

**PROJECT
"FORUM FOR EUROPEAN TOLERANCE"**



**"XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION AND AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM IN EUROPE"
(January 2014 – June 2015)**

Athens-London-Berlin-Paris-Moscow-Napoli-
Krakow, Budapest, Kiev, Amsterdam
2015



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Introduction.

This present article aims to analyse the most prominent manifestations of hatred in countries of the so-called “Greater Europe”, i.e. the Council of Europe member-states and countries located within European geographical borders. The primary objective is to identify factors that influence the demand for radicalism and those that contribute to the reduction of radical sentiments in society.

The first stage involved 10 European countries: the United Kingdom, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and France.

Analysis was conducted in the following areas: legislation affecting minorities (changes and compliance during the monitored period); law enforcement practices; discriminatory practices affecting minorities; statements and actions of public officials affecting minorities; the position of immigrants and the societal attitude towards these individuals, foreign nationals, different ethnic groups; religious and ethnic hate speech; the activity of neo-Nazi and radical nationalist groups and parties, their influence in government and in civil society; various degrees of hate crime; the public glorification of German National-Socialism and Nazi collaborationists, the desecration of war cemeteries, memorials, Holocaust denial; the misuse of anti-extremist legislation and the persecution of human rights activists.

This present material draws upon several sources: legislative acts, internal documentation of government institutions in the public domain (such as statistical reports on hate crime), documentation from the office of the human rights ombudsman, materials of international human rights organisations, sociological surveys conducted in countries during the observed period and media reports.

Analysis of the situation in 10 aforementioned countries leads to the following conclusions:

1. Legislation.

Legislation directly discriminating minorities or inciting hatred was not present in the countries subject to this study.

However, criminal legislation in several countries did not consider *racial or religious hatred as an aggravating circumstance* in a crime (Hungary and Poland, for example). Certain countries leave this decision for the court (Germany); or link racist actions to certain conditions, such as “direct intent”, which must be proven in court (Ukraine), or intent to affect the wider public in order to “affect its behaviour” (Italy¹).

Legislation in some countries contains *discriminatory norms towards certain religions*. For example, Greek law allows for the discrimination of “non-traditional religions”. Article 13(2) of the Greek Constitution states that “any known religion is free; its religious rights are performed freely under protection of the law.” The condition that a religion must be *known* is also seen in Paragraph 3 of the same Article, as well as in Article 14 (3a), which deals with “insulting Christianity or any other *known* religion.”

¹NB. Italy is the only country under review that over the past 10 years reduced the punishment for hate crime from 3 to 1.5 years, setting the maximum fine of 6 000 euros for racial discrimination or hate speech (Law N 85/2006) – *author’s note*.

On October 1, 2014 the Greek authorities passed a legislation that provides for the establishment of religious legal entities; previously only the Greek Orthodox Church, the Jewish community, and the Muslim minority of Thrace were officially recognized as religious groups under the law. The new law granted automatic recognition to several other groups with historical presence in the country, and established a procedure for other groups to seek legal recognition. The government granted some privileges to the Greek Orthodox Church it did not grant to other religious groups and maintained some restrictions affecting members of non-Greek Orthodox religious groups. A new ministerial directive regarding the granting of house of prayer permits requires the compliance of a proposed house of prayer with local, public health, and safety regulations.

The law automatically recognized as legal entities the Catholic Church; the Anglican Church; two evangelical Christian groups; and the Ethiopian, Coptic, Armenian, and Assyrian Orthodox Churches. The October 1 law also provides recognition of Catholic Church canon law.

For groups not automatically granted legal status, the law sets criteria for legal recognition of religious groups, provided the groups meet certain requirements related to the number of members, qualifications of the leadership, and adherence to public order. Once a religious group has legal status, it can legally transfer property and administer houses of prayer and worship, private schools, charitable institutions, and other non-profit entities. The new law also allows religious communities without status as legal entities to appear before administrative and civil courts as plaintiffs or defendants.

But the problem remains for Muslims outside Thrace, who do not have a single legal mosque beyond that region (there are, however, more than 100 illegal mosques currently under threat of being closed). They also have few appropriate cemeteries. In Thrace, where the Muslim minority have their religious autonomy as in accordance with the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, Imams are appointed by the government without consulting the community itself².

Hungarian Law “On the right to freedom of conscience and faith, religion, church and religious organisations” (2011) also created problems for new religious organisations that have not been present in the country for more than 20 years and who have less than 1000 followers permanently residing in Hungary.

German legislation also provides for the inequality of some religious organisations, dividing them into “*corporate bodies under public law*” and others. *Corporate bodies under public law* have the right to collect their part of the Church Tax, which is derived from the taxable income by the regional financial body (*Finanzamt*) and given to the community. Other religious organisations are deprived of this status, which presumes that a religious community is guaranteed long-term existence by its statute and the number of followers. Currently, such status is applied to various Christian denominations, including Orthodox Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as the Jewish community and the Union of Religious Communities that each consist of several smaller communities and sects (predominantly Christian). Meanwhile, the Muslim community in Germany, which has more than 4 million

²https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/200913299?access_key=key-k5f1ehq6vjz2tbbwxtr&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll, p.6-7.

members (almost 5% of the population), does not fall under the status of a corporate body under public law, despite meeting all of the necessary conditions.

France essentially lacks any state funding for Islamic schools, removing Islamic education from government control. This situation is derived from a law of 1925, which prohibited state funding for all religious organisations that have no ties with France, its history and culture. Thus, the majority of religious organisations adhered to by the migrants, many of whom are Muslims, have no access to state resources. Public support in accordance with the Debre Act (1959) is provided for Catholics, Protestants and Jews only³.

Italy requires religious communities to enter into a special contract with the government. Those that have not done so (including Muslims) encounter various problematic issues.

Ukraine amended its Law “On freedom of conscience and religious organisations” in 2012, making the registration of religious organisations more difficult and providing various government bodies with the authority to monitor and control their activities (including Prosecution, Ministry of Culture and other local and central bodies). 2012 amendments also introduced a procedure for conducting peaceful public religious events, which contradicts Article 39 of the Ukrainian Constitution.

It is of value to mention the Law “On protecting religious feelings,” adopted by Russia in 2013⁴. The law is characterised by extremely ambiguous wording, which essentially allows for the prosecuting criticism of religious organisations and their “disrespectful” portrayal within the artistic world. For example, the law introduces the concept of “public actions displaying clear disrespect towards a community and committed in order to insult religious feelings” (Article 148.1 of the Criminal Code)⁵, but does not further expand on its meaning, which allows for misuse of the law, particularly towards Atheists and members of “non-traditional” religions.

Article 6.21 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (2013) has a similar issue. The Article provides administrative punishment for the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors”. The need for this law was not apparent in the first place, since Russian legislation had always prohibited “propaganda” of *any* sexual relations among minors. However, after its adoption, many human rights organisations criticised the law for its ambiguity. The law defines “propaganda” as the “spread of information aimed at forming non-traditional sexual orientation among minors, imposing the attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relations and skewed perception about the equality of non-traditional and traditional sexual relations, causing interest in them”⁶. The law does not expand on several terms, including “spread of information” or “imposition of information”, and so on. This creates an opportunity for abuse in law enforcement practice, especially towards LGBT educational projects aimed at teenagers.

Issues with liberalising same-sex relations also exist in Poland, Northern Ireland, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Italy and Ukraine.

³<http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06rights/georegions/Europe/France01.htm>

⁴Official title: Law “On introducing amendments to Article 148 of the Russian Criminal Code and several legislative acts in order to combat insults of religious beliefs and feelings of citizens” – *author’s note*.

⁵ <http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/30/zashita-site-dok.html>

⁶<http://www.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2013/06/30-26423.htm>

However, the *main problem with European legislation is the attitude towards national minorities*. This problem has two sides:

First, it is the *failure to recognise ethnic minorities* as such, which deprives them of corresponding rights. Ethnicity and self-determination of minorities is excluded from the legal and political vocabulary in countries like France and Greece (excluding Western Thrace). The argument for this practice is that recognising the “special rights” of national minorities would escalate racism and inequality on ethnic grounds. Thus, France and Greece have been reluctant to join the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Meanwhile, de facto national minorities in France and Greece constitute at least 10% of their populations. Their presence is officially unrecognised and therefore their rights are not protected.

Second, it is the *manipulation of the list of officially recognised ethnic minorities*. Many monitored countries seek to limit this list by including smaller indigenous ethnic minority groups and excluding larger ones. These countries have joined the aforementioned Framework Convention with considerable reservations.

This is particularly characteristic of Germany, which only recognises German citizens identifying as Serb, Dutch, Frisian or German Roma as national minorities. The Netherlands recognises only the Frisian minority; Poland does not recognise national minorities whose members are not Polish citizens.

Non-indigenous peoples – particularly immigrants – are affected by this the most. However, there are also millions of citizens in Germany, for example, who were born in these countries, but not recognised as national minorities due to not identifying themselves as any of the four accepted ethnic groups. These are people of Asian and African origin, who are excluded from the Framework Convention.

The situation is not so different in most of the countries that have signed and ratified the Framework Convention without reservations. For example, in the United Kingdom there is one state language (English) and three regional ones- Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish in Northern Ireland. The use of other languages in official business is prohibited, though an interpreter is provided in some cases.

English is the only educational language in the UK, which is justified by the desire to integrate all students and the fact that there are more than 200 ethnic groups; some schools educate students who speak 60 different languages in total. Students can learn their native language as a second language course, or in extra-curricular education⁷. The three regional languages are usually the only ones considered as “minority languages” in this country.

Thus, The United Kingdom lacks national schools with a minority language of education. This includes areas of dense minority populations.

It is apparent today, that governments in most European states are not supporting national-religious development though attempt to impose their model of conduct. In other words, governments provide minorities with their own individual programmes of assimilation, which aim to partly or completely change their identity. So far, most members of unrecognised national minorities accept this programme. For example, approximately

⁷ Ibid.,

75% of Muslims in France identify themselves first as “somewhat” or “fully” French, and then according to their respective religion, ethnic group or country of origin⁸. However, 25% (considered a large figure, percentage wise), do not accept this model. They consider ethnicity, religion or place of origin a more important characteristic, which is particularly common among people of Asian and African origin. Some of them, even as second or third generation immigrants, do not accept the European model; some even incline towards Islamic fundamentalism. Herein lies the most substantial threat as such processes may soon lead to a serious conflict in Europe.

European countries are facing difficulties concerning the integration of immigrants, falling behind and demonstrating their powerlessness, while trying to adopt new repressive laws to decelerate the expansion of extremism. For example, after the shooting at Charlie Hebdo and the departure of European Muslims to fight for the Islamic State, governments of several monitored countries hastily adopted laws which deprived IS fighters of European citizenship and denied them access to various benefits. Such law in its purest form was adopted by the Netherlands⁹; elements of such legislation are contained in that of the United Kingdom (since 2013) and France, although the latter blocked a similar bill on April 2, 2015.

Changes in legislation in the monitored countries in the first half of 2015 also tightened anti-discrimination and anti-terrorism legislation, which sparked criticism in the opposition of many countries, including France, Greece and Italy.

On the other hand, EU policy towards immigrants is fairly contradictory. For example, the UK, Hungary, Italy and France have adopted several laws in recent years, which tightened the procedure of accepting immigrants and their social benefits. In 2014, Germany recognised the Balkan States as safe to stay, which caused many asylum seekers from these countries to be rejected. At the same time, in 2013-14, Germany adopted extensive programmes to accept 20 000 Syrian refugees on humanitarian grounds. The main objective was family reunification. In June 2015, Greece adopted a law that provided citizenship for children who have been born on its soil. This was an important milestone, not only for the 200 000 second-generation immigrants, but also for people who have just moved to Greece¹⁰.

On April 2, 2015, The Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, reduced the number of legal vacancies for migrant workers from 15 to 13 thousand.¹¹ However, only several months earlier, Italy allocated additional funds for the reception of migrants from non-EU states. This measure was adopted in accordance with EU resolution N514/2014 and approved by the Cabinet on April 16, 2015¹². Therefore, the Italian government allocates additional resources to accept migrants, understanding that their influx will only increase, while simultaneously reducing the number of legal vacancies for foreign nationals. Thus, the Italian authorities are facilitating the expansion of an illegal workforce and criminalisation among immigrants.

⁸<http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/the-diversity-of-muslims-in-france-pre-and-post-charlie-hebdo/>

⁹<http://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/actieprogramma-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme/>

¹⁰http://grreporter.info/en/greece_grants_citizenship_100000_children_immigrants/12824

¹¹[www.immigrazione.biz/legge.php?id=795](http://immigrazione.biz/legge.php?id=795)

¹²[www.immigrazione.biz/legge.php?id=789](http://immigrazione.biz/legge.php?id=789)

Non-EU countries subject to this study have also been experiencing problems with the rising migration flow. According to the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), more than 10 million foreign nationals were present in the country by the end of July. Most of them are citizens of former Soviet Republics. More than 25% of them were Ukrainian, 35% were Central Asian and 11% were from the Caucasus. As of May this year, Russia accepted 970 thousand Ukrainian refugees. Of those, circa 500 thousand had the right to temporary asylum or residency¹³.

Russia is taking measures to streamline the immigration process. On the one hand, as of May 2015, Russian authorities rejected entry for 1.35 million foreign nationals who violated the regulations of stay. The registration of foreign nationals has been somewhat improved. Previously, many migrant workers were registering in so-called “rubber flats” – addresses that have no relation to their actual place of residence. Such flats often officially housed hundreds of migrants, who actually lived in other places, or did not have housing at all. Since the adoption of a corresponding law, the number of rubber flats was reduced from 10 090 to 1 160.¹⁴

On the other hand, Russia attempted to ease employment for migrant workers. Since January 2015, those who require an entry visa continue to work on the basis of special quotas. Citizens of states that have visa-free agreements with the Russian Federation have been excluded from these quotas and are required to obtain work permits. Such permits are issued to people who have indicated “work” as their reason of entry at the border. Thus, migrant workers are divided into two categories, which should improve the conditions for citizens of visa-free countries. However, law enforcement practices have essentially nullified these improvements (see below).

The absence of a cohesive anti-discrimination legislation remains a problem for Russia. “Discrimination” as a term is only contained in the Russian Criminal Code and is poorly defined as the violation of a citizen’s rights, freedom and legal interests. However, according to international law, the violation of an individual’s rights and freedom may be one of the objectives or consequences of discrimination, but not its form. In addition, Russian legislation does not specify what constitutes a “violation of rights”, does not identify forms of discrimination, differences between direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation, and does not prohibit discrimination by officials or discrimination based on nationality. A whole range of important legislative documents did not contain the prohibition of discrimination at all. Normative acts that prevent informal discrimination in employment, housing, education, healthcare, and so on, are virtually non-existent.

A difficult situation arose with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Ukraine. According to the UN, the number of IDPs in Ukraine is almost 1.4 million.¹⁵ Among those running from the conflict in the East are Ukrainians, Jews, Roma, Greeks, Russians and members of Caucasian and other peoples¹⁶. Ukraine is committed to reform its asylum system, which is among the conditions for a visa-free regime with Schengen nations. However, these reforms have not been implemented so far. Ukrainian officials claim an

¹³<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49417>

¹⁴As above.

¹⁵ <http://rian.com.ua/society/20150714/370485794.html>

¹⁶ <http://donoda.gov.ua/?args=&cmd=main&iface=Public&lang=ru&sec=01.04>

absence of funds, which they hope to receive from the EU and other international financial organisations.

2. Law enforcement practice

Law enforcement practice is highly dependent on legislative norms concerning minorities and professionalism as well as the personal views of law enforcement officers. An important assessment criterion in this regard is the authorities' ability to establish an effective *infrastructure* to combat discrimination and hate crime. This includes data gathering methods, the implementation of police measures and legal protection. In this regard, countries like Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands have distinguished experience.

The Netherlands has a two-step system that extends to the maximum portion of the population. The Anti-Discrimination Bureau works directly with the locals in 393 municipalities. Any person can appeal to their regional bureau for a consultation or to file a complaint. Each complaint is registered and transferred to the National Association of Anti-Discrimination Bureaus, which works closely with the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights – a quasi-judicial organisation that provides a legal assessment of incidents based on the Equality Act. Officially, NIHR decisions are not compulsory, but courts are obliged to take their assessments into account.

The National Association of Anti-Discrimination Bureaus maintains an anonymous 24-hour discrimination hotline.

Victims of hate crime appeal to the police, who then assemble all of the information into a special department for the Public Prosecutor, who has offices in all 11 regions of the country. The Public Prosecutor then makes the final assessment of the hate crime and incites criminal proceedings. He is usually assisted by the National Centre of Expertise for Discrimination.

Thus, all cases of discrimination are divided into hate crime and common incidents or administrative offences related to discrimination. Every citizen of the Netherlands knows which institution to appeal to (sometimes anonymously), depending on the issue and location. This multi-step system relieves some of the burden from the law enforcement bodies, removing all incidents unrelated to hate crime without violating the rights of citizens, who receive free consultations in the Anti-Discrimination Bureau and can appeal for free expertise in NIHR and protect their rights in the administrative court, knowing and understanding the prospects of their case.

Germany and the UK have extensive experience in combating discrimination and hate crime with the help of non-governmental organisations. NGOs and local councils conduct extensive educational activities among citizens, initiate boycotts of neo-Nazis and right-wing radicals. In fact NGOs in these countries regularly mediate between the government and the public in matters of countering hatred.

For example, in 2012 the UK announced a new anti-hate crime programme called *Challenge It, Report It, Stop It*, which intended to involve the general population in

preventing such crime¹⁷. Also in 2012, the UK launched the *Tell Mama* project, which focused on crimes against Muslims.

However, most countries subject to this report have outdated procedures that fail to identify hate crime from the mass of other offences. Many countries lack a specialised body to investigate discrimination and hate crime; some countries lack such specialisation in the law enforcement system itself. Thus, local police officers have to deal with hate crime as well as regular hooliganism, which often results in the misclassification of hate crime as common crime or even reluctance to report such crime at all.

This issue is particularly acute in Ukraine today. Since 1998 the country has had no official expert body concerned with resolving inter-ethnic relations and hate crime. To incite a hate crime case, premeditated motives must be proven. In addition, Ukraine does not provide relevant police training. As a result, only 26 cases of hate crime have been recorded in Ukraine in 2014 (excluding war crimes committed in Eastern Ukraine during the armed conflict), despite the considerably high level of general xenophobia in society. Italy, Hungary, Greece and Russia face similar problems.

Russia should be mentioned separately, as it is the country that does not have a developed anti-discrimination legislation or an effective system of working with victims and witnesses of discrimination and hate crimes. However, this is compensated for by an effective political infrastructure designed to ensure inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace. This allows for conducting regular monitoring of the situation at the institutional level (religious organisations and national associations). Corresponding departments are present in all levels of government – from Presidential Administration to subjects of the Federation and large municipal organisations. In March 2015, Russia established a Federal Agency on National Affairs, which is designed to prevent attempts to incite racial, national or religious hatred. One of its goals is to establish a state monitoring system of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the country.

Another important criterion of assessing law enforcement practice is their *focus on results* in combating racism and hate crime. The poor attitude of law enforcement officers practically voids the effectiveness of any infrastructure. For example, while the Netherlands has some of the most advanced anti-discrimination systems, out of 1600 discrimination complaints in 2014, its Public Prosecutor agreed to initiate criminal proceedings in only 83 cases¹⁸. This is the lowest figure since 1998. Meanwhile, the level of xenophobia in the country did not decrease: NIHR reports that the Anti-Discrimination Bureau received 9714 complaints in 2014, compared to 6186 in 2013.¹⁹ Law enforcement in the UK²⁰, Germany²¹ and Poland²² have similar problems, despite the latter country demonstrating the highest level of professionalism in combating hate crime. Meanwhile,

¹⁷<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-action-plan-chal-lenge-it-report-it-stop-it>

¹⁸<http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/03/29/aangifte-van-discriminatie-belandt-vaak-niet-bij-om/>

¹⁹<http://www.art1.nl/>

²⁰<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/08/gay-asylum-seekers-humiliation-home-office>; <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/15/police-uphold-just-one-percent-of-public-complaints-of-racism>

²¹<http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/04/28/news/un-urged-to-examine-murders-of-turks-racism-in-germany/>; Human Rights Watch, WORLD REPORT 2015; <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/016/1801629.pdf>

²²http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/HFHR_CERD_84_session_shadow_report.pdf

French courts issued guilty verdicts in only 35 cases related to hate crime in 2014²³ out of 1662 hate crime cases reported that year (1 274 in 2013)²⁴.

Greece and Russia, despite their systemic problems in combating discrimination, were able to significantly reduce the number and severity of hate crimes, as well as the activity of radical nationalists, compared to 2013. This was primarily due to the political will of the government, which took this issue under “manual control”.

Greece is perhaps the clearest example of a country infiltrating a successful policy, and one that had exhibited the highest level of radical nationalism in the social sphere. On previous occasions, politically motivated murder and even terrorist attacks were not considered a sensation in this country; and neo-Nazis actively combined their parliamentary activities with street actions.

During the monitored period, as well as in 2014, Greece had a significant reduction in crime motivated by racial or religious intolerance. There have been no racial murders or political terrorist attacks. Greek neo-Nazis, despite the worsening economic climate, did not increase their political influence. These improvements can be attributed to the modernisation of anti-extremism and anti-racism legislation, as well as the active struggle against hate crime and repressions against the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Party. For example, in August 2014, 78 of its members had been put on trial (including members of its parliamentary faction)²⁵.

Russia also experienced a reduction in crime rate. In 2013, 583 people had been sentenced on charges of hate crime, and 509 in 2014. Russia also has a continuously updated Federal List of Extremist Materials maintained by the Ministry of Justice, which includes physical and digital xenophobic materials. Items listed in the list are removed from sale or blocked from the internet. In 2014, 369 items had been added to the Federal List (2 558 items in total). Inclusion in the list can be appealed in court.

However, it must be noted that the conflict in Ukraine also played a role in the falling hate crime rate in Russia, as local Nationalists shifted their focus to the neighbouring country, joining either side of the conflict. As a result, the levels of violent hate crimes in Russia reduced by 54% in 2014.

The situation in Greece and Russia serves as evidence that political will of the government, which recognised the threat of neo-Nazism and took radical measures to combat hate crime, usually yields favourable results. At the same time, if this result is achieved *solely* through “manual control” of the government, the effect is usually short-term. Sustainable results are achieved only through all of these measures combined: political will, the professionalism of law enforcement officers and a developed infrastructure, based on cooperation and collaboration between the state and civil society.

Effectiveness of the state *migrant and refugee policy* is another factor in assessing the effectiveness of law enforcement practices in terms of combatting discrimination and hate crime.

Analysis of the situation in European countries revealed significant shortcomings in the system concerning the reception of migrants and asylum seekers. Besides poor living

²³ See: "White Papers of Hate", Moscow, 2015.

²⁴ http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/cncdh_-_essentiels_rapport_racisme_2014.pdf

²⁵ [We are not Nazis](#)[Human Rights Watch](#), 2014.

conditions, this particularly concerns the creation of artificial bureaucratic obstacles for new migrants. Note, however, that the majority of countries have fulfilled the recommendations of international organisations regarding the construction of migrant reception centres and the rules of stay in them. On the other hand, almost all of the monitored countries have been suffering from the migrant crisis – experiencing an absence of accommodation space for the continuously increasing number of migrants. The inhumane treatment of migrants is another serious problem, concerning refugees residing in centres and other migrants who often face racism among police officers.

Discrimination of immigrants at work, particularly in terms of wages, has been recorded in Italy, Greece and Russia. However, in many cases this concerns illegal migrant workers.

During the monitored period, Russia faced difficulties in implementing new rules of employment of migrant workers from visa-free countries. According to new regulations, since January 1, 2015, these people can seek employment outside quotas by simply purchasing a work patent (permit). However, the application for such a permit is extremely complicated. Immigrants have only 30 days to gather all of the necessary documents, go through medical examinations, pass exams in the Russian language, culture and law, set up health insurance, provide a legal translation of their passports, fill out necessary forms and then receive the patent. The work patent is about two times more expensive than the previous work permit. Furthermore, the patent is restricted by region – working in other regions leads to deportation.²⁶ For the first time, migrants have to physically collect their work patents. As a result, Moscow offices of the Federal Migration Service were overwhelmed with applicants. People were complaining of massive queues and authorities admitted that some migrants have no time to go through all of the procedures. In March 2015, migrants who received patents in 2014 were allowed to extend them for 12 months²⁷.

In Ukraine, the government is failing to manage the huge quantity of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The official figure (1.4 IDPs) is most likely underestimated. The state can guarantee IDPs only minimal benefits, and even these funds are soon to run out. Experts believe that without external assistance to support refugees, Ukraine is likely to experience a humanitarian disaster very soon²⁸.

To summarise, law enforcement practice in terms of combating discrimination and hate crimes usually suffers as a result of a poor legislative base, an absence of effective state cooperation with the civil society, a lack of professionalism, an absence of political will and a lack of resources to accommodate an unexpected influx of migrants.

3. The role of government and media.

It is no secret that *mass media and communication* play an important role in forming public opinion. A clear example was the portrayal of migrants in European media, which resulted in citizens from countries like Poland and Hungary, naming Arabs as the “least

²⁶<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2709017>

²⁷<http://www.fergananews.com/articles/8480>

²⁸<http://rian.com.ua/society/20150714/370485794.html>

desirable” immigrants in public opinion polls, without even personally having encountered migrants from Arab countries²⁹. The media was also undoubtedly responsible for anti-immigration sentiments in Greece and Italy, as well as homophobic sentiments in Russia³⁰.

In fact, Russia serves as a great example of how the media can facilitate negative perceptions in society. For example, despite the presence of various phobias towards certain ethnic and religious groups (see below), the majority of Russians (86%) have not been the subject of discrimination based on their ethnicity; only 23% claimed to feel “ethnic tensions” in their regions³¹. Thus, the negative attitude of Russians towards members of other ethnic and religious groups has not been due to personal experience,, moreover, it has been due to the portrayal of these groups in the media, or general xenophobic traditions in their circles.

Ukrainian media are currently guilty of regularly publishing materials dehumanising their political opponents, which occurs on both sides of the conflict. As a result, degrading terms have been added to political and everyday vocabularies to describe those who hold different opinions (*vatnik* or *vata-* “wadding”, used to describe pro-Russian Ukrainians; *ukrop* – “dill”, used to describe pro-West Ukrainians).

On the other hand, mass media also plays a substantial role in combatting racism, as is noted in Italy and Russia as well³².

The media is also used to broadcast *positions of the government and other political forces* on the most sensitive issues. Government position is usually defining in not only legislation or law enforcement, but also in forming public opinion. With the exception of political crises and revolutions, the population usually regards the state and its leaders as the legitimate authority in solving the internal issues of their country. Therefore, any statements made by state representatives against racism and discrimination usually facilitate a more tolerant environment, and vice versa.

The position of *members of parliament* and *local officials* is no less important in forming public opinion.

Monitoring revealed that senior officials often recognise the danger of racism and intolerance on ethnic or religious grounds (often making statements against these sentiments), but may sometimes speak against sexual minorities and immigrants. For example, ImreKerényi – The Personal Representative of the Prime Minister of Hungary on Cultural Issues – stated in May 2014 that the world must resist the “gay lobby”³³; meanwhile, The Minister of Order and Civil Protection of Greece, Nikos Dendias, complained about the “low quality of immigrants” in January 2014³⁴.

On the other hand, Right-Wing MPs and members of local governments often make xenophobic statements, trying to concentrate their focus on nationalist and homophobic voters. In this regard, one of the leading oppositional parties in the Netherlands – the

²⁹See: Newcomers from near and far. Immigrants in Poland, CBOS Public Opinion Research Center, May 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_093_15.PDF [accessed: 14 August 2015]; <http://www.finugor.ru/dve-pyatyh-vengrov-protiv-immigrantov>

³⁰<http://fom.ru/TSennosti/12121>; <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114190>

³¹<http://fom.ru/Obraz-zhizni/11876>

³²<http://iltirreno.gelocal.it/pisa/cronaca/2015/05/19/news//la-ragazza-non-va-a-scuola-prima-devono-punirli-1.11452510>

³³<http://www.hir24.hu/vele meny/2014/07/25/felfele-buknak-a-partkatonak/>

³⁴<http://lenta.ru/news/2014/01/30/quality/>

Freedom Party – is most notable. Its leader, Geert Wilders, is infamous for his anti-Muslim statements³⁵. The Hungarian Jobbik Party is also quite notorious, specialising in anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and homophobic sentiments. The same can be said about Greece's Golden Dawn Party and Italy's Lega Nord.

France's National Front underwent an interesting transformation in recent years. Seeking to distance itself from the image of an extremist anti-Semitic Party, its leader Marine Le Pen and other senior Party officials met with members of the European Jewish Parliament, where they made several statements against anti-Semitism. In addition, the Party abandoned its homophobic views and even dismissed some of its more odious members, including its founder - Jean-Marie Le Pen who didn't refuse from Homophobia and anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, The National Front continues to promote anti-Islamic views³⁶.

Members of local governments in France, Italy and several other countries made several blatantly xenophobic actions. For example, it was reported that the Mayor of Béziers (Southern France) introduced a record of Muslim children in order to choose who will be accepted in municipal schools³⁷.

In December 2014, France was shocked when the Mayor of Champlan, Christian Leclerc, rejected a Roma family for burying their child in a municipal cemetery, saying that the cemetery has little places and priority is given to taxpayers, implying that Roma do not pay taxes³⁸. He later apologised and said that his words were taken out of context, however the press accused him of racism and the Prime Minister, Manuel Valls called his remarks "insulting to France"³⁹. On July 9, Borgosesia, the Mayor from Lega Nord, MEP Gianluca Bonanno suggested the introduction of a fine of 500 euros for gays for public displays of affection⁴⁰; on October 31, it was reported that a member of the Motta Visconti City Council, Maxssimila Conti called for the burning of Roma in furnaces in a Facebook post⁴¹.

With the growth of radical nationalist sentiments in society in recent years, mainstream parliamentary parties have been borrowing nationalist slogans from far-right groups in order to attract more voters. This situation is present in Russia, where nationalists and senior officials – including the Mayor of Moscow – have been making remarks against migrants and LGBT⁴².

A more severe situation is in Ukraine, where politicians do not hesitate to appeal to the radical nationalist electorate. For example, on June 3, 2015, Ukrainian MP Vladimir Parasyuk said that gays who come to the LGBT parade in Kiev should be "gathered in a van and sent to the war zone in the southeast", because "they too must protect the Homeland." Another MP, Mikhail Gavriljuk threatened to "castrate gays" and "crush their spines".⁴³

³⁵ <http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2013/10/anti-racism-monitors-report-on-the-netherlands/>

³⁶ <http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-06-26/le-pen-calls-for-action-against-islamic-extremism/>

³⁷ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/french-mayor-attacked-for-counting-schoolchildren-with-muslim-names>

³⁸ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11324730/New-France-Roma-row-as-mayor-refuses-burial-of-baby.html>

³⁹ As above.

⁴⁰ http://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/07/09/news/incorreggibile_buonanno_multe_per_i_baci_gay_in_pubblico-91124136/

⁴¹ http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/politica/14_ottobre_31/per-rom-ci-vorrebbero-forni-bufera-consigliere-comunale-0c21a4bc-611b-11e4-938d-44e9b2056a93.shtml

⁴² <http://www.rg.ru/2014/04/21/sobyanin-site.html>; <https://twitter.com/Rogozin/status/430276874779262977>

⁴³ <http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/905619-Parasjuk-hochet-otpravit--geev-v-ATO--a-Gavriljuk---perebit--hrebet->

Mainstream parties in Hungary, Greece and France have also been noticed using radical rhetoric.

At the same time, leading politicians in countries like Great Britain, Greece and Russia over the past 1.5 years have been actively using anti-xenophobic rhetoric and conducting events to promote tolerance.

4. Radical nationalist groups and parties.

Extreme right groups exist in all countries subject to monitoring. However, in some countries these groups are represented in parliament (The Jobbik Party in Hungary; The Golden Dawn Party in Greece; The Freedom Party in the Netherlands; The National Front in France). It should be noted that a significant influence of the Ukrainian neo-Nazi Party "Freedom" ("Svoboda") exists in local authorities in the western regions of Ukraine. The Jobbik Party also has a strong local position.

Great Britain and Italy have moderate nationalist parties represented in their parliaments (UKIP and Lega Nord, respectively). All of these parties form the opposition in their respective parliaments, relying upon the constantly growing electorate (from 11% in Greece to 25% in France).

Extreme Right parties share several ideas, including anti-immigration, anti-Semitism, anti-Islam and anti-Roma sentiments, as well as Euroscepticism. In Hungary and Ukraine, this is accompanied by attempts to glorify World War Two collaborationists⁴⁴⁴⁵.

Radical nationalists usually successfully combine parliamentary activity with street action. This was particularly true for the Greek Golden Dawn Party, despite the government ceasing all of its state funding and beginning investigating its members.

It is obvious that radical nationalist parties are seeking easy answers to modern issues, but their positions continue to gain appeal among the electorate. Fearing their increased influence, mainstream parties are borrowing extreme right slogans in order to attract conservative nationalists, who sympathise with far-right views, but are wary of change and possible chaos that an extreme right government entails.

Therefore, the absence of radical nationalist parties in parliament does not always indicate lower levels of xenophobia in society. More often, it means that a xenophobic electorate has voted for the party that has more chances of winning, without plunging the country into chaos. Thus, we saw the defeat of Ukraine's Svoboda Party and the Right Sector in recent parliamentary elections. Their slogans, however, were borrowed by the Liberal-Nationalists from other parties that passed through the parliament (excluding the Oppositional Bloc).

As a result, we are observing an objective increase of the radical nationalist electoral base, along with the subjective radicalisation of mainstream parties. This process has been noted in Hungary, where the ruling Fidesz Party is actively borrowing anti-immigrant and homophobic rhetoric from the Jobbik Party. UKIP managed to rally the previously divided nationalist electorate in Great Britain. Nicolas Sarkozy's Party in France has been

⁴⁴ <http://eajc.org/page16/news42633.html>

⁴⁵ <http://www.unian.net/politics/912242-vo-lvove-okolo-polutyisyachi-chelovek-prinyali-uchastie-v-marshe-v-chest-divizii-galichina.html>

successfully borrowing slogans from the National Front, particularly with regards to same-sex marriage⁴⁶. The Law and Justice Party in Poland has been periodically using anti-Islamic and anti-Russian rhetoric. Almost all Russian political parties, including many liberal parties (such as the Yabloko), have been using anti-immigration slogans in 2013-2014, borrowed from Russian nationalist groups.

5. Xenophobia

Xenophobia is the dislike of or hostility towards that which is perceived to be foreign or strange. Its roots often lie in stereotypes that have been entrenched in traditions (religious, family, historical), as well as in modern government policies (legislation, law enforcement) and political ideology towards ethnic, religious and other specific groups of people. If such ideology is absent or unsatisfactory, it is replaced by various movements that influence the opinion of the public.

Xenophobia lies in the motives of all hate crimes. It is present in all monitored countries in various shapes and forms. It is caused by various objective and subjective factors that affect the social environment.

Various sources and reports allowed us to identify 4 of the most common forms of xenophobia, inherent to all of the countries under review:

✓ **Ethnic and religious xenophobia** – the dislike towards members of a certain ethnic or religious group. This form of xenophobia is common in most of the countries under review.

- *Anti-Roma* sentiments are extremely common. Surveys show that the dislike towards Roma, was expressed by 86% of Italians⁴⁷, 70% of Hungarians⁴⁸, 60% of Ukrainians (80% of Ukrainian Roma said that they feel the negative attitude towards them in the country)⁴⁹, 60% of French⁵⁰, 48% of Poles⁵¹, 37% of Brits, 34% of Germans⁵² and 23% of Russians⁵³.

At the same time, despite these figures, the attitude towards Roma in 2015 has improved on average – by 16% in the UK, according to the Pew Research Centre⁵⁴. In Poland, this indicator improved by 19%⁵⁵, and in Russia – by 9%⁵⁶. The situation however, remained the same in Italy and Hungary.

- *Anti-Islamic* views are professed by 61% of citizens in the Netherlands⁵⁷ (a country that has been known as the most tolerant and open society in Europe) and 61% of Italians⁵⁸,

⁴⁶<http://www.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2014/11/17-30145.htm>

⁴⁷<http://www.giornalettismo.com/archives/1484477/litalia-e-uno-dei-paesi-piu-razzisti-deuropa/>

⁴⁸<http://www.finugor.ru/dve-pyatikh-vengrov-protiv-immigrantov>

⁴⁹<http://vchaspik.ua/ukraina/180733v-ukraine-prozhivayut-bolee-200-tys-cygan>

⁵⁰[WE ASK FOR JUSTICE": EUROPE'S FAILURE TO PROTECT ROMA FROM RACIST VIOLENCE. INDEX: EUR 01/007/2014 Amnesty International April 2014](http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eueu01/007/2014/en)

⁵¹See: <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2015/06/Pew-Research-Center-European-Union-Report-FINAL-June-2-20151.pdf>

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³<http://www.levada.ru/26-08-2014/natsionalizm-ksenofobiya-i-migratsiya>

⁵⁴<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/chapter-3-anti-minority-sentiment-not-rising/>

⁵⁵Konflikt między Polakami a Romami w Andrychowie. Będą "patrole obywatelskie" // <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/krakow/konflikt-miedzy-polakami-a-romami-w-andrychowie-beda-patrole-obywatelskie/f93sm>

⁵⁶<http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti>

⁵⁷<http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2015/06/anti-muslim-sentiment-far-higher-than-anti-jewish-prejudice-report-shows/>

56% of Poles⁵⁹, 24% of citizens of France and Germany⁶⁰and 18% of Russians (although, 40% of Russians believe that Islam has played a generally negative role in the world)⁶¹.

In comparison with previous periods, the attitude towards Muslims has improved by 11% in Germany, 8% in the UK⁶² and 5% in Russia⁶³. The situation in other countries remains unchanged.

- *Anti-Semitism* is professed by 69% of Greeks (according to ADL), 28% of Poles, 21% of Italians, 15% of Hungarians⁶⁴, 11% of Dutch⁶⁵, 9% of Germans,⁶⁶ 7% of French and British⁶⁶and 8% of Russians.⁶⁷.

The study did not cover Ukraine in 2014-2015, but research in 2013 revealed that 38% of Ukrainians hold anti-Semitic views to varying degrees⁶⁸.

The level of anti-Semitism remained constant in comparison to 2014 in all countries, except for France, where we observed a small reduction. Pew Research Centre reports that the number of open anti-Semites in this country reduced by 3%⁶⁹. Anti-Semitism in the Netherlands grew by 6% (more than two times)⁷⁰.

Some forms of ethnic or religious xenophobia are specific to certain countries. For example – Russophobia in Poland⁷¹, anti-Pakistani sentiments in Greece and anti-Caucasian sentiments in Russia.

Russia has recently faced a problem with xenophobia towards new religious movements, which are perceived by many as fraudulent schemes aimed at deceiving people for money. New religious movements include spiritual organisations that have been established in the 20th or 21st century, such as Hare Krishna, Jehovah's Witnesses, neo-Paganism, Pentecostalism, and so on, 58% of Russians expressed their dislike towards these religions⁷².

An alarming figure is the 29% of British citizens who identified themselves as racist (2014)⁷³. In France, this figure is 9% (26% are “somewhat racist”)⁷⁴. Despite the overall reduction in xenophobia and small nationalist groups in Russia, nationalism is still regarded positively by twice as many people. In 2009, 9% of Russians were “generally positive” towards nationalism; this year, however, the figure grew to 20%. The majority of “pro-nationalists” are aged 18 to 24. The number of people who have a negative attitude towards

⁵⁸<http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2015/06/Pew-Research-Center-European-Union-Report-FINAL-June-2-20151.pdf>

⁵⁹<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/chapter-3-anti-minority-sentiment-not-rising/>.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹<http://fom.ru/TSennosti/12121>

⁶²<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/chapter-3-anti-minority-sentiment-not-rising/>

⁶³<http://fom.ru/TSennosti/10652>

⁶⁴<http://global100.adl.org/#country/hungary>

⁶⁵<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4674840,00.html>

⁶⁶<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/faith-in-european-project-reviving/eu-report-17/>

⁶⁷<http://www.levada.ru/26-08-2014/natsionalizm-ksenofobiya-i-migratsiya>

⁶⁸<http://global100.adl.org/#country/ukraine>

⁶⁹<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/chapter-3-anti-minority-sentiment-not-rising/>

⁷⁰<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4674840,00.html>

⁷¹See: Attitude towards other nations, CBOS Public Opinion Research Center, January 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_014_15.PDF [accessed: 12 August 2015]

⁷²fom.ru/TSennosti/11418

⁷³<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/27/-sp-racism-on-rise-in-britain>

⁷⁴<http://www.bva.fr;> <http://ru.rfi.fr/frantsiya/20140401-sotsiologii-rasizm-vo-frantsii-perestal-byt-marginalnym>

nationalism decreased by 11% - from 75% in 2009 to 64% in 2015⁷⁵. On the other hand, the Russian analytical agency "Levada Centre" notes that modern youth perceive the term "nationalism" as a synonym to "civil" or "state" (as it is defined in European traditions), rather than as a concept of ethnic inequality⁷⁶.

✓ **Migrantophobia.** This is the most widespread form of xenophobia, recorded in virtually all of the European countries, including those not covered by the present report.

Eurostat reports (18 May 2015) that the dislike of immigrants is most common in Italy – more than 80%. It is followed by Greece and Hungary (72%-78%); France and Germany (65%-71%); Poland and Great Britain (58%-64%) and the Netherlands (54%, which is considered a relatively favourable figure)⁷⁷.

Russia's Levada Centre reports that 68% of Russians are negative towards migrants⁷⁸. Russians seem to be more loyal towards refugees from Ukraine, according to the Public Opinion Foundation. Despite the common view that "migrants are taking locals' jobs", 80% of people in the Russian-Ukrainian border district do not report any changes following the influx of Ukrainian migrants in the area. Residents of the Rostov region are positive towards Ukrainians; conflicts between locals and migrants are extremely rare. At the same time, more than half of the respondents would not provide housing for the refugees and would prefer that they leave after the conflict is over⁷⁹.

Immigration is no longer a priority issue for Russians. The VTsIOM agency reported on February 13 and March 31 2015, that only 1% of respondents considered Russia's migration policy as the most relevant issue in the country⁸⁰. Levada Centre survey (March 16, 2015) showed that only 9% of respondents said that the "influx of migrants" is the "most acute issue" at the moment⁸¹.

With regards to Ukraine, in April 2015 the United Nations reported an increase of xenophobia towards IDPs in the country. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the harassment of refugees from Eastern regions of Ukraine became more common in the country. "Increasingly, there are reports of tensions between migrants and host communities in Ukraine. Monitoring carried out by local non-governmental organisations shows that IDPs have been subjected to hate speech in various regions. In the city of Pavlograd, in the Dnepropetrovsk region, IDPs were accused of many social problems"⁸².

⁷⁵http://www.levada.ru/25-08-2015/loyalnost-rossiyan-k-migrantam-dostigla-rekordnogo-urovnya&sa=U&ved=0CA4QFjADahUKEwji_7Wioe_HAhVBWRoKHX2SA5E&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNEQSFey3Eje4vr-qg0-640Jp3rvDA

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷<http://www.oxeurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/4932007-map-showing-eu-countries-attitude-towards-foreign-immigration>

⁷⁸http://www.levada.ru/25-08-2015/ksenofobiya-i-natsionalizm&sa=U&ved=0CAAsQFjACahUKEwji_7Wioe_HAhVBWRoKHX2SA5E&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNE7wFG916TPIlhqlRtqX9ThbCHNxA

⁷⁹ <http://fom.ru/Mir/12188>

⁸⁰<http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115209>, <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115151>

⁸¹<http://www.levada.ru/16-03-2015/trevozhashchie-problemy-i-pretenzii-k-pravitelstvu>

⁸²<http://rian.com.ua/society/20150421/366476146.html>

✓ **Anti-LGBT.** 65% of Russian respondents are negative towards sexual minorities⁸³ (although this figure is 9% lower than that of 2013). In Poland, this figure is 46%⁸⁴; in Greece – 40%⁸⁵; in the Netherlands – 35%⁸⁶; in France – 22%⁸⁷; in Great Britain – 18%; and in Germany – 11%⁸⁸.

✓ **Xenophobia in sports.** Also known as “sports racism”, this form of xenophobia is characterised by racist abuse and hate speech targeting players and/or fans of a rival team. Stadiums and sports events can become a powerful catalyst for racist and even neo-Nazi sentiments, particularly among the youth. Extreme right parties and groups often use such events to recruit new followers and activists, which is why governments and sports associations have been intensely combatting such manifestations. According to various experts, there is a direct link between the level of xenophobia in a society and the activity of radical sports fans.

In 2014-2015, xenophobic manifestations have been recorded in all monitored countries. Traditionally, the situation in France was more satisfactory, having only one racist incident in February 2015 against Chelsea FC, where French fans shouted racist abuse and blocked the way for black players of the British football club. The incident is currently under investigation⁸⁹.

Only two racist incidents have been recorded in Germany. On August 10, 2014, anti-Semitic language sounded at a football match between Hannover FC and Lazio FC⁹⁰. In May 2015, a group of young neo-Nazi hooligans attacked players of an amateur football team in Neuhausenbergen. The team consisted of asylum seekers living in one of the local camps. Attackers shouted racist slogans and threw bananas at the players. Later, the same group of people attacked and assaulted a player from a refugee team. Police launched a criminal investigation⁹¹.

The largest number of racist incidents occurred in Italian football. Considerable outrage was caused by the President of the Italian Football Association (FIGC) Carlo Tavecchio, who made racist remarks in his speech⁹². He was elected as President despite the investigation launched by FIFA.

Several serious incidents occurred in the Netherlands. In April 2015, a local football team in Utrecht was hosting “Ajax” from Amsterdam – often branded as a “Jewish football club”. In this case, local fans chanted at Ajax FC, “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas” and “My father was in the commandos, my mother was in the SS, and together they burned Jews, because Jews burn the best!”⁹³ Utrecht FC was fined 10 000 euros.

⁸³http://www.levada.ru/15-05-2015/nevidimoe-menshinstvo-k-probleme-gomofobii-v-rossii&sa=U&ved=0CAQFjACahUKEwjo6begwe_HAhVLiRoKHR32Cog&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNE2u3mCiDgbTGbp-G3ZqYlaQtyp_Q

⁸⁴As of 2013: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/>

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶ <http://www.icare.to/news.php?en>

⁸⁷As of 2013: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/>

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹<http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/feb/18/racist-chelsea-fans-push-black-man-paris-metro>

⁹⁰<http://jfda.de/blog/2014/08/10/bei-freundschaftsspiel-massive-antisemitische-hetzparolen/>

⁹¹<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/15/asylum-seekers-face-increasing-violence-in-germany.html>

⁹²http://www.corriere.it/sport/14_luglio_25/gaffe-tavecchio-stranieri-mangiano-banane-poi-subito-a-e498ffd6-1434-11e4-9950-e546b7448c47.shtml

⁹³<http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Dutch-Soccer-fans-boast-Nazi-heritage-at-game-chant-Hamas-Hamas-Jews-to-the-gas-396413>

Information about xenophobia in Polish sports in 2015 is so far unavailable, but local anti-fascist organisations reported around 400 racist incidents in 2013-2015⁹⁴. The report of the Polish Prosecutor General on hate crime in 2014 (published in May2015) showed that of the 1 365 racist incidents, 34 have been committed by radical sports fanatics⁹⁵.

There have been several xenophobic incidents in Russian sports in 2015. On March 15, Torpedo FC fans shouted racist abuse at a Zenit FC player from Brazil⁹⁶. On April 5, Torpedo FC fans displayed Nazi symbols in a game against Arsenal FC in Tula⁹⁷. Some sports commentators have also made xenophobic remarks, something previously unheard of. On June 10, the commentator Alexei Andronov called Shakhter FC trainer M. Lucescu a "dirty gypsy"⁹⁸.

In Ukraine, it was reported on September 15, 2014, that Karpati FC from the city of Lviv, Western Ukraine, was updating their uniform to resemble that of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a WW2-era organisation that collaborated with Nazi Germany and took part in the Jewish genocide in Lviv and Babiy Yar (1941), as well the Volyn Massacre (1943). It was also announced that Karpati FC would use the black-red UPA flag as its symbol⁹⁹. In November, the press liaison officer of the Ukrainian national football team Alexandre Glivinsky spoke in favour of legalising Ukrainian SS Galicia symbols in sports: "If we speak of SS Galicia symbols, those were the Sich Riflemen, not the German SS."¹⁰⁰

In the first half of 2015 in the Ukrainian football has been fixed one xenophobic incident. March 19 during a match of the Kiev football club "Dynamo" with the British "Everton" in the 1/8 finals of the Europa League, Dynamo fans shouted the racist slogans. According to some sources, radical football hooligans were heavily involved in an attack on foreign students in Kharkiv¹⁰¹.

Several acts of racism in sports were recorded in 2014 in Hungary. However, the monitoring indicates a reduction in the number of such manifestations in this country. In the first half of 2015 there were only two such manifestations recorded¹⁰².

Some non-traditional forms of xenophobia can also be seen in some European countries. In particular, the **glorification of Nazi collaborationists**, which is common in Southern and Eastern Europe – countries that in the 1990s began revising their socialist past and the consequences of the Second World War. To an extent, this problem exists in Italy, which was one of the Axis Powers during the war.

Such glorification pursues many or all of the following goals:

1. To strengthen the ideological base of extreme right movements by building historical links and parallels with political regimes of the 1930s-1940s.

⁹⁴See: http://www.nigdywiecjej.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1632&Itemid=13 [accessed: 6 August 2015]

⁹⁵<http://www.pg.gov.pl/aktualnosci-prokuratury-generalnej/prokuratorzy-w-walce-z-rasizmem-i-ksenofobia-raport-za-2014-r.html#.Vdy0SmTmk0> [accessed: 10 August 2015]

⁹⁶<http://rsport.ru/football/20150318/815925308.html>

⁹⁷<http://rsport.ru/football/20150407/821311386.html>

⁹⁸<http://dynamo.kiev.ua/news/208866-aleksej-andronov-a-tsyigan-vse-tot-zhe>

⁹⁹<http://www.rg.ru/2014/09/15/karpati.html>

¹⁰⁰<http://www.politnavigator.net/ss-ne-imeet-otnosheniya-k-fashizmu-press-attashe-sbornoj-ukrainy-po-futbolu.html>

¹⁰¹<http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1434244542>

¹⁰²MLSZ – Pénzbüntetés a Győrnek és a Ferencvárosnak. [MLSZ – Fine for the Győr and the Ferencváros]. 8 April, 2015.

<http://archiv1988tol.mti.hu/Pages/HirSearch.aspx>; PMFC is a football-club from Pécs, a city in South-West Hungary; MLSZ: 500 ezret fizet a PMFC. []. 2 June, 2015. <http://www.bama.hu/baranya/sport/mlsz-500-ezret-fizet-a-pmfc-613997>

2. To establish historical justification for opposing Russia as an heir to the Soviet Union – the main rival of Nazi Germany and its Allies on the Eastern front.
3. To reinforce and justify negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities, who were the targets of collaborationists and pro-Nazi regimes (Russians, Czechs, Serbs, Poles, and so on.)

Those seeking to glorify local collaborationists, who supposedly “actually” fought against Communism and Stalinism, have difficulties explaining the Holocaust, since the collaborationists played an active role in this tragedy. As a result, Holocaust denial becomes a common phenomenon in these circles. While the Catastrophe of European Jewry is recognised, the role of local collaborationists is portrayed as passive victims of the conflict between Nazism and Communism. However, there are also those who completely deny the Holocaust, who whitewash Hitler’s regime and equate it to other totalitarian regimes in history.

It must be mentioned that the countries under review have different approaches to the glorification of Nazism in their policies and legislations. For example, the leader of Italy’s Lega Nord, Matteo Salvini and some of his supporters were charged in May 2015 for greeting their leader with “Roman” greetings and shouting “Duce” upon his arrival in Lecce, Apulia region.¹⁰³. Another incident occurred in Udine, where a local was charged for posting the portrait of Mussolini on Facebook, inviting his friends to “like” the post¹⁰⁴.

Russia had a similar situation. On April 20, a group of neo-Nazi youth organised a party dedicated to Adolf Hitler’s birthday. Police subsequently arrested around 40 people, confiscating weapons and Nazi symbols¹⁰⁵. All participants were brought up on criminal charges, including the one in Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code – “The Rehabilitation of Nazism”, introduced in April 2014.

Several days earlier, on April 1, 2015, it was reported that Donskoye Cemetery in Moscow had a memorial plaque dedicated to the “Fighters of Tyranny” – Officers of the “Vlasov Army”¹⁰⁶ and the SS Gruppenfuhrer Arthur Nebe, who was associated with the death of 46 000 Jews in Belarus (in 1944, he was involved in a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler). The monument also included other members of the Hitler assassination plot (July 20, 1944) and several Soviet intelligence officers. The plaque was removed, following controversy¹⁰⁷.

The situation is different in countries that do not have the legislation to prohibit the glorification of Nazism. For example, followers of Miklos Horthy – the Hungarian dictator and Adolf Hitler’s ally, responsible for the Holocaust in Hungary and the deaths of many other foreign nationals – hold an annual “Honour March” dedicated to the Hungarian Waffen SS Officers who were killed by the Red Army in 1945.

In 2013, a bust of Miklos Horthy was installed on the Freedom Square in Budapest, initiated by the Jobbik Party. The Hungarian authorities try to distance themselves from such events and make no effort to stop them. Furthermore, the government is deliberately

¹⁰³<http://www.direttanews.it/2015/05/18/lecce-salvini-denunciato-per-apologia-di-fascismo>

¹⁰⁴http://www.ilgazzettino.it/nordest/facebook_foto_mussolini_udine_apologia_fascismo/notizie/1407328shmtl

¹⁰⁵<http://ria.ru/incidents/20150421/1060049118.html#ixzz3XyNiBguT>

¹⁰⁶Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov or Wlassow (Russian: Андрéй Андréевич Влáсов) was a Russian Red Army general who collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II. Members of his army were often called “Vlasovs”

¹⁰⁷<http://www.nakanune.ru/news/2015/4/2/22394238/>

avoiding forming an official position on this matter, despite numerous public protests, citing freedom of speech¹⁰⁸

The situation in Ukraine is different. Symbols of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) have been seen above the barricades on Maidan Square in 2013-2014.

On August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day, President Poroshenko mentioned the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War, as heroes of Ukrainian history.¹⁰⁹ Ukrainian television broadcasted documentary and feature films dedicated to Stepan Bandera. On September 25, The President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko said that he considers the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) heroes and role models for modern Ukrainian patriots.

“OUN-UPA is a very important issue and very timely delivered. Previously, it split the country and therefore not given a priority. But today is a very good time. Who is a warrior who defends his country like a UPA soldier? If you paid attention, my inauguration speech and my speech during the State Flag Day mentioned UPA as heroes. This is my position”¹¹⁰.

On October 14, Ukraine made the day of the foundation of the UPA a national holiday – “Day of the Defender of Ukraine”¹¹¹.

The permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, Yuriy Sergeyev publicly justified Ukrainian Nationalists on March 3, 2014, saying that charges presented by the USSR at the Nuremberg Trials were fabricated¹¹².

On May 15, 2015, President Poroshenko signed a Law “On the legal status and commemoration of fighters for Ukraine’s independence in the 20th century”, as part of the “de-communisation” legislation.¹¹³ These “fighters”, criticising those who are now against the law, are OUN-UPA soldiers, who collaborated with the Nazis and took part in the Volyn Massacre, as well as the mass murder of Jews in Lviv and Babi Yar, and soldiers of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1920, headed by S. Petlyura), who also took part in the Jewish massacres¹¹⁴. Another Law – “On condemning Communist and National Socialist totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and prohibiting the propaganda and symbols [of those regimes]” – prohibited the use of Communist and National Socialist symbols, equating the two regimes¹¹⁵.

Thus, Ukraine is the only observed country that has the glorification of Nazi collaborationists and local radical nationalists on a state level, including the President.

There have been cases of Holocaust denial during the monitored period. For example, on February 25, 2015, former attorney Sylvia Stoltz, known for holding pro-Nazi views, was sentenced for denying the Holocaust in Europe¹¹⁶.

Two Polish Holocaust denial websites have been identified during the monitored period¹¹⁷.

¹⁰⁸http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20131104_zsido_szervezetek_tiltakoznak_a_horthy_szaboravato_ellen/fullsite

¹⁰⁹<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRy5mUINl4>

¹¹⁰http://censor.net.ua/video_news/304269/voiny_upa_eto_primer_geroizma_poroshenko_video

¹¹¹<http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/10/14/7040682/>, <http://president.gov.ua/documents/18252.html>

¹¹²<http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3314415-banderovtsy-byly-oklevetany-na-nuirnberhskom-protsesse-predstavytel-ukrayny-pry-oon>

¹¹³<http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/05/15/7068057/?attempt=1>

¹¹⁴<http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/04/9/7064239/>

¹¹⁵<http://ria.ru/world/20150409/1057657585.html>

¹¹⁶<http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.644197#!>

In addition, there was a deliberate understatement of Ukrainian collaborationist involvement in the Holocaust in the *Ukraine During World War 2* textbook published by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory¹¹⁸. The textbook distributed by Ukraine's Ministry of Education states that the mass destruction of the Jewish population began in the first days of the War, but blames all of the atrocities on the German Nazis, not mentioning the active involvement of Ukrainian people (who, in some cases, did not need encouragement from the Nazis)¹¹⁹.

On June 1, Rivne State Commission refused to approve the inscription dedicated to the fallen Jews in Ostrozhets, because the plaque stated that the Nazis murdered Jews with the help of local collaborationists. Members of the Commission argued that it was the Russians who collaborated with the Nazis and voted not to include the inscription at all – saying that they are unwilling to play into the hands of Russian propaganda¹²⁰.

An exhibition in Zolochiv, where 9000 Jews (or 60% of its population) had been murdered, does not mention this massacre at all. Instead, it details the destruction of Ukrainian prisoners in the NKVD in 1941. The plaque on the prison castle states that these Jews were killed by the Nazis.

From late 2014 to May 2015 there were 5 cases of the denial of the Holocaust recorded in Hungary. This was stated by the Jewish "Action and Protection Foundation" (TEV).

6. Hate crimes

Hate crime (also known as bias-motivated crime) is a usually violent, prejudice-motivated crime that occurs when a perpetrator targets a victim because of his or her perceived membership in a certain social group. Examples of such groups include but are not limited to: ethnicity, gender identity, disability, language, nationality, physical appearance, religion, or sexual orientation.

Conducting a comparative analysis of crime rate and detection rate in different countries is extremely challenging, as the accuracy of sources and the availability of data varies depending on the country.

For example, hate crime statistics in Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland and the Netherlands are held to certain standards and are available in the public domain; however, countries like Italy and Greece do not publish such data or do not record hate crime at all. Non-governmental institutions in these countries also do not record accurate hate crime statistics. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs publishes abridged information regarding "extremism-related crime" on its website, providing comparisons to different periods¹²¹. However, it does not distinguish between the different types of hate crime, as well as the proportion of violent hate crime and those individuals targeted. This is

¹¹⁷The address of the website has been disclosed by OtwartaRzeczpospolita – Association against Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia, <http://zglosnienawisc.otwarta.org/incident/610?lang=pl> and <http://zglosnienawisc.otwarta.org/incident/609> [accessed: 12 August 2015]

¹¹⁸ <http://mon.gov.ua/usi-novivni/novini/2015/04/30/ukrayinskij-institut-nacionalnoyi-pam%E2%80%99yatirozrobiv-metodichni-materiali-dlya-vidznachennya-70-iyi-richniczi-peremogi-nad-naczizmom-u-evropi/>

¹¹⁹<http://www.memory.gov.ua/sites/default/files/userupload/broshura Ukr-sait.pdf>

¹²⁰www.lechaim.ru/5816

¹²¹<https://mvd.ru>

supplemented by a range of NGOs. Official statistics in Hungary and Ukraine are clearly inaccurate. All countries that have “closed” or “semi-closed” access to such data are prone to the misclassification of hate crime as everyday crime. Although, such cases are still fairly frequent in countries with open statistics too.

Furthermore, the classification of hate crime also differs depending on the country, as there are no universal standards. Thus, some countries would include crimes based on gender identity, for example, while others would not. Therefore, the results of comparing hate crime levels in different countries are bound to be inaccurate. On many occasions, the countries that provide open access to their hate crime data would display the highest levels of hate crime, whereas the countries that hide these statistics would display better results.

Nevertheless, we identified several classifications of hate crime. These are as follows:

✓ **Hate speech** (the incitement of inter-ethnic or inter-religious enmity or hatred towards a certain group of people). Each country has a different definition for hate speech. Italy, for example, only criminalises hate speech aimed at a “wide audience” and aimed at “changing its behaviour”¹²²; Ukraine, meanwhile, requires “direct intent”.

Nevertheless, even in such wording of the law, there have been several cases of hate speech in Italy. For example, in July 2014, Imam Raudi Abdelbar in San Dona di Piave called for the murder of all Jews for the “prosperity of Muslims”¹²³.

In general, all countries subject to this study have been prone to cases of hate speech during the monitored period.

✓ **Vandalism** or the desecration of religious objects, cemeteries, properties of ethnic or social communities, based on hostilities towards certain ethnic circles.. While there are practically no disparities in the statistics of such crime between different countries, the accuracy of official statistics must be taken into account. Usually, this data can be verified through media reports and non-governmental organisations.

For example, *Germany* surprisingly had the highest recorded figure of vandalism with regard to religious and cultural objects in 2014 (229 cases of xenophobic vandalism). Most targets were objects related to migrants (172 cases), followed by Jewish objects (39 – mostly related to the Gaza conflict), Muslim objects (7), objects related to the victims of the Nazi regime (4), and Christian objects (2). One case of vandalism in each was related to LGBT, Roma, Anti-Fascists, die Linke and Ukrainian Nationalists.

Ukraine is in second place with 53 cases of xenophobic vandalism (46 in 2013). 23 of those were based on anti-Semitism. 16 cases were anti-Christian and 14 cases had other motives. 53 such incidents were also recorded in *Russia* (77 in 2013); 43 in *France* (45 in 2013); followed by *Great Britain, Italy, Hungary, Greece* and *Poland* in that order¹²⁴.

The present report does not include any data of vandalism in the Netherlands in 2014; however, according to various sources, 39% of the 475 mosques in the country have been subjected to vandalism, including arson¹²⁵.

¹²²<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/italy/ITA-CbC-IV-2012-002-ENG.pdf>


¹²³<http://www.sedmitza.ru/text/4964624.html>

¹²⁴ See: "White Papers of Hate", Moscow, 2015.

¹²⁵ <http://www.euro-islam.info/2015/04/26/monitoring-muslim-discrimination-pdf-report/>

Vandalism

Cases of vandalism motivated by hatred in 2014



In the first half of 2015, cases of vandalism continued in all of the monitored countries. France in particular, had attacks on 26 mosques after the Charlie Hebdo incident¹²⁶. However, Muslims were not the only victims. In February 2015 alone, 300 graves had been desecrated in the Sarre Union Jewish cemetery, close to Strasbourg¹²⁷, as well as the Holocaust memorial in Elbeuf, Northern France¹²⁸.

A wave of vandalism against religious objects and cemeteries occurred in Poland in the first half of 2015.¹²⁹

30 cases of xenophobic graffiti and vandalism have been reported in Russia. At the same time, vandalism in the cemeteries has decreased, while the desecration of religious objects constitutes 35% of all of the cases. 5 of them were anti-Muslim, 3 – anti-Semitic and 1 – anti-Christian. Russophobic graffiti and the desecration of military monuments constitute 10% of all of the cases.

11 cases of xenophobic vandalism were reported in Greece between February 24 and June 6, 2015.

20 cases of xenophobic vandalism were officially reported in Ukraine in the first half of this year. Ten incidents were aimed against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), and another ten were anti-Semitic. 21 such incidents were recorded in 2014.

✓ **Hate crime against a person.** This term refers to a broad array of criminal offenses that usually involve bodily harm, the threat of bodily harm, or other actions

¹²⁶<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/firebombs-and-pigs-heads-thrown-into-mosques-as-antimuslim-attacks-increase-after-paris-shootings-9977423.html>

¹²⁷<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/15/hundreds-of-tombs-defaced-in-french-jewish-cemetery>

¹²⁸<http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.643945>

¹²⁹ P. Żytnicki, Akcja przeciwko islamowi w Poznaniu. Okleili meczet, Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 stycznia 2015 r., http://wyborcza.pl/1.75248.17280308.Akcja_przeciwko_islamowi_w_Poznaniu_Okleili_meczet.html [accessed: 7 August 2015]; B. Romanek, Sataniści sprofanowali zabytkowy kościół w Częstochowie, 25 lutego 2015 r., <http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/3763567.satanisci-sprofanowali-zabytkowy-kosciol-w-czestochowie-zdjecia-ave-satan-ten-kosciol-splonie.id.t.html> [accessed: 7 August 2015]; P. Kubiczek, Wandalizm czy antysemityzm? Olkuski kirkut zdewastowany, 7 kwietnia 2015 r., <http://przeglad.olkuski.pl/index.php/artykuly/aktualnosci/11905-wandalizm-czy-antysemityzm-olkuski-kirkut-zdewastowany> [accessed: 7 August 2015]

committed against the will of an individual on the basis of his or her belonging to a certain affiliation. There are no accurate statistics on such type of hate crime in any of the monitored countries. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, there are no universal guidelines that would allow for a uniform identification of such crime.

For example, the British Home Office Statistical Bulletin provides hate crime data for England and Wales, identifying the number of cases where violence was used. According to the report for 2013/14, there have been 44 480 cases of hate crime in these regions of the United Kingdom, of which 30% (13 344) were violent hate crime offences. Furthermore, 34% of all hate crime offences have resulted in the maiming or injury of the victims¹³⁰. However, the police report for Northern Ireland presents only the total figure of hate crime offences, grouped by motives (racism, religious hatred, sectarian incidents, homophobia, transphobia, hatred towards the disabled) – 3 419 incidents combined. The number of violent hate crime cases is not reported¹³¹. This information is also absent in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) in Scotland, which only had 5 388 hate crime cases in 2014/2015¹³². Similar situations occur in the Netherlands and Ukraine.

Italy provides the data at the request of the OSCE, but until now (the middle of October, 2015) it has never been published by this Organization. However, with reference to oral information as voiced by Italian officials in an aside during the OSCE Review meeting on the implementation of the commitments in the human dimension in Warsaw 21.09.-02.10.2015 city), the "Italian experience in preventing and combating hate crimes", which was organized on the 29 September 2015 by the Observatory for Religious Tolerance and Freedom, "Giuseppe Dossetti", together with the Department of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination of the OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as well as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior of Italy, we are able to talk about 596 hate crimes as having occurred in 2014. Of these, 91 offenses had a violent nature.

Greece did not publish such data; however, NGO sources provide some information about racist attacks. According to general information, Greece had 81 hate crime attacks in 2014, which is two times less than in 2013 (166 incidents), which is possibly related to the prosecution of the Golden Dawn Party Activists. Nevertheless, the number of such incidents in 2015 has been increasing once more. Most involved migrants, young people of different appearance and transgender individuals. In the first half of this year, there have been more than 30 attacks based on racism and 60 attacks based on hatred towards the LGBT community.¹³³

Open sources paint the following picture in other countries:

- Germany: 990 violent hate crime offences have been recorded in 2014, compared to 801 in 2013 (23.6% increase). However, the overall number of "politically-motivated offences" had decreased from 17 042 to 17 020¹³⁴. The number of racial-motivated offences increased from 273 to 512 in 2014. Anti-Semiticcrimes decreased from

¹³⁰ http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/home_office_hate_crime_data_201314.pdf

¹³¹ http://www.psni.police.uk/psni_statistical_press_release_2014_15_final.pdf

¹³² <http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/images/HateCrimeinScotland2014-15.pdf>

¹³³ <https://omniatv.com/blog/5466-the-chronicle-of-fascist-violence-2015>

¹³⁴ <http://www.netz-gegen-nazis.de/artikel/verfassungsschutzbericht-2014-zahlen-daten-fakten-10459>


45 to 31 in 2014¹³⁵. Attacks continued in 2015, the majority of those being directed against Muslims and migrants.¹³⁶

- France: 397 violent hate crime offences have been recorded¹³⁷. 241 of these crimes were motivated by anti-Semitism, 55 by Islamophobia, 101 were other motives¹³⁸. The total number of hate crime offences in 2014 was 1 662, with anti-Semitic attacks growing by 101% compared to 2013 (423 in 2013; 851 in 2014; 509 in the first half of 2015 (versus 276 over the same period in 2014 and 195 in 2013)¹³⁹). Attacks motivated by Islamophobia decreased by 41% (133 versus 226) and attacks motivated by racism increased by 8.5% (678 versus 625)¹⁴⁰. The number of violent hate crime incidents in the first half of 2015 was 121, compared to 76 in 2014 and 54 in 2013 over the same period¹⁴¹.

- Russia: 101 violent hate crime offences have been recorded in 2014, compared to 184 in 2013 (54.9% decrease). The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports 1 024 "extremism-related crimes", indicating an increase in such crimes compared to 2013¹⁴². The monitoring recorded 30 attacks in the first half of 2015, with 31 victims¹⁴³. Over the same period in 2014, 77 people have been victims of hate crime; in 2013, 99 victims. The Ministry reports that 830 "extremism-related crimes" have been recorded over the same period (30% increase)¹⁴⁴. Therefore, with the general increase of hate crime incidents in Russia, the number of violent attacks has been gradually reducing over the past three years.

- Poland: 37 violent hate crime incidents have been recorded in 2014, with a total number of 154 hate crime offences¹⁴⁵.

Violent hate crimes



¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶<http://www.dw.com/en/schuster-jewish-institutions-still-need-police-protection/a-18594623>

¹³⁷https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/253859922?access_key=key-OUVFT1Tqs99tluOt2uhY&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll, p.22.

¹³⁸https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/253859922?access_key=key-OUVFT1Tqs99tluOt2uhY&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll,

¹³⁹<http://antisemitism.org.il/article/98176/antis%C3%97Amitisme-en-france-janvier-%25C3%25A0-mai-2015&usg=ALkjRhi6cLHpUvr2yqKVRBaDYyOGMnvyMg>

¹⁴⁰http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/cncdh_-_essentiels_rapport_racisme_2014.pdf

¹⁴¹<http://antisemitism.org.il/article/98176/antis%C3%97Amitisme-en-france-janvier-%25C3%25A0-mai-2015&usg=ALkjRhi6cLHpUvr2yqKVRBaDYyOGMnvyMg>

¹⁴²<https://mvd.ru/folder/101762/item/2994866/>

¹⁴³Not a final figure, as the number of victims was unknown in at least one case – *author's note*


¹⁴⁴<https://mvd.ru/folder/101762/item/6350811/>

¹⁴⁵<http://www.pg.gov.pl/aktualnosci-prokuratury-generalnej/prokuratorzy-w-walce-z-rasizmem-i-ksenofobia-raport-za-2014-r.html#.VdxoXGTtmko> [accessed: 10 August 2015]

Murders motivated by hatred are usually recorded separately. Such cases have been recorded in Germany (2 victims in 2014), Italy (2 victims in 2014)¹⁴⁶, Great Britain (3 victims in 2014)¹⁴⁷, France (18 victims of terrorist attacks in 2015), Russia (35 victims in 2014¹⁴⁸; 6 victims in the first half of 2015, of which 4 were migrants, and 2 homosexual¹⁴⁹), Ukraine (48 victims due to the incident in Odessa on May 2, 2014¹⁵⁰; 3 victims in the first half of 2015¹⁵¹).

The mass murder of 48 people in Odessa (Ukraine) became the largest hate crime in 2014. Besides these deaths, 70 people have been injured. On this day, extremist supporters of the current Kiev Government, including members of the Right Sector and Kharkiv football fans, organised a procession "For Ukrainian Unity" and clashed with the supporters of Federalisation. Activists on both sides were armed with weapons and firearms¹⁵².

The murders motivated by hatred



✓ **Terrorist attacks motivated by hatred.** These include bombings, arson, planned mass murder or other actions aimed at intimidating a certain group of the population and destabilising the situation in the country or threatening as such.

Terrorist attacks in France at the beginning of 2015 have outraged the international community. The country also experienced several attacks in 2014, which fortunately did not result in any victims. These included an attempt made by a radical Islamist to run over

¹⁴⁶<http://www.qcodemag.it/2014/07/06/omicidio-ciro-esposito-fascisti;>
<http://www.internazionale.it/reportage/2014/12/11/come-i-neofascisti-hanno-provato-a-prendere-le-periferie-romane>

¹⁴⁷ <http://islam.ru/news/2014-06-26/11545>; <http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/rhyan-wilson-death-police-accused-7660000>; <http://www.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2014/12/06-30288.htm>

¹⁴⁸ See: "White Papers of Hate", Moscow, 2015.

¹⁴⁹<http://www.mk.ru/incident/2015/03/16/nesovershennoletnie-nacionalisty-zabili-ukrainca-do-smerti-vpervye-vstretivshis-v-realnosti.html>; <http://www.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2015/02/26-30845.htm>; <http://www.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2015/02/26-30843.htm>; <http://www.fontanka.ru/2015/04/27/044/>; <http://www.gazeta.spb.ru/1832290-0/>; <http://rus.ozodi.org/content/beheaded-body-tajik-migrant-transferred-dushanbe-/27010037.html>

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.wsfs.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html>.

¹⁵¹ <https://youtu.be/yAqF2rEu-c0?t=50s>; <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/04/16/7064932/>; http://upogau.org/ru/inform/uaneWS/uaneWS_2223.html

¹⁵²<http://www.wsfs.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html>.

11 people in Nantes on December 22¹⁵³ and the shooting of the synagogue in Paris on December 23¹⁵⁴. The attack on the office of a satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* on January 7, 2015, resulted in 12 deaths. On the following day, a police officer was attacked in a Paris suburb and on January 9 an attack was made on a kosher food store *Hyper Cacher*, which resulted in 4 more deaths. Together, the series of Islamist terrorist attacks in January resulted in the deaths of 17 people. As a result, 26 mosques across France have been attacked with Molotov's Cocktails. 60 anti-Muslim incidents have been recorded in total.¹⁵⁵.

Another serious terrorist attack occurred in Ukraine in 2014, where 48 people died and 70 were injured in a clash at the Odessa House of Trade Unions (see above). On May 28, 2015, a bombing occurred in Kiev's *Roshen* supermarket, owned by the President, Petro Poroshenko. No one was injured. The following day, the Right-Wing Kiev Division posted a [video](#) of a man armed with a baseball bat assuming responsibility for the bombing. The organisation called President Poroshenko a "Jewish Dictator" and called for attacks to be made on "the business of an illegitimate occupier, who destroyed our country"¹⁵⁶.

3 terrorist attacks were recorded in Hungary in 2014. A Roma home in the North-East of Hungary had been attacked by Molotov Cocktails in May.¹⁵⁷ On November 13 and 14, a Jewish school "Lauder Yavne" was under fire in Budapest¹⁵⁸.

3 terrorist attacks were recorded in Northern Ireland in 2014. On March 8, homemade bombs were thrown at the homes of two Romanian families in Derry¹⁵⁹. On March 16, a Polish family living in a Belfast suburb was forced to leave their home after several men threw homemade bombs at the building¹⁶⁰. In March, hooligans attacked the home of a Polish family in Belfast and destroyed their vehicle¹⁶¹.

2 terrorist attacks were recorded in Russia in 2014. On February 9, private security guard and radical neo-Pagan Stepan Komarov, 24, opened fire in a Christian temple in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. 2 people were killed and 7 were injured.¹⁶² On April 21, Chelyabinsk regional Prosecution offices had been set on fire. Swastika and pro-Nazi graffiti appeared on the building¹⁶³. No such incidents have been reported in the first half of 2015.

A terrorist attack was recorded on September 7, 2014, in Italy, when a Molotov Cocktail was thrown into the refugee centre in Mercogliano¹⁶⁴.

¹⁵³<http://cursorinfo.co.il/news/world/2014/12/22/terrorist-vrezalsya-na-avtomobile-v-tolpu-lyudey-na-rinke-v-nante/>

¹⁵⁴<http://www.leparisien.fr/paris-75/paris-une-synagogue-visée-par-un-tir-23-12-2014-4396459.php#xtref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.fr%2F>

¹⁵⁵<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/firebombs-and-pigs-heads-thrown-into-mosques-as-antimuslim-attacks-increase-after-paris-shootings-9977423.html>

¹⁵⁶<http://eajc.org/page16/news51874.html>

¹⁵⁷Human Rights Watch, WORLD REPORT 2015

¹⁵⁸http://index.hu/mindekozben/poszt/2014/11/14/csuzlival_lottek_a_lauderre/

¹⁵⁹<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/migrant-families-in-derry-targeted-in-racist-pipe-bomb-attacks-30077595.html>

¹⁶⁰<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/forced-out-by-racists-rathcoole-family-terrorised-by-petrol-bombs-and-smashedwindows-30100785.html>

¹⁶¹<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/17/racism-northern-ireland-race-related-incidents-reported-daily>

¹⁶²<http://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/10/hramp/>

¹⁶³<http://znak.com/chel/news/2014-04-21/1021497.html>

¹⁶⁴<http://www.orticalab.it/Mercogliano-molotov-contro-il>

Terrorist Attacks (2014 – June 2015)

Nº	Country	Terrorist Attacks	Dead	Injured
1	Ukraine ¹⁶⁵	2	48	70
2	France	9	17	11
3	Russia	2	2	7
4	Hungary	3	-	-
5	N. Ireland (UK)	3	-	-
6	Italy	1	-	-

Ethnic and religious clashes are an important catalyst towards the incidents described above. Such clashes often result in mass large-scale crimes against a person.

For example, on June 6, 2014, six young people aged 15-16 attacked two Roma women in Andrychów, Poland, provoking massive clashes in the city. Roma retaliated by beating up two young Andrychów locals. On June 9, Polish Nationalists attacked Roma homes¹⁶⁶.

In 2014, there have been 10 attempts to turn an everyday conflict into an inter-ethnic clash in Russia. Some attempts have been successful. For example, on January 11, 2014, Russians clashed with Tajiki migrants, which resulted in two Tajiks being injured. 134 people have been detained by police, including 90 minors¹⁶⁷. In May, unrest occurred in the Pushkin area of Moscow, sparked by the murder of a Spartak FC fan by a migrant on May 13¹⁶⁸.

Attempts to incite inter-ethnic clashes have been recorded in France as well. On July 13, 2014, Muslim youth in Paris tried to attack three local synagogues. The Attackers were armed with baseball bats and stolen chairs. Three members of the Jewish community and six police officers have been injured in such clashes¹⁶⁹. On July 20, 2014, Muslim youth were shattering windows and looting Jewish shops in Sarcelles. The Police recommended Jewish locals to stay at home for safety¹⁷⁰.

In Rivne, Ukraine, locals clashed with foreign students on November 11¹⁷¹. On June 11, a massive clash occurred in Kharkiv. Around 40 people, some masked and armed with knives and bats, attacked a group of foreign students near a nightclub.¹⁷² 4 students were injured.¹⁷³

In Italy, around 2000 people protested against the refugee centre in Tor Sapienza, Rome, claiming that migrants were causing an increase in the crime rate. A peaceful protest escalated into an attack on the refugee centre and a subsequent clash with the police and

¹⁶⁵Excluding war crimes – *author's note*

¹⁶⁶<http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1155756,Andrychow-narodowcy-i-pseudokibice-planuja-wielka-antyromska-manifestacje>

¹⁶⁷www.regnum.ru/news/1759083.html

¹⁶⁸<http://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/39768>

¹⁶⁹<HTTP://WWW.NEWSRU.CO.IL/WORLD/14JUL2014/SYNAGOGE456.HTML>, <http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/14/2764806>

¹⁷⁰http://aen.ru/?page=brief&article_id=71169

¹⁷¹<http://www.wsfs.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html>

¹⁷²<http://vesti-ukr.com/harkov/103299-massovoe-izbienie-v-harkove-schitajut-mestju>

¹⁷³<https://twitter.com/itsector/status/609305854366601216>, <http://dozor.kharkov.ua/news/crime/1162987.html>

migrants. 14 people were injured¹⁷⁴. Clashes continued on the following day; one refugee was injured¹⁷⁵.

In Germany, Yazidi Kurds clashed with Muslims in Hamburg and Celle on October 7, 2014. Both sides were armed with knives, bats and brass knuckles. Dozens of people were injured¹⁷⁶.

Conclusion

Xenophobia became an integral part of everyday life in European countries. These sentiments initiated the popularity of extreme-right organisations, leading to the radicalisation of mainstream parties and causing inter-ethnic clashes and hate crime.

Present assessment of the situation identifies several basic trends observed by us during the monitored period:

First, the exponential expansion of radicalism in Ukraine, fuelled by the crisis in the eastern regions of the country. Ukrainian Separatists are prone to anti-Semitism – expressed by the leaders of the self-proclaimed Republics – and homophobia, which was enshrined in their legislation. The Kiev Government meanwhile, is heavily influenced by radical Nationalists, as evidenced by the occurrences in Mukachevo and Kiev in the Summer of 2015. This increased hate crime rate, along with the previously uncommon terrorist attacks in Ukraine is causing many deaths in the country.

Radical Nationalist forces played a significant role in the Ukrainian Revolution in February 2014. Their active involvements in the Maidan protests have painted the social protest against government corruption in nationalist colours. These sentiments of protest and increased popularity of Nationalists as the only force capable of opposing the government have caused several small radical nationalist circles to unite under a single banner of the Right Sector. This party quickly displaced the more “traditional” neo-Nazi Svoboda Party, which preferred to make loud statements and share posts in the interim government.

Understanding that nationalist slogans are becoming more popular, the new political establishment, consisting of opposition leaders and activists and various new parties, started borrowing radical nationalist rhetoric and ideology. As a result, the ideology of Ukrainian Nationalism from the Stepan Bandera period became the official state ideology de facto and de jure.

This ideology is a combination of pro-Western slogans about the “European Choice” and the doctrine of “integral Nationalism”, which was prominent in the 1930s-1940s among the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA).

The new government was hoping to position itself against Russia and attract the “revolutionary masses” to its side. By focusing on the national-conservative electorate, parties adhering to this strategy managed to secure the government. This electorate has distinct anti-Russian sentiment, formed after the events in the Crimea and in South-Eastern

¹⁷⁴<http://www.romatoday.it/cronaca/rivolta-viale-morandi-tor-sapienza.html>

¹⁷⁵http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/11/12/news/tor_sapienza-100372119/

¹⁷⁶<http://lenta.ru/news/2014/10/08/kurds>

Ukraine. It idealized the EU, although increasing fears of lawlessness and repression began to surface with the coming to power of the "Right Sector" or the "Freedom" Party.

The new regime immediately found itself in confrontation with its ideological left-wing opposition, which opposed Ukrainian Nationalism, European integration and the conflict with Russia.

Radical Nationalist forces thus became temporary allies of the new government – the Right Sector Party and several militarised voluntary units, established in 2014 from those who fought against Ukrainian security forces during the Maidan protests.

These forces were used to suppress resistance in the eastern regions of the country. These forces also arranged the massacre in Odessa on May 2, 2014, and the attacks on pro-Russian Activists in other cities. These forces were essentially outside of government control; and soon they started posing a threat to the official Kiev forces themselves. By mid-2015, after losing the elections, but regaining its popularity, the Svoboda Party joined these forces. This had considerably reinforced the extreme right position and their influence over the government and the public. All of these components are bound to make an impact on the overall level of xenophobia and tensions in the country.

As well as the above, it is, the increased radical nationalist activity in the previously more stable countries, such as Germany, Italy, France, the UK and the Netherlands. During the monitored period, all of these countries experienced an expansion in hate crime rates, which was reflected in violent incidents (including murders) on racial and religious grounds, and such previously rare occurrences as inter-ethnic clashes and terrorist attacks.

The growing demand for an extreme right agenda, specifically towards "controlling immigration", is the underlying cause for such manifestations. Immigration, which became a major issue in these countries, became a landmark factor for the whole of the European Union. In 2014-15, Germany had the highest number of crimes against immigrants (172 attacks on immigration-related objects in 2014). Strong anti-immigrant sentiments were the catalysts of anti-Islamic crimes in France and the Netherlands.

It is important to note the influence of radical Islamism on migrants, as well as the radical Nationalists' desire to use the dissatisfaction of locals to their advantage and the government's desire to appeal to more right-wing voters. The influx of migrants from Muslim countries resulted in increased anti-Semitic incidents, which are becoming more intensive as the situation in Palestine and the Middle East deteriorates. Anti-Semitic manifestations are most common in France, which has a large Middle Eastern community. They are less common in Germany, where most migrants hail from Turkey.

On the other hand, crimes against Muslims are also extremely common – particularly the attacks on mosques. In 2013, Great Britain had the majority of such attacks, sparked by the murder of the British soldier Lee Rigby by two Islamists in downtown London. During the monitored period, France and the Netherlands had the majority of such attacks, which were sparked by a series of terrorist threats staged by Al Qaeda in January 2015.

A hostile attitude towards the LGBT community has decreased in all of the monitored countries. To a lesser extent, this occurred in Greece and Eastern Europe.

The Third trend concerns countries where the situation had improved in 2014. During the monitored period, these countries were Greece and Russia.

Greece, which has demonstrated the worst results in terms of radical Nationalism, has considerably improved its standing in 2014. During the monitored period, we noticed a sharp decline in hate crime, with no racially motivated murders or political terrorist attacks. Greek neo-Nazis, despite the financial crisis, did not obtain any more support. These improvements are largely due to new additions to anti-extremism and anti-racism legislation, as well as effective measures against hate crime and repressions against the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Party. However, the first half of 2015 demonstrated an increase in hate crimes – particularly racism and homophobia.

The modern support towards Golden Dawn party has been a stable dimension both in the political arena and that of the society in Greece especially in the areas and islands that receive refugees. Though the leader of the party admitted publicly that the assassination of Paylos Fyssas was committed on purpose by the members of Golden Dawn, its percentages and support have gone higher.

Russia is also actively combating manifestations of hate. The number of violent hate crime incidents in 2014-2015 was two times lower than in previous periods, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs initiated 30% more criminal cases on charges of extremism in 2015 than in 2014. The number of murders was considerably lower in 2015 as well, an area where Russia demonstrated the worst results in terms of manifestations of hate.

The high level of homophobia in Russian society continues to be a significant concern, despite the 9% decrease in 2014, which could indicate a more positive trend.

Migration is not a priority issue in Russia, which is possibly related to the deteriorating economic climate and the resulting decrease in labour immigration. Citizens themselves are currently more concerned with everyday problems.

At the same time, an important factor that contributed to the reduction of xenophobia in Russia was the physical relocation of many active extreme right activists to Ukraine, where they joined the conflict on either side. Local Nationalists became divided based on their stance on the Ukrainian crisis, supporting either the Separatists or the Kiev government. The government played a definite role in the departure of 2'500 Islamic radicals of Russian citizenship to Syria, where they are fighting on the side of ISIS.

At the same time, this is not the main underlying factor in both countries. An absence of an effective government infrastructure to work with the population, a low level of professionalism in law enforcement, an absence of resources to accommodate new refugees, as well as an underdeveloped anti-discrimination legislation (in Russia) remain the main problems. Therefore, positive trends are most likely unsustainable in the long run and depend heavily on the success of the aforementioned reforms.

Hungary and Poland continue to suffer from high levels of xenophobia. The situation is particularly worrying in Hungary, where the radical Nationalist Jobbik Party passed into parliament.