist attack involving a truck on London Bridge in June 2017, and in the London Bridge Knife Strike in 2019. As with a number of right-wing organizations, Al-Muhajirun has attempted

⁶³⁹ *Muslim extremism in Egypt: the prophet and pharaoh* by Gilles Kepel, pp. 55–56.

to change its name to circumvent the bans - under the names **Islam4UK**, **Need4Khilafah**, and **Shariah Project**. However, such attempts were largely thwarted by the UK.⁶⁴⁰ Several smaller groups in the Netherlands can also be named: **the Arnhem Jihadist Group**, which plotted two attacks - one using body armor and an AK-47 assault rifle, the other at the same time using a car bomb⁶⁴¹ and **the Hofstad Group** which is a Salafist Jihadi cell made up mainly of young Muslims of North African origin, based in the Hague. It is known for its members' involvement in single acts of terrorism.⁶⁴² Also worth mentioning are the so-called radical mosques that exist in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and other countries. In the Netherlands, for example, one could mention the El Tawhid mosque in Amsterdam, which is considered "a haven for terrorists who are actively recruiting young people to join extremist groups". The Sunna Mosque in Hague, the Salam Family Network in Tilburg, and the Furkan Mosque in Eindhoven are also linked to extremist Salafism.⁶⁴³ There are also the recently closed down mosques in Ottakring and Meidling in Austria,⁶⁴⁴ the Finsbury Mosque in London, the Manchester Mosque, the mosque in Chartres in France, etc.⁶⁴⁵

Obviously, it is these groups that are causing the most protest in the European public and that create the conditions for the existence and growth of right-wing radical organizations. We are talking about so-called cumulative extremism, where one form of extremism can feed into and reinforce other forms.⁶⁴⁶ For example, the Defence League of England and its subsequent round of street protests across the UK emerged from localized opposition to the Allah Alliance, Al-Muhajiroun Action, in the South Bedfordshire town of Luton. Moreover, it has recently been revealed that earlier Islamist terrorist attacks in 2017 provided some of the tactical basis for *Darren Osborne's* June 2017 terrorist attack at the Finsbury Park mosque, with the use of more crude transport attacks becoming a key modus operandi in a wider range of terrorist attacks perpetrated by British right-wing radicals.⁶⁴⁷

Indeed, Islamic extremists have perpetrated the most high-profile terrorist attacks in recent years - bombings in crowded places, shootings of civilians, attacks on military personnel, finally the beheading of a school teacher talking about democratic values, etc. Naturally, this cannot leave the authorities indifferent. This leads to a situation in which the State is trying to force large Islamic organizations and individual religious communities to pledge allegiance to democratic values. This is important from the point of view of the

⁶⁴⁰ UK Home Office, 'Proscribed Terrorist Organizations', 17 July 2020, online at:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/901434/20200717_Proscription.pdf.

⁶⁴¹ European Center for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, online at: <https://en.europarabct.com/>

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ "Radical" mosques closed", online: <https://wien.orf.at/stories/3074771/>

⁶⁴⁵ "Radical mosques and jihad in Europe", *Le Temps*, online: <https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/mosques-radicales-djihad-europe>.

⁶⁴⁶ Eatwell, R., 'Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain'. *Political Quarterly*. 77 (2): 205, 2006.

⁶⁴⁷ Veilleux-Lepage, Y., 'The Extreme Right's Legitimation of Vehicle Ramming', Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right Insight's Blog, 26 August 2018, online at: <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/08/26/the-extreme-rights-legitimation-of-vehicle-ramming/>

European public conscience, as extremism in Europe is associated with actions against democratic values.⁶⁴⁸ For example, the French Government has asked all the 9 official members of the French Council of Muslim Worship (CFCM) to ratify the "Charter of Republican Values", which the Council is to produce together with the Ministry of the Interior (!), and to propose how to train imams in accordance with these values, instead of inviting them from the Maghreb and Turkey. The Government's aim is undoubtedly to quickly stop issuing residence permits to foreign imams and replace them with others who are native French, speak French, and are used to European values, especially secular values, gender equality, and the primacy of civil law over Sharia.⁶⁴⁹ However, this approach is certainly offensive to French Muslims, whom the proposal puts in the eyes of the whole country in the position of "unreliable" citizens and even "traitors".

The closure of so-called "radical mosques" is no less controversial. For one thing, they are, for the most part, no longer a medium for radicalization. For example, Iranian-born French expert *Fakhrad Khosrokhavar* says mosques no longer play a significant role in recruiting for jihad, and that those who leave [for extremists] are mostly young Muslims and converts from so-called poor "banlieues" (suburbs of big cities) who were attracted to jihad *via the Internet* or who became radicalized while *in prison* for petty criminal offences.⁶⁵⁰ A study by the US National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) also found that 91% of radical Islamists in the US radicalized via the internet rather than in mosques or other institutions.⁶⁵¹ The other most common medium for radicalization is prisons. As for mosques, imams, even the most radical ones, have recently been increasingly avoiding direct radical preaching for fear of closure.

Islamists are even more active than right-wing radicals in using the Internet to radicalize sympathizers, which has resulted in the recent emergence of so-called "lone wolves" - Muslims who, having received information online not only about jihad, but also about how to stage an attack, become a headache for the security services because they have no contact with any established terrorists. According to American experts, "lone wolf" attacks are more dangerous: their actions are more difficult to trace and prevent, and the perpetrators evade arrest longer.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁸ Resolution 1344 (2003) on "Threats to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe" - online: [https://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary_assembly/\[russian_documents\]/\[2003\]/\[Sept_2003\]/Res%201344%20Rus.asp](https://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary_assembly/[russian_documents]/[2003]/[Sept_2003]/Res%201344%20Rus.asp)

⁶⁴⁹ "Islam de France: le CFCM présente à l'Elysée un projet de " conseil des imams ", *Le Monde*, online: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/11/19/islam-de-france-le-cfcm-presente-a-l-elysee-un-projet-de-conseil-des-imams_6060279_3224.html

⁶⁵⁰ "Radicalisation : " Le rôle des mosques est très effacé dans les nouvelles formes du djihadisme """, *Le Monde*, online: https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/26/radicalisation-le-role-des-mosquees-est-tres-efface-dans-les-nouvelles-formes-du-djihadisme_4818497_4809495.html

⁶⁵¹ "Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS)", May 14, 2020, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, online at: <https://start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus>

⁶⁵² Brian J. Phillips (2017) *Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves, Terrorist Groups, and Attack Lethality*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29:3, 533-549, online at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2015.1054927>.

For example, between 2015 and 2019, according to security sources, 19 terrorist attacks, in addition to 61 terrorist plots, were being uncovered.

Most of the attacks are carried out *by lone terrorists* who share the beliefs of the jihadists but have chosen to operate independently, thus following the tactic recommended by both Islamist groups: strike the enemy where they live instead of going to fight in Iraq/Syria's war zones. French intelligence agencies identify this as a very serious problem, which is that young Muslims who were born or raised in France and are not known to the police become radicalized. There are currently 8,000 people under surveillance by the intelligence community for being close to Islamic terrorism.⁶⁵³

The same is true of data from the US National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START). As of 2015, they estimate that lone wolves accounted for 6% of all terrorists in the US and, at the same time, 25% of all US terrorist attacks.⁶⁵⁴ Most lone-wolf jihadists in the US were, as in France, spiritually inspired by the IS/II/I via the internet. Four years later, the situation has changed. There has been a shift from terrorism perpetrated by specific terrorist groups to lone wolves inspired by a specific Islamist ideology, but not associated with a specific terrorist group.⁶⁵⁵ Thus, of the 53 attacks in 2019, only two were attributed to a specific terrorist group. Between 2014 and 2019, 77 people were killed in IS-linked attacks in the US, all of which were carried out by "lone wolves".⁶⁵⁶

The problem has begun to manifest itself even in Russia, where previously the vast majority of Islamist terrorist attacks were perpetrated mainly by militants from organized extremist groups. The first Islamist attack in Tatarstan, after a number of years of silence, was an alarming signal in this regard. On 30 October, 2020, an Islamist teenager armed with a knife attacked an Interior Ministry department in Kukmor, Tatarstan, but was shot and killed by police. While attacking the police officers, he called them "infidels" and shouted "Allahu akbar!" One of the police officers was wounded.⁶⁵⁷

Despite the claim that extremism has no nationality or religion, we can see that there are significant differences between far-right radicalism and Islamic extremism. In contrast to right-wing radical organizations, Islamist organizations are represented to a greater extent by international groups. Moreover, local organizations in many of the countries monitored do not operate independently, but with the support of large networks. Meanwhile, there are more "lone wolves" among Islamists who operate without links to any organization, which makes it difficult for the police to identify extremists and prevent crime. As for the debate over which extremism is more dangerous, there is no universal answer, as the situation, for

⁶⁵³ "More than 8,000 people on file for terrorist radicalisation, announces Gérald Darmanin", *20 minutes*, online: <https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2850699-20200831-interieur-plus-8000-personnes-fichees-radicalisation-caractere-terroriste-annonce-gerald-darmanin>

⁶⁵⁴ "Patterns of Lone Actor Terrorism in the United States," online at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ATS_PatternsofLoneActorTerrorismUS_ResearchBrief.pdf

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ "Teenager in Tatarstan attacked police officers while shouting 'Allahu akbar'", *Interfax*, <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/734870>

example, in the United States, where there is a generally well-integrated Muslim community that does not face discrimination and assimilation problems, differs significantly from that in France, where there are officially no ethnic minorities and only assimilation in its harshest form is understood as integration.

CONCLUSION.

As we can see, both anti-extremist and minority legislation were tightened during the period under review. In order to curb radicalization on the Internet, a number of legislative decisions were taken in the monitoring countries, aimed at ensuring control over the distribution of extremist materials online, suppressing the financing of extremism, expanding the powers of special services, etc. Lists of terrorist organizations and individuals involved in violent extremism have been expanded, the list of countries that apply deprivation of citizenship and deportation of persons involved in terrorist militias, stripping potential terrorists and their accomplices of their rights has been expanded. An important development is the new trend towards an expansive interpretation of extremism already adopted in countries such as Germany, Russia, Poland, partly Italy, and Ukraine, which consider not only violent extremism but also so-called "hate extremism", i.e. inciting hatred against members of certain social groups, as a crime. In 2019-20, France was added to them, and in 2020, a clear revision of the views on extremism started in Britain.

A number of countries have passed laws restricting the rights of minorities. The French draft law on separatism clearly infringes on the rights of Muslims. In an attempt to counter Salafist influence, it virtually calls into question the funding of Islamic organizations from abroad, bans home schooling, which is unacceptable to many people from Arab countries who want to preserve their identity, and stops foreign imams being allowed into France to work in mosques in the absence of a French training institution for Islamic religious figures and in the context of the current principle of separation of religion and state. France's global security law clearly targets freedom of speech and creates conditions for abuse by the police when dispersing unauthorized demonstrations. Countries such as Greece, Italy, and the US have enacted laws that discriminate against asylum seekers and in some cases even foreigners.

The line of restricting the rights of believers was continued. Canada, represented by Quebec, and the Netherlands have taken new steps in this regard. Bill 21, or the Act Respecting the Sovereignty of the State, passed by the Canadian authorities prohibits civil servants from wearing religious symbols, including the Christian cross, the Jewish kippah, and the hijab. The Netherlands, on the other hand, passed a law, the "Partial Prohibition of Clothing Covering the Face," which was aimed exclusively at Muslims. In both cases, these laws have provoked a range of anti-Islamic manifestations on a domestic basis. A number of US states have passed so-called "anti-Sharia laws" which have restricted the rights of those practicing Islam.

In Ukraine, parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate have been discriminated against, while in Russia there has been increased pressure on

representatives of some so-called non-traditional religions, most notably Jehovah's Witnesses. Assimilationist tendencies towards linguistic minorities and, above all, the Russian minority have also increased in Ukraine, as reflected in the new Law on Education.

In essence, assimilationist tendencies can also be seen in the above legislative changes against Muslims, as they all aim to force the Islamic population to adopt the lifestyle and values of a secular state, including bans on prayer according to Sharia norms, i.e., to abandon Islamic traditions. And all this is still happening at a time when there are assimilationist models of integration in Europe as well as in Quebec, Canada, which are largely discriminatory in nature. De facto, multicultural approaches to integration, in which different cultures coexist in mutual harmony in accordance with the Charter of Rights and Civil Liberties, are denied there.

Law enforcement practices followed legislative practices. The list of banned organizations was expanded, procedures for blocking radical and extremist websites were improved, radical mosques were closed in a number of monitoring countries, potentially dangerous individuals were stripped of their citizenship and deported, a system of reporting of radicalism and discrimination by various civil organizations and individuals to law enforcement agencies was put in place. A clear trend during the period under review towards a decrease in the number of convictions against a background of an increase in the number of registered hate crimes is also a serious signal. The number of unreported crimes, for various reasons, continued to be high. This trend was characteristic of such monitoring countries as Poland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Ukraine.

All this suggests that in the internal conflict that emerged decades ago between democratic values on the one hand and the interests of security and identity preservation on the other, the authorities of most monitoring countries are opting for the latter. This is less true of the US and Canada (due to their historical patterns of integration), although even there these tendencies have also emerged in recent years, and more so in Western Europe. It should also be noted that nationalistic, assimilationist tendencies towards minorities have prevailed in Ukraine, not due to security issues, but due to the chosen way of forming a new identity for a multiethnic state based on the culture of the ethnic majority.

Some positive integration practices in relation to minorities - assistance to migrants and refugees to start their own businesses as well as to study in Germany; the French leader's announcement of his intention to teach Arabic to Maghreb immigrants and to start training imams; protection of LGBT and Roma rights in the Netherlands; achieving gender equality in Canadian law enforcement agencies - have been more than offset by widespread discriminatory practices against minorities. It was about racial and religious profiling against Muslims and blacks (in the US, Canada and Britain), Latinos and natives (US), Roma (in Greece), violations of Muslim rights, discrimination against refugees, including children of illegal immigrants who were separated from their parents, for example in the US, etc.

The legislative and law enforcement bias towards toughening against the background of continuing pressure on minorities, above all the Islamic minority in certain monitoring

countries, has failed to change the situation in the attitudes of the population of these countries (the level of xenophobia has been rising). The number of hate crimes also increased, although Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and Greece stand out as countries where a positive trend can be observed, indicating that the authorities are building an effective policy to counter extremism. Nevertheless, the abundance of active extremist organizations, as well as the number of "lone wolves" committing an increasing number of attacks and terrorist attacks, suggests that there is a powerful infrastructure, largely international in nature, that opposes state power that upholds democratic values.

This, as well as an analysis of legislation, law enforcement practices, levels of xenophobia and the dynamics of hate crime, suggests that these trends will continue in the coming years.

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CONTENT:

ANNEX. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH..... page 3.
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISSUEpage 4.
INTRODUCTIONpage 25.
CHAPTER 1. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES RELATING TO MINORITIES.
ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION.....page 26.
CHAPTER 2. LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICESpage 40.
CHAPTER 3. XENOPHOBIA.....page 71.
CHAPTER 4. HATE CRIMEpage 86.
CHAPTER 5. RADICALS AND EXTREMISTS.....page 111.
CONCLUSIONpage 158.